{
  "id": 8617519,
  "name": "E. MAXWELL AMMONS, SR., and Wife, MARY M. AMMONS, v. THE NORTH AMERICAN ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY",
  "name_abbreviation": "Ammons v. North American Accident Insurance",
  "decision_date": "1957-03-20",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "655",
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  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "E. MAXWELL AMMONS, SR., and Wife, MARY M. AMMONS, v. THE NORTH AMERICAN ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "HiggiNS, J.\nAfter deliberating for some time the jury returned to the courtroom and the following took place:\nCourt: \u201cHave you arrived at a verdict?\u201d\nJuror: \u201cNo, your Honor, we have not. We have returned to ask for further clarification of point one.\u201d\nCourt: \u201cWhat point is that?\u201d\nJuror: \u201cIf I may read it (here juror read the first issue).\u201d\nCourt: \u201cGentlemen, I have tried to instruct you very fully on what \u2018accidental\u2019 means. I will be glad to read that to you again if you again would like to hear it. Our Supreme Court has held as follows: \u2018We regard it as established by the numerous decisions on the subject that in case of accident insurance as expressed in the general terms of this policy,\u2019 (that is, the policy in that particular case, and in that case the word \u2018accident,\u2019 these words were used: \u2018external, violent and accidental means\u2019), \u2018that the word \u201caccident\u201d should receive its ordinary and popular definition as an unusual and unexpected occurrence, one that takes place without the foresight or expectation of the person affected and that in a given case the question is to be determined by reference to the facts as they may affect the holder of the policy, or, rather, the person injured, an event which under the circumstances is unusual and unexpected by the person to whom it happens.\u2019 That is the definition of \u2018accident\u2019 the Supreme Court gave in that case, where the policy was to the effect that where the death had been caused by external, violent and accidental means.\u201d\nIt is obvious from the foregoing that- the jurors were uncertain about the law involved and its application to the /acts in the case. In answer to their request for clarification, the learn >d trial judge quoted from a former opinion of this Court defining th< \u00a1 word \u201caccidental\u201d and the term \u201caccidental means.\u201d The court did not apply the law to the facts, thus leaving the jury to make its own application. \u201cThe courts have been rather meticulous ... in requiring that the law be explained in its connection with the facts in evidence. We feel that the court was inadvertent to this necessity and the fact that perhaps the jury, being laymen, would not be so apt to see the connection between the principles of law laid down and the facts in the case, which so clearly appears to an experienced lawyer or judge.\u201d Smith v. Bus Co., 216 N.C. 22, 3 S.E. 2d 362. \u201cIt is the duty of the court to instruct the jury on all substantial features of the case arising on the evidence, . . . and the court\u2019s failure to do so will be held for error.\u201d (citing cases) \u201cThe statute, G.S. 1-180, makes it incumbent on the trial judge to declare and explain the law arising on the evidence given in the case.\u201d Finch v. Ward, 238 N.C. 290, 77 S.E. 2d 661.\n\u201cImplicit in the meaning of this statute (G.S. 1-180) as interpreted by numerous decisions of this Court is the requirement that the judge must declare and explain the law as it relates to the various aspects of the evidence ... in the case.\u201d Bank v. Phillips, 236 N.C. 470, 73 S.E. 2d 323. \u201cIt is the duty of the court to state the evidence to the extent necessary and to declare and explain the law as it relates to the pertinent aspects of the testimony offered (citing cases) and the duty of the court to declare and explain the law arising on such evidence remains unchanged by the present provisions of G.S. 1-180.\u201d Chambers v. Allen, 233 N.C. 195, 63 S.E. 2d 212; Finch v. Ward, supra.\nThe confusion in the minds of the jurors probably arose with respect to the application of the law to the facts. The evidence was all offered by the plaintiff and was not in dispute. When the court, therefore, charged again as to the law it was its duty to do more than read from the book. It was its duty to apply the law, as given, to the evidence in the case. This the court failed to do. The plaintiffs\u2019 assignment of error No. 1, based on exception No. 1, must be sustained.\n\u201cIt is not our purpose now to suggest what instructions might be given to the jury on the evidence as it may be presented on a new trial, since we are not considering the subject of erroneous instructions, but the absence of sufficient instructions.\u201d Bradshaw v. Warren, 215 N.C. 442, 2 S.E. 2d 375. We deem it not inappropriate, however, to call attention to the distinction this Court has heretofore drawn between insurance policies indemnifying against \u201caccidental bodily injury\u201d as provided by the policy in suit, and bodily injury by \u201caccidental means\u201d as provided in the policy involved in the case from which the court quoted. For the distinction, we refer to Scott v. Insurance Co., 208 N.C. 160, 179 S.E. 434; and Fletcher v. Trust Co., 220 N.C. 148, 16 S.E. 2d 687.\nFor the error indicated, it is ordered that the cause be sent back to the Superior Court of Buncombe County for a\nNew trial.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HiggiNS, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "J. W. Haynes for \u2018plaintiffs, appellants.",
      "Carl W. Greene for defendant, appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "E. MAXWELL AMMONS, SR., and Wife, MARY M. AMMONS, v. THE NORTH AMERICAN ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY.\n(Filed 20 March, 1957.)\n1. Trial \u00a7 31Tj\u2014\nIt is the duty of the trial court to apply the law to all substantial features of the ease arising on the evidence. G.S. 1-180.\n2. Insurance \u00a7 41\u2014\nIn this action on an insurance policy to recover for deatli from accidental bodily injury, the charge of the court, given in response to request by the jury for additional instructions, defining the word \u201caccident\u201d without applying the law to the facts in evidence, held prejudicial.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Clarkson, J., 24 September, 1956 Civil Term, BuNCOmbe Superior Court.\nCivil action to recover insurance benefits under a policy issued by the defendant payable to the plaintiffs in case of death of the insured, E. Maxwell Ammons, Jr., \u201cresulting directly, independently, and exclusively of all other causes from accidental bodily injury effected while this policy is in force.\u201d\nThe evidence disclosed that on 15 April, 1954, at about three o\u2019clock, a.m., the police officers of the City of Asheville, while on patrol, observed a car which passed them and continued on the left-hand side of the street. The officers gave chase and when the car did not obey the stop signal by siren and spotlight, the officers, being unable to overhaul the car, alerted the sheriff and the latter\u2019s deputies picked up and continued the chase at the time the speeding automobile left the city limits. However, the car turned back into the city at a high rate of speed, ran across a number of street intersections, and, in making a turn, crashed. The insured was the lone occupant. He sustained bodily injuries from which he died during the day. No evidence of contraband was found on the car and no violation of the law by the insured was shown other than the speed and reckless driving which occurred after the chase started. The defendant did not offer evidence.\nThe court submitted to the jury the following issue:\n\u201c1. Was the plaintiffs\u2019 intestate E. Maxwell Ammons, Jr.\u2019s death caused by an accident which resulted directly, independently and exclusively of all other causes from accidental bodily injury, as set forth in the policy issued by the defendant, and attached to the complaint, and marked Exhibit \u2018A\u2019?\u201d\nThe parties stipulated that the court should answer the issue as to the amount of recovery in accordance with the jury\u2019s answer to the first issue. The jury' answered the first issue, \u201cNo,\u201d and from the judgment based on the verdict, the plaintiff appealed, assigning as error the further instruction given to the jury at its request.\nJ. W. Haynes for \u2018plaintiffs, appellants.\nCarl W. Greene for defendant, appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0655-01",
  "first_page_order": 693,
  "last_page_order": 696
}
