{ "id": 8572312, "name": "P. L. LORBACHER, JR. v. WALTER T. TALLEY T/A TALLEY'S FRUIT AND PRODUCE COMPANY", "name_abbreviation": "Lorbacher v. Talley", "decision_date": "1962-01-12", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "258", "last_page": "260", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "256 N.C. 258" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "40 S.E. 2d 421", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 N.C. 762", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625407 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "764" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/226/0762-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 S.E. 2d 746", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 N.C. 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8660095 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/165/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 N.C. 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8690148 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/80/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 S.E. 602", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "178 N.C. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11272398 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/178/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 S.E. 2d 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "228 N.C. 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625918 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/228/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 S.E. 2d 443", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "244 N.C. 368", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2219621 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/244/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 S.E. 212", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 N.C. 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11271065 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/162/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 S.E. 912", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 N.C. 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8652967 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/105/0455-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 445, "char_count": 7345, "ocr_confidence": 0.546, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.086269886943972e-07, "percentile": 0.759736571514401 }, "sha256": "43553f3906073d696779b28b5bf10a5179982228d4906187ffae871a08d90a20", "simhash": "1:036731086ced3be7", "word_count": 1179 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:51:02.884412+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "P. L. LORBACHER, JR. v. WALTER T. TALLEY T/A TALLEY\u2019S FRUIT AND PRODUCE COMPANY." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Bobbitt, J.\nAt trial, plaintiff testified in support of his allegations. Defendant, on cross-examination of plaintiff and by evidence in direct contradition of plaintiff\u2019s testimony, sought to impeach plaintiff and thereby discredit plaintiff\u2019s testimony. Indeed, the testimony of one witness for defendant was to the effect plaintiff attempted by bribe to induce him to testify in plaintiff\u2019s favor.\nIn rebuttal, plaintiff offered witnesses who, if permitted, would have testified that plaintiff\u2019s general reputation in the community was good. Two such witnesses were called to so testify. The court sustained defendant\u2019s objections to such testimony. The court, having ruled such testimony incompetent, refused to permit plaintiff to call other witnesses to give testimony of like import. Plaintiff excepted to said rulings.\nDefendant contends the court\u2019s said rulings were correct, citing Norris v. Stewart, 105 N.C. 455, 10 S.E. 912. There the plaintiff alleged that Stewart, the original defendant, by false and fraudulent representations, obtained the signature of the father of the feme plaintiff to a deed of conveyance. Prior to trial, Stewart died and his heirs were made parties defendant in his stead. It was held the court properly excluded testimony, offered by defendant as substantive evidence, that Stewart\u2019s general character (reputation) was good. Norris v. Stewart, supra, is in accordance with the rule that, subject to exceptions, evidence of the good or bad character of a party is inadmissible as substantive evidence. Stansbury, North Carolina Evidence \u00a7 103.\nIn Lumber Co. v. Atkinson, 162 N.C. 298, 78 S.E. 212, the defendant Rabb, charged with fraud, testified as a witness in his own behalf. Thereafter, he offered witnesses who testified to his good general character. The trial judge instructed the jury that the evidence as to Rabb\u2019s good general character should be considered \u201cas substantive as well as corroborative evidence in passing on the issue of fraud.\u201d Citing Norris v. Stewart, supra, this Court held the said character evidence was not competent as substantive evidence and a new trial was awarded on account of the erroneous instruction. But, as stated by Walker J.: \u201cIt was competent to prove his good character so far as necessary to sustain his credibility as a witness.\u201d\nWhere a party testifies, it is competent to show his general reputation as bearing on his credibility as a witness. Nance v. Fike, 244 N.C. 368, 93 S.E. 2d 443; Morgan v. Coach Co., 228 N.C. 280, 45 S.E. 2d 339; Kirkpatrick v. Crutchfield, 178 N.C. 348, 351, 100 S.E. 602.\nAs stated by Smith, C.J., in Jones v. Jones, 80 N.C. 246, 250: \u201cIn whatever way the credit of the witness may be impaired, it may be restored or strengthened by this [proof of prior consistent statements] or any other proper evidence tending to insure confidence in his veracity and in the truthfulness of his testimony.\u201d Bowman v. Blankenship, 165 N.C. 519, 81 S.E. 2d 746; Brown v. Loftis, 226 N.C. 762, 764, 40 S.E. 2d 421; Stansbury, op. cit. \u00a7 50. Where a party testifies and the credibility of his testimony is challenged, testimony that his general character is good is competent and proper evidence for consideration as bearing upon the truthfulness of his testimony.\nHere, the excluded testimony was not offered as substantive evidence bearing upon what occurred on July 26, 1958, in defendant\u2019s place of business, but as bearing upon plaintiff\u2019s credibility as a witness at the time of trial. See Stansbury, op. cit. \u00a7 116. It was competent and should have been admitted for this limited purpose. The exclusion thereof was prejudicial error and entitles plaintiff to a new trial.\nThere is merit in the assignments of error directed by plaintiff to designated portions of the charge relating to the duty owed by defendant to (1) a trespasser, (2) a licensee and (3) an invitee. Since a new trial is awarded on* another ground, it is deemed unnecessary to discuss these assignments. However, it seems appropriate to call attention to the fact that plaintiff bases his action solely on the alleged personal negligence of defendant, not on any defective condition of defendant\u2019s premises.\nNew trial.", "type": "majority", "author": "Bobbitt, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Everett, Everett & Everett for -plaintiff appellant.", "Bryant, Lipton, Strayhorn & Bryant for defendant appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "P. L. LORBACHER, JR. v. WALTER T. TALLEY T/A TALLEY\u2019S FRUIT AND PRODUCE COMPANY.\n(Filed 12 January, 1962.)\nEvidence \u00a7 55\u2014\nWhile evidence of good character of a party is not ordinarily competent as substantive evidence in a civil action, where a party has testified as a witness, evidence of his good character is competent for the purpose of sustaining his credibility as a witness, and exclusion of character evidence offered for this purpose is prejudicial.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Williams, May Term 1961 of Dueham.\nPlaintiff\u2019s action is to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by the negligence of defendant.\nOn the morning of July 26, 1958, about 9:30, plaintiff, a retailer, as on previous occasions, entered the place of business of defendant, a wholesaler, to buy produce. Plaintiff alleges he suffered an injury to his back while defendant\u2019s customer and in defendant\u2019s place of business on said occasion.\nIn brief summary, plaintiff alleges defendant, in person, opened the door to a refrigerated room or cooler at or near the back of defendant\u2019s premises; that, as defendant held open this door, an employee of defendant entered the cooler to bring out produce for inspection by plaintiff who was standing on the main floor, some eight inches below the level of the floor of the cooler, facing the interior of the cooler; that defendant negligently, without warning to plaintiff, released the heavy door and walked away; and that, as the heavy door closed, plaintiff was struck by a knob on the end of \u201ca long stem handle\u201d (for unlatching the door from inside the cooler), which protruded some six to eight inches out from the back (inside) of the cooler door.\nDefendant, by answer, denied all allegations as to his negligence; and, as further answers and defenses, pleaded (1) that plaintiff was a trespasser in respect of this 'portion of defendant\u2019s premises, and (2) that plaintiff was contributorily negligent. In brief summary, defendant asserted that, notwithstanding defendant\u2019s repeated requests that plaintiff remain in the front portion of defendant\u2019s premises and there inspect the produce when brought from the cooler by defendant\u2019s employee, plaintiff persisted in going with defendant\u2019s employee back to the cooler; that he (defendant) did not at any time on this occasion hold open the cooler door; that after defendant\u2019s employee entered the cooler plaintiff stepped up onto the threshold thereof and held (propped) the door open with the heel of his right foot; and that plaintiff was not injured on this occasion by the cooler door or any part thereof.\nEvidence was offered by plaintiff and defendant in support of their respective (conflicting) allegations.\nIssues of negligence, contributory negligence and damages, raised by the pleadings, were submitted. The jury answered the first (negligence) issue, \u201cNo,\u201d and did not reach the second and third issues. From judgment that plaintiff \u201chave and recover nothing of the defendant,\u201d plaintiff excepted and appealed, assigning errors.\nEverett, Everett & Everett for -plaintiff appellant.\nBryant, Lipton, Strayhorn & Bryant for defendant appellee." }, "file_name": "0258-01", "first_page_order": 294, "last_page_order": 296 }