{ "id": 8622350, "name": "RUTH E. SLAUGHTER v. STATE CAPITAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY", "name_abbreviation": "Slaughter v. State Capital Life Insurance", "decision_date": "1959-05-06", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "265", "last_page": "269", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "250 N.C. 265" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "13 S.E. 2d 609", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "219 N.C. 368", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8623756 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/219/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 S.E. 2d 479", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "217 N.C. 705", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8616734 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/217/0705-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 S.E. 2d 17", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 N.C. 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629922 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/215/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 S.E. 293", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 N.C. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8609932 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/212/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 S.E. 328", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 N.C. 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628206 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/213/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 S.E. 5", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 N.C. 526", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8631734 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/214/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 S.E. 2d 201", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 614", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8615445 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0614-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 S.E. 2d 214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "247 N.C. 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625253 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/247/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 S.E. 2d 521", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 N.C. 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8619916 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/248/0086-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 541, "char_count": 10880, "ocr_confidence": 0.409, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.494135828168944e-07, "percentile": 0.922728313503992 }, "sha256": "32b23485e2432a628f5d8083ed7fa27f96a470e02ba34122123fc0e80219e6f1", "simhash": "1:454bd79f903c34d0", "word_count": 1841 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:44:40.326881+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "RUTH E. SLAUGHTER v. STATE CAPITAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Higgins, J.\nThe plaintiff has abandoned all assignments of error except those relating to the judgment of nonsuit. The policy here involved provided coverage for death \u201cresulting directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injury sustained by the insured solely through external, violent, and \u00a1accidental means.\u201d In order to prevail in her suit on the policy, the plaintiff must bring the insured\u2019s death within the coverage provision. If coverage is established, the defendant may relieve itself of liability by showing the insured\u2019s death was caused \u201cdirectly or indirectly, wholly or partly, 'by the intentional act of the insured or any other person, whether sane or insane.\u201d Goldberg v. Ins. Co., 248 N.C. 86, 102 S.E. 2d 521; Fallins v. Ins. Co., 247 N.C. 72, 100 S.E. 2d 214; Patrick v. Ins. Co., 241 N.C. 614, 86 S.E. 2d 201; Gorham v. Ins. Co., 214 N.C. 526, 200 S.E. 5; Whitaker v. Ins. Co., 213 N.C. 376, 196 S.E. 328; Warren v. Ins. Co., 212 N.C. 354, 193 S.E. 293; 215 N.C. 402, 2 S.E. 2d 17; 217 N.C. 705, 9 S.E. 2d 479; 219 N.C. 368, 13 S.E. 2d 609.\nUnless the plaintiff\u2019s evidence in this case permits the legitimate inference that the insured met his death solely through external, violent, and accidental means, nonsuit is proper. It is not enough to show death by external means. It is not enough to \u00a1show death by violent means. We -think the proper rule requires the plaintiff to offer evidence sufficient to permit the inference that death was caused also by acei-dental means. The plaintiff has recognized heir responsibility in this particular by the following in her brief: \u201cThus, there is no question that .the plaintiff in.an action on 'an accidental policy must prove that the death for which the action was brought was caused by accidental means within the terms of the policy.\u201d\nThe evidence in this case may be deemed conclusive that the death of the insured resulted solely from external 'and violent means. The body was found in a lonely place .at the city dump, within about three hours from the time he left Selma to carry a passenger to Smithfield. The -insured had been shot in the back .and above the left ear with a pistol. His money, his pistol, and his taxicab were gone. His belt and empty purse were found near the body. His taxicab was found in a parking lot 22 miles away. The .tire marks near the body -showed a vehicle had spun its wheels 'as it left the scene. All the evidence points to .an -intentional killing with robbery as the motive. This evidence, viewed in the light of reason and. common sense, leaves no basis for a finding of death .as the result of accident as the term \u201caccident\u201d is generally understood. The evidence, circumstantial, of course, offered nothing which even remotely tended to .suggest, much less to support a finding, that death resulted through accidental means.\nThe plaintiff cites a number of eases, .some our own, to the effect that when a prima facie case of coverage under a -policy is made -out that death resulted solely from external, violent, -and accidental me-ans, then in -considering whether the insurer has relieved itself of liability under the exclusion -clause in the policy,, -a -presumption against suicide or against intentional killing by another arises where -nothing appears except death by shooting. The presumption, if it is -proper so to designate it, is little if anything more than another statement of the fact that the burden under the exclusion clause is upon the insurance company.\nNo attempt is -here made to reconcile what this Court and others have said with respect to accidental death -or death by accidental means. The definitions and holdings have -arisen under different policy -provisions and different factual situations. The -cases have involved double indemnity provisions -in life .policies. They have arisen with respect to coverage provisions in accident polioie\u00ae, some of which insure -against injury by -accident, injury or death by esternal, violent, or accidental means, -and injury or death by external, violent, and accidental means. The latter is the provision in this case. They have arisen under exclusion clauses -in policies where .the burden of proof is upon the insurance carrier. Each opinion must be -interpreted in the light of the facts in the case. Taking our -own advi-ce, we hold the plaintiff\u2019s evidence in this case, under the policy provision here involved, shows 'an -intentional, not an accidental killing. The .plaintiff\u2019s evidence not only -shows lack of .coverage, but it also establishes the defense set up in the answer that the death of .the insured was caused by the intentional .act of .-another.\nWhen the plaintiff flails to show coverage under the insuring clause of a policy, nonsuit is proper. If the plaintiff\u2019s evidence makes' -out a case of coverage and at the same time establishes the defense that the particular injury is excluded from coverage, nonsuit is likewise proper. .Suich are the rules when the plaintiff\u2019s evidence does not make out a case, or does make out a defense. However, when the defendant\u2019s evidence, not in conflict with the plaintiff\u2019s, shows the plaintiff does not have a case, or that the defendant does have a complete defense, the defendant\u2019s remedy -is by motion for a -peremptory instruction to the jury. In the Warren oases, swpra, the defendant, at the beginning of the trial, assumed the burden of proof. The plaintiff -did not offer evidence. Consequently the defendant\u2019s remedy, when its evidence shewed lack of coverage, was by prayer for a peremptory instruction rather than by motion for nonsuit. In the Warren cases the prayer was allowed. The Court directed the jury to answer the issue against the plaintiff-on the -ground that -all the evidence-showed the insured was intentionally shot and killed.\nIn this case the plaintiff\u2019s -own evidence showed an intentional killing. That showing established lack of coverage. It showed also a- bar under the exclusion clause. Either was fatal to plaintiff\u2019s cause, requiring nonsuit.\nThe judgment of the Superior Court of Johnston County is\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Higgins, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Joseph H. Levinson, William I Godwin for plaintiff, appellant.", "Allen & Hipp, Wellons & Wellons for defendant, appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RUTH E. SLAUGHTER v. STATE CAPITAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.\n(Filed 6 May, 1959.)\n1. Insurance \u00a7 46\u2014\nIn an action on a policy to recover for death by external, violent and accidental means, the burden is on .plaintiff to prove not only that the death resulted through external and violent means, but also that it resulted from accidental means, so as to bring his claim within the coverage of the policy, and, upon a prima facie showing by plaintiff, the burden is on insurer to relieve itself of liability by showing that insured\u2019s death was caused directly or indirectly by the intentional act of insured or any other person within the exclusion1 clause of the policy.\n3. Same: Insurance \u00a7 84\u2014\nPlaintiff\u2019s evidence tending- to show that insured was a taxicab operator, that he picked up a passenger, that several hours theteafter insured was found at a lonely place with, a .pistol wound in his .back and above his left ear, his money, his pistol and Ms t-axioab gone, that tire marks near the 'body showed that a vehicle had spun its wheels as it left the scene, and that the eab was later found some 22 miles away, is held, insufficient to show that the death was the result of an accident within the coverage of the policy and does show an intentional and not an accidental killing within the exclusion clause of the policy, and nonsuit was proper.\n3. Insurance \u00a7 46\u2014\nWhere plaintiff, in a suit on an accident policy, fails to make out a case of coverage, nonsuit is proper, and if plaintiff\u2019s evidence establishes a defense in that the death resulted from a cause within the exclusion clause of the policy, nonsuit .is also, .proper; if insurer\u2019s evidence not in conflict with that of plaintiff shows that plaintiff does not have a case or that insurer does have a complete defense, insurer\u2019s remedy is by motion foor a peremptory instruction.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Mallard, J., November, 1958 Civil Term, JohNSTON Superior Court.\nCivil action 'by the .plaintiff, beneficiary, (to recover on a preferred accident policy issued by defendant in winch it contracted to pay $2,500.00 for the loss of life 'by -the insured, William B. Slaughter, \u201cresulting directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injury sustained by the insured solely (through external, violent, -and accidental means.\u201d The policy contained an exclusion clause, in material part as follows: \u201cThe insurance under this policy shall not cover death . . . caused directly or indirectly, wholly or partly, (1) by the intentional act of the Insured or any other person, whether sane or insane ...\u201d The policy was in force 'at the time of the insured\u2019s death on April 5, 1956.\nThe evidence presented at the trial disclosed the following: The insured was 36 years old. He operated a taxicab in Selma. He had a permit to carry and was in the ha'bit of carrying a pistol. Some time in the late afternoon or early evening of April 5, 1956, some unidentified man \u201casked him to take 'him to Smithfield and he said, \u2018O.K.\u2019 \u201d At 9:15 that night the dead body of the insured was found \u201cin a desolate place\u201d at the city dump about three miles from Smithfield. The deceased was lying face down in a little d/itch \u201cthat was \u2018piled\u2019 up by the road -scraper.\u201d His left shoe was off. His belt was found four or five yards from Iris body. His money pouch, usually attached to his belt, was found nearby, empty. His pistol, money, and cab were gone. His watch and keys to his wife\u2019s car were in his pockets. His rings and pins were not taken. The insured 'had a pistol wound in the -back under the right shoulder blade andi another about one inch above his left ear. A .38 calibre pistol bullet passed through the -head and was recovered from the side opposite the point of entry. Tire marks near the dead man\u2019s body \u201ctook off\u201d toward Highway 301, \u201cspinning, . . . up dirt.\u201d The deceased\u2019s cab was found in a parking lot at Dunn, North Carolina, at about four o\u2019clock on the morning of April 6. The distance between Selma and Smithfieldi is approximately three miles and between Smithfield .and Dunn is approximately 22 miles.\nThe coroner made an investigation and report, though he did not impanel a jury or hold a formal inquest. The plaintiff offered the report, which was excluded on defendant\u2019s objection. The plaintiff excepted. The plaintiff signed and .filed proof of .claim which was prepared by the defendant\u2019s agent. The evidence was in conflict as to whether the plaintiff knew the .contents qf the claim relating to' the cause of death.\nAt the close of the plaintiff\u2019s evidence, the trial judge entered judgment of compulsory nonsuit, from which the plaintiff appealed.\nJoseph H. Levinson, William I Godwin for plaintiff, appellant.\nAllen & Hipp, Wellons & Wellons for defendant, appellee." }, "file_name": "0265-01", "first_page_order": 305, "last_page_order": 309 }