{
  "id": 8622740,
  "name": "HARDING L. CLARK v. WALLACE E. RUCKER and wife, JEAN W. RUCKER",
  "name_abbreviation": "Clark v. Rucker",
  "decision_date": "1959-10-21",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "90",
  "last_page": "91",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "251 N.C. 90"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 183,
    "char_count": 2251,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.508,
    "sha256": "53ea4bc54fbda932e0102f7aeb5d5944742b7e88ce3f8a215faf3d31b1d21441",
    "simhash": "1:9b191b761c96c148",
    "word_count": 372
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:26:21.126874+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Higgins, J., not sitting."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "HARDING L. CLARK v. WALLACE E. RUCKER and wife, JEAN W. RUCKER."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Per Curiam.\nThe Highway Commission may determine safe speeds on highways in proximity to schools. When conditions do not exist requiring a limitation of speed, the Commission is not required to impose restrictions. Here the posted signs fixed the time when the speed restriction was in force. The collision did not occur during that period. It follows that a speed not in excess of 55 m.p.h. was not per se unlawful.\nNo error.\nHiggins, J., not sitting.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Per Curiam."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Fate J. Beal for plaintiff, appellee.",
      "Townsend and Todd for defendant, appellants."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "HARDING L. CLARK v. WALLACE E. RUCKER and wife, JEAN W. RUCKER.\n(Filed 21 October, 1959.)\n1. Automobile \u00a7 25\u2014\nThe limitation of speed in the vicinity of a school house during school hours, effected by the posting of appropriate signs by the Highway Commission, does not affect the speed restrictions outside the time limited.\nHiggins, J., not sitting.\nAppeal by defendants from Campbell, J., May Term, 1959, of Caldwell.\nPlaintiff sought and was awarded compensation for damages done to his automobile in a collision with an automobile owned by defendant Wallace Rucker, driven by his wife, Jean Rucker.\nThe collision occurred 9 December 1958 on Highway 321 near Lenoir. Plaintiff's vehicle was, according to plaintiff\u2019s testimony, traveling southwardly at a speed of 35 to 40 m.p.h.; defendants\u2019 evidence tended to fix the speed in excess of 60 m.p.h.\nDefendant\u2019s vehicle pulled from a parking area on plaintiff\u2019s right, immediately in front of plaintiff. The collision occurred not far from a schoolhouse and in an area in which the speed limit during school hours had been fixed (G.S. 20-141.1) at 35 m.p.h. by posted signs. The signs limited the speed restriction to school hours. The collision occurred after school hours.\nThe court charged the jury that the maximum speed limit was 55 m.p.h., and a speed in excess thereof would constitute negligence. He further charged: \u201c. . . even if she were driving it at a speed less than fifty-five miles an hour, she nevertheless had to still drive it at a speed which was not greater than was reasonable and prudent under the conditions as they then existed.\u201d Defendant excepted' to the charge, insisting that speed in excess of 35 m.p.h. was unlawful and negligent.\nFate J. Beal for plaintiff, appellee.\nTownsend and Todd for defendant, appellants."
  },
  "file_name": "0090-01",
  "first_page_order": 134,
  "last_page_order": 135
}