{ "id": 8618878, "name": "MRS. LOU BELLE DAVIS (Employee) v. DEVIL DOG MANUFACTURING COMPANY (Employer); and NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY (Carrier.)", "name_abbreviation": "Davis v. Devil Dog Manufacturing Co.", "decision_date": "1959-02-25", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "543", "last_page": "549", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "249 N.C. 543" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "95 S.E. 2d 521", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 N.C. 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8607109 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/245/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 S.E. 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "205 N.C. 739", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8631149 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/205/0739-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 S.E. 165", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 N.C. 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625723 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/207/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 S.E. 2d 862", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "246 N.C. 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627497 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/246/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 N.E. 2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 Mass. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 927321 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/317/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 Okla. 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Okla.", "case_ids": [ 8892341 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/okla/194/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 N.E. 2d 607", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ohio App. 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio App.", "case_ids": [ 1377341 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-app/74/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 A. 2d 194", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 N.J. Misc. 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Misc.", "case_ids": [ 456027 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-misc/19/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 A. 2d 327", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 N.J. Super. 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 410053 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/26/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Kan. 434", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan.", "case_ids": [ 25272 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan/181/0434-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 S.E. 2d 516", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ga. App. 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga. App.", "case_ids": [ 1547452 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/81/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 S.E. 2d 214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ga. App. 622", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga. App.", "case_ids": [ 1576911 ], "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/95/0622-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 A. 2d 896", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 Conn. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn.", "case_ids": [ 1591793 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/conn/141/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 A.L.R. 1394", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 N.E. 2d 341", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 Mass. 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 929839 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/318/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 A.L.R. 1395", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 768, "char_count": 16824, "ocr_confidence": 0.484, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0507895154020584e-07, "percentile": 0.7553311023152315 }, "sha256": "21bf60309f6da431fa83f47a24eaf01085cfe74709e2a1f940bb874af9fb4abd", "simhash": "1:07708cf930fa085e", "word_count": 2929 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:25:15.863799+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MRS. LOU BELLE DAVIS (Employee) v. DEVIL DOG MANUFACTURING COMPANY (Employer); and NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY (Carrier.)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PARKER, J.\nThe defendants\u2019 brief states \u201cthere is no' dispute as to the facts,\u201d and the sole question for decision is \u201cdid the accident which plaintiff (claimant) sustained arise out of and in the course of her employment?\u201d\n\u201cWhere a parking lot constitutes a part of an employer\u2019s premises, or is provided by him, and an injury is sustained by an employee in a fall, or otherwise, while in such lot or while passing between it and his working place, or area, such injury has been held, in some circumstances and by some authorities, to arise out of, or in the course of, the employment, notwithstanding the employer was not obliged by the contract of employment to furnish a parking lot, and the employee was not obliged to come to work in /an automobile. However, the contrary view has also been taken. . . .\u201d 99 C.J.S., Workmen\u2019s Compensation, \u00a7234, f, Parking Lots. For substantially similar statements see 58 Am. Jur., Workmen\u2019s Compensation, p. 725; and Annotation 159 A.L.R. 1395 et seq.\nIn Larson\u2019s The Law of Workmen\u2019s Compensation, Vol. I, pp. 199-200, it is written: \u201cOne category in which compensation is almost always awarded is that in which the employee travels along or across a public road between two portions of his employer\u2019s premises, whether going and coming, or pursuing his active duties. Parking lot oases are an increasingly common example in this category. It is usually held that -an injury on a parking lot 'Owned or maintained by the employer for his employees is an injury on the employer\u2019s premises.\u201d\nThe facts in the instant ease iare nearly on all fours with the facts in John Rogers\u2019s Case, 318 Mass. 308, 61 N.E. 2d 341, 159 A.L.R. 1394. The Massachusetts statute, Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, Yol. 4-B, Ch. 152, Workmen\u2019s Compensation, \u00a726, provides \u201cif an employee . . . \u00a1receives a personal injury arising out of 'and in the course of his employment, or arising out of an 'ordinary risk of the street while actually engaged, with -his employer\u2019s authorization, in the business affairs or undertakings of 'his employer . ..., he shall be paid compensation. ...\u201d This statute also provides for compensation to an employee while using >a motor vehicle \u201cin the performance of work in connection with the business affairs or undertakings of his employer.\u201d The crucial findings of facts of that case were these: \u201cThe employee worked in a hat factory. He was 'accustomed to come to work in an automobile of a fellow employee which would be parked in a \u2018parking lot\u2019 owned and \u2018furnished\u2019 by the employer where the employer permitted its employees to park. At the time of the injury the automobile was parked as usual in the \u2018parking lot.\u2019 The employee left it to go to work, and while still on the lot and \u2018going down an incline,\u2019 he fell and broke an ankle. \u2018It was no part of the duty of the employee to use an .automobile to reach his work.\u2019 The furnishing of the \u2018parking lot\u2019 was \u2018no part of the contract of employment.\u2019 Although the board did not expressly find that this lot was opposite the employer\u2019s factory, the uncontradicted evidence both of the employee and of the insurer was to that effect, and that fact seems- to have been assumed. It was necessary, however, to walk a short distance down the -street to the plant entrance.\u201d The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court said: \u201cThese facts require as matter of law >a decree for the employee. Although the employee was not obliged to come to work in -an automobile, 'and the 'employer was not obliged by contract to furnish the \u2018parking lot,\u2019 yet it is plain that it did furnish the lot as an incident of the employment, and that the employee, while actually -on his employer\u2019s premises and on his way to the place where his day\u2019s work was to be performed by a route which he was permitted and expected to take, fell and was injured. .It is of no consequence that a street intervened between the part of the employer\u2019s premises where the employee fell and the part where he was to work. The \u2018parking lot\u2019 was used -as an adjunct to the factory. The ca-se stands just as it would if the automobile had been parked on the same lot on which the factory building stood and the employee had fallen while walking from the automobile to the factory door. The injury arose out of and in the course of the employment.\u201d While our statute does not contain all the provisions of the Massachusetts statute, it has a similar provision that a compensable injury means \u201conly injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment,\u201d G.S. 97-2 (f), and the decision seems to be based on a provision in the Massachusetts statute similar to our statute.\nIn Hughes v. American Brass Co. 141 Conn. 231, 104 A. 2d 896, the defendant maintained a parking lot near its casting shop for the convenience of its employees. The officials of the defendant knew that it was the custom of its employees to park -their -cars in the parking lot, and had consented to it, and acquiesced in it for about 25 years prior to December 1952. On 4 December 1952 claimant drove his car to the parking lot, parked it there, walked 10 or 15 paces toward the gatehouse on the bridge to report for work, slipped and fell on a slippery patch of snow or ice and was injured. The Connecticut statute, General Statutes of Connecticut, Revision of 1958, Vol. VI, Ch. 566, Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, \u00a7 31-139, provides, \u201c \u2018Arising out of and in the course of his employment\u2019 means an accidental injury happening to an employee . . . originating while he has been engaged in the line of his duty in the business or 'affairs of the employer upon the employer\u2019s premises. ... A personal injury shall not be deemed to arise out of the employment unless causally traceable to the employment other than through weakened resistance or lowered vitality.\u201d The Court said in finding no error in a judgment of the Superior Court sustaining a finding and award of compensation for his injury to claimant: \u201cUpon the facts found, it is clear that the accident resulting in the plaintiff\u2019s injury, which thus occurred in the course of his employment, was a natural and necessary incident or consequence of the employment, or of the conditions under which it was carried on, though not foreseen or expected. The essential causal connection appears, therefore, to support the further conclusion that -the accidental injury arose out of the employment. And where, as here, benefit to the employer was involved, this is so even though the particular act of the plaintiff was merely permitted rather than required.\u201d\nFederal Insurance Company v. Coram, 95 Ga. App. 622, 98 S.E. 2d 214 (1957), was a proceeding under Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act to recover compensation for disability due to injury sustained by nurse\u2019s aid, while walking to parking lot on employer\u2019s premises en route to her home after completing her day\u2019s work. The employer, John D. Archbold Memorial Hospital, furnished the parking lot for the convenience of its patients, visitors and employees. The injured employee had the right and privilege to park her car in said parking lot but was not required to do so. The employer did not furnish her transportation. The Court affirmed a judgment of the Superior Court affirming the full board\u2019s award of compensation, and said: \u201cThe finding that the accident arose out of and in the course of employment was authorized. The parking facilities were furnished by the employer for the use of the claimant employee and were furnished as an incident of employment. Where an employer furnishes an employee parking facilities on the employer\u2019s premises, it is, of course, necessary for the employee, before he can commence his actual employment duties, to park his automobile and walk from that portion of the employer\u2019s premises to that other portion of the premises where he performs his actual employment duties. We think this situation is \u2018analogous to one where the employee first reports tonne part of the employer\u2019s premises for instructions, assignment, clock punching, drawing tools, etc., and then must proceed to another portion of the premises to begin his actual duties. See Employers Ins. Co. of Alabama v. Bass, 81 Ga. App. 306, 58 S.E. 2d 516. The \u2018rest period\u2019 and \u2018lunch hour\u2019 cases are not applicable here. The reasoning behind such cases is that during a rest period or lunch hour, an employee is spending such time for his personal benefit and pleasure. In the instant case it cannot be said that in proceeding from that portion of the premises where she parked, to her immediate work area and in returning therefrom, the claimant was on a purely personal mission. We think that going to and from the parking lot in order to reach and leave her immediate working area was a necessary incident to the claimant\u2019s employment.\u201d\nFor other parking lot cases in which under Workmen\u2019s Compensation Acts an award of compensation was decreed to an employee injured on a parking lot owned or maintained by the employer or while passing between the lot and the employer\u2019s working place 'as being an injury -by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee\u2019s employment, see: Teague v. Boeing Airplane Co., 181 Kan. 434, 312 P. 2d 220 (1957); Buerkle v. United Parcel Service, 26 N.J. Super. 404, 98 A. 2d 327; Dewar v. General Motors Corp., 19 N.J. Misc. 297, 19 A. 2d 194; Krovosucky v. Ind. Com., 74 Ohio App. 86, 57 N.E. 2d 607; E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Redding, 194 Okla. 52, 147 P. 2d 166. See also Murphy v. Miettinen, 317 Mass. 633, 59 N.E. 2d 252.\nIn Hardy v. Small, 246 N.C. 581, 99 S.E. 2d 862, the deceased employee lived in a house on his employer\u2019s farm, and was employed to .feed the livestock at a barn. The employer\u2019s farm was situate on both ..sides of N. C. Highway 32. The deceased:employee crossed the highway, went to the barn, and fed the livestock. He then started across the highway to go to his home, and near the edge of the highway was struck by a car and killed. This Court in affirming an award of compensation held that his injury and death arose out of and in the course of his employment.\nIn Morgan v. Cloth Mills, 207 N.C. 317, 177 S.E. 165, the deceased employee was a piece worker in a cotton mill. On the morning of the accident he reported for work at the usual time, and was told to return at 11:00 or 12:00 o\u2019clock. He said he would go home and return. Shortly thereafter he was found unconscious near a platform at an entrance to the mill, with indications that he hadi slipped on some ice or stumbled over some lumber or a hand truck on the unlighted platform and had fallen to the frozen ground fracturing his skull, which injury caused death. This Court held, that the evidence was sufficient to support the Industrial Commission\u2019s finding that the employee\u2019s death resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. See also Gordon v. Chair Co., 205 N.C. 739, 172 S.E. 485, where an award of compensation was affirmed, when an employee went to a platform .at the front of the mill to tell his son not to wait for 'him, and there \u00a9lipped on ice and fell.\nThe defendants\u2019 brief cites a number of our oases. None of these cases have any reference to a parking lot owned or maintained by the employer, except Horn v. Furniture Co., 245 N.C. 173, 95 S.E. 2d 521. In the Horn case claimant was struck by an automobile on the highway while going to lunch to a place of his own free choosing. All of \u2022these cases are distinguishable, and are not applicable here.\nWe are well aware of the cases which hold that while 'an employee is traveling to and from the employer's premises in transportation furnished solely by the employee and over a route chosen solely by the employee, he is not in the .course of his .employment, and an accident occurring during such time is not compensable. These cases -are clearly not in point in the instant case, because the claimant here was not \u2022away from her employer\u2019s premises and traveling a route of her own choosing.\nThe employer in this case maintained and supervised a parking lot about 70 feet from the entrance to its plant. About 75 per cent of its employees used this parking lot for their automobiles when at work, with its consent and acquiescence. Clearly this parking lot was maintained and furnished by the employer for the benefit of its employees. Claimant parked.her automobile on the parking lot maintained and provided by her employer for its employees, and about five minutes before she was to begin work was walking on her employer\u2019s premises to another portion of its premises where she actually worked, when she fell and was injured by .accident. It seems clear that claimant's going from this parking lot to her working area, all on her employer\u2019s premises, was a necessary incident to her employment, and there was a causal connection between her employment .and the injury she received with the result that the injury by accident she suffered arose out of and in the course of her employment. She is, therefore, entitled to compensation under the North Carolina Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act.\nThe judgment of the Superior Court is\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "PARKER, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "E. J. Wellons for plaintiff, appellee.", "Teague, Johnson and Patterson for defendants, appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MRS. LOU BELLE DAVIS (Employee) v. DEVIL DOG MANUFACTURING COMPANY (Employer); and NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY (Carrier.)\n(Filed 25 February, 1959.)\nMaster and Servant \u00a7 40c\u2014\nWhere the employer provides a parking lot on its premises next to its factory and permits its employees to park their ears in the lot, an injury received by 'am employee in a fall while she was walking from her \u00a1parked ear on her -way to the other part of the employer\u2019s premises where she actually worked, is an injury arising out of and in the course of her employment within the purview of G.S. 97-2(f).\nAppeal by defendants from Crissman, J., July Assigned Civil Term 1958 of Wake. This case was 'argued as Gase No. 461 at the Fall Term 1958.\nA proceeding for workmen\u2019s compensation.\nThe Hearing Commissioner\u2019s findings of fact and conclusions of law are summarized: The-jurisdictional facts found were based on a stipulation of the parties. On 26 June 1957 Mrs. Lou Belle Davis had been an employee of the Devil Dog Manufacturing Company for about 15 months. Her employer\u2019s plant is situate on U. S. Highway 64 east of the Town of Zefoulon. Claimant lives near the Town of Middlesex, and drove her husband\u2019s automobile -to and from work. No part of the cost of her transportation to and from work was provided by her employer. During her entire time of employment she parked the automobile in a parking lot provided by her employer. This parking lot is about 70 feet from the entrance to her employer\u2019s plant. There is a walkway of red clay and loose gravel leading from the parking lot to the plant\u2019s entrance. About half way from the parking lot to the plant\u2019s entrance is a trench or ditch crossing this walkway, and an incline leads down into this trench or ditch from both directions of the walkway. All of the above property is under the maintenance .and supervision of the employer. Approximately 75 per cent of the employees of the Devil Dog Manufacturing Company used this parking lot with its consent and acquiescence.\nThe work day of claimant and her fellow employees' is from 7:30 a. m. to 4:00 p. m., and these are the only hours for which they are paid. All employees must be at their machines ready for work at 7:30 a. m.\nOn 26 June 1957 about 7:25 a. m. claimant parked her automobile in the usual manner in the parking lot provided by her employer, got out of the automobile, and walked east to the plant entrance. Due to prior rain the walkway was wet. As she was walking down the incline from the parking lot, and when she was about 30 feet from, her automobile and 40 feet from the plant entrance, her foot slipped and she fell, breaking her right ankle, which was an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment.\nAt the date of the hearing claimant had not reached the end of the healing period, and her permanent disability, if any, was not ready to be rated. Claimant has been temporarily totally disabled by reason of her injury.\nThe Hearing Commissioner concluded as a matter of law that claimant sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment, and made an award of compensation to claimant for temporary total disability.\nOn appeal to the Full Commission all the defendants\u2019 assignments of error were overruled, and the findings of fact, conclusions of law and award of compensation by the Hearing Commissioner were affirmed, and the defendants appealed to the Superior Court.\nIn the Superior Court the order of the Full Commission was in all respects affirmed, and the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court.\nE. J. Wellons for plaintiff, appellee.\nTeague, Johnson and Patterson for defendants, appellants." }, "file_name": "0543-01", "first_page_order": 585, "last_page_order": 591 }