{
  "id": 8602239,
  "name": "STATE v. PAUL MYERS",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Myers",
  "decision_date": "1954-06-04",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "462",
  "last_page": "465",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "240 N.C. 462"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "47 S.E. 2d 697",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "229 N.C. 126",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        12164932
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/229/0126-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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    "char_count": 7476,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.455,
    "pagerank": {
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    "sha256": "08eb2a096a62eb1fa8f42e69e1741989202456c6049bccce04cb069706052ea9",
    "simhash": "1:aeefe4b6b4fdb954",
    "word_count": 1275
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:47:25.593057+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Bobbitt, J., took no part in tbe consideration or decision of this case."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE v. PAUL MYERS."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "BaeNiiill, C. J.\nWhen we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, as we are required to do in determining the merits of an exception to the refusal of the court to sustain a demurrer to the evidence under G.S. 15-173, a mere statement of the essential facts relied on by the State renders the conclusion that defendant received the property listed in the bill of indictment \u201cknowing the same to have been feloniously stolen or taken,\u201d G.S. 14-71, so impelling that it requires no discussion or citation of authority. S. v. Larkin, 229 N.C. 126, 47 S.E. 2d 697; S. v. Collins, ante, p. 128. He received a large quantity of valuable merchandise at a grossly inadequate price; he refused to trade for the property in the presence of a young boy; he received it at night; and he was told that it was \u201chot stuff,\u201d a term commonly understood to mean stolen. He had theretofore inspected a large quantity of merchandise stored in an old barn and later purchased the same for a nominal sum. He accepted, at night, five cases of cigarettes, stored in an old church yard. He took the cigarettes and other merchandise from young boys he had no cause to believe were lawfully engaged in the sale of merchandise in the manner here disclosed. He had theretofore received a large quantity of new merchandise taken from the Colonial Stores while it was piled up at night in his home like so much junk, so that he could not tell what it was or estimate its value. He was told each time from whence it came and that it was stolen. He solicited small radios and TV sets. That he was put on notice that the property was stolen would seem to be beyond debate. Indeed the defendant, in his brief, advances no argument to the contrary.\nBut defendant duly excepted to the evidence tending to show that he received the Colonial Stores property and the TV sets, and that he solicited the delivery of small radios. He did not, however, except to the evidence concerning his offer to purchase TV sets or to the evidence tending to show that he purchased a 17-inch set.\nThese exceptions are brought forward in his brief. He contends that this evidence tending to show that he had committed like offenses at other times was incompetent and highly prejudicial. We are, however, constrained to hold that they are without substantial merit.\nOrdinarily, on a prosecution for a particular crime, evidence tending to show that defendant has committed other distinct, independent, or separate offenses is wholly impertinent and should be excluded. S. v. McClain, ante, p. 171.\nBut this general rule is subject to well-recognized and uniformly applied exceptions. These exceptions are fully discussed in S. v. McClain, supra, and the cases cited. What is there said needs no amplification, and mere repetition would serve no useful purpose. Suffice it to say that the testimony to which these assignments of error are directed was admissible on the question of defendant\u2019s guilty knowledge at the time he received the merchandise described in the bill of indictment.\nIn this connection we note that the trial judge, of his own volition, fully and correctly instructed the jury that it was to consider the same only in the event it found the property described in the bill of indictment was stolen and was thereafter received by defendant, \u201cand then only as it may tend to bear and to throw light on the question as to whether the defendant, in receiving such stolen goods described in the bill of indictment, had guilty knowledge of the fact, that they were stolen goods and received such goods with felonious intent, it being for the jury to determine to what extent, if any, such evidence does bear and throw light on such question.\u201d\nThe other exceptive assignments of error fail to disclose cause for a new trial.\nNo error.\nBobbitt, J., took no part in tbe consideration or decision of this case.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "BaeNiiill, C. J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney-General McMullan, Assistant Attorney-General Moody, and Gerald P. White, Member of Staff, for the State.",
      "P. W. Glidewell for defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE v. PAUL MYERS.\n(Filed 4 June, 1954.)\n1. Receiving Stolen Goods \u00a7 6\u2014\nEvidence of defendant\u2019s guilt of receiving stolen goods with knowledge \u25a0that they had been stolen, held amply sufficient to overrule defendant\u2019s motion for nonsuit. G.S. 14-71.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 29b\u2014\nOrdinarily, on a prosecution for a particular crime, evidence tending to show that defendant has committed other distinct, independent, or separate offenses is wholly impertinent and should be excluded.\n3. Same: Receiving Stolen Goods \u00a7 5\u2014\nIn a prosecution for receiving stolen goods with knowledge that they had been stolen, evidence tending to show that defendant on a previous occasion had accepted stolen merchandise from the same parties under such circumstances that defendant must have known .that the merchandise had \u25a0been stolen, is competent upon the question of defendant\u2019s guilty knowledge upon the occasion specified in the indictment.\nBobbitt, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.\nAppeal by defendant from Bobbitt, J., September Term 1953, Fos-sytii. No error.\nCriminal prosecution under bill of indictment in which, it is charged that defendant did feloniously receive stolen property knowing at the time it was stolen in violation of G-.S. 14-71.\nAbout 1 :00 or 2:00 a.m. on the night of 11 July 1953, J. D. Harrelson, Jimmy Lee Saunders \u2014 an infant of about 17 years of age \u2014 and two other associates broke and entered the Acadia Pharmacy in \"Winston-Salem. They took and carried away a large quantity of merchandise including radios, watches, cameras, cigarette lighters, a cash register, an adding machine, a typewriter, and various other articles described in the bill of indictment. They put the merchandise into a truck and Harrelson and Saunders carried it to defendant\u2019s home. The other two got off the truck at a church in the vicinity of defendant\u2019s home and waited in the church yard where they had theretofore stored other stolen property. Defendant declined to discuss the purchase of the property in the presence of the young boy. Harrelson carried Saunders to the church, and went back to defendant\u2019s home. Defendant then accepted the property and paid Har-relson $152.\nOn or about 15 June, Harrelson and associates broke and entered the Colonial Stores building and stole oyer $4,400 worth of merchandise. They left five cases of cigarettes in the church yard and stored the rest of the merchandise in an old tobacco barn. That night they delivered the cigarettes to defendant. Defendant went to look at the other property, and that night it was delivered to him, piled up in his home in such manner he said he could not tell what it was and could not say what he would give for it. He later paid $250.\nDefendant told Harrelson and associates he would pay $50 each for 21-inch TY sets. He bought from them one 17-inch TY set about 2:00 a.m. one night and paid $25 for it. He also told them \u201che could use a lot of little radios.\u201d\nDefendant was told that the merchandise delivered in June came from the Colonial Stores and that the last came from the Acadia Pharmacy and was \u201chot stuff.\u201d He was also told where the TY set came from.\nDefendant denied that he had ever received any property from the State\u2019s witnesses and otherwise contradicted their testimony.\nThe jury rendered a verdict of guilty as charged in the bill of indictment. The court pronounced judgment on the verdict and defendant appealed.\nAttorney-General McMullan, Assistant Attorney-General Moody, and Gerald P. White, Member of Staff, for the State.\nP. W. Glidewell for defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0462-01",
  "first_page_order": 506,
  "last_page_order": 509
}