{ "id": 8621703, "name": "JERRY O. WILSON v. JESS WILLARD CAMP and BILLIE LEE CAMP", "name_abbreviation": "Wilson v. Camp", "decision_date": "1959-03-25", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "754", "last_page": "759", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "249 N.C. 754" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "82 S.E. 2d 331", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8600212 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 S.E. 2d 854", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 N.C. 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624551 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/248/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 S.E. 2d 115", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630917 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 S.E. 2d 361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 N.C. 673", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8615738 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/233/0673-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 S.E. 2d 17", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "236 N.C. 643", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627306 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/236/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 S.E. 2d 661", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "238 N.C. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8606352 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/238/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 S.E. 2d 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 N.C. 664", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628204 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/239/0664-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 S.E. 2d 337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8611418 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 S.E. 2d 683", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8611925 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 S.E. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 N.C. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8611264 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/245/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 S.E. 2d 686", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 N.C. 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8614439 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/245/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 S.E. 2d 245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 N.C. 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8617430 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/245/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 S.E. 2d 912", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "236 N.C. 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626231 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/236/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 S.E. 2d 804", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "243 N.C. 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621505 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/243/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 S.E. 2d 860", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "246 N.C. 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627232 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/246/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 S.E. 2d 881", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 N.C. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626558 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/239/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 S.E. 736", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 N.C. 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628600 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/195/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 S.E. 394", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 N.C. 773", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628010 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/201/0773-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 S.E. 498", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 N.C. 758", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8619652 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/212/0758-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 S.E. 2d 614", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 N.C. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8614236 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/218/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 S.E. 555", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 N.C. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8655130 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/179/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 S.E. 2d 107", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 N.C. 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8603277 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/245/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 S.E. 2d 33", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "246 N.C. 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625839 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/246/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 S.E. 2d 730", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "237 N.C. 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8617856 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/237/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 S.E. 2d 357", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8601055 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 S.E. 2d 589", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8611586 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0412-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 665, "char_count": 12871, "ocr_confidence": 0.487, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.8353602977696236e-07, "percentile": 0.8989755773406094 }, "sha256": "37e916abf5b97cb1d10d1d27b248acc93bbf5e108c6e27911ed1028cd5234108", "simhash": "1:37adddac842deade", "word_count": 2211 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:25:15.863799+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JERRY O. WILSON v. JESS WILLARD CAMP and BILLIE LEE CAMP." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HiggiNS, J.\nThe findings of negligence against the defendants and contributory negligence against the plaintiff settled the controversy. Garmon v. Thomas, 241 N.C. 412, 85 S.E. 2d 589; Badders v. Lassiter, 240 N.C. 413, 82 S.E. 2d 357; Lyerly v. Griffin, 237 N.C. 686, 75 S.E. 2d 730. Last clear chance not being involved, the plaintiff must remove the bar of contributory negligence in order to get back into court. He can do this only by showing prejudicial error on that issue. Errors, if committed on .other issues, are nonprejudicial. We make this statement not suggesting other errors appear, but by way of explanation of our failure to discuss the assignments with respect to them.\nBy assignment of error No. 5, the plaintiff contends the court committed error in submitting the issue of contributory negligence because of the lack of evidence to support it. In passing on tire question, we must take the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, disregarding that which is favorable to the plaintiff. \u201cIf different inferences may be drawn from the evidence on the issue of contributory negligence, some favorable to plaintiff and others to the defendant, it is a case for the jury to determine.\u201d Bell v. Maxwell, 246 N.C. 257, 98 S.E. 2d 33; Gilreath v. Silverman, 245 N.C. 51, 95 S.E. 2d 107; Battle v. Cleave, 179 N.C. 112, 101 S.E. 555.\nIn this case, Camp testified he waited at the light for two cars to pass, saw no other traffic, and while he was in the act of crossing the two north traffic lanes to enter the McAdenville Road, the plaintiff\u2019s automobile crossed the hill aA high speed and crashed into him before he was able to clear the intersection. His witnesses, Talley and Johnston, testified the dark Chevrolet did not reduce speed of 70 miles or more per hour. The plaintiff admitted he -did not reduce speed for the intersection; that he saw the defendants\u2019 automobile (stopped there, \u201cgetting ready to make .a left-hand turn ... I observed this oar \u00a1before the collision a couple of seconds. When I first saw the Camp oar he was parked in the outside lane making a left turn.\u201d\nThe fact that defendant, from his stationary position in one of the south lanes, had time to cross over the inside lane and into the outside one in front of plaintiff, permits the inference the defendant was first in the intersection. It permits -the inference that plaintiff\u2019s speed was so great that he could not stop. The physical evidence with respect to the position of the vehicles at the time of and after the collision, and the damage to them offer nothing to refute these inferences. We conclude, therefore, the evidence of contributory negligence was sufficient to go to the jury. Assignment of error No. 5 is not sustained.\nBy assignments of error Nos. 1 -and 2, the plaintiff contends the court committed error in admitting the evidence of Talley and Johnston as to the speed of -the automobile which passed them less than one-quarter of a mile from the scene of the accident He relies on Barnes v Teer, 218 N.C. 122, 10 S.E. 2d 614, as authority for his position. In that case, however, the evidence of speed was excluded because the observer saw the vehicle three or four miles from the scene of the accident. Here, the speed continued until the ear passed out of sight at the blinker warning lights 400 feet from .the accident. The evidence of Talley and Johnston was clearly admissible. State v. Peterson, 212 N.C. 758, 194 S.E. 498; Hicks v. Love, 201 N.C. 773, 161 S.E. 394; State v. Leonard, 195 N.C. 242, 141 S.E. 736.\nBy his assignments Nos. 6, 7, and 8, the plaintiff challenges the charge relating ,to the respective duties of motorists at intersections. Particularly by assignment No. 6, he objects to the charge that if tire plaintiff had notice of tire defendant\u2019s intention to make a left turn at the intersection \u201cand if he was given that notice at such distance from the intersection that he could, in the exercise of ordinary care, control his vehicle accordingly,\u201d the failure to give the hand signal would not be a proximate cause of the injuries. Under the facts in the case, the charge is free from error. The purpose -of a hand signal -is to give notice. If a complaining motorist has due notice otherwise, the purpose of the hand signal has 'been served. In this case the plaintiff testified: \u201cThe Camp car was in the second 1-ane going towards Charlotte, getting ready to make a left turn.\u201d Of a similar situation, where notice was given by circumstances but not by hand signal, Justice Ervin, in the case of Cozart v. Hudson, 239 N.C. 279, 78 S.E. 2d 881, ihaidj this to say: \u201c . . . this being so, the evidence warrants the inference there was no causal connection whatever between the failure of the plaintiff to give a hand signal and the subsequent collision. The omission to perform a duty cannot constitute one of the proximate causes of an accident unless the doing of the omitted duty would have prevented the accident.\u201d Coach Co. v. Fultz, 246 N.C. 523, 98 S.E. 2d 860; Barker v. Engineering Co., 243 N.C. 103, 89 S.E. 2d 804; Jernigan v. Jernigan, 236 N.C. 430, 72 S.E. 2d 912. The charge as to the respective duties of motorists at intersections was in accord with, and much of it actually quoted from, the following oases: Coach Co. v. Fultz, supra; Mallette v. Cleaners, 245 N.C. 652, 97 S.E. 2d 245; Taylor v. Brake, 245 N.C. 553, 96 S.E. 2d 686; White v. Lacey, 245 N.C. 364, 96 S.E. 2d 1; Marshburn v. Patterson, 241 N.C. 441, 85 S.E. 2d 683; Hamson v. Kapp, 241 N.C. 408, 85 S.E. 2d 337; Hamilton v. Henry, 239 N.C. 664, 80 S.E. 2d 485; Finch v. Ward, 238 N.C. 290, 77 S.E. 2d 661; Hawes v Refining Co., 236 N.C. 643, 74 S.E. 2d 17; Matheny v. Motor Co., 233 N.C. 673, 65 S.E. 2d 361; Cooley v. Baker, 231 N.C. 533, 58 S.E. 2d 115.\nFinally, by assignment No. 9, the plaintiff alleges error in the definition of proximate cause and reasonable foreseeability as a constituent element thereof. On this subject the court charged in accordance with the rules as approved in Adams v. Board of Education, 248 N.C. 506, 103 S.E. 2d 854; White v. Lacey, supra; Aldridge v. Hasty, 240 N.C. 353, 82 S.E. 2d 331; and Cooley v. Baker, supra. The charge on the issue of contributory negligence was free from error.\nThe jury found the accident resulted from the negligence of both parties. Neither is responsible to the other for the resulting damage Both having been found at fault, tire law leaves them where they left themselves\nNo Error.", "type": "majority", "author": "HiggiNS, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Childers & Fowler, By: Henry L. Fowler, Jr., for plaintiff, appellant.", "Mullen, Holland & Cooke, By: James Mullen for defendants, ap-pellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JERRY O. WILSON v. JESS WILLARD CAMP and BILLIE LEE CAMP.\n(Filed 25 March, 1959.)\n1. Appeal and Error \u00a7 1\u2014\nAn affirmative finding on the issue of contributory negligence precludes recovery by plaintiff, and therefore if none of plaintiff\u2019s exceptions relating -to- that issue can be sustained, other exceptions of plaintiff need not be considered.\n2. Negligence \u00a7 19c\u2014\nIn determining the sufficiency of the evidence to require the submission of \u00a1the issue of contributory negligence, the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to defendant and the evidence favorable to plaintiff disregarded.\n3. Same\u2014\nIf diverse inferences may be drawn from the evidence on the issue of contributory negligence, the issue is for the determination of the jury.\n4. Automobiles \u00a7 42g\u2014\nEvidence tending to show that plaintiff, traveling west, approached an intersection in the northern lane of a four-lane highway at a high and \u00a1unlawful rate of speed, that he saw a ear, headed in the opposite direction, waiting to make a left turn into the intersecting road', that the other car, after waiting for two other west-bound cars to clear the intersection, proceeded to make a left turn and had cleared the inside west-bound lane and was struck by plaintiff\u2019s car in the north lane, is sufficient to require the submission of the issue of contributory negligence to the jury.\n5. Automobiles \u00a7 38\u2014\nTestimony of witnesses that plaintiff\u2019s ear passed them traveling 70 miles per hour less than a quarter of a mile from the scene of the accident, with further testimony by the witnesses that the speed continued until the car passed out of sight some 400 feet from the accident, is competent as evidence tending to show plaintiff\u2019s excessive speed at .the time of the accident.\n6. Automobiles \u00a7 8\u2014\nWhere plaintiff testifies that he saw defendant\u2019s car waiting at an intersection to make a left turn, plaintiff\u2019s testimony discloses that he had notice of the intended movement, and therefore defendant\u2019s failure to give the hand signal for such turn cannot be a proximate cause of the subsequent collision.\n7. Negligence \u00a7 5\u2014\nThe omission to perform a duty cannot constitute one of the proximate causes of an accident unless the doing of the omitted duty would have prevented the accident.\n8. Automobiles \u00a7 46\u2014\nThe charge in this case on the respective duties of motorists at intersections, proximate cause and contributory negligence, held free from error.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Fountain, 5. at the scene of the accident. Talley testified: \u201cTo my knowledge that was the same oar that was involved in the \u2022accident. ... I would say I last sighted him just about at the blinker lights, 400 feet from the intersection.\u201d\nThe plaintiff made a motion to .strike the evidence of Johnston and Talley, .and excepted to the court\u2019s refusal to grant the motion.\nAt the close of sail the evidence, the plaintiff moved to dismiss the defendants\u2019 counterclaim, and excepted to the court\u2019s refusal to allow the motion. The court submitted issues of negligence, contributory negligence, and damages (as to each of the parties.) The plaintiff excepted to the submission of the issue of contributory negligence. The jury found the issue of negligence against the defendants and the issue of contributory negligence against the plaintiff, and left the other issues unanswered. From the judgment that neither party recover, the plaintiff excepted and appealed.\nChilders & Fowler, By: Henry L. Fowler, Jr., for plaintiff, appellant.\nMullen, Holland & Cooke, By: James Mullen for defendants, ap-pellees." }, "file_name": "0754-01", "first_page_order": 796, "last_page_order": 801 }