{ "id": 8625913, "name": "BAXTER HENSLEY, Employee, v. FARMERS FEDERATION COOPERATIVE, Employer; NATION-WIDE INSURANCE COMPANIES, Carrier", "name_abbreviation": "Hensley v. Farmers Federation Cooperative", "decision_date": "1957-05-22", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "274", "last_page": "281", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "246 N.C. 274" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "41 S.E. 2d 592", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "227 N.C. 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8622633 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/227/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 A.L.R. 205", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 S.E. 2d 410", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8600828 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 A. 2d 54", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 S.E. 2d 74", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 S.E. 225", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "3 S.E. 2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 2044073 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sc/190/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 S.W. 2d 257", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 S.W. 2d 589", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 S.W. 2d 590", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 A. 240", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 So. 2d 903", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1962144, 1962157 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/fla/155/0576-01", "/fla/155/0549-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 N.W. 306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 S.E. 2d 113", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8598826 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 S.E. 2d 828", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 N.C. 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8600430 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/232/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 S.E. 2d 398", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 N.C. 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12165320 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/229/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 S.E. 2d 382", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "217 N.C. 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8601834 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/217/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "8 S.E. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "217 N.C. 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8610651 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/217/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 S.E. 2d 96", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 N.C. 314", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624486 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/227/0314-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 S.E. 605", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 N.C. 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8631123 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/214/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 S.E. 664", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 N.C. 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8610581 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/212/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 S.E. 434", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 N.C. 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8597858 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/208/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 S.E. 844", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 N.C. 823", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2221546 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/209/0823-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 S.E. 266", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 N.C. 723", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8619113 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/198/0723-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 S.E. 2d 730", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 N.C. 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8612007 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/226/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 S.E. 2d 298", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "228 N.C. 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626976 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/228/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 S.E. 2d 760", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630523 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 S.E. 2d 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 N.C. 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626215 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/235/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 S.E. 2d 592", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 N.C. 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8622633 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/227/0184-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 918, "char_count": 20544, "ocr_confidence": 0.574, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.61160706595281e-07, "percentile": 0.9813811538819445 }, "sha256": "578e09435fa3d1b501423770580d4e7f89955c56bb2b77a0e8a95a2605454957", "simhash": "1:c0b97adeb76e8c76", "word_count": 3579 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:30:34.544387+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BAXTER HENSLEY, Employee, v. FARMERS FEDERATION COOPERATIVE, Employer; NATION-WIDE INSURANCE COMPANIES, Carrier." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "RodmaN, J.\nThe crucial question presented by the exceptions is: Does the evidence suffice to show that plaintiff, in the course of his employment, sustained a compensable hernia?\nDefendants\u2019 exceptions necessitate a review of the evidence. We do so in conformity with the well-settled rule that findings of fact made by the Commission are, when supported by any evidence, conclusive on appeal. Plaintiff is entitled to urge, in support of the findings, every reasonable inference which can be drawn from the testimony; but when all the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom result in only one conclusion, liability is a question of law subject to review. Thomason v. Cab Co., 235 N.C. 602, 70 S.E. 2d 706; Henry v. Leather Co., 231 N.C. 477, 57 S.E. 2d 760; Perley v. Paving Co., 228 N.C. 479, 46 S.E. 2d 298; Smith v. Paper Co., 226 N.C. 47, 36 S.E. 2d 730.\nIf the Commission in its findings of fact used the words \u201ctwisted,\u201d \u201cnormal,\u201d and \u201ctwist\u201d in the sense that there was something abnormal in plaintiff\u2019s movement when he felt the pain, the finding is not supported by the evidence. We understand the Commission used the words \u201ctwisted\u201d and \u201ctwist\u201d as meaning \u201cturned\u201d and \u201cturn\u201d and the word \u201cnormal\u201d as the equivalent of \u201cusual.\u201d When so understood, they accord with plaintiff\u2019s testimony. He did not use any of the quoted words.\nlie described his work in this manner: \u201cI was dipping chickens in barrels of water, six chickens at a time, pick them up off a table and dipping them in a barrel of water and picking them back up and put them on a scale. I would turn to my left and get the chickens off a table about three feet high. The table was about equal height all the way around. I was standing up, and turned to my left and got six chickens off a table about three feet high. I then turned them around and dipped them and into a barrel of water, to the right. I had to stoop down to do that. The tub was on the floor. I brought them back out of the barrel and placed them on the scales to get weighed. . . . When I got the chickens out of the barrel of water, I turned around and put them on the scales to my right. ... I had been doing that kind of work for the Federation for about two and a half years at that time.\u201d\nWith respect to the moment of injury he said: \u201cI was dipping those chickens in that barrel of water when the pain first started. ... I had come off the table with a basket of chickens to take them and dip them in a barrel of water. I had turned to my left to get the chickens off the table when I first felt it and it was from that on the more I dipped the chickens the worse it got.\u201d On cross-examination he said: \u201cI handled every one of them essentially, exactly alike. I picked them up off the table as I have described, to my left, dipped them in a tub of water straight in front of me. Then I put them on the scales to my right. ... I was doing them the same way on this day that I felt the pain. On the particular one, when I felt the pain, I hadn\u2019t handled it any different from any of the others. I didn\u2019t slip or fall or turn or anything of that sort.\u201d\nThe normal manner of operation at the moment he felt the pain is emphasized by questions asked later in the testimony. \u201cQ Now, I want to be sure I understand. At the time you first experienced this pain, you hadn\u2019t done anything, slipped, twisted, turned or anything, fallen down, or anything different than you had been doing for two years. A No, sir, I hadn\u2019t. Q And the weight you were lifting wasn\u2019t any heavier than the weight you had been lifting for the last two years? A That\u2019s right.\u201d\nDr. Chapman, who treated plaintiff, found the hernia when he first examined him on 3 September. He expressed the opinion that work of the kind and done in the manner described by plaintiff could have caused the hernia.\nA hernia, to be compensable, must, by the express language of our statute, G.S. 97-2, meet five conditions:\n\u201cFirst. That there was an injury resulting in hernia or rupture.\u201d\nInjury is defined as \u201cDamage or hurt done to or suffered by a person or thing.\u201d Webster\u2019s Int. Die.\nThe evidence is sufficient to justify a finding that plaintiff had an injury resulting in hernia. The first requirement is met.\n\u201cSecond. That the hernia or rupture appeared suddenly.\u201d For the purpose of this case it may be conceded that the second requirement is established.\n\u201cThird. That it was accompanied by pain.\u201d Plaintiff so testified. The Commission accepted his testimony. The third requirement is met.\n\u201cFourth. That the hernia or rupture immediately followed an accident.\u201d\nWhere is the evidence to support an affirmative finding to this condition? What is an accident? The mere fact that plaintiff suffered an injury does not establish the fact of accident.\nThe Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act was enacted in 1929. At the Spring Term 1930 the word \u201caccident,\u201d as used in the Act, was defined. Justice Adams said: \u201cThe word \u2018accident,\u2019 as used here, has been defined as an unloolced for and untoward event which is not expected or designed by the person who suffers the injury.\u201d Conrad v. Foundry Company, 198 N.C. 723, 153 S.E. 266.\nThe distinction between and necessity of both injury and accident was emphasized in Slade v. Hosiery Mills, 209 N.C. 823, 184 S.E. 844, decided Spring Term 1936. There an employee, performing his work in the usual and customary manner, got wet and contracted pneumonia. Stacy, C. J., said: \u201cDeath from injury by accident implies a result produced by a fortuitous cause. Scott v. Ins. Co., 208 N.C. 160, 179 S.E. 434. A compensable death, then, is one which results to an employee from an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. There must be an accident followed by an injury by such accident which results in harm to the employee before it is com-pensable under our statute.\u201d\nThe rule enunciated in the Slade case that death or injury sustained as a result of work by the employee in his usual, customary manner and without some fortuitous event is not compensable was reiterated the following year in Neely v. Statesville, 212 N.C. 365, 193 S.E. 664. There a fireman died from a heart attack while engaged in fighting a fire. The Court said: \u201cThe work in which the deceased was engaged was the usual work incident to his employment. The surrounding conditions might be expected at a fire. The falling in of the roof is a natural result of fire burning there. Heat and smoke are expected. Physical exertion is required in handling hose and fire-fighting equipment. The firemen, of necessity, act hurriedly. We find no evidence of an accident.\u201d\nMoore v. Sales Co., 214 N.C. 424, 199 S.E. 605, was decided at the Fall Term 1938. Plaintiff claimed compensation for hernia. He was injured while helping in the lifting of heavy pipes. The Commission found the hernia compensable and awarded compensation. The award was affirmed. The defendants there insisted that compensation was forbidden by the decisions in the Slade and Neely cases, supra. Justice Seawell, responding to this argument, said: \u201cThis could be so only to the extent that the cases were on all-fours. Since the Neely case, supra, and the Slade case, supra, merely applied well-known principles of law to the circumstances peculiar to those cases.\u201d Pie then points to the difference, viz., the injured employee was not accustomed to do that kind and character of heavy work. He said: \u201cIn the case at bar, there is in the foregoing sufficient evidence of the interruption of the routine of work, and the introduction thereby of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences, and these were of such a character as to justify the Industrial Commission in finding that plaintiff\u2019s injury was the result of an accident.\u201d\nA similar result was reached in Gabriel v. Newton, 227 N.C. 314, 42 S.E. 2d 96, where there was unusual and unexpected exertion and straining in the performance of duties, thus producing the heart attack which resulted in death.\nSmith v. Creamery Co., 217 N.C. 468, 8 S.E. 2d 231, was decided in 1940. The Court was again called upon to determine liability in hernia cases. Factually the case came within the rule announced by the Court in Moore v. Sales Co., supra, and hence outside of the rule laid down in the Slade and Neely cases, supra. This was frankly recognized by Justice Seawell, who wrote the opinion. Having announced the fact, he uses language which lends support to the argument that the Court intended to adopt a new rule and hold that injury and accident were equivalent, at least in hernia and similar cases involving bodily infirmities. That the Court did not intend to abandon the rule announced in previous decisions that compensation could not be awarded unless the injury was produced by an accident seems apparent. Buchanan v. Highway Commission, 217 N.C. 173, 7 S.E. 2d 382, was decided shortly prior to Smith v. Creamery Co., supra. There an employee \u201cwhile lifting the scoop in the usual manner without anything unusual happening turned sick and blind and was unable to work for several days . . .\u201d In sustaining the Commission\u2019s finding that there was no injury by accident, Devin, J., said: . . we conclude that this was not an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of plaintiff\u2019s employment, so as to bring the case within the purview of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act.\u201d He cites as authority Neely v. Statesville, supra, and Slade v. Hosiery Mills, supra.\nThe Court was next called upon to consider this question in the case of Edwards v. Publishing Co., 227 N.C. 184, 41 S.E. 2d 592. There the Commission found that the injury was produced by the twisted and unusual position of the body when claimant had to handle the weight. The receiving of the weight in this abnormal position was the fortuitous event or accident which sufficed to meet the terms of the statute. That the Court so understood and that Justice Seawell, who wrote the opinion in the case of Smith v. Creamery Co., so understood, is emphasized by his separate opinion concurring in the result but vigorously dissenting from the reasoning of the Court. In the course of his opinion, he says: \u201cI do not question the right of the Court to overrule or disregard Smith v. Creamery Co., supra, without assigning any reason for it. It cannot be distinguished.\u201d He overlooks the fact he had, in the Smith case, pointed out the very facts which justified the affirmance of the award made by the Commission.\nThe necessity of establishing both accident and injury has been recognized by the Commission; and its awards denying compensation have been affirmed because the evidence demonstrated the death or injury occurred when the work was performed in the customary and usual manner. West v. Dept. of Conservation, 229 N.C. 232, 49 S.E. 2d 398; Johnson v. Cotton Mills, 232 N.C. 321, 59 S.E. 2d 828.\nProcedural defects prevented the correction of another award where the work was done in the usual and customary manner. Beaver v. Paint Co., 240 N.C. 328, 82 S.E. 2d 113.\nWe are aware that the interpretation given to our statute does not harmonize with the interpretation given by a majority of the courts to the compensation statutes of their States. Differing results are in some cases due to varying provisions of the different statutes. Williams v. National Cash Register Co., 262 N.W. 306 (Mich.); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Shepard, 20 So. 2d 903 (Fla.); Beadle v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 193 A. 240 (Md.); Kendrick v. Sheffield Steel Corporation, 166 S.W. 2d 590 (Mo.); Screeton v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 166 S.W. 2d 589 (Mo.), and Higbee v. Fire Brick Co., 191 S.W. 2d 257 (Mo.), are illustrative of cases from other jurisdictions in accord with the conclusions we have reached.\nLayton v. Hammond-Brown-Jennings Co., 3 S.E. 2d 492 (S.C.); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Robinson, 141 S.E. 225 (Va.); Hardware Mut. Casualty Co. v. Sprayberry, 25 S.E. 2d 74 (Ga.); St. John v. U. Piccolo & Co., 25 A. 2d 54 (Conn.) illustrate the opposite view. The difference in viewpoints is noted in the opinion of Justice Parker in Lewter v. Enterprises, Inc., 240 N.C. 399, 82 S.E. 2d 410. The question of what is compensable hernia is considered in the annotations to 98 A.L.R. 205; 58 Am. Jur. 756; Larson Workmen\u2019s Comp., V. 1, sec. 39.70 et seg.\nIf the question was now presented for the first time, we would feel at liberty to give more consideration to the reasoning of the cases which reach conclusions differing from our own, but we are not dealing with a new question. Twenty years and more ago the Court placed its interpretation on the Act. Except for the dicta to be found in the opinion by Justice Seawell in the case of Smith v. Creamery Co., the language used as well as the conclusions reached have supported the interpretation that injury and accident are separate and that there must be an accident which produces the injury before the employee can be awarded compensation.\nThe legislative history strengthens the view here expressed as to the meaning of the word \u201caccident\u201d as used in the original Act. In 1935, when the Act was amended to provide compensation for occupational diseases, no change was made in the provisions relating to hernia. But it was expressly provided: \u201cThe word \u2018accident,\u2019 as used in the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, shall not be construed to mean a series of events in employment, of a similar or like nature, occurring regularly, continuously or at frequent intervals in the course of such employment, over extended periods of time, whether such events may or may not be attributable to fault of the employer . . .\u201d G.S. 97-52.\nThe interpretation so consistently given to the statute is as much a part of the statute as if expressly written in it. We have no right to change or ignore it. If it is to be changed, it must be done by the Legislature, the law-making power. If, in its wisdom, a change is desirable, it can readily do so.\nThere was evidence to justify the finding that plaintiff had not suffered from hernia prior to 26 August 1955. The fifth requirement is met.\nSince there is no evidence to support the finding that plaintiff\u2019s hernia or rupture immediately followed an accident, the award lacks the requisite fourth pillar for its support.\nThe judgment is\nReversed.", "type": "majority", "author": "RodmaN, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Williams & Williams for defendant appellants.", "No counsel contra." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BAXTER HENSLEY, Employee, v. FARMERS FEDERATION COOPERATIVE, Employer; NATION-WIDE INSURANCE COMPANIES, Carrier.\n(Filed 22 May, 1957.)\n1. Master and Servant \u00a7 55d\u2014\nWhile the findings of fact of the Industrial Commission are conclusive on appeal when supported by any evidence, and claimant is entitled to every reasonable inference which can be drawn from the testimony, when all the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom result in only one conclusion, liability is a question of law subject to review.\n3. Same\u2014\nThe evidence tended to show that claimant, in the course of his employment, was required to turn to his left, pick up a loaded tray, bend over and place the tray in a drum of hot water in front of him, and then place the tray on scales to his right. The findings were to the effect that claimant\u2019s duties required him to \u201ctwist\u201d to his left, return to the \"normal\u201d position facing straight ahead, bend over and dip the basket, then straighten up to a \u201cnormal\u201d standing position and then \u201ctwist\u201d to his right . . . Held,: The findings are in accord with the testimony when the word \u201ctwist\u201d is construed as \u201cturn,\u201d and the word \u201cnormal\u201d is construed as \u201cusual.\u201d\nS. Master and Servant \u00a7 40g\u2014\nIn order for a hernia to be compensable under the Compensation Act it is required that there be an injury resulting in hernia or rupture, that it appear suddenly, that it be accompanied by pain, and that it immediately follow an accident.\n4. Master and Servant \u00a7 40b\u2014\nThe mere fact that an employee suffers an injury does not establish the fact of accident, and it is required by the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act that an injury, in order to be compensable, result from an accident, which is an unlooked for and untoward event which is not expected or designed by the person who suffers the injury.\n5. Master and Servant \u00a7 40g\u2014\nThe evidence disclosed that claimant in performing his duties in lifting a loaded basket from his left, bending down and placing it in hot water in front of him and then placing it on scales to his right, suddenly suffered a hernia accompanied by pain. The evidence further tended to show that the hernia occurred while the employee was performing his work in the customary and usual manner, and there was no evidence of any unusual condition or any slipping or falling by the employee. Held: There was no evidence to justify a finding that the hernia resulted from an accident, and an award of compensation must be reversed.\nC. Constitutional Law \u00a7 10c\u2014\nIt is the duty of the courts to declare the law as written and to give to statutes the same interpretation theretofore given in former decisions, the duty to make the law being the exclusive province of the General Assembly.\nAppeal by defendants from Sink, E. J., September \u201cA\u201d 1956 Civil Term of BuNcombe.\nPlaintiff claims compensation and surgical expenses for hernia as provided by the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, G.S. 97-2. At the time of his injury he had been employed by defendant Farmers Federation for a period of two and one-half years to \u201cturn chickens.\u201d The Commission, after a hearing, found: \u201c1. . . . his duties required him to work in a standing position; that he turned and twisted to his left and using both hands picked up a wire basket containing six chickens weighing 26% to 48 pounds from a table approximately three feet high; that after claimant picked up the basket of chickens he would then return to the normal position facing straight ahead, bend over, and dip the basket of chickens in a 30-gallon oil drum containing hot water; that claimant would then straighten up to a normal standing position and would then turn and twist to his right and place the basket of chickens on a scale approximately 3 feet from the ground.\n\u201c2. That at 5:00 P.M. on August 26, 1955, while working for defendant employer and while performing the operation above described, claimant turned and twisted to his left and picked up a wire basket containing six chickens weighing 26% to 48 pounds from the table; that as claimant lifted the chickens, he felt a pain in his left side; that he immediately reported the occurrence to his supervisor, Gordon Barn-well, and told Barnwell that he could not do any more lifting and would have to quit and go home.\u201d\nPlaintiff was not scheduled to work on Saturday, 27 August, or Sunday, 28 August. He returned to work on Monday morning, 29 August, and worked that day and 30 August. On the morning of 31 August he first noticed that he had a bulge or protrusion on his left side. He reported that morning to his employer and was directed to see a doctor. He continued with his work on 1 and 2 September. On 3 September he saw a surgeon who informed him he was suffering with a hernia. The surgeon, not understanding the nature of plaintiff\u2019s work, directed him to continue with his work until 10 September. He did so notwithstanding the pain he suffered. He was hospitalized on 12 September for herniorrhaphy. He returned to work 24 October 1955.\nThe Commission further found: \u201c4. That as above described, claimant had an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant employer resulting in a left inguinal hernia.\n\u201c5. That the hernia or rupture appeared suddenly, was accompanied by pain, immediately followed an accident, and did not exist prior to August 26, 1955.\u201d\nBased on its findings of fact, the Commission, citing Edwards v. Publishing Co., 227 N.C. 184, 41 S.E. 2d 592, concluded as a matter of law that plaintiff had sustained an injury by accident, that the resulting hernia met the statutory requirements, and made an award for compensation and surgical expenses.\nDefendants excepted to the use of the words \u201ctwisted,\u201d \u201cnormal,\u201d and \u201ctwist\u201d in the findings; to the finding that plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and to the finding that the hernia immediately followed an accident. Appropriate exceptions were noted to the conclusions of law; an appeal was taken from the award made by the Commission to the Superior Court. Defendants\u2019 exceptions were overruled and judgment was entered affirming the award. Defendants, preserving the exceptions taken, 'appealed.\nWilliams & Williams for defendant appellants.\nNo counsel contra." }, "file_name": "0274-01", "first_page_order": 324, "last_page_order": 331 }