{ "id": 8625466, "name": "STATE v. WILLIAM F. FURMAGE", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Furmage", "decision_date": "1959-07-02", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "616", "last_page": "627", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "250 N.C. 616" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "219 U.S. 346", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3652922 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/219/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 U.S. 91", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 675086 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/234/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 So. 2d 612", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1696892 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ala-app/37/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 N.W. 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": 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WILLIAM F. FURMAGE." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Bobbitt, J.\nThe Recorder\u2019s Court of Red Springs District, Robeson County, is one of six district recorders\u2019 courts in Robeson County created by Chapter 634, Puiblic-Local Laws of 1915.\nSection 6(f) of the 1915 Act provided: \u201cWarrants may be issued by- the recorders of said courts or by any justice of the peace of Robeson County, made returnable to said courts, for any person or persons charged with the commission of any offense of which the said courts have jurisdiction; . .\nThe 1915 Act was amended by Chapter 572, Public-Local Laws of 1925; by Chapter 333, Public-Local Laws of 1927; and by Chapter 22, Public-Local Laws of 1937.\nThe 1927 and 1937 amendments, in pertinent part, provide: \u201cThat the prosecuting attorneys of the recorders\u2019 courts of Robeson County, as provided for by Public-Local Laws of one thousand nine hundred and fifteen, chapter six hundred thirty-four, shall have full power and authority to issue warrants, summons, subpoenas, commitments and administer oaths, and all other papers incident to the dispatch of business in said courts, ...\u201d\nThe warrants, issued by C. Durham Ratley, Solicitor of the Recorder\u2019s Court of Red Springs District, Robeson County, upon his examination under oath administered by him of one J. H. Creech, commanded the arrest of defendant to answer the charges set forth in the appended affidavits of Creech. The warrants were returnable to said recorder\u2019s court. \u201cThe affidavit and warrant must be read together, and so construed.\u201d S. v. Gupton, 166 N.C. 257, 80 S.E. 989; Moser v. Fulk, 237 N.C. 302, 74 S.E. 2d 729, and cases cited.\nThere is no contention that the warrants failed to allege facts sufficient to constitute criminal offenses, or that said recorder\u2019s court did not have jurisdiction of the criminal offenses therein charged, or that C. Durham Ratley was not the duly qualified solicitor or prosecuting attorney of said recorder\u2019s court.\nJudge Hobgood, allowing defendant\u2019s said motions, quashed the warrants upon the ground that, \u201cinsofar as said public-local laws purport to confer authority on Solicitors of the Recorders Courts of Robeson County to administer oaths and to issue warrants for arrest,\u201d they are null and void \u201cfor that the same are in violation of Article I, Section 8, of the North Carolina Constitution.\u201d\nArticle I, Section 8, Constitution of North Carolina, provides: \"The legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other.\u201d (Our italics) Originally, this provision (Article I, Section 8) was Section 4 of \"A Declaration of Rights\u201d of the Constitution of 1776. See, The Constitution of North Carolina, Connor and Cheshire.\nArticle I, Section 15, which contains the only specific reference to warrants, provides: \u201cGeneral warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded to search suspected places, without evidence of the act committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, whose offense is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty and ought not to be granted.\u201d Originally, this provision (Article I, Section 15) was Section 11 of \u201cA Declaration of Rights\u201d of the Constitution of 1776. See, The Constitution of North Carolina, Connor and Cheshire. It relates to the essentials of a valid warrant. Brewer v. Wynne, 163 N.C. 319, 79 S.E. 629.\nArticle IV, Section 12, of our organic law, incorporated therein by the Convention of 1875, provides: \u201cThe General Assembly shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which rightfully pertains to it as a coordinate department of the government; but the General Assembly shall allot and distribute that portion of this power and jurisdiction which does not pertain to the Supreme Court among the other courts prescribed in this Constitution or which may be established by law, in such manner as it may deem best; provide also a proper system of appeals; and regulate by l'aw, when necessary, the methods of proceeding in the exercise of their powers, of all the courts below the Supreme Court, so far as the same may be done without conflict with other provisions of this Constitution.\u201d\nArticle II, Section 29, providing, in part, \u201c(T)he General Assembly shall not pass any local, private, or special act or resolution relating to the establishment of courts inferior to the Superior Court,\u201d (our italics) did not become a part of the Constitution of North Carolina until January 10, 1917, that is, subsequent to the passage of the 1915 Act creating the Recorder\u2019s Court of Red Springs District, Robeson County. Defendant makes no contention that said public-local laws are invalid as violative of Article II, Section 29. In this connection, see Provision Co. v. Daves, 190 N.C. 7, 128 S.E. 593; S. v. Horne, 191 N.C. 375, 131 S.E. 753; Williams v. Cooper, 222 N.C. 589, 24 S.E. 2d 484; In re Wingler, 231 N.C. 560, 565, 58 S.E. 2d 372; S. v. Norman, 237 N.C. 205, 210, 74 S.E. 2d 602. Compare, In re Harris, 183 N.C. 633, 112 S.E. 425, and S. v. Williams, 209 N.C. 57, 182 S.E. 711.\nNo provision of the Constitution of North Carolina designates the officials who are or may be clothed with authority to issue warrants. The officials authorized to issue warrants are those upon whom such authority has been conferred by the General Assembly.\nG.S. 15-18 provides: \u201cThe\u2019 following persons respectively have power to issue process for the apprehension of persons charged with any offense, and to execute the powers and duties conferred in this chapter, namely: The Chief Justice and the associate justices of the Supreme Court, the judges of the superior court, judges of criminal courts, presiding officers of inferior courts, justices of the peace, mayors of cities, or other chief officers of incorporated towns.\u201d\nIn addition to the authority conferred by G.S. 15-18, the General Assembly, by said public-local acts, has specifically conferred on the solicitor of the Recorder\u2019s Court of Red Springs District, Robeson County, the power to issue warrants. Defendant does not attack these statutes on the ground they are public-local acts. Hence, insofar as Article I, Section 8, Constitution of North Carolina, may be relevant, the said solicitor\u2019s authority has the same status as if conferred by G.S. 15-18.\nIn S. v. Thomas, 141 N.C. 791, 53 S.E. 522, the authority of the Mayor of Monroe to issue a valid warrant was not challenged. The office imposed upon the mayor both administrative and judicial duties. The question raised was whether under applicable statutes the board of aldermen could confer the mayor\u2019s authority to issue warrants upon the person chosen to act (in the absence of the mayor) as mayor pro tern. It was held that the mayor pro tern, was authorized, in the mayor\u2019s absence, to execute all the duties of the office, including authority to issue a valid warrant.\nIn S. v. Turner, 170 N.C. 701, 86 S.E. 1019, the appeal was based on defendant\u2019s exceptions to the court\u2019s refusal to quash the warrant and to-arrest judgment. Defendant\u2019s motions were interposed \u201con the ground that the chief of police of High Point' had no authority to take the affidavit of the complainant who applied for the warrant and signed as 'complainant, and, therefore, had no authority to issue the warrant.\u201d Clark, C. J., said: \u201cThere are several grounds on either of which the'judgment was correct. Sec. 9, ch. 569, Public-Local Laws 1913, creating the court at High Point, provides: \u2018All processes of said court- shall be issued by either the judge of said court or by the chief of police/the same to be issued on affidavit and returnable forthwith to said court.\u2019 The statute authorizing the chief of police to issue process inferentially confers on him the power to pass upon the sufficiency of the complaint as basis for a warrant and to administer the oath before issuing the process.\u201d No reference to Article I, -Section 8, appears in the opinion or in the briefs.- ' \u2022\nIt seems appropriate to refer briefly to certain recent decisions of this Court in which the defendant challenged the validity of a-warrant, viz.:\nThis Court held that a defendant\u2019s right to challenge as unconstitutional (but not as violative of Article I, Section 8) a statute authorizing the issuance of warrants by a desk sergeant, S. v. Doughtie, 238 N.C. 228, 77 S.E. 2d 642, and by a police lieutenant, S. v. St. Clair, 246 N.C. 183, 97 S.E. 2d 840, w-as waived when the defendant\u2019s objection was first made after trial and conviction in a court having original jurisdiction.\nIn S. v. Wilson, 237 N.C. 746, 75 S.E. 2d 924, it was held that a defendant\u2019s right to challenge as unconstitutional (but not as viola-tive of Article I, Section 8) a -statute authorizing the issuance of warrants by a police sergeant, was waived when the objection was first made in the Supreme Court.\nIn S. v. McHone, 243 N. C. 231, 90 S.E. 2d 536, and in S. v. McHone, 243 N.C. 235, 90 S.E. 2d 539, the justice of the peace who issued the warrants was also a police officer of Mount Airy; and the warrants were issued on affidavit of another police officer of Mount Airy. The latter decision (243 N.C. 235) was based in part on the ground that defendant\u2019s plea in abatement, by which he challenged the validity of the warrant, came too late, i.e., after trial and conviction in a court having original jurisdiction. The former decision (243 N.C. 231) was put on different grounds. There it was held that the person who issued the warrant did so as authorized by G.S. 15-18 in his capacity as justice of .the peace. Winborne, J. (later C. J.), said: \u201cThus in the light of. the factual situation in hand, this Court deems the action of the justice of the peace to be permissible under the proviso of Sec. 7 of Article XIV of the Constitution of North Carolina. And it does not appear that such action.is violative of any provision of either the State, or the Federal Constitution.\u201d Although no specific reference is made in the opinion .to Article I, Section 8, this constitutional provision was brought to the attention of this Court and discussed in the- briefs.\nIn S. v. McGowan, 243 N.C. 431, 90 S.E. 2d 703, there was no warrant but \u201cat most an affidavit of a complaining witness upon which a warrant of arrest might be predicated.\u201d No question was presented as to the validity of a -statute authorizing persons other than those designated in G.S. 15-18 to issue warrants.\nIn S. v. Blackwell, 246 N.C. 642, 99 S.E. 2d 867, the judgment quashing the warrant issued .by: a police sergeant was upheld on the ground there was no statutory \u00a1-authority authorizing -his issuance of the warrant.\nDefendant does not challenge the power of the General Assembly under Article IV, Section 12, to regulate the practice and procedure in the Recorder\u2019s Court of Red Springs District, Robeson County, .\u201cso far as the same may be done without conflict with other provisions of this Constitution.\u201d He does not attack as invalid any provision of said public-local laws except that conferring authority on the solicitor of said recorder\u2019s court to issue warrants; and the sole \u25a0ground for this attack is that this particular provision of said public-local laws is violative of Article I, Section 8.\nOur question is whether the General Assembly, by reason of Article I, Section 8, is prohibited from conferring .such authority upon such solicitor. If not, whether, as a matter of policy, such authority should be conferred is solely for legislative determination.\nIn undertaking our task of decision, we are mindful that \u201c(I)n considering the constitutionality of a statute, every presumption is to be indulged in favor of its validity.\u201d Stacy, C. J., in S. v. Lueders, 214 N.C. 558, 561, 200 S.E. 22. Too, \u201c. . . under our Constitution, the General Assembly, so far as that instrument is concerned, is possessed of full legislative .powers unless restrained by express constitutional .provision or necessary implication therefrom.\u201d Hoke, J. (later C.J.), in Thomas v. Sanderlin, 173 N.C. 329, 332, 91 S.E. 1028.\nThe only decisions cited by defendant in support of his position are Lewis v. Commissioners, 74 N.C. 194, S. v. Crowder, 193 N.C. 130, 136 S.E. 337, and S. v. Thomas, 236 N.C. 454, 73 S.E. 2d 283. Defendant fails to identify the portion of the opinion in S. v. Thomas, supra, he deems relevant to the question under consideration.\nIn Lewis v. Commissioners, supra, the opinion of Bynum, J., contains these statements, which are quoted with approval in S. v. Crowder, supra, viz.: \u201cA Solicitor is not a judicial officer. He cannot administer an oath. He cannot declare the law. He cannot instruct the grand jury in the law. That function belongs to the Judge alone.\u201d Lewis v. Commissioners, supra, related to whether a person summoned by the Clerk of the Superior Court of Wake County to appear \u201cto give evidence in a certain matter then and there to be inquired of by the grand jury,\u201d was, absent a statute so providing, entitled \u25a0bo prove a witness ticket for his appearance and attendance. In S. v. Crowder, supra, this Court held a plea in abatement to the bills of indictment should have been sustained when it appeared that the solicitor was with the grand jury, \u201cparticipated in the examination of the witness and explained the testimony to the grand jury and advised and procured their action in finding a true bill.\" No reference is made in the opinions to Article I, Section 8, of our Constitution.\nGeneral statements to the effect that a solicitor (prosecuting attorney) is or is not \u201ca judicial officer\u201d must be considered in relation to the legal problem presented in each case. In Lewis v. Commissioners, supra, and in S. v. Crowder, supra, whether judicial power had been or could be committed to a solicitor was not presented. Nothing in the nature of a judicial act was involved.\nIn vaified factual situations, and in relation to diverse legal problems, a prosecuting attorney has been held \u201ca judicial officer.\u201d Cawley v. Warren (CA 7th), 216 F. 2d 74; Tinder v. Music Operating (Ind.), 142 N.E. 2d 610; S. ex rel. Freed v. Circuit Court of Martin County (Ind.), 14 N.E. 2d 910. In other cases, he is referred to as a \u201cquasi-judicial officer,\u201d or as a public officer acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. Commonwealth v. Ragone (Pa.), 176 A. 454, 456; Holder v. State (Ark.), 25 S.W. 279.\nA solicitor, as a public officer and as an officer of the court, is vested/ with important discretionary powers. True, it is his responsibility, upon a fair and impartial trial, to bring forward all available evidence and to prosecute persons charged with crime. Even so, prior to prosecution, if he finds the available evidence insufficient to support a conviction, he may enter a nolle prosequi or. nolle prosequi with leave. G.S. 15-175; Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 159 N.C. 265, 74 S.E. 740. In S. v. Moody, 69 N.C 529, Reade, J., said: \u201cIt was discussed at the bar whether it is within the power of a Solicitor to dis- \u25a0 charge a defendant or to enter a nol. pros., etc., or whether that is the province of the court. The rule is that it is within the control of the court, but it is usually and properly left to the discretion of the Solicitor.\u201d Also, see S. v. Thompson, 10 N.C. 613; S. v. Buchanan, 23 N.C. 59; S. v. Conly, 130 N.C. 683, 41 S.E. 534; 27 C.J.S., District & Pros. Attys. \u00a7 14(1).\nThe contention that the General Assembly had no power to authorize the solicitor to administer an oath is untenable and requires no discussion. Clearly, the administration of an oath does not involve the exercise of judicial powers.\nTrue, a solicitor, absent authorization by the General Assembly, has no authority to administer an oath or to issue a warrant. Our question is whether he may lawfully do so when specifically authorized by the General Assembly.\nSince the responsibility of prosecution rests on the solicitor, it would seem he would not be disposed to authorize arrests in the absence of sufficient evidence to justify trial. Indeed, the practice in the federal courts, with certain exceptions, is that no application for the issuance of a warrant is made unless first approved by the office of the district attorney.\nIn S. ex rel. Freed v. Circuit Court of Martin County, supra, the action was for a writ of prohibition to stay the prosecution of a criminal case on the ground that the respondent judge had ordered the prosecuting attorney to approve the affidavit on which the prosecution was based. The writ was granted. This excerpt from the opinion indicates the basis of decision: \u201cIt is clear that the affidavit was approved under coercion, or what seemed to be coercion. The prosecuting attorney is a judicial officer, charged with .the administration of justice. Criminal prosecutions cannot be instituted/ by private individuals. They may be initiated by grand jury indictment. . . . Formerly the only other method was an information. For this latter procedure the Legislature substituted prosecutions by affidavit, approved \u2018by the prosecuting attorney. The public policy, evidenced by the requirement that the affidavit must be approved by the prosecuting attorney, is apparent in former statutes. Its purpose is to protect citizens against criminal actions until the charges are investigated and the prosecution approved by the officer who is by law vested with jurisdiction to act for the state. This officer is not the judge. It is the prosecuting attorney. Jurisdiction to approve, and thus make possible, the prosecution of criminal actions lies with the grand jury or the prosecuting attorney, and not elsewhere.\u201d\nWhether the issuance of a warrant is a ministerial or a judicial act is the subject of conflicting decisions, based largely on the statutes of the particular jurisdictions. In State v. Price (Ohio), 137 N.E. 2d 163, it was held that the issuance of a warrant (by a deputy clerk of a municipal court) was a ministerial act. In State v. Dibble (Conn.), 22 A. 155, it was held that the issuance of a warrant by the city attorney was a ministerial act.\nIn S. v. McGowan, supra, Higgins, J., for this Court, said: \u201cThe issuance of a warrant of arrest is a judicial act.\u201d As the context plainly indicates, this statement was based on the provisions of G.S. 15-19 and G.S. 15-20 which vest discretionary power in officials authorized to issue warrants. We need not consider whether the General Assembly, within the limitations of Article I, Section 15, of our Constitution, has the power to authorize the issuance of warrants upon proper affidavit as ministerial acts. Relevant to the right of a police officer to arrest without warrant, see G.S. 15-41 as amended by Ch. 58, Session Laws of 1955.\nReference is made to Article I, Section 8, in the following cases:\nIn discussing Article I, Section 8, in the dissenting opinion in S. v. Bell, 184 N.C. 701, 719, 115 S.E. 190, Stacy, J. (later C. J.), aptly described the judicial -department of our government as \u201cthe department of trial and judgment.\u201d\nIt has been held that the exclusive power to establish its own rules of practice and procedure is vested in the Supreme Court by Article I, Section 8, and Article IV, Section 12, and that the General Assembly has no power to modify the rules so established. Horton v. Green, 104 N.C. 400, 10 S.E. 470; Herndon v. Insurance Co., 111 N.C. 384, 16 S.E. 465; S. v. Johnson, 183 N.C. 730, 110 S.E. 782; Cooper v. Commissioners, 184 N.C. 615, 113 S.E. 569; S. v. Ward, 184 N.C. 618, 113 S.E. 775; Hardy v. Heath, 188 N.C. 271, 124 S.E. 564; Lacy v. State, 195 N.C. 284, 141 S.E. 886.\nThe Attorney General directs our attention to the statement of Clark, J. (later C. J.), in the dissenting opinion in Wilson v. Jordan, 124 N.C. 683, 705, 33 S.E. 139. Referring to Article I, Section 8, he said: \u201cThe independence of the Supreme Court only (and not of the entire judicial department) is provided for.\u201d When we recall that Article I, Section 8, was a part of the Constitution of 1776, and that the Supreme Court had no constitutional status until the Constitution of 1868, we are not disposed to give full approval to the quoted statement. It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court of North Carolina was established by the General Assembly. Acts of 1818, Chapter 1. As stated by Clark, J. (later C. J.), in Herndon v. Insurance Co., supra: \u201cThe Supreme Court was originally created in 1818 by legis-lafcive enactment, and remained till 1868, as to its powers, its duties, its rules, even as to its very existence, subject to control by the Le-islature, which -could abolish or modify it -since it had created it.\u201d See, Battle\u2019s History of the Supreme Court, 1 N.C. (Reprint) 837, and Clark\u2019s History of the Supreme Court, 177 N.C. 617.\nIn Cox v. Kinston, 217 N.C. 391, 8 S.E. 2d 252, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the statute creating the Kinston Housing Authority on the ground, inter alia, that it delegated judicial functions to the city council, a nonjudicial body, in violation of Article I, Section 8. Relevant to this ground of challenge, Seawell, J., said: \u201cAs to the judicial function, the Legislature itself has none, and,'therefore, the use of the word \u2018delegation\u2019 is not apt as regarding the power of the Legislature to confer judicial powers. The Legislature has always, without serious question, given quasi-judicial powers to administrative bodies in aid of the duties assigned to them, without necessarily making them courts. Such powers are given to the Utilities Commission, the Industrial Commission, the Commissioner of Revenue, the State Board of Assessment, and/, in lesser degree, to many other State agencies which we might add to the list. The performance of gwasi-judicial and administrational ' duties by the same board violates no implication of the cited section of the Constitution, requiring that the supreme judicial power be kept separate from -the legislative and executive. Certainly the limited discretion given to these bodies is no part of the \u2018supreme judicial power\u2019 of the State.\u201d\nA reference to Article I, Section 8, appears in the dissenting opinion of Seawell, J., in Humphrey v. Churchill, Sheriff, 217 N.C. 530, 533, 8 S.E. 2d 810.\nThis statement appears in 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law \u00a7 318: \u201cWhen so provided by statute the authority to issue warrants may be vested in officers whose other duties are purely ministerial, such as clerks, sheriffs, prosecuting attorneys, coroners, mayors, and the like.\u201d Also, see 4 Am. Jur., Arrest \u00a7 9; 10 Am. Jur., Clerks of Court \u00a7 16.\nLegislation authorizing clerks to issue warrants has been upheld on the ground that, although involving the exercise of a judicial or gwasi-j-udicial function, the determination is in no sense a final adjudication. Kreulhaus v. City of Birmingham (Ala.), 51 So. 297; Gladden v. State (Ala.), 54 So. 2d 607; State v. Van Brocklin (Wis.), 217 N.W. 277.\nIn Holloman v. State (Ala.), 74 So. 2d 612, the warrant was issued by the County Solicitor upon affidavit executed before him. The court, in opinion by Harwood, J., said: \u201cWhile the ascertainment of probable cause upon which to issue a warrant of arrest involves the exercise of a judicial function, as distinguished from merely administrative or ministerial powers, yet the legislature may commit such functions to ministerial officers because it is not final. (Citations) \u201d\nIn Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 34 S. Ct. 712, 58 L. Ed. 1231, the information on which the prosecution was based was signed by the prosecuting attorney, after his preliminary investigation and examination of witnesses under oath, as authorized by the Act of Congress applicable to the City of Manila, Philippine Islands. The accused moved to vacate the order of arrest \"upon the ground that it was made without any preliminary investigation held by the court, and without any tribunal, magistrate, or other competent authority having first determined that the alleged crime had been committed, and that there was probable cause to believe the defendants guilty of it.\u201d The Supreme Court of the United States, in opinion by Mr. Justice Pitney, said: \"It is insisted that the finding of probable cause is a judicial act, and cannot properly be delegated to a prosecuting attorney. We think, however, that it is erroneous to regard this function ... as being judicial in the proper sense. There is no definite adjudication. A finding that there is no probable cause is not equivalent to an acquittal, but only entitles the accused to his liberty for the present, leaving him subject to rearrest. ... In short, the function of determining that probable cause exists for the arrest of a person accused is only quasi judicial, and not such that, because of its nature, it must necessarily be confided to a strictly judicial officer or tribunal.\u201d It was held that said motion was properly overruled.\nStory, in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1833), Vol. 2, \u00a7 524, said: \u201cBut when we speak of a separation of the three great departments of government, and maintain, that that separation is indispensable to public liberty, we are to understand this maxim in a limited sense. It is not meant to affirm, that they must be kept wholly and entirely separate and distinct, and have no common link of connexion or dependence, the one upon the other, in the slightest degree. The true meaning is, that the whole power of one of these departments should not be exercised by the same -hands, which possess the whole power of either of the other departments; and that -such exercise of the whole would subvert the principles of a free constitution.\u201d\nWe forbear extended discussion of the term \u201cjudicial power.\u201d 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law \u00a7 144; 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law \u00a7 202. This quotation from Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 31 S. Ct. 250, 55 L. Ed. 246, indicates its essential nature: \u201c 'Judicial power,\u2019 says Mr. Justice Miller, in his work on the Constitution, \u2018is the power of a court to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between persons and parties who bring a case before it for decision.\u2019 Miller, Const. 314.\u201d\nArticle I, Section 8, providing that \u201c(T)he legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other,\u201d is to be considered as a general statement of a broad, albeit fundamental, constitutional principle.\nDefendant has not cited, nor has our research disclosed, any decision in which legislation authorizing the issuance of warrants by officials other than those whose functions are exclusively or primarily judicial in character has been declared void as violative of such a constitutional provision.\nWhile we do not presently undertake to mark out .the precise meaning of Article I, Section 8, we have no difficulty in concluding that the issuance of a warrant, whether considered a judicial act, a quasi-judicial act, a judicial function, or a ministerial act, does not require or involve the exercise of supreme judicial power within the meaning of that term as used in Article I, Section 8.\nTherefore, we hold that the said public-local laws are not void as violative of Article I, Section 8; and that the court erred in quashing the warrants.\nReversed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Bobbitt, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Seawell, Assistant Attorney General Love and Bernard A. Harrell, Member of Staff, for the State.", "Britt, Campbell & Britt for defendant, appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE v. WILLIAM F. FURMAGE.\n(Filed 2 July, 1959.)\n1. Indictment and Warrant \u00a7 6\u2014\nThe Constitution of North Carolina does not designate officials who are or may he clothed with authority to issue warrants, and\u2019 therefore .the General Assembly may designate such officials.\n2. Constitutional Law \u00a7 6\u2014\nMatters of public policy are in the exclusive province of the General Assembly.\n3. Constitutional Law \u00a7 10: Statutes \u00a7 6\u2014\nEvery presumption is to be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.\n4. Constitutional Law \u00a7 6\u2014\nThe General Assembly has' full legislative powers unless restrained by express constitutional provision or necessary implication therefrom.\n5. Solicitors \u00a7 3\u2014\nA solicitor is an official of the court and is vested with important discretionary powers some of which, like the power to- enter a nolle prosequi, are quasi-judicial in nature.\n6. Constitutional Law \u00a7 5: Indictment and Warrant \u00a7 6\u2014\nThe provisions of Chapter 634, Public-Local Laws 1916, sec. 6(f), authorizing the solicitors of the Recorders Courts of Robeson County to issue warrants of arrest are valid and are not in conflict with Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of North Carolina, since the issuance of warrants does not involve the exercise of the supreme judicial powers within the meaning of that term as used in this section of- the Constitution.\nAppeal by the State from Hobgood, J., January Criminal Term, 1959, of Robeson.\nThis appeal is from a judgment quashing two warrants, each charging defendant with a misdemeanor of which the Recorder\u2019s Court of Red Springs District, Robeson County, had original jurisdiction.\nIn said Recorder\u2019s Court, defendant\u2019s motions to quash the warrants, aptly made, were overruled. Thereupon, defendant pleaded not guilty. Upon trial, defendant was found guilty of the criminal offenses charged in the warrants. Judgments were pronounced. Defendant appealed.\n\u25a0 In the superior court, defendant\u2019s motions to quash the warrants, aptly made, were allowed; and judgment, in accordance with the court\u2019s ruling, was entered. The State, pursuant to G.S. 15-179, appealed.\nAttorney General Seawell, Assistant Attorney General Love and Bernard A. Harrell, Member of Staff, for the State.\nBritt, Campbell & Britt for defendant, appellee." }, "file_name": "0616-01", "first_page_order": 656, "last_page_order": 667 }