{ "id": 8610062, "name": "STATE v. LeROY THOMAS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Thomas", "decision_date": "1955-01-14", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "337", "last_page": "344", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "241 N.C. 337" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "4 Allen, 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Allen", "case_ids": [ 2100571 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/86/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 Mass. 583", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 707256 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/97/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "37 So. 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1916 D 1299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Dall.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 285", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L.R.A.N.S.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 So. 166", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Miss. 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Miss.", "case_ids": [ 1689322 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/miss/92/0613-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 A.L.R. 1134", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 A.L.R. 1131", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 S.E. 2d 773", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8596934 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 S.E. 2d 238", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 N.C. 662", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8616230 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/225/0662-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 S.E. 2d 620", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 N.C. 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8620243 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/227/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 S.E. 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 N.C. 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8615955 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/203/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 S.E. 2d 371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 N.C. 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630091 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/215/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 U.S. 596", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6144835 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/322/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 S.E. 2d 205", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 N.C. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8607556 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/225/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 S.E. 411", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 N.C. 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630822 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/206/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 S.E. 2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 N.C. 390", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8608863 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/233/0390-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 S.E. 2d 11", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 N.C. 713", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8631711 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/215/0713-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 S.E. 603", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 N.C. 659", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630901 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/191/0659-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 N.C. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2090049 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/61/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 S.E. 2d 684", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 N.C. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8618520 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/234/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 S.E. 2d 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8594957 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0085-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 777, "char_count": 19185, "ocr_confidence": 0.449, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.9898663761232614e-07, "percentile": 0.8516322766307997 }, "sha256": "1cc19cf89ebe12d69183b95d1d6f4e36fd2bf918c93ff0241293ecb4d98192ee", "simhash": "1:92d07689c57a0ce9", "word_count": 3399 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:30:40.140494+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE v. LeROY THOMAS." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Parker, J.\nThe defendant has two assignments of error, which pose two questions for decision. One. Was an alleged confession made by the defendant properly admitted in evidence? Two. Should his motion for judgment of nonsuit made at the conclusion of the State\u2019s evidence\u2014 the defendant introduced no evidence \u2014 have been allowed?\nFirst, the Voluntariness of the Defendant\u2019s Confession.\nThurman Jones, a deputy sheriff of Guilford County, testified for the State that he arrested LeRoy Thomas, the defendant, on a warrant charging him with the capital crime of arson, and that he questioned him that same afternoon, while he was fingerprinting him, and immediately afterwards.\nAt this point in Thurman Jones\u2019 testimony counsel for the defendant requested the court \u201cfor a finding of fact as to whether or not any purported conversation was voluntary.\u201d Whereupon, the court sent the jury to their room, and the following testimony was elicited in their absence. Thurman Jones gave testimony tending to show: The defendant was not drunk, and had been in custody only a few minutes. He did not handcuff, or strike or otherwise mistreat the defendant. No one pointed a pistol or weapon at the defendant. He neither promised defendant any reward, nor gave him any inducement to make a statement, nor did anyone in his presence. Neither did he, nor anyone in his presence, make any threats against the defendant. The defendant had been in his presence all the time since he had been in custody. He did not tell the defendant if he confessed, it would go lighter on him, or if he didn\u2019t confess, he could convict him any way. He did not tell the defendant if he confessed he might get 10 years; if not, he might get life or the gas chamber. The only thing he told the defendant was: \u201cThomas, this is a serious charge. You know you couldn\u2019t do that, and get by with it without someone seeing you.\u201d To which the defendant replied: \u201cI know it. When I left the house they turned the car lights on me as I went down the street.\u201d After the fingerprinting was finished, he went into a room and talked to the defendant in the presence of two officers. \u201cWe told him if he told us anything to tell the truth, if he would not tell the truth, not to tell anything at all.\u201d The defendant said he \u201cwanted to tell the truth about it,\u201d and then made a statement. We did not tell him that what he said might be used against him, or that he did not have to talk.\nLeRoy Thomas, the defendant, testified: That he was questioned by two officers, one of whom was Mr. Riley \u2014 Thurman Jones was not one of them \u2014 from 7:30 to 2:30 the Saturday he was arrested. On Sunday evening he was questioned hy one man, who came from Raleigh; so he was told. One of the deputy sheriffs told him something like \u201cIt will be better for you if you confess, and it will be bad on you if you don\u2019t confess. We got you. We got three witnesses see you down there at the house at this time. We can prove you did it. You might as well make a confession.\u201d They did not tell me what would happen to me if I did not confess, hut they were beating on the desk at me. They said: \u201cBe better if you make a confession, and plead guilty to it, you would come out better- \u2014 might get out in 8 or 10 years, and then again you might not make no time.\u201d\nBetty Warren testified for the State that she took down what the defendant said \u2014 not the questions. Three deputy sheriffs were questioning the defendant.\nAt this point the jury was recalled into the courtroom, and the court held that the statement made by the defendant was competent, and admitted it in evidence.\nThe defendant contends that he testified Mr. Riley and-another officer questioned him, and that one of them told him it would be better for him if he confessed; that this evidence was not refuted, though Mr. Riley was in the courtroom and was pointed out by him; and therefore the statement was not voluntary.\nThe substance of Thurman Jones\u2019 testimony was to the effect that the defendant was not told, if he confessed, that it would be better for him, or that the officers used any such words to him as were testified to by the defendant.\nA confession in a criminal action is voluntary in law if, and only if, it was in fact, voluntarily made. S. v. Hamer, 240 N.C. 85, 81 S.E. 2d 193. The Court said in S. v. Marsh, 234 N.C. 101, 66 S.E. 2d 684: \u201cThe competency of a confession is a preliminary question for the trial court, S. v. Andrew, 61 N.C. 205, to be determined in the manner pointed out in S. v. Whitener, 191 N.C. 659, 132 S.E. 603, and the Court\u2019s ruling thereon is not subject to review, if supported by any competent evidence. S. v. Alston, 215 N.C. 713, 3 S.E. 2d 11.\u201d\nThe mere fact that the defendant was in jail under arrest, and was there questioned by several officers does not render his confession incompetent. S. v. Rogers, 233 N.C. 390, 64 S.E. 2d 572; S. v. Stefanoff, 206 N.C. 443, 174 S.E. 411.\nIt is not essential to the competency of the defendant\u2019s confession that the officers should have cautioned him that any statement made by him might be used against him, and should have informed him that he was at liberty to refuse to answer any questions, or to make any statement, and that such refusal could not thereafter be used to- his prejudice. It suffices if the statement were voluntary. The questioning by the officers was not a judicial proceeding. S. v. Lord, 225 N.C. 354, 34 S.E. 2d 205; Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 88 L. Ed. 1481. As to the rule in a judicial proceeding, see S. v. Dixon, 215 N.C. 438, 2 S.E. 2d 371; S. v. Grier, 203 N.C. 586, 166 S.E. 595.\nThe statement to the defendant by the officers that if he told them anything, to tell the truth, did not make the statement incompetent. \u201cThe rule generally approved is, that 'where the prisoner is advised to tell nothing but the truth, or even when what is said to him has no tendency to induce him to make an untrue statement, his confession, in either case, is admissible.\u2019 \u201d S. v. Thompson, 227 N.C. 19, 40 S.E. 2d 620.\nThe record discloses that the trial judge made due preliminary inquiry into the voluntariness of the confession allegedly made by the defendant. After hearing Thurman Jones and Betty \"Warren for the State, and the defendant for himself, the trial judge found that the confession was voluntary, and admitted it in evidence. This ruling cannot be disturbed on this appeal, because it is supported by competent evidence, and no error of law or legal inference appears. S. v. Rogers, supra; S. v. Brooks, 225 N.C. 662, 36 S.E. 2d 238.\nSecond, the Sufficiency of the Evidence.\nThe defendant contends that the State did not introduce any evidence aliunde the defendant\u2019s confession of sufficient probative value to withstand his motion for judgment of nonsuit under the rule set forth in S. v. Cope, 240 N.C. 244, 81 S.E. 2d 773.\nThe general rule is well settled that a naked extra-judicial confession of guilt by a defendant charged with crime, uncorroborated by any other evidence, is not sufficient to sustain a conviction. S. v. Cope, supra; Anno. 127 A.L.R. 1131, where the cases are assembled.\nThe overwhelming weight of authority requires that the evidence corroborating the confession must relate to and tend to establish the corpus delicti. Anno. 127 A.L.R. 1134, where the cases are cited.\nWhitfield, C. J., speaking for the Court in Spears v. State, 92 Miss. 613, 46 So. 166, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 285, said: \u201cThe corpus delicti in a ease of arson consists, not only in the proof of the burning of the house or other thing burnt, but of criminal agency in causing the burning.\u201d A note in 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 285, states: \u201cHowever, in accordance with the rule laid down in Spears v. State, it is now universally recognized by all the courts that the corpus delicti in arson consists of both elements, that is not only the burning, but also the criminal agency causing it.\u201d And on p. 286 of the same note it is said: \u201c. . . it naturally follows that there can be no conviction of arson without satisfactory proof, either by direct or circumstantial evidence, not only that the building was burned, but also that it was burned through some criminal agency, and was not an accidental or other providential cause.\u201d To the same effect see Anno. L.R.A. 1916 D 1299 et seq. Proof of corpus delicti in arson.\nThe corpus delicti may be established by direct or by circumstantial evidence. S. v. Cope, supra; 23 C.J.S., Criminal Law, p. 185.\nIn Davis v. State (Ala.), 37 So. 676, evidence that the prosecutor\u2019s house was burned in his absence, that no dynamite or other explosive substance was in his house when he left it, \u2019 that there were tracks from the house to where a mule had been hitched, and mule tracks from there to where defendant lived, that the mule tracks corresponded with the defendant\u2019s mule, and the finding of tufts of mule\u2019s hair that corresponded with the hair of defendant\u2019s mule, was held sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti to render admissible evidence of defendant\u2019s confession that he set fire to the house.\nIn Com. v. McCann, 97 Mass. 583, the Court said: \u201cThe fact that the barn had been burned was proved by other evidence. There was evidence of the hostility of the defendant towards the occupant of the property destroyed, and of her threats against him within a few hours before the fire. This was not, therefore, a case requiring the judge to instruct the jury whether uncorroborated confessions will warrant a conviction. Commonwealth v. Tarr, 4 Allen, 315.\u201d\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show these facts: The house in which Rufus Chapman and his wife and children lived was owned by Banks Marley. It was destroyed by fire on Saturday night, 3 April, 1954. Rufus Chapman is a brother of the defendant\u2019s wife, Rosa Belle. Their mother and their sister, Thelma Marcus, lived in a house on the same side of the street 15 or 20 feet from the Chapman house. Prior to the night of the fire the defendant and his wife had fallen out, and for a week or two before the fire she had been living with her mother. The Monday before the fire Rosa Belle had moved all the furniture and bedclothes belonging to defendant and her away from the house where they had lived, and stored the bedclothes, including sheets, quilts and blankets, in a closet on the back porch , of the Chapman home. On Thursday night before the fire the defendant and his wife were on the Chapman back porch fussing over the bedclothes. She gave defendant two sheets and two blankets. The defendant was drinking. Chapman asked him to leave. He said he would, but he was coming back.\nOn Thursday before the fire defendant was at Thelma Marcus\u2019 home talking to his wife. He said \u201che was coming down there on Saturday to the house where his wife was between 4:00 and 6 :00 o\u2019clock, and when he left, it wouldn\u2019t be nobody left but him.\u201d\nOn Thursday night before the fire the defendant went to Jesse Cor-bett\u2019s house about 9 :00 p.m. He was about half drunk. He said he had fallen out with his wife. Referring to Rufus Chapman and Rosa Belle he said: \u201cI am going to get even with them people.\u201d\nAbout a week before the fire Rufus Chapman had a warrant issued against the defendant for shooting at him. Chapman took up the warrant, and paid the costs.\nOn the night of the fire Thelma Marcus and George Curry went to the movies. They returned to her home, and about midnight were sitting in a car with the lights out in the space between the house in which she lived and the Chapman house. In 10 or 15 minutes they saw the defendant come from behind the house and between the houses with a bedspread under his arm. When defendant came in front of the car,' they cut the lights on him, and he started running. In about five minutes George Curry left, and Thelma Marcus went in her home. She was fixing her bed, and her mother hollered \u201cMagnolia\u201d (the'defendant\u2019s wife) \u201cyour house is on fire.\u201d Thelma went outside. There were no lights on in the Chapman house. Fire was coming from the closet on the back porch. She called Magnolia. Everyone there seemed asleep. After Thelma broke the glass, Magnolia opened the door, and they took out six children who were asleep inside. It was a wooden house, and burned down fast.\nWhen Rufus Chapman got home his house'was falling in. He saw the defendant sitting on the back of a car in Jesse Corbett\u2019s yard. Jesse Corbett asked the defendant why he burned the house down. Defendant made no reply. Chapman asked him, \u201cwhat you burn up the house for, what you set my children afire for?\u201d The defendant replied he didn\u2019t burn it down. Chapman responded he did, and the defendant jumped\" on him.\nGeorge Curry saw the defendant in the earlier part of the\u2018evening of the fire, and he was drinking.\nAbout a month before this closet caught fire from some hot ashes Chapman\u2019s wife had taken up.\nSaturday night after the fire Jesse Corbett went to the defendant\u2019s house. He was in bed with all his clothes on but his shoes. He was not asleep. Corbett asked him \u201cwhat he burned the house up for?\u201d The defendant looked straight at him, and did not speak. He didn\u2019t deny it. The defendant \u201clooked groggy; he was pretty drunk.\u201d\nThe defendant made the following statement in substance to the officers: That on Saturday night, 3 April, 1954, he went to the Chapman house. There were no lights in the house. He went to the closet on the back porch and got out a spread or quilt. When he started to leave, he decided if he couldn\u2019t have the rest of the stuff, his wife couldn\u2019t have it, so he struck a match, set a quilt on fire, and stayed until it was burning good. He left the burning quilt hanging in the closet. In leaving the car lights were turned on him. He went to his room, stayed a few minutes, and decided to go back to the house. In going back he met his mother-in-law, who cursed him, and accused him of burning up the house, which was then on fire. He then went back to his house. On Sunday he went on Market Street, and asked someone if they had a warrant for him, and that person said he didn\u2019t know. In respect to the fire, he said he thought the children would get out. He said he burned the house down out of meanness.\nThere is this evidence aliunde the defendant\u2019s confession: Immediately before the fire the lights were out in the Chapman house, and the inmates apparently asleep. The defendant and his wife had separated, fussed over their bedclothes, and most of these bedclothes were stored in a closet on the back porch of the Chapman house. About midnight the defendant was seen leaving the back of the houses occupied by Chapman and his wife and mother, with a bedspread under his arm. In 5 or 10 minutes fire was coming from this closet which spread to the house, burning it down. There was evidence of animosity on the part of defendant against Eufus Chapman and his wife. Shortly after the house burned up, Jesse Corbett asked defendant why he burned the house up, and the defendant never denied it.\nIn our opinion, and we so hold, there is evidence aliunde the defendant\u2019s confession that the house occupied by Eufus Chapman burned down, and that the defendant was the criminal agency causing the burning. Therefore, the extra-judicial confession of the defendant is corroborated by other evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction.\nIn the trial below we find\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "Parker, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Harry McMullan, Attorney General; Ralph Moody, Asst. Attorney General; and Charles Q. Powell, Jr., Member of Staff, for the State.", "E. L. Alston, Jr., for Defendant, Appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE v. LeROY THOMAS.\n(Filed 14 January, 1955.)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 33\u2014\nA confession in a criminal action is voluntary in law if, and only if, it was in fact voluntarily made.\n2. Same\u2014\nTlie competency of a confession is a preliminary question for the trial court, and the court\u2019s ruling thereon is not subject to review if supported by any competent evidence.\n3. Same\u2014\nThe mere fact that the defendant was in jail under arrest, and was there questioned by several officers does not render his confession incompetent.\n4. Same\u2014\nIt is not essential to the competency of a confession that the officers should have cautioned the defendant that any statement made by him might be used against him, and should have informed him that his refusal to answer could not thereafter be used to his prejudice.\n5. Same\u2014\nThe fact that officers, while questioning defendant, state that if defendant told them anything, to tell the truth, does not render defendant\u2019s confession incompetent.\n6. Same\u2014\nWhere the trial court duly hears testimony for the state and for the defendant upon the preliminary inquiry as to the voluntariness of the defendant\u2019s alleged confession, the trial court\u2019s finding that the confession was voluntary is conclusive on appeal when supported by competent evidence, and no error of law or legal inference is made to appear.\n7. Criminal Law \u00a7 52a (2)\u2014\nAn extrajudicial confession of guilt made by defendant must be corroborated by other evidence tending to establish the carpus deUcM in order to be sufficient to sustain a conviction.\n8. Arson \u00a7 1\u2014\nIn, order to prove tlxe corpus delicti in a prosecution for arson, the state must show not only the burning of the house or other structure, but also that the burning was caused by criminal means.\n9. Arson \u00a7 7\u2014\nThe corpus delicti may be established by direct or by circumstantial evidence.\n10. Same \u2014 Defendant\u2019s confession and evidence alinnde establishing the corpus delicti held sufficient to be submitted to the jury.\nIn addition t.o defendant\u2019s extrajudicial confession, the State\u2019s evidence tended to show that the defendant and his wife were separated, that the wife had gone to live with her sister and brother-in-law, that she had taken their bedclothing, over which the parties had disputed, and stored them in a closet of the house occupied by her brother-in-law, that there was animosity between the brother-in-law and defendant, that on the night of the fire all the lights were out of the house occupied by the brother-in-law, and the inmates thereof were apparently asleep, that defendant was seen leaving the house about midnight, and that about 5 or 10 minutes thereafter fire was seen coming from the closet, which spread to the house, burning it down. There was also evidence that shortly after the house burned defendant was asked why he had burned it, and that defendant did not deny the accusation. Sold,: The evidence aMunde the confession is sufficient to establish the corpus delicti, and the confession, corroborated by the other evidence, is sufficient to sustain conviction.\nAppeal by defendant from Gwyn, J., July Term, 1954, of Guilford.\nNo error.\nCriminal prosecution upon a bill of indictment charging the defendant LeRoy Thomas with unlawfully, wilfully, feloniously and maliciously attempting to set fire to and burn a dwelling house, the property of Banks Marley, by setting fire to bedclothing in the said dwelling house with the intent and purpose to set fire thereby to the said dwelling house.\nThe defendant pleaded not guilty.\nYerdict: Guilty as charged in the bill of indictment. Judgment: Imprisonment in the State\u2019s Prison.\nDefendant excepted and appealed, assigning error.\nHarry McMullan, Attorney General; Ralph Moody, Asst. Attorney General; and Charles Q. Powell, Jr., Member of Staff, for the State.\nE. L. Alston, Jr., for Defendant, Appellant." }, "file_name": "0337-01", "first_page_order": 375, "last_page_order": 382 }