{
  "id": 8627090,
  "name": "J. E. DANIEL v. BUTLER LUMBER COMPANY, INC.",
  "name_abbreviation": "Daniel v. Butler Lumber Co.",
  "decision_date": "1961-04-19",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "504",
  "last_page": "506",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "254 N.C. 504"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "221 N.C. 546",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 271,
    "char_count": 4124,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.546,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 4.400479698708787e-08,
      "percentile": 0.27620587146200415
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    "sha256": "7e9457d9eae629f3e1109f2f2218b863e97f10794f256c132ff741541ef4f285",
    "simhash": "1:f1cb8fd8b64cd74b",
    "word_count": 643
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:52:35.681015+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "J. E. DANIEL v. BUTLER LUMBER COMPANY, INC."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Pee CuRiam.\nThe only evidence by which plaintiff undertook to establish the alleged contract consisted of his testimony as to statements made to him by one John P. Forneau, defendant\u2019s former employee. The court, sustaining defendant\u2019s objections thereto, excluded this testimony.\nIt is well established that the nature and extent of an agent\u2019s authority may not be shown by extra-judicial declarations of such agent. Forneau did not testify. His employment by defendant had terminated, upon his resignation, on or about April 7, 1956. He was not present at the trial.\nJ. T. Butler, President, and Clyde R. Butler, Secretary and Treasurer, of defendant, were examined adversely by plaintiff. Their positive testimony is that Forneau had no authority to purchase and had not pm-chased land or timber for defendant and that Forneau had no authority to make a contract (in behalf of defendant) such as that alleged. Moreover, the evidence offered by plaintiff is insufficient to support a finding that Forneau, in making the statements attributed to him by plaintiff, was acting within the apparent scope of his authority as defendant\u2019s employee.\nIt is noted that all negotiations incident to the purchase by defendant of the \u201cBall\u201d and \u201cHall\u201d tracts were conducted by its said executive officers. Neither plaintiff nor Forneau participated in such negotiations. Indeed, it appears from plaintiff\u2019s testimony that he had had no conversation or contact with either of defendant\u2019s said executive officers at any time, that he did not know said negotiations were in progress, and that he just happened to learn that defendant had made such purchases a considerable length of time after such purchases had been consummated.\nAll of appellant\u2019s exceptions relate to the competency of excluded testimony and to his exception to the judgment of involuntary nonsuit. Upon consideration of all the evidence, that excluded as well as that admitted, we have reached the conclusion stated above.\nAppellant\u2019s so-called \u201cASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR\u201d do not comply with Rule 19(3), and appellant\u2019s so-called statement in his brief of \u201cQUESTIONS INVOLVED\u201d does not comply with Rule 27%. Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court, 221 N.C. 546, et seq. In each instance, appellant merely listed, seriatim, each of his seventy-two exceptions. Having considered the appeal fully on its merits, further discussion as to appellant\u2019s failure to comply with our rules is unnecessary.\nThe court\u2019s judgment of involuntary nonsuit is affirmed.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Pee CuRiam."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "James D. Gilliland for plaintiff, appellant.",
      "Banzet \u2022& Banzet for defendant, appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "J. E. DANIEL v. BUTLER LUMBER COMPANY, INC.\n(Filed 19 April, 1961.)\nBrokers and Factors \u00a7 6\u2014\nPlaintiff\u2019s evidence is held insufficient to show that defendant or any-authorized agent of defendant contracted with plaintiff to pay him a commission on .the purchase price of any timber suitable to the needs of defendant which plaintiff should locate. Failure of plaintiff to comply with Rule 19(3) and Rule 2714 of the Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court is pointed out.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Carr, J., October Civil Term, 1960, of WARREN.\nPlaintiff, a resident of Warren County, alleged he entered into a contract with defendant, Butler Lumber Company, Inc., a Virginia corporation, whereby defendant agreed to pay plaintiff a commission of 5% of the purchase price of any timber or land \u201cwhich the plaintiff could locate suitable to the needs of the defendant which the defendant subsequently purchased\u201d; that plaintiff \u201clocated\u201d several such tracts, two of which, the \u201cBall\u201d tract in Franklin County and the \u201cHall\u201d tract in Warren County, were subsequently purchased by defendant for more than $212,000.00; and that plaintiff, under the alleged contract, was entitled to recover commission in an amount in excess of $10,600.00\nAnswering, defendant denied the alleged contract and indebtedness. Defendant admitted it purchased the \u201cBall\u201d and \u201cHall\u201d tracts.\nAt the close of plaintiff\u2019s evidence, the court, allowing defendant\u2019s motion therefor, entered judgment of involuntary nonsuit. Plaintiff excepted and appealed.\nJames D. Gilliland for plaintiff, appellant.\nBanzet \u2022& Banzet for defendant, appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0504-01",
  "first_page_order": 542,
  "last_page_order": 544
}