{
  "id": 8694774,
  "name": "STATE vs. ROBERT S. HUNTLY",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Huntly",
  "decision_date": "1843-06",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "418",
  "last_page": "423",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "nominative",
      "cite": "3 Ired. 418"
    },
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "25 N.C. 418"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 601,
    "char_count": 10703,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.462,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 6.293951440510225e-07,
      "percentile": 0.9581398374963174
    },
    "sha256": "01f28ac0c40d57495324a68d97be57294062a09b09fdb19a1d6131aa3e6d3141",
    "simhash": "1:bb37f3e20e8433b7",
    "word_count": 1882
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:56:07.564663+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "STATE vs. ROBERT S. HUNTLY."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Gaston, J.\nOn the trial it was insisted by the defendant\u2019s counsel, and the judge was required so to instruct the jury, that if the facts charged' in the indictment were all true, they nevertheless constituted in law no offence of which they could find the defendant guilty. His Honor refused this prayer, and instructed the jury, that, il the facts charged were proved to their satisfaction, it was their duty to find him guilty. The same ground of defence has been taken here by way of a motion in arrest of judgment; but we are of opinion that in whatever form presented, it is not tenable.\nThe argument is, that the offence of riding or going about armed with unusual and dangerous weapons, to the terror of the p\u00e9ople, was created by the statute of Northampton, 2nd Edward the 3d, ch. 3d, and that, whether this statute was or was not formerly in force in this State, it certainly has not been since the first of January, 1838, at which day it is declared in the Revised Statutes, (ch. 1st, sect. 2,) that the statutes of England or Great Britain shall cease to be of force and effect here. We have been accustomed to believe, that the statute referred to did not create this of-fence,(but provided only special penalties and modes of proceeding for its more effectual suppression, and of the correctness of this belief we can see no reason to doubt. All the elementary writers, who give us any information on the subject, concur in this representation, nor is there to be found in them, as far as we are aware of, a dictum or intimation to the contrary. Blackstone states, that \u201c the offence of riding or going armed with dangerous or unusual weapons, is a \u25a0crime against the public peace, by terrifying the good people of the land ; and is particularly prohibited by the statute of Northampton, 2 Edward 3d, ch. 3d, upon pain of forfeiture of the arms, and imprisonment during the King\u2019s pleasure.\u201d 4 Bl. Com. 149. Hawkins, treating of offences against the public peace under the head of \u201cAffrays,\u201d pointedly remarks, \u201c but granting that no bare words in judgment of law carry in them so much terror as to amount to an affray, yet it seems certain that in some cases there may be an affray, where there is no actual violence, as where a man arms himself with dangerous and unusual weapons in such a manner, as will naturally cause a terror to the people, which is said to have been ahoays an offence at common law and strictly prohibited by many statutes.\u201d Haw. P. C. B. 1, ch. 28, sect. 1. Burns and Tomlyns inform us, that, this term \u201c Affray,\u201d is derived from the French word \u201c ef-frayer\u201d to affright, and that anciently it meant no more, \u201c as where persons appeared with armour or weapons not usually worn, to the terror of others.\u201d Burn\u2019s Yerbo \u201c Affray.\u201d Dierdo, It was declared by the Chief Justice in Sir John Knight\u2019s case, that the statute of Northampton was made in affirmance of the common law. 3 Mod. Rep. 117. And this is manifestly the doctrine of Coke, as will be found on comparing his observations on the word \u201c Affray,\u201d which he defines (3d Just. 158,) \u201ca public offence to the terror of the King\u2019s subjects, and so called because it affrighteth and maketh men afraid, and is enquirable in a leet as a common nuisance,\u201d with his reference immediately thereafter to this statute, and his subsequent comments on it (3d Inst. 160,) where he cites a record of the 29fh year of Edward 1st, shewing what had been considered the law then. Indeed, if those acts be deemed by the common law crimes and misdemeanors, which are in violation of the public rights and of the duties owing to the community in its social capacity., it is difficult to imagine any which more unequivocally deserve to be so considered than the acts charged ujion this defendant. They attack directly that public order and sense of security, which it is one of the first objeets of the com-nion law, and ought to be of the law of all regulated societies,to preserve inviolate \u2014 and they lead almost necessarily to actual violenee. Nor can it for a moment be supposed, that such acts are less mischievous here or less the proper subjects of legal reprehension, than they were in the country of our ancestors. The bill of rights in this State secures to every man indeed, the right to \u201c bear arms for the defence of the State.\u201d While it secures to him a right of which he cannot be deprived, it holds forth the duty in execution of which that right is to be exercised. If he employ those arms, which he ought to wield for the safety and protection of his country, to the annoyance and terror and danger of its citizens, he deserves but the severer condemnation for the abuse of the high privilege, with which he has been invested.\nIt was objected belo w, and the objection has been also urged here, that the eourt erred in admitting evidence of the declarations of the defendant, set forth in the case, because those, or some of them at least, were acknowledgments of a different offence from that charged. But these declarations were clearly proper, because they accompanied, explained, and characterized the very acts charged. They were not received at all as admissions either of the offence under trial, or any other offence. They were constituent parts of that offence.\nIt has been remarked, that a double-barrelled gun, or any other gun, cannot in this country come under the description of \u201c unusual weapons,\u201d for there is scarcely a man in the community who does not own and occasionally use a gun of some sort. But we do not feel the force of this criticism. A gun is an \u201c unusual weapon,\u201d wherewith to be armed and clad. No man amongst us carries it about with him. as one of his every day accoutrements \u2014 as a part of his dress\u2014 and never we trust will the day come when any deadly weapon will be worn or wielded in our peace loving and law-abiding State, as an appendage of manly equipment.\u2014 But although a guu is an \u201cunusual weapon,\u201d it is to be remembered that the carrying of a guu \u2018per se constitutes no offence. For any lawful purpose \u2014 either of business or musement \u2014 .the citizen is at perfect liberty to carry his gun. It is the wicked purpose \u2014 and the mischievous result \u2014 which essentially constitute the crime. He shall not carry about this or any other weapon of death to terrify and alarm, and in such-manner as naturally will terrify and alarm, a peaceful people.\nOour opinion is, that there is no error in the sentence below. This decision will be certified to the Superior Court of Anson accordingly.\nPer Curiam.. Ordered accordingly..",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Gaston, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General for the State.",
      "Winslon for the defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE vs. ROBERT S. HUNTLY.\nJune 1843\noffence of riding or going armed with unusual and dangerous weapons, the terror of the people, is an offence at common law, and is indictable in this State.\nA man may carry a gun for any lawful purpose of business or amusement; but ho cannot go about with that or any other dangerous weapon, ta terrify and alarm, and in such manner as naturally will terrify and alarm, a peaceful people.\nTho declarations of the defendant are admissible in evidence, on tho part of the prosecution, as accompanying, explaining, and characterizing tho acts charged.\nAppeal from the Superior Court of Law of Anson county, at Spring Term, 1843, his Honor Judge Settle presiding.\nThe defendant was tried upon the following indictment, found in Anson Superior Court :\nThe jurors for the State upon their oath present, thaf Robert S. Huntly, late of the county aforesaid, laborer, on the first day of September, in the present year, with force and arms, at and in the county aforesaid, did arm himself with pistols, guns, knives and other dangerous and unusual weapons, and, being,so armed, did go forth and exhibit himself openly, both in the day time and in the night, to the good citizens of Anson aforesaid, and in the said highway and before the citizens aforesaid, did openly and publicly declare a purpose and intent, one Jam.es H. Ratcliff and other good citizens of the State, then and there being in the peace of God and of the State, to beat, wound, kill and murder, which said purpose and intent, the said Robert S. Huntley, so openly armed and exposed and declaring, then and there had and entertained, by which said arming, exposure, exhibition and declarations of the said Robert S. Huntley, divers good citizens of -the State were terrified, and the peace of the State endangered, to the evil example of all others in like cases offending, to the terror of the people, and against the peace and dignity of the State.\nOn the trial, it was insisted on the part of the defendant, that allowing all the facts charged in the indictment to be true, they constituted no offence for which the defendant could be punished as'lor a misdemeanor. His Honoe, instructed the jury, that, if the facts charged in the indictment, were proven to their satisfaction, the defendant had been guilty of a violation of the law, and that they ought to render their verdict accordingly. In the investigation before the jury it appeared, among other things, that the defendant was seen by several witnesses, and on divers occasions, riding upon the public highway, and upon the premises of Jamos H. Ratcliff, (the person named in the indictment,) armed with a double barrelled gun, and on some of those occasions was heard to declare, \u201cthat if James H. Ratcliff did not surrender his negroes, he would kill him,\u201d at others, \u201c if James H. Ratcliff did not give him his rights, he would kill him;\u201d on some, that \u201c he had way laid the house of James H. Rat-cliff\u2019 in the night about day.break, and if he had shewn himself he would have killed him, that he shewed himself once, but for too short a time to enable him to do so, and that he mistook another man for him, and was very near shooting him.\u201d On one occasion, that \u201c he would kill James H. Ratcliff if he did not surrender his negroes, and that as for William Ratcliff, he was good for him any how on sight, that there were four or five men whom he meant to kill.\u201d All these declarations were objected to by the defendant\u2019s counsel, but were received by the court, as accompanying and qualifying and-explaining the defendant\u2019s riding about the county armed with a double barrelled gun \u2014 \u2022 The jury having found the defendant guilty, his counsel moved for a new trial upon the grounds, first, that the declarations of the defendant before mentioned, were improper-received; secondly, because the judge should have told the jury, that supposing all the facts charged in the indictment to be trite, still the defendant was entitled to their ver-The motion was overruled, and judgment having been pronounced, the defendant appealed.\nAttorney General for the State.\nWinslon for the defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0418-01",
  "first_page_order": 418,
  "last_page_order": 423
}