{
  "id": 8684290,
  "name": "OLIVER QUINN vs. GILBERT PINSON",
  "name_abbreviation": "Quinn v. Pinson",
  "decision_date": "1842-12",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "47",
  "last_page": "48",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "nominative",
      "cite": "3 Ired. 47"
    },
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "25 N.C. 47"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 263,
    "char_count": 3905,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.459,
    "sha256": "157d43db6abe4737052299241f75a980d7693a1a4fcb9cb8c4f718f90a2c3c13",
    "simhash": "1:3aa1d4ccd807f7de",
    "word_count": 702
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:56:07.564663+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "OLIVER QUINN vs. GILBERT PINSON."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Ruffin, C. J.\nIt seems not to have been disputed that the horse\u2019s eyes were diseased at the time of the sale. That may have been inferred front the opinion of the farrier of the natural defect of those organs, and from the circumstance, without any particular hurt or subsequent ill-usage proved, they went out in so short a period after the sale.. \u2014 \u25a0 -Against that inference the defendant made no objection; but he insisted only, that, \u201c as to the defendant\u2019s knowledge of the unsoundness, there was no evidence.\u201d Now if to those facts, which were thus taken for granted, be added, that the defendant bred the horse and owned him until he was nine years old, and that the witness stated, that such eyes did not usually go out suddenly, but that \u201c they would come and go sometime before they entirely failed\u201d \u2014 we must say, there is some ground, though it must be admitted to be slight, for the jury to suppose, that during the long use of the horse by the defendant, some of those affections of the eyes had occurred, and, if so, were visible to him. It is true, they might reasonably have judged, that, if the eyes had been actually diseased before the sale, the plaintiff could have proved the fact explicitly, instead of offering a conjecture of the witness on the point; and had the court authority to grant a new trial upon the ground, that the verdict was not warranted by sufficient evidence, we might feel inclined to set this verdict aside. But we have no such power; and we must admit, that the judgment of one skilled in such diseases, who saw the horse at the, sale, and after he became blind, does afford some presumption, that the seller had discovered the defect in the vision during his ownership. The expression \u201c for some time,\u201d is, indeed, vague ; but it was the duty of the party to ask for an explanation of his meaning from the witness, and the province of the jury to interpret his words.\u2014 They do not, necessarily, relate- back beyond the period of the sale ; but they may not have been so intended, and, with the context, and under the finding of the jury, we are now so to understand them. We cannot therefore say, that the case was so entirely destitute of proof of a scienter, as to render it erroneous in his Honor to submit the point to the jury, and must affirm the judgment.\nPer Curiam. Judgment affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Ruffin, C. J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Hoke for the plaintiff",
      "No counsel for the defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "OLIVER QUINN vs. GILBERT PINSON.\nDecember 1842.\nWhere, in an action for deceit in the sale of a horse, it was proved that the horse went blind soon after he was sold, without any subsequent hurt or ill usage; that in the opinion of a farrier his eyes were naturally defective-, the defect was such as would not render the horse blind suddenly, and that the defendant had bred the horse and owned him till he was nine years old; these are circumstances the judge must leave to the jury as tending to prove the scienter. He has no rightto say there is no evidence upon that point.\nAppeal from the Superior Court of Law of Cleaveland county, at the Fall Term, 1842, Lis Honor Judge Pearson presiding.\nThis was an action on the case, in the nature of an action of deceit, brought to recover damages fora deceit in the sale of a horse. On the trial, a variety of testimony was introduced, but the only material parts, which relate to the question brought before the Supreme Court, are stated in the opinion of the court. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff.\nThe defendant\u2019s counsel then moved for a new trial, upon the ground that the court erfed in leaving to the jury the question as to the defendant\u2019s knowledge of the unsoundness of the horse \u2014 that the court should have instructed the jury there was no evidence to justify them in finding such knowledge in the defendant.\nThe court refused a new trial, and, having rendered judgment according to the verdict^ the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court.\nHoke for the plaintiff\nNo counsel for the defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0047-01",
  "first_page_order": 47,
  "last_page_order": 48
}