{ "id": 8572872, "name": "CARL A. BOY, JR., and JAMES BOY, Doing Business as CAROLINA AIRCRAFT COMPANY v. RIDDLE AIRLINES, INC., a Corporation", "name_abbreviation": "Boy v. Riddle Airlines, Inc.", "decision_date": "1962-02-28", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "392", "last_page": "401", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "256 N.C. 392" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "116 S.E. 2d 454", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "253 N.C. 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8623711 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/253/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 S.E. 141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 N.C. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8622183 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/192/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 So. 296", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 S.E. 2d 797", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "230 N.C. 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629713 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/230/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 S.E. 2d 908", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "230 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627942 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/230/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 896, "char_count": 23611, "ocr_confidence": 0.55, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.20662806982183132 }, "sha256": "8de211b18e715fa446eceaaf268d4c68f2ac40f6300beb37ebb82e2e0f89677a", "simhash": "1:700bfb1aee87def9", "word_count": 3900 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:51:02.884412+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CARL A. BOY, JR., and JAMES BOY, Doing Business as CAROLINA AIRCRAFT COMPANY v. RIDDLE AIRLINES, INC., a Corporation." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Bobbitt, J.\nThe sole question is whether the evidence, when considered in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, was sufficient for submission to the jury.\nBackground facts, disclosed by plaintiffs\u2019 evidence, include the following : Plaintiffs, under the name of Carolina Aircraft Company, had been engaged since 1946 in the business of buying and selling airplanes, and in repairing and rebuilding airplanes for sale, with headquarters in Durham, North Carolina. They had bought and sold \u201cin the neighborhood of 400 airplanes,\u201d including C-46 airplanes. They \u201csold airplanes primarily in South America.\u201d Both plaintiffs were airline transport pilots. James W. Boy was \u201cChief Pilot for Peruvian Airlines, Tapsa,\u201d based in Lima, Peru.\nThe negotiations in October, 1958, leading up to the sale, were between plaintiff James W. Boy and James P. Garvey, defendant\u2019s Supervisor of Surplus Sales, at defendant\u2019s principal office and main base of operations at International Air Terminal at Miami, Florida. The \u201cfuselage and center section,\u201d which had been purchased by defendant from the United States Air Force, was at defendant\u2019s facility in Macon, Georgia.\nIn their brief, plaintiffs assert: \u201cThe defendant has consistently taken the position that the C-46 aircraft fuselage and center section were restricted for flight purposes, but that the plaintiffs knew of this restriction.\u201d Referring to this statement, defendant, in its brief, says: \u201cThe appellee reiterates this position and endorses this statement.\u201d\nPlaintiffs\u2019 evidence consists principally (1) of the testimony, by deposition, of James W. Boy, (2) of the testimony of Carl A. Boy, Jr., and \u00cd3) of documents and photographs. The deposition of James W. Boy was taken April 24, 1961, in Guayaquil, Ecuador. There was no cross-examination.\nDefendant\u2019s evidence consists of the testimony of James P. Garvey, with whom James W. Boy negotiated the contract of sale, and of documents.\nThe testimony of James W. Boy is summarized or quoted in the following (our numbering) paragraphs:\n1. In October, 1958, he saw \u201ca wrecked C-46 outside of Riddle Airlines\u2019 main gate in Miami, Florida, and was told to talk with a Mr. Jim Garvey in regard to these parts.\u201d When he approached Garvey \u201cabout the parts,\u201d Garvey said, \u201cLet me sell you a whole 0-46,\u201d and he replied, \u201cTell me more.\u201d Garvey then read from a Riddle Airlines\u2019 interoffice memo \u201cparts necessary to fly a C-46 at Macon, Georgia.\u201d He looked over the list and asked the price. Garvey told him defendant \u201cwanted $10,000 for it\u201d and gave him the memo. He said he would think about it and make an inspection of the aircraft. He and Garvey also discussed \u201cthe other C-46 parts\u201d he had come \u201cto see about.\u201d\n2. He and Garvey negotiated over the price for the fuselage and center section at Macon for several days. He made an offer of $5,000.00 \u201cwhich they accepted.\u201d To the best of his recollection, \u201cthis bill of sale was delivered when (he) handed them the check.\u201d\n3. There was no discussion \u201cof what (he) was going to do with the airplane.\u201d He approached Garvey, originally, with reference to \u201cthose parts outside of their (defendant\u2019s) door\u201d at Miami. He did tell Garvey what he was going to do with these parts, namely, \u201cthat (he) knew of an aircraft that had been wrecked and needed a nose section.\u201d He purchased no property from defendant \u201cother than a Curtiss C-46 aircraft fuselage and center section\u201d at Macon.\n4. \u201cWith respect to any restrictions placed on rebuilding the fuselage and center section of a Curtiss C-46 aircraft into a complete plane, there was never any mention of any restrictions at any time.\u201d He was in Peru when he first learned there was a restriction \u201con the manner of their use.\u201d His brother (Carl A. Boy, Jr.) notified him \u201cthat he had applied for registration of the aircraft and had been refused by the FAA.\u201d\n5. Prior to delivery of the bill of sale, Garvey advised him \u201cthat the wings to the aircraft were owned by another company and were also located at the site of the aircraft and that the aircraft was without engines.\u201d Garvey told him a repair company at Macon had given the owner of the wings \u201can estimate of $1,500 for the repair\u201d thereof. Garvey estimated it would cost $10,000.00 to repair \u201cthe damaged belly\u201d of the fuselage and center section.\n6. Garvey\u2019s statements as to estimated costs of repairs were made \u201cwhen (he) was, so to speak, chiseling Mr. Garvey over the price of the aircraft.\u201d Garvey \u201cwas telling (him) of its merits and how inexpensively and how cheap (he) could have a complete C-46 ready to go.\u201d\n7. If there had been no restrictions on the use of the fuselage and center section \u201cwhen (he) paid $5,000 for it, (he) got a good buy.\u201d The fuselage and center section, if restricted so that it -could not be rebuilt for flight purposes, \u201cwould be of very little value.\u201d\n8. He made arrangements \u201cto rebuild the Curtiss C-46 aircraft fuselage and center section into a complete aircraft. (He) made a trip to Texas and located a pair of wings that were overhauled and ready to go. (He) contacted E. E. Jones of Ramsa Airlines and arranged to borrow the necessary equipment to repair the damage.\u201d\nJames W. Boy did not identify any bill of sale or other exhibit. There is no evidence he ever saw the fuselage and center section. Nothing in James W. Boy\u2019s testimony indicates he had any contact with Garvey or other agent of defendant except during said negotiations in October, 1958.\nThe \u201cfuselage and center section\u201d was altogether, not in sections. It included a nose section. Garvey, defendant\u2019s witness, testified this was \u201cquite a big thing, includes the cockpit.\u201d Too, Garvey testified that James W. Boy said all he wanted was \u201cthe nose from the airplane,\u201d but that defendant was unwilling to \u201ccannibalize\u201d the fuselage and center section, that is, tear it apart and sell it \u201cpiece by piece\u201d; and that James W. Boy said he could \u201csell the rest of it to Charlotte Leasing or someone.\u201d However, James W. Boy did not so testify; and Garvey\u2019s testimony, unless favorable to plaintiffs, may not be considered in passing on defendant\u2019s motion for judgment of nonsuit.\nThe testimony of Carl A. Boy, Jr., is summarized or quoted in the following (our numbering) paragraphs.\n1. He had no contacts with Garvey until January, 1959. In October, 1958, while in Durham, he received a telephone call from James W. Boy. In compliance with James W. Boy\u2019s request, he went to Macon the next day by airplane. There, in company with Mr. Gerber, Chief of Maintenance at defendant\u2019s Macon installation, he checked the fuselage and center section against the said memo (forwarded to him by James W. Boy) and otherwise. This memo had been prepared by Gerber. In addition to the fuselage and center section, Gerber showed him \u201cone horizontal stabilizer, and a vertical fan, and elevator, and one aeron,\u201d then located in a hangar, and told him that \u201cthese were parts of this deal.\u201d He told Gerber plaintiffs would take the airplane to Peru where they had a customer for it.\n2. After he reported his findings to James W. Boy, the $5,000.00 offer was made and accepted. James W. Boy left for Peru. Carl A. Boy, Jr., returned to Durham.\n3. In December, 1958, James W. Boy was in Miami. He then received from defendant a bill of sale dated December 24, 1958, which referred to a sale made by defendant to plaintiffs on October 29, 1958, and another or other documents, which he forwarded to Carl A. Boy, Jr. Carl A. Boy, Jr., with these documents, attempted to obtain an FAA registration number but was unable to do so. In January, 1959, he contacted Mr. Thompson, defendant\u2019s Executive Vice-President and Treasurer, seeking his assistance. He was advised by Mr. Thompson that \u201cwhen (defendant) purchased the airplane from the Air Force, it was with the clear understanding that it was not to be flown\u201d; that defendant had bought it for a special purpose, namely, to use the parts or certain parts in rebuilding an airplane; that it \u201cwould be breaking faith with the Air Force for him to go back and ask them at this date for papers that would allow us to fly the airplane\u201d; and that, \u201c(i)f anybody in this organization sold you that airplane and didn\u2019t tell you it was restricted, or had a restricted title, then we\u2019ll get rid of them and we\u2019ll give you your money back.\u201d\n4. In a conference with Thompson, Garvey and others, Garvey stated he told James W. Boy when he bought the airplane that it had a restricted title and could not be flown. Thereupon, Thompson stated he would have to stand by Garvey and plaintiffs would have to sue.\n5. \u201cExcept for flying, the only way the aircraft fuselage and center section could be transported overland across the United States, or anywhere else for that matter, would be to disassemble it, which would make the cost prohibitive.\u201d To a junk dealer in Macon, the fuselage and center section would be worth about $250.00.\n6. \u201c. . . it would cost us approximately $19,000 to buy the parts and labor for installing the parts to make it ferryable.\u201d Plaintiffs had a purchaser for the reconstructed plane at the price of $31,000.00 plus transportation charges provided they could deliver it in Lima, Peru, \u201cwithin 90 days from the first of the year.\u201d\nIt is unnecessary to review the evidence with reference to plaintiffs\u2019 prospective purchaser in South America. Our inquiry is to determine whether the evidence was sufficient for submission to the jury in respect of whether plaintiffs are entitled to recover, not to determine the measure or amount of damages plaintiffs are entitled to recover.\nIt is here noted that Garvey testified: \u201cIn order to fly the aircraft fuselage and center section located at Macon to Miami you would have to have a ferry permit.\u201d Again: \u201cTo get one (ferry permit) it would be required to have an EAA number.\u201d Again: \u201cYou could not get an FAA number if the plane was restricted so that it could not be flown.\u201d\nDecision depends largely upon the testimony of James W. Boy. As indicated above, James W. Boy\u2019s testimony does not support plaintiffs\u2019 allegations that, in the negotiations, \u201cthe plaintiffs stated repeatedly to the officials of the defendant\u201d that the particular purpose for which they were acquiring the fuselage and center section was \u201cto rebuild an airplane around the fuselage and center section and then sell the airplane either somewhere in the United States or in Latin America.\u201d Moreover, plaintiffs\u2019 evidence discloses clearly that plaintiffs, at the time the sale was made, knew the fuselage and center section \u201ccomprised parts of a wrecked Air Force plane.\u201d Too, contrary to plaintiffs\u2019 allegation that defendant\u2019s officials \u201cknowingly, both expressly and impliedly, misrepresented that the aircraft fuselage and center section had no legal restrictions which would prevent their being used for flight purposes as plaintiffs intended,\u201d James W. Boy testified: \u201c. . . there was never any mention of any restrictions at any time.\u201d\n\u201cThe Uniform Sales Act provides that 'any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon.\u2019 Williston on Sales (Revised Edition), section 194. Our Legislature has not incorporated the Uniform Sales Act in our statutory law, but the accuracy of the lucid and succinct definition of an express warranty embodied in the Act is fully supported by repeated decisions of this Court.\u201d Potter v. Supply Co., 230 N.C. 1, 7, 51 S.E. 2d 908.\nThe bill of sale executed by defendant under date of December 24, 1958, provides: \u201cFor and in consideration of $10 & OYC the undersigned owner of the full legal and beneficial title of the aircraft described as follows: AIRCRAFT MAKE AND MODEL. Curtiss C-46 (Fuselage & center section only). SERIAL NO. AFM 44-77847-A, REGISTRATION MARK . does this 29 day of October 1958 hereby sell, grant, transfer, and deliver all of his right, title and interest in and to such aircraft unto: Carolina Aircraft, P. 0. Box 365, West Durham, North Carolina, and to its executors, administrators, and assigns, to have and to hold singularly the said aircraft forever, and certifies that same is not subject to any mortgage or other encumbrance except TYPE OF ENCUMBRANCE NONE.\u201d\nThere was evidence that the bill of sale executed December 24,1958, was on a form ordinarily used for the sale and transfer of a complete aircraft. Plaintiffs contend the references in the bill of sale to the \u201caircraft\u201d and to \u201cSERIAL NO. AFM 44-77847-A\u201d constitute an express warranty as alleged. This contention is without merit. It plainly appears from this bill of sale that defendant sold to plaintiffs the \u201cFuselage & center section only,\u201d a fact well known to plaintiffs; and the serial number merely denotes the aircraft of which the fuselage and center section was once a part. Moreover, we think the provision, \u201cTYPE OF ENCUMBRANCE NONE,\u201d indicates there was no mortgage or other lien on the fuselage and center section.\nIn our opinion, the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that defendant expressly warranted that there were no restrictions that would prevent an aircraft built around the fuselage and center section from being legally flown.\nHow\u2019ever, we think the evidence, when considered in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, is sufficient to support a finding that the purchase was made by plaintiffs for the particular purpose of constructing an airplane around the fuselage and center section for use in flight and that defendant had knowledge of plaintiffs\u2019 said particular purpose. The testimony of James W. Boy that he did not tell Garvey \u201cwhat (he) was going to do with the airplane,\u201d when considered in context, would seem to imply that he did not tell Garvey whether the reconstructed plane was to be sold or used as a flyable aircraft. Certainly, this inference is permissible.\n\u201cWhen a buyer purchases goods for a particular purpose known to the seller and relies on the skill, judgment, or experience of the seller for the suitability of the goods for that purpose, the seller impliedly warrants that the goods are reasonably fit for the contemplated purpose, and is liable to the buyer for any damages proximately resulting to him from the breach of this warranty.\u201d Stokes v. Edwards, 230 N.C. 306, 310, 52 S.E. 2d 797; 46 Am. Jur., Sales \u00a7 346 et seq.; 77 C.J.S., Sales \u00a7 325; Williston on Sales, Revised Edition, Vol. 1, \u00a7 235; Berger v. E. Berger & Co. (Fla.), 80 So. 296.\nPlaintiffs make no contention they relied on the skill, judgment or experience of defendant. On the contrary, they relied upon the full and careful inspection made by Carl A. Boy, Jr. Plaintiffs make no contention there was any defect of such nature that an aircraft could not be constructed around the fuselage and center section and flown. On the contrary, they contend they bought the fuselage and center section' solely because it was suitable for such use.\nThe evidence, when considered in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, tends to show plaintiffs were unable to obtain an FAA registration number and authority to fly an aircraft constructed around the fuselage and center section; that their inability to do so resulted from the fact that defendant, when it purchased the fuselage and center section from the Air Force in a negotiated sale, expressly agreed it would not be used for such purpose or flown; and that plaintiffs had no knowledge or notice of this limitation upon the use of the fuselage and center section until January, 1959. Thus, according to plaintiff\u2019s evidence, the limitation as to use derives from defendant\u2019s said agreement, not from any statute or regulation of the FAA or other governmental agency.\nNo decision dealing with a similar factual situation has come to our attention. The precise question seems to be one of first impression. However, we are mindful of this statement by Connor, J., in Swift & Co. v. Aydlett, 192 N.C. 330, 334, 135 S.E. 141: \u201cThe doctrine of implied warranty in the sale of personal property is too well established in this jurisdiction now to be drawn in question. It should be extended rather than restricted. (Citations) The harshness of the common-law rule of caveat emptor, when strictly applied, makes it inconsistent with the principles upon which modern trade and commerce are conducted; the doctrine of implied warranty is more in accord with the principle that \u2018honesty is the best policy,\u2019 and that both vendor and vendee, by fair exchange of values, profit by a sale.\u201d\nUnder the circumstances here considered, we are of opinion, and so decide, that, if the purchase was made by plaintiffs for the particular purpose of constructing an airplane around the fuselage and center section for use in flight and defendant had knowledge of plaintiffs\u2019 said particular purpose, defendant, in making the sale, impliedly warranted that the fuselage and center section was free from restrictions imposed thereon by any agreement made by defendant whereby its use for such purpose was prohibited. In this view, the evidence was sufficient to require submission to the jury.\nHaving reached the conclusion the evidence was sufficient to require submission to the jury on the issues relating to the alleged breach of implied warranty, we do not pass upon whether plaintiffs\u2019 allegations and evidence were sufficient to require submission as to issues appropriate, upon legal principles stated in Brooks v. Construction Co., 253 N.C. 214, 116 S.E. 2d 454, in an action for fraud and deceit.\nOn the ground stated, the judgment of involuntary nonsuit is reversed.\nReversed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Bobbitt, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Everett, Everett & Everett for plaintiffs, appellants.", "J. G. McKay, Jr., and Reade, Fuller, Newsom & Graham for defendant appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CARL A. BOY, JR., and JAMES BOY, Doing Business as CAROLINA AIRCRAFT COMPANY v. RIDDLE AIRLINES, INC., a Corporation.\n(Filed 28 February, 1962.)\nSales \u00a7\u00a7 6, 14\u2014 Evidence held sufficient to be submitted to the jury on question of seller\u2019s implied warranty of goods.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 evidence, considered in the light most favorable to them, tending to show that they purchased the fuselage and center section of an airplane for the purpose of constructing an airplane around the fuselage and center section for use in flight, that defendant seller had knowledge of said purpose, and that by reason of the seller\u2019s prior agreement with the Air Force when the seller purchased the property as surplus, a plane reconstructed from the fuselage and center section could not be licensed or flown, and that plaintiffs had no knowledge of such restrictions upon the use of the plane, is held sufficient to be submitted to the jury on the issue of defendant\u2019s implied warranty and breach thereof, even though the evidence fails to make out an express warranty as alleged in the complaint.\nAppeal by plaintiffs from Williams, J., May Civil Term 1961 of Durham, docketed and argued as No. 668 at Fall Term 1961.\nPlaintiffs, partners doing business as Carolina Aircraft Company, instituted this action February 17,1959, to recover damages on account of defendant\u2019s alleged breach of express and implied warranties and misrepresentations in connection with the sale by defendant to plaintiffs for $5,000.00 of an airplane fuselage and center section.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 allegations, summarized or quoted, are stated in the following (our numbering) paragraphs.\n1. In October, 1958, plaintiffs, acting through James W. Boy, entered into the contract of sale with defendant and paid the purchase price. During the negotiations, it was stated repeatedly to defendant\u2019s officials that plaintiffs were acquiring the fuselage and center section for a particular purpose, namely, \u201cto rebuild an airplane around the fuselage and center section and then sell the airplane either somewhere in the United States or in Latin America.\u201d Defendant expressly and impliedly warranted that the fuselage and center section could be rebuilt as an airplane and that the assembled airplane could be legally registered and flown in the United States and elsewhere.\n2. On December 24,1958, defendant executed and delivered to plaintiffs a bill of sale for a Curtiss C-46 aircraft fuselage and center section, described by the Serial No. AFM 44-77847-A. Thereafter, plaintiffs made arrangements \u201cto rebuild an aircraft around the fuselage and center section,\u201d and located a prospective purchaser in Latin America \u201cfor the airplane when-rebuilt\u201d at the price of $31,500.00 plus transportation expenses.\n3. Plaintiffs were informed, after receipt of said bill of sale, that the fuselage and center section comprised parts of a wrecked Air Force plane purchased by defendant as surplus property from the United States Air Force; that the aircraft fuselage and center section, \u201ceven when re-assembled and rebuilt into a complete aircraft,\u201d cannot be registered by the Federal Aviation Agency, or by any other agency of the United States Government; and that, without such registration, such rebuilt and reassembled aircraft cannot be flown in the United States or in any other country.\n4. Prior to and at the time of the contract of sale, \u201cdefendant was well aware of the fact that the aircraft fuselage and center section, \u25a0which it intended to deliver to the plaintiffs, was subject to legal restrictions which prevented its use for any flight purposes\u201d; but defendant \u201cat no time disclosed to the plaintiffs the existence of these restrictions.\u201d Defendant\u2019s officials \u201cknowingly, both expressly and impliedly, misrepresented that the aircraft fuselage and center section had no legal restrictions which would prevent their being used for flight purposes as plaintiffs intended.\u201d Plaintiffs were induced to buy and did buy the fuselage and center section in reliance on defendant\u2019s said warranties and misrepresentations.\n5. The fuselage and center section \u201care almost worthless to the plaintiffs or to anyone else other than the defendant. By reason of their bulk and the expense of moving them, the fuselage and center section have no fair market value except as junk or scrap, in which form it is worth . . . about $100.00.\u201d\n6. \u201cBy reason of the defendant\u2019s misrepresentations and the breaches of the defendant\u2019s expressed and implied warranties, and by reason also of the failure of the defendant to fulfill its contract to provide a fuselage and center section that could legally be used for flight purposes, the plaintiffs have been damaged in the sum of $12,500.00.\u201d\nAnswering, defendant denied all of plaintiffs\u2019 allegations relating to breach of warranties and misrepresentations. Defendant admitted it sold the fuselage and center section to plaintiffs; that it received the purchase price of $5,000.00; and that, in December, 1958, it gave plaintiffs a bill of sale therefor. Defendant also admitted the fuselage and center section was bought by it as surplus property from the United States Air Force; that it was purchased \u201cas a part number and not as an aircraft with serial number\u201d; that it cannot be registered by the Federal Aviation Agency or by any other agency of the United States Government; and that the fuselage and center section was subject to legal restrictions preventing its use for flight purposes. Defendant alleged that James W. Boy was fully informed and had knowledge of these facts.\nEvidence was offered by plaintiffs and by defendant.\nAt the conclusion of all evidence, the court, granting defendant\u2019s motion therefor, entered judgment of involuntary nonsuit. Plaintiffs excepted and appealed.\nEverett, Everett & Everett for plaintiffs, appellants.\nJ. G. McKay, Jr., and Reade, Fuller, Newsom & Graham for defendant appellee." }, "file_name": "0392-01", "first_page_order": 428, "last_page_order": 437 }