{ "id": 8572272, "name": "J. S. CORUM, Administrator of the Estate of ROBERT M. CORUM, Deceased; MARY M. CORUM, Administratrix d.b.n. of Estate of ROBERT M. CORUM, Deceased, Substitute Plaintiff v. JOHN WILLIAM COMER, CLYDE THOMAS GILLEY and HARDIN LEE GILLEY", "name_abbreviation": "Corum v. Comer", "decision_date": "1962-01-12", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "252", "last_page": "255", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "256 N.C. 252" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "161 S.E. 707", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 N.C. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624327 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/202/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 S.E. 2d 341", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 N.C. 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8618743 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/218/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 S.E. 2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "219 N.C. 823", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626798 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/219/0823-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 S.E. 2d 614", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 N.C. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8614236 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/218/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 Mont. 224", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mont.", "case_ids": [ 2418863 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mont/93/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 N.E. 237", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 Mass. 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 5673190 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/212/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 Ore. 672", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or.", "case_ids": [ 2032340 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or/115/0672-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 Tenn. App. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Tenn. App.", "case_ids": [ 4739717 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/tenn-app/1/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 N.W. 352", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 Iowa 825", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Iowa", "case_ids": [ 2322781 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/iowa/214/0825-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 S.E. 2d 468", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 N.C. 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625498 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/227/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 S.E. 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 N.C. 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627088 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/197/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 S.E. 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "190 N.C. 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8595302 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/190/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 S.E. 6", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 N.C. 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8656612 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/179/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 S.E. 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 N.C. 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8652368 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/117/0027-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 537, "char_count": 8433, "ocr_confidence": 0.572, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.156544222047027e-07, "percentile": 0.9117129994837537 }, "sha256": "6b12ef7b65c23147ab777c2733d4465939a797cb9637d7cec8536def6f6be381", "simhash": "1:ab8111310c67e6b9", "word_count": 1420 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:51:02.884412+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "J. S. CORUM, Administrator of the Estate of ROBERT M. CORUM, Deceased; MARY M. CORUM, Administratrix d.b.n. of Estate of ROBERT M. CORUM, Deceased, Substitute Plaintiff v. JOHN WILLIAM COMER, CLYDE THOMAS GILLEY and HARDIN LEE GILLEY." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Higgins, J.\nThe evidence disclosed the accident occurred about 12:35 a.m., three miles north of Reidsville on Highway 87. The appellant Comer left Big Oaks Restaurant to go to his home, a distance of about 1,500 feet, to secure hunting equipment for use the following day. Appellant Gilley, with plaintiff\u2019s intestate as a guest passenger, followed. A distance of approximately 250 feet separated the vehicles at the time Gilley left the parking place at the restaurant. The two vehicles and both drivers had been at the restaurant for approximately 20 minutes before Comer started home.\nThe plaintiff offered, and the court admitted, over objection, evidence tending to show a racing contest at a speed estimated at 60 miles per hour between the vehicles operated by the defendants prior to the time they stopped at the restaurant. If a contest took place, it was concluded at least 20 minutes before Comer left for home. In offering the testimony with respect to racing, plaintiff\u2019s counsel stated: \u201cThis evidence is not offered as evidence of how fast they were traveling at the time, or in the manner in which operated, but for the purpose of establishing identity, proximity, and knowledge.\u201d\nApparently referring to the foregoing evidence, the court charged: \u201cThe plaintiff alleges that on this occasion the two automobiles left the vicinity of Reidsville traveling westward (northward) and left in a manner, the plaintiff alleges, that should cause you to find by the greater weight of the evidence that they were racing.\u201d Apparently the court, in saying, \u201cthe plaintiff alleges,\u201d meant to say, \u201cthe plaintiff contends.\u201d The complaint does not contain any allegation the defendants were racing.\nThe evidence of racing was inadmissible as too remote. The charge served to emphasize its harmful effect. The plaintiff based her cause of action on the following tortious conduct: (1) Comer\u2019s stopping, or attempting to stop without giving Gilley notice in time to avoid the collision; and (2) Gilley\u2019s following too closely and so speedily that he could not stop in the reaction time allowed.\nAs a general rule, evidence, to be admissible, must have some bearing on the issues involved. It must tend to prove or disprove some fact material to the cause of action alleged, or to the defense interposed. This is so for very sound reason. \u201c . . . such facts and circumstances as raise only a conjecture or suspicion ought not to be allowed to distract the attention of juries from material matters.\u201d Pettiford v. Mayo, 117 N.C. 27, 23 S.E. 252. \u201cAll the authorities are agreed that if the evidence is merely conjectural or is remote, or has no tendency except to excite prejudice, it should be rejected, because the reception of such evidence would unduly prolong the trial of causes, and would probably confuse and mislead the jury, . . .\u201d Bank v. Stack, 179 N.C. 514, 103 S.E. 6; Godfrey v. Power Co., 190 N.C. 24, 128 S.E. 485; Connor v. Manufacturing Co., 197 N.C. 66, 147 S.E. 672; Wilson v. Ervin, 227 N.C. 396, 42 S.E. 2d 468; Glass v. Ice Cream Co., 214 Iowa 825, 243 N.W. 352; Whitfield v. Loveless, 1 Tenn. App. 377. The rule is succinctly stated in Ramp v. Osborne, 115 Ore. 672, 239 P. 112: \u201cThe question is the negligence of the offending party at the time and place of the accident. It does not necessarily follow that a defendant is negligent at a particular time and place because he was negligent at some other place and at a different time.\u201d\nThe cases generally hold that to be admissible, evidence of speed at a former time and at a different place from the scene of the accident must be accompanied by evidence from which the jury may reasonably infer the speed or race continued to the scene of the accident. Brown v. Thayer, 212 Mass. 392, 99 N.E. 237; Jones v. Northwestern Auto Supply Co., 93 Mont. 224, 18 P. 2d 305; Barnes v. Teer, 218 N.C. 122, 10 S.E. 2d 614, and on rehearing, 219 N.C. 823, 15 S.E. 2d 379; Queen City Coach Co. v. Lee, 218 N.C. 320, 11 S.E. 2d 341; Charnock v. Refrigerating Co., 202 N.C. 105, 161 S.E. 707.\nPlaintiff\u2019s counsel, realizing the evidence of racing might present a foreign issue, sought to limit the purpose to \u201cidentity, proximity, and knowledge.\u201d Neither was an issue in the case. Each appellant admitted, by answer, he was the driver of one of the vehicles involved. The place of the accident was not in dispute. The investigating officer testified to the point of impact, the debris, the skidmarks, the damage to the vehicles, and their position at the scene. Both defendants lived nearby. They were familiar with the road. The evidence of racing injected a collateral issue not raised by the pleadings.\nRacing on the highway is highly dangerous. It is condemned both by statute and by public opinion. So general and pronounced is this view that any evidence of racing, though disassociated from the accident. is calculated to have prejudicial effect. For the error in admitting such evidence in this case, the defendants are awarded a\nNew trial.", "type": "majority", "author": "Higgins, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gwyn & Gwyn, By Julius J. Gwyn for plaintiff appellee.", "Sapp & Sapp, By Armistead W. Sapp, Jr., for defendant Clyde Thomas Gilley, appellant.", "Brown, Scurry, McMichael & Griffin, By Claude S. Scurry, Jule McMichael for defendant Comer, appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "J. S. CORUM, Administrator of the Estate of ROBERT M. CORUM, Deceased; MARY M. CORUM, Administratrix d.b.n. of Estate of ROBERT M. CORUM, Deceased, Substitute Plaintiff v. JOHN WILLIAM COMER, CLYDE THOMAS GILLEY and HARDIN LEE GILLEY.\n(Filed 12 January, 1962.)\n1. Evidence \u00a7 15\u2014\nIn order to be relevant, evidence must have some tendency to prove or disprove a fact in issue, and evidence which is merely conjectural or remote, or has no tendency except to invite prejudice, ought not to be admitted and thus distract the attention of the jury from the material matters involved.\n2. Evidence \u00a7 16; Automobiles \u00a7\u00a7 37, 38\u2014\nEvidence that a defendant drove at an unlawful speed or engaged in a speed competition at a different time and place than the occasion in suit, in order to be admissible must be accompanied by evidence from which the jury may reasonably infer that the speed or race continued to the scene of the accident, nor may the admission of such evidence be upheld as tending to show identity, proximity, or knowledge when there is no controversy as to the identity of the drivers or the place of the accident.\nAppeal by John William Comer and Clyde Thomas Gilley from Sink, E.J., April 1961 Term, RociciNgham Superior Court.\nThe plaintiff alleged her intestate, Robert M. Corum, was killed in a rear-end automobile collision on the night of September 20, 1958, near Reidsville. The intestate, a guest passenger in a 1957 Ford automobile driven north by the defendant Clyde Thomas Gilley, sustained fatal injuries when the Ford crashed into the rear of a 1956 Oldsmobile, also driven north by the defendant John William Comer. At the time of the collision Comer slowed down, attempting to cross the west traffic lane and enter a private driveway into his home. The plaintiff alleged the defendant Comer was negligent by driving at a dangerous speed and by applying his brakes, causing his vehicle to slow down or stop suddenly, without giving any sign or warning of his intention to reduce speed or to cross to his left. The defendant Gilley was negligent by driving too fast and following too closely behind the Oldsmobile, and without having his Ford under proper control; that the joint and concurrent negligence of both drivers was the proximate cause of the fatal accident.\nThe plaintiff also alleged Clyde Thomas Gilley was operating the Ford as the agent of Hardin Lee Gilley, the owner. However, the jury answered the issue of agency against the plaintiff\u2019s contention. From the judgment dismissing the action as to Hardin Lee Gilley, there was no appeal.\nThe defendants filed separate answers. Comer admitted he was driving the Oldsmobile and Gilley admitted he was driving the Ford at the time the collision occurred. However, each for himself denied negligence and by affirmative defense alleged the other\u2019s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident. Each alleged a cross action for contribution against the other. Only the evidence pertinent to the question raised on this appeal will be discussed in the opinion.\nThe jury found both defendants negligent and assessed damages at $18,000. From judgment on the verdict, the defendants appealed.\nGwyn & Gwyn, By Julius J. Gwyn for plaintiff appellee.\nSapp & Sapp, By Armistead W. Sapp, Jr., for defendant Clyde Thomas Gilley, appellant.\nBrown, Scurry, McMichael & Griffin, By Claude S. Scurry, Jule McMichael for defendant Comer, appellant." }, "file_name": "0252-01", "first_page_order": 288, "last_page_order": 291 }