{ "id": 8569862, "name": "GWENDELLYN BRINN GIBBS v. SHELDON ALVIN GAIMEL", "name_abbreviation": "Gibbs v. Gaimel", "decision_date": "1962-09-19", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "650", "last_page": "653", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "257 N.C. 650" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "105 S.E. 2d 297", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 N.C. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8609696 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/249/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 N.C. 797", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 S.E. 2d 294", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 N.C. 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8609819 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/249/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 N.C. 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568884 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/257/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 A. 294", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "4 N.J. Misc. 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Misc.", "case_ids": [ 584295 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-misc/4/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 S.E. 2d 200", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "253 N.C. 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621833 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/253/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 S.E. 2d 33", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "246 N.C. 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625839 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/246/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 S.E. 2d 385", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ga. App. 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga. App.", "case_ids": [ 1574411 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/94/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 S.E. 2d 380", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 N.C. 751", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627434 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/251/0751-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 S.E. 2d 501", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "247 N.C. 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626526 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/247/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 Neb. 662", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 5291795 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/neb/157/0662-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 So. 748", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "752" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 S.E. 2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8596845 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 S.E. 2d 553", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 N.C. 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621188 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/252/0283-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 437, "char_count": 6274, "ocr_confidence": 0.592, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.061447019797991e-08, "percentile": 0.31923540716080356 }, "sha256": "6f7650a38a306adc1543c80fe8140f7f01b6c83477d7c107b222b1dc3c156106", "simhash": "1:168e96b3d01e6cee", "word_count": 1063 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:02:42.075591+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "GWENDELLYN BRINN GIBBS v. SHELDON ALVIN GAIMEL." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HiggiNS, J.\nThe evidence permits these inferences: The defendant\u2019s vehicle was defective. He knew of the defect, but permitted the plaintiff to use it without disclosing the defect, of which she had no knowledge. The defective condition of the accelerator occasionally permitted the gasoline to continue to flow into the engine after the release of pressure on the accelerator pedal. The defendant had found out the danger of a racing engine could be overcome by \u201cpatting\u201d the pedal. But he neither informed the plaintiff of the defect nor explained the manner by which the danger could be avoided. Thus, when the accelerator jammed, the plaintiff was unprepared for what confronted her. The result was a damaged house, a demolished automobile, and a permanently injured driver.\nThe evidence was sufficient to support a finding the owner had breached his duty to give the plaintiff notice of the defective condition of the automobile he was permitting her to use. \u201cHe who puts a thing in charge of another which he knows, or in the exercise of prudence he should have known, to be dangerous, or to possess characteristics which, in the ordinary course of events, are likely to produce injury, owes a duty to such person to give reasonable warning or notice of such danger.\u201d Austin v. Austin, 252 N.C. 283, 113 S.E. 2d 553; Honeycutt v. Bryan, 240 N.C. 238, 81 S.E. 2d 653; Sears v. Interurban Transp. Co., 125 So. 748, 752 (La.); Cronin v. Swett, 157 Neb. 662, 61 N.W. 2d 219.\nIn order to make out a case, \u201cDirect evidence of negligence is not required, but the same may be inferred from acts and . . . circumstances . . .\u201d Frazier v. Gas Co., 247 N.C. 256, 100 S.E. 2d 501; Shepard v. Mfg. Co., 251 N.C. 751, 112 S.E. 2d 380; Young v. Koger, 94 Ga. App. 524, 95 S.E. 2d 385.\nThe evidence was insufficient to show the plaintiff\u2019s contributory negligence as a matter of law. Bell v. Maxwell, 246 N.C. 257, 98 S.E. 2d 33. The jammed accelerator confronted her with a sudden emergency which she did not create. Hence she cannot be held for failure to pursue the wisest choice of conduct. Bundy v. Belue, 253 N.C. 31, 116 S.E. 2d 200; Hennig v. Booth and Naugle v. Booth, 4 N.J. Misc. 150, 132 A. 294.\nWe have carefully examined and found without merit all assignments of error which comply with Rule 19(3). Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486; Nichols v. McFarland, 249 N.C. 125, 105 S.E. 2d 294; Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court 19(3), 254 N.C. 797. The cause presented issues of fact for the jury. McFalls v. Smith, 249 N.C. 123, 105 S.E. 2d 297. The record discloses\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "HiggiNS, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Robt. B. Lowry, John H. Hall for plaintiff appellee.", "LeRoy, Wells & Shaw, by Dewey W. Wells for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GWENDELLYN BRINN GIBBS v. SHELDON ALVIN GAIMEL.\n(Filed 19 September 1962.)\n1. Automobiles \u00a7\u00a7 21, 41r\u2014\nEvidence permitting the inference that the accelerator of defendant\u2019s car was defective so that it occasionally permitted gasoline to continue to flow to the engine after the release of pressure from the accelerator pedal, that defendant, with knowledge of the condition, loaned the vehicle to plaintiff without disclosing the defect, with further evidence that plaintiff was injured in an accident resulting from the sticking of the accelerator, is held sufficient to be submitted to the jury on the issue of defendant\u2019s negligence.\n2. Negligence \u00a7 24c\u2014\nNegligence may be proved by circumstantial evidence from which the conclusion of negligence may be inferred.\n3. Automobiles \u00a7 19; Negligence \u00a7 14\u2014\nWhere the driver of a car is confronted with a sudden emergency arising from the jamming of the accelerator pedal, such driver cannot be held guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in failing to pursue the wisest choice of conduct, the driver not having contributed to the creation of the emergency.\nAppeal by defendant from Copeland, S.J., January, 1962 Term, CuerituCK Superior Court.\nIn this civil action the plaintiff alleged, and at the trial offered evidence tending to show, that on September 30, 1960, she requested and was given permission to drive defendant\u2019s automobile on a short errand in connection with her father\u2019s business. Unknown to the plaintiff, the automobile had a defective accelerator which occasionally jammed, causing the engine to race after pressure on the foot pedal was released. The defendant, knowing of the defect, failed to notify or warn the plaintiff. While she was in the act of returning to her father\u2019s place of business, the accelerator stuck. She lost control, crashed into a house, sustaining painful and permanent injuries. Although plaintiff and other members of her family had on several occasions driven the vehicle, the plaintiff did not know of the defective accelerator.\nThe defendant, by answer, denied \u201cany tendency on the part of the accelerator ... to become jammed or stuck to any appreciable extent, or to operate in any manner . . . likely to endanger any competent driver.\u201d The defendant averred the plaintiff\u2019s injuries were caused entirely by her own carelessness and negligent operation of the vehicle.\nThe plaintiff introduced in evidence, as the admission of the defendant, the following:\n\u201cSheldon Alvin Gaimel, being duly sworn, says: That on the 30th day of September, 1960, I loaned my automobile to Mrs. Gwendellyn Gibbs to go to a store so she would make some purchases and learned a short time thereafter that Mrs. Gwendellyn Gibbs was in an accident as a result of and the proximate cause being that the accelerator on my car stuck or jammed causing said car to get out of control. I truthfully say that the accelerator, prior to this occasion, had jammed with me at several times and that I had thought of carrying the car to a mechanic to repair same but this had been put off. I failed to advise or explain the condition of the accelerator to Mrs. Gwendellyn Gibbs at the time I loaned my car to her.\n\u201cWitness my hand and seal this 6th day of October, 1960.\n\u201c/s/ Sheldon Alvin Gaimel.\u201d\nThe defendant testified that a driver could restore the accelerator to its normal function by \u201cpatting\u201d the accelerator pedal with the foot.\nThe jury answered issues of negligence, contributory negligence, and damages in favor of the plaintiff. From the judgment on the verdict, the defendant appealed.\nRobt. B. Lowry, John H. Hall for plaintiff appellee.\nLeRoy, Wells & Shaw, by Dewey W. Wells for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0650-01", "first_page_order": 690, "last_page_order": 693 }