{
  "id": 8625999,
  "name": "ROBERT RAY HOLLOWELL v. SIDNEY B. ARCHBELL",
  "name_abbreviation": "Hollowell v. Archbell",
  "decision_date": "1959-09-23",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "716",
  "last_page": "720",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "250 N.C. 716"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
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    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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      "cite": "53 S.E. 2d 251",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "230 N.C. 392",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
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    {
      "cite": "72 S. E. 2d 912",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "236 N. C. 430",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
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    {
      "cite": "250 N. C. 132",
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      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8620900
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      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
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    {
      "cite": "32 S.E. 2d 209",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "224 N.C. 688",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8612616
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      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:44:40.326881+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "HiggiNS, J., not sitting."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "ROBERT RAY HOLLOWELL v. SIDNEY B. ARCHBELL."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "RodmaN, J.\nThe first assignment is to the refusal to sustain defendant\u2019s motions -to nonsuit.\nHe waived his motion made at the conclusion of plaintiff\u2019s evidence by offering evidence. G.S. 1-183.\nThe argument in support of the motion made at the conclusion of all the evidence is thus stated in defendant\u2019s brief: \u201cThe physical facts at the scene of the collision speak louder than the testimony of plaintiff and his witnesses, and upon this basis the defendant was entitled to judgment as of nonsuit.\u201d\nThe physical facts on which defendant relies are depicted in the evidence offered by defendant. His evidence tends to show (1) plaintiff applied his brakes with sufficient force to make them squeal; (2) after the collision, skid marks were found on the pavement extending from the truck 66 feet to the north; (3) the Plymouth left no skid marks; (,4i)- following the collision defendant\u2019s car traveled more than 100 feet where it struck a tree on the west side of the highway. Defendant contends he was knocked that distance by the violent impact; plaintiff says he traveled that distance by virtue of his own momentum.\nDefendant cites and relies on Atkins v. Transportation Co., 224 N.C. 688, 32 S.E. 2d 209, in support of his motion. The distinction between that case and the case at bar is readily apparent. There, admittedly, plaintiff\u2019s truck was following defendant's bus very closely \u25a0 \u2014 \u25a0 so closely that plaintiff could not stop in the distance separating the vehicles. Here, if the jury accepted plaintiff\u2019s version of the facts, the short distance separating the vehicles was caused by defendant\u2019s act in passing and cutting in ahead of plaintiff. There, plaintiff was not confronted with oncoming traffic; he could have turned to his left and prevented the collision. Here, no such choice was open to plaintiff \u2014 according to his evidence a vehicle was approaching from .the south. There, the physical facts were usedi to amplify and explain plaintiff\u2019s evidence. Here, defendant frankly suggests using his desci\u2019iption of the physical facts, with his interpretation of those facts to rob the evidence of plaintiff and his witnesses of probative force. The evidence for plaintiff and defendant painted different pictures. This disagreement with respect to the facts required a submission of appropriate issues to the jury. Beauchamp v. Clark, 250 N. C. 132; Jernigan v. Jernigan, 236 N. C. 430, 72 S. E. 2d 912; Winsfield v. Smith, 230 N.C. 392, 53 S.E. 2d 251.\nDefendant assigns as error the court\u2019s statement directing attention .to two statutes relating to the operation of motor vehicles, which statement is followed by a delineation of the operator\u2019s duty under G.S. 20-141 and 154. The contention is made that the court thereby unduly restricted the jury in answering the issue as -to contributory negligence. The assignment is without merit. The statement was not specifically directed to the second issue. It was merely a portion of the charge relating to the duties of any operator of a motor vehicle applicable to both the first and second issues. Other portions of the charge, without specifically referring to the statutes by number, accurately and adequately covered the field.\nThe assignment of error relating to the charge on the issue of contributory negligence is without merit. It gave defendant\u2019s contention with respect to the facts and properly and adequately described plaintiff\u2019s duty in the operation of his vehicle. The jury were told that a failure on plaintiff\u2019s part to perform his duty, thereby proximately contributing to the collision and damages, would require an affirmative answer.\nThe charge covered the questions at issue and correctly applied the law thereto.\nNo error.\nHiggiNS, J., not sitting.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "RodmaN, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "John F. White, William S. Privott, and LeBoy, Goodwin & Wells for plaintiff, appellee.",
      "John W. Graham and John H. Hall for defendant, appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "ROBERT RAY HOLLOWELL v. SIDNEY B. ARCHBELL.\n(Filed 23 September, 1959.)\n1. Automobiles \u00a7 39\u2014\nNonsuit on tlie ground that the physical facts at the scene of the accident speak louder than the testimony of the witnesses cannot be granted when conflicting inferences can be drawn from the physical facts, one consonant with plaintiff\u2019s evidence and the other consonant with 'that of defendant.\n2. Automobiles \u00a7 42f\u2014 Evidence held not to show contributory negligence as matter of law in hitting rear of defendant\u2019s decelerating vehicle.\nWhere plaintiff\u2019s evidence is to the effect that defendant\u2019s car, traveling at a rapid speed in the same direction, pulled around and passed plaintiff's truck, and then, without signal, decelerated so rapidly that plaintiff could not avoid hitting the rear of the defendant\u2019s car, the opposite side of the highway being blocked by an oncoming vehicle, is held not to disclose contributory negligence as a matter of law notwithstanding skid marks extending 66 feet from where plaintiff\u2019s vehicle stopped and the absence of skid marks back of defendant\u2019s vehicle, since under plaintiff\u2019s evidence the fact that he was following defendant\u2019s vehicle so closely was due to defendant\u2019s act in passing and cutting in ahead of him, and diverse inferences can be drawn from the physical facts.\nHiogins, J., not sitting.\nAppeal by defendant from Paul, J., April-May Term 1959 of ChowaN.\nThis action grows out of a collision between a Chevrolet pickup truck ownedl and operated by plaintiff and a Plymouth automobile owned and operated by defendant. The collision occurred about 8:00 a.m., 26 July 1958, on TJ. S. Highway 17, about one and one-half miles north of Hertford, near a roadside picnic table on the west side of the highway. The highway had a paved surface of 22 feet and dirt shoulders of 18 feet. It was straight for 7/10 of a mile north of the point of collision and 3/10 of a mile south of that point. A tractor-trailer was parked near the picnic table. The tractor-trailer was completely off and five to eight feet west of the paved portion of the highway. Plaintiff and defendant were traveling southwardly. Another vehicle was traveling northwardly and in the east lane. The front of plaintiff\u2019s vehicle collided with the rear of defendant\u2019s automobile. The truck was damaged as a result of the collision. Defendant sustained personal injuries and his automobile was damaged. \u2022\nPlaintiff instituted this action to recover his property damage. To support his claim he alleged that he was traveling from Elizabeth City to Hertford, operating his vehicle in a proper .and prudent manner at a speed approximating 40 m.p.h.; that defendant, also traveling in a southwardly direction but at a high and unlawful rate of speed, passed plaintiff and, immediately after passing, pulled into the path of plaintiff\u2019s vehicle, suddenly and without warning applied his brakes, thereby stopping or so slowing his motor vehicle that plaintiff was unable to avoid a collision. Plaintiff predicated his right to recover on his assertion of excessive speed, reckless driving, and a failure to give warning of defendant\u2019s intention to stop or turn off of the road.\nDefendant denied plaintiff\u2019s allegations of negligence. He pleaded contributory negligence as a bar .to plaintiff\u2019s action and asserted a counterclaim for personal injuries and property damage. As the basis for his affirmative pleas he alleged he was at all times to the south of plaintiff and never passed .plaintiff\u2019s truck; that he decided to stop at the picnic table when he was some distance north of it and for that purpose gradually reduced his speed, which was at all times reasonable and prudent, and in due time gave proper warning by signal of his intention to turn off the highway and stop at the picnic table; and that he was, when the collision occurred, partially off the paved portion of the highway. He charged plaintiff with excessive speed, reckless driving, following too closely, and failing to keep a proper lookout.\nIssues were submitted to determine (1) defendant\u2019s negligence, (2) plaintiff\u2019s contributory negligence, (3) plaintiff\u2019s damage, (4) plaintiff\u2019s negligence, and (5) .defendant\u2019s damage. The jury answered the issues in accord with plaintiff\u2019s contentions. Judgment was entered thereon, and defendant appealed.\nJohn F. White, William S. Privott, and LeBoy, Goodwin & Wells for plaintiff, appellee.\nJohn W. Graham and John H. Hall for defendant, appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0716-01",
  "first_page_order": 756,
  "last_page_order": 760
}
