{ "id": 8623209, "name": "STATE v. ALEX TAYLOR", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Taylor", "decision_date": "1959-05-20", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "363", "last_page": "366", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "250 N.C. 363" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "95 S.E. 2d 548", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 N.C. 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8606795 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/245/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 S.E. 2d 594", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 N.C. 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8606923 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/245/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 S.E. 600", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "190 N.C. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8599745 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/190/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 S.E. 2d 926", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "242 N.C. 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8617602 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/242/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 S.E. 2d 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "242 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8608169 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/242/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 S.E. 2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 N.C. 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8615924 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/245/0604-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 493, "char_count": 9100, "ocr_confidence": 0.434, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8903083469065235e-07, "percentile": 0.7289052373323696 }, "sha256": "7d184b27a7b69eab93ffd13fa8e6b5bf8afe00b37a42a2b40e23ff55a578e0a5", "simhash": "1:a7de79e3fec588b7", "word_count": 1498 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:44:40.326881+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE v. ALEX TAYLOR." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Bobbitt, J.\nDefendant\u2019s assignments of error, directed to the court\u2019s denial of his motion for judgment of nonsuit, are overruled. Indeed, on oral argument, defendant\u2019s counsel frankly conceded that the evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to warrant submission to the jury and to support the verdict. Hence, there is no need to state evidential facts other than those necessary to understand the assignments of error stressed by defendant.\nOn cross-examination, defendant testified: \u201cThe man I think put the stuff there is Oliver Lucas who lives right behind me.\u201d Again: \u201cHe (Oliver Lucas) came up to the house -about two or three days before that .to speak to me about this \u2014 I guess it\u2019s this; I don\u2019t know. He wanted to use my garage to put white liquor in and I said 'No.\u2019 And he said: \u2018Well, in case you do see some around there, you won\u2019t say anything about it, will you? You won\u2019t see it?\u2019 or something like that, land as far as I know, I didn\u2019t answer him. ... I told him he couldn\u2019t use the garage. As for telling him that he couldn\u2019t put it behind the garage, I don\u2019t believe I ever answered him.\u201d Defendant testified that if he had seen Lucas the daiy preceding the day of his arrest, that is, on August 26, 1958, \u201cit was off at a distance,\u201d and that he was not \u201cin Oliver Lucas\u2019 presence.\u201d\nAfter defendant had so testified, the State offered an ABC enforcement officer who testified, over objections by defendant, that he had seen the defendant on August 26, 1958, between -seven and eight A.M., in company with Oliver Lucas and one Woodrow Jordan, on Union Street in Greensboro; that defendant and Lucas left together in a 1946 Mercury four-door sedan; and that Jordan left in .another car.\nDefendant\u2019s contention that the court erred in admitting the officer\u2019s testimony is based upon the -premise that it related to a collateral matter and therefore the State was bound by defendant\u2019s .answer. Relevant to whether -the subject of the contradictory testimony relates to a material or a collateral matter, defendant quotes Stansbury, North Carolina Evidence, \u00a7 48(3): \u201cThe proper test would seem to be whether \u25a0the evidence offered in contradiction would be admissible if tendered for some purpose other than mere contradiction; or, in case of prior inconsistent statements, whether evidence of the facts \u00a1stated would be so admissible.\u201d The \u201cproper test,\u201d 'ajs so defined, is 'amply supported by oases cited by Professor Stansbury \u00a1and by defendant. But when this test is -applied, it appears -that the officer's testimony was competent.\nThe State\u2019s evidence in chief .contained no reference to Lucas. Lucas was introduced by defendant as a person who, two Or three days before the whiskey was found, had approached defendant with reference to putting nontaxp-aid whiskey on defendant\u2019s premises and to whom defendant had given no answer as'to whether Lucas could put it behind defendant\u2019s garage. Indeed, defendant stated frankly that he believed Lucas had put it there. The fact that defendant was seen with Lucas, going off with him in a car, on the morning preceding the morning when the whiskey was found on defendant\u2019s premises, considered in connection with the testimony relating to defendant\u2019s prior conference with Lucas, was a relevant circumstance bearing upon whether the whiskey was on defendant\u2019s premises with his knowledge and consent. Thus, the evidence was properly admitted as material to the issue, not for the mere purpose of contradicting defendant in relation to a collateral matter.\nDefendant assigns as error portions of the charge as given relating to constructive possession. Defendant concedes that possession may be either active or contractive. S. v. Harrelson, 245 N.C. 604, 606, 96 S.E. 2d 867, and cases cited. His.contention is based largely .on the asserted inadequacy of the court\u2019s instructions. \u201cIt is elemental that an exception to an excerpt from the charge ordinarily does not challenge the 'omission of the court to charge further on the same or another aspect of the case.\u201d Peek v. Trust Co., 242 N.C. 1, 16, 86 S.E. 2d 745, and cases cited; Rigsbee v. Perkins, 242 N.C. 502, 503, 87 S.E. 2d 926. Even so, when the evidential facts are considered, the instructions given appear adequate.\nDefendant asserts that the court erred in instructing the jury as follows: \u201c. . . where liquor is on the premises of a pereofn, or any other article of personal property for that matter, with his knowledge and consent, it is ras a matter of law in\u2019'his constructive possession.\u201d (Our italics) In S. v. Meyers, 190 N.C. 239, 129 S.E. 600, on which defendant relies, it was held that mere knowledge of the fact that the whiskey was on the 'defendant\u2019s premises was insufficient to establish as a matter. of law that such whiskey was i'n .the defendant\u2019s constructive possession. However, if nontaxpaid whiskey is on a person\u2019s premises with his knowledge and consent, he has constructive possession thereof while it remains on premises under his exclusive control.\nAssignments of error directed to the 'court\u2019s instructions as to aiding and abetting have been fully considered but do not merit particular discussion. Suffice to say, none discloses prejudicial error.\nIt is noted that the court explicitly instructed the jury that defendant would not be guilty on either count if a'nother penson \u201ccame and placed it there behind this garage without .his knowledge or consent.\u201d\nDefendant has failed to show prejudicial error in the conduct of the trial. The judgment, .as to the first count, is affirmed. As to the second count, appeal having been taken to entry of judgment suspending the prison sentence, the judgment pronounced on the second count is stricken and the cause is remanded for proper judgment. See S. v. Henderson, 245 N.C. 165, 95 S.E. 2d 594, and S. v. Moore, 245 N.C. 158, 95 S.E. 2d 548, and cases cited therein.\nAs to first count: No error \u2014 Judgment affirmed.\nAs to second count: No error in trial \u2014 Remanded for proper judgment.", "type": "majority", "author": "Bobbitt, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Seaioell and Assistant Attorney General Mc-Galliard for the State.", "E. L. Alston, Jr., for defendant, appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE v. ALEX TAYLOR.\n(Filed 20 May, 1959.)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 S3, 84, 85\u2014 Intoxicating Liquor \u00a7 12\u2014\nWhere there is testimony that the intoxicating liquor in question was placed on defendant\u2019s premises by another, and defendant has \u2022testified that on the day before .the whiskey was found on defendant\u2019s premises he had not been in \u25a0 the .presence of such other person, testimony by a State\u2019s witness that on the day before the occurrence defendant was seen in the presence of such other person is competent .as material to .the issue as to whether the liquor was placed on defendant\u2019s premises with his consent, and the rule that the State is concluded by the defendant\u2019s testimony as to a collateral matter is inap-posite.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 156\u2014\nOrdinarily an exception to an exerpt from the charge does not present asserted error of the court in failing to charge further on the same or another aspect of the case.\n3. Intoxicating Liquor \u00a7 5\u2014\nWhile mere knowledge of defendant that intoxicating liquor is on his land does not establish as a matter of law that the whiskey is in defendant\u2019s constructive possession, if the whiskey is on defendant\u2019s premises with his knowledge and consent, he has constructive possession thereof while it remains on premises under his exclusive control.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 135, 169\u2014\nWhere no error .is found on the count upon which sentence is suspended, the judgment must be set aside and the cause remanded for proper judgment.\nAppeal by defendant from Armstrong,