{ "id": 8559250, "name": "GRADY ROOSEVELT DELLINGER v. HAROLD VAUGHN BRIDGES and PIEDMONT MOTORS, INC., Defendants, and AARON HAMPTON COOKE and GASTONIA TRANSIT COMPANY, Additional Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Dellinger v. Bridges", "decision_date": "1963-03-20", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "90", "last_page": "95", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "259 N.C. 90" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "178 S.E. 560", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 N.C. 755", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628358 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/207/0755-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 S.E. 585", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "190 N.C. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8598573 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/190/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 S.E. 33", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8656843 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/168/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 S.E. 313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 N.C. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8655544 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/179/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 S.E. 397", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 N.C. 777", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8620789 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/198/0777-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 S.E. 2d 416", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8596256 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0183-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 574, "char_count": 12038, "ocr_confidence": 0.521, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4718747949825802e-07, "percentile": 0.6594285998913451 }, "sha256": "2d549ac5aadc807d9935397882525f5eea0ee21b848cd592961885cee6e4b788", "simhash": "1:2608d56a8b0c32f4", "word_count": 2038 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:55:17.750134+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "GRADY ROOSEVELT DELLINGER v. HAROLD VAUGHN BRIDGES and PIEDMONT MOTORS, INC., Defendants, and AARON HAMPTON COOKE and GASTONIA TRANSIT COMPANY, Additional Defendants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PARKER, J.\nPlaintiff\u2019s only assignment of error is the judgment of involuntary nonsuit.\nPlaintiff\u2019s evidence shows:\nA few days prior to 9 September 1960 he delivered his 1960 Mercury automobile to Piedmont for a six months checkup and to have a broken rear window replaced. Before the work was done someone in plaintiff\u2019s family called up Piedmont and asked that the automobile be returned as it was needed. When Piedmont was returning the automobile to plaintiff\u2019s home as requested, it was wrecked on its left front. After the wreck it was returned to Piedmont. lie could have gotten his automobile back in its wrecked 'condition, but he did not want it. It would seem that the wrecked automobile was taken by Universal C.I.T. in a court proceeding.\nThe original defendants introduced evidence. This is a summary, except when quoted, of the testimony of Harold Vaughn Bridges, one of the original defendants, as to a collision between plaintiff\u2019s Mercury and a bus of Gastonia Transit Company driven by Aaron Hampton Cooke:\nOn direct examination: About 5:15 o\u2019clock p.m. on 9 September 1960 he, an automobile mechanic working for Piedmont, was driving plaintiff\u2019s Mercury east on East Davidson Street in the city of Gas-tonia on his way to deliver the automobile to plaintiff's home. When he came up to. 'the intersection of East Davidson Street with Broad Street, he stopped on his right side of the street 15 to 18 feet from the edge of Broad Street, looked south on Broad Street, and saw a bus of Gastonia Transit Company about 200 to 300 feet away down Broad Street approaching the intersection at a speed of about 15 to 20 miles an hour. He then looked north up Broad Street to see if it was clear, and when he looked back the bus was right on his side, and then there was a collision between the bus and the Mercury. After the collision the bus was straight in the street about three to five feet over on his side of the street. After the collision Cooke, the driver of the bus, told him at the .scene, he didn\u2019t .see him, the post between the windshield and the mirror blocked his view. In the collision the left front bumper, grille, fender, hood, and radiator of the Mercury were mashed: there was no damage to its right side or rear. There was a \u201cyield right of way\u201d sign on North Broad Street.\nCross examination by plaintiff: He doesn\u2019t know whether or not the bus had a left turn signal on. He didn\u2019t look to see whether the bus was going to turn left. When he saw the bus 200 to 300 feet away from the intersection, he didn\u2019t bother to look at it anymore until a few seconds before the collision.\nCross examination by the additional defendants: He was planning to turn left to go up Broad Street. East Davidson Street is about 30 feet wide from ditch to ditch \u2014 the pavement about 20 feet wide. \u201cI can\u2019t explain how it damaged the left front of the car I was driving and the left front of the bus if it was headed directly into my lane.*' * * I don\u2019t remember testifying to anything about my saying that I had started off. Now, I believe I did say I wouldn\u2019t deny it\u2014 that I told somebody that.\u201d\nRecross examination by plaintiff: \u201c1 did say it w>as shorter to make a left turn, .and that is the reason I stopped 20 feet back. No, sir, my car was not pointed in a northeasterly direction. That\u2019s right, I was going the shortest way around the intersection.* * *1 said he was some 3 to 5 feet over on my side of the road. If I had been watching the bus all the time, I could have gotten over on the side of the road. I wouldn\u2019t be sure that the bus cleared the intersection before the collision occurred. The front of the bus had gotten through the intersection at the time of the collision. I don\u2019t know about the back.\u201d\nWillis Cantrell, a city policeman and a witness for the original defendants, arrived at the scene of the wreck .about 15 minutes after it occurred. At that time the front end of the bus was about 50 feet from the intersecting line of North Broad Street and on the Mercury\u2019s side of the traveled portion of East Davidson Street. The Mercury was about 60 feet from the same intersecting line. He saw glass, dirt, and debris about three feet on the south side of the center of East Davidson Street. The left front of the Mercury was damaged. The left front of the bus, the paneling, and all under the windshield were pushed back. Cantrell, without objection, testified on cross examination by the additional defendants: \u201cThe driver of the bus told me that the driver of the Mercury was making a left turn*' * *he was also making a left turn and they collided there in the intersection.\u201d\nAccording to the evidence, Piedmont\u2019s possession and control of plaintiff\u2019s automobile was that of bailee, under a bailment for the mutual benefit of plaintiff, the bailor, and itself, the bailee. Consequently, Piedmont\u2019s duty was to exercise due care \u2014 it is not an insurer. \u2014 and its liability for the safe return of plaintiff\u2019s automobile turns upon the presence or absence of ordinary negligence. Insurance Co. v. Motors, Inc., 240 N.C. 183, 81 S.E. 2d 416; Hutchins v. Taylor- Buick Company, 198 N.C. 777, 153 S.E. 397; Beck v. Wilkins-Ricks Company, 179 N.C. 231, 102 S.E. 313; Hanes v. Shapiro, 168 N.C. 24, 84 S.E. 33.\nPlaintiff\u2019s evidence tends to show that he delivered his automobile to Piedmont, that Piedmont accepted it, and thereafter had possession and control of it, and that it failed to return the automobile and had it in its possession and control in a damaged condition. This made out a prima 'facie case of actionable negligence -against Piedmont. Insurance Co. v. Motors, Inc., supra; Hutchins v. Taylor-Buick Company, supra; Beck v. Wilkins-Ricks Company, supra; Hanes v. Shapiro, supra.\nWhile plaintiff\u2019s evidence makes out a prima facie case of negligence against Piedmont, the ultimate burden of establishing negligence is on plaintiff, the bailor, and remains on him throughout the trial. Insurance Co. v. Motors, Inc., supra; Beck v. Wilkins-Ricks Company, supra; Hanes v. Shapiro, supra.\nThe original defendants concede that plaintiff\u2019s evidence presents a prima facie case, 'but contend that the judgment of involuntary-nonsuit is 'correct, and should be sustained, for the reason that their evidence clearly rebuts plaintiff\u2019s prima facie case. With that contention we do not agree.\nInterpreting the evidence with that degree of liberality required in motions for judgment of involuntary nonsuit, it is our opinion that plaintiff\u2019s prima facie showing of negligence against Piedmont is not rebutted 'and overcome by the evidence of the original defendants so as to warrant the sustaining of the judgment of involuntary nonsuit, because the evidence of the original defendants is not clear, plain and unambiguous to the effect that the damage to plaintiff\u2019s automobile was proximately caused by the sole negligence of the additional defendants, but permits, although it does not compel, a reasonable inference that Bridges, who- was the agent and employee of Piedmont acting within the scope of his employment, did not keep an adequate lookout and drove the Mercury automobile into the intersection of East Davidson and Broad Streets so nearly in front of the approaching bus that a collision could not be avoided, and as a direct result of such negligence the -collision between the Mercury and the bus occurred, and further, the nonsuit cannot be sustained as to Bridges because every person is individually responsible for his own acts of actionable negligence. This negligence is -alleged by plaintiff against both of the original defendants.\nWe think the case is controlled by the decisions in Insurance Co. v. Motors, Inc., supra; Hutchins v. Taylor-Buick Company, supra; Beck v. Wilkins-Ricks Company, supra, and that the facts here do not bring it within the principle announced in Morgan v. Bank, 190 N.C. 209, 129 S.E. 585; Swain v. Motor Co., 207 N.C. 755, 178 S.E. 560.\nThe judgment of involuntary nonsuit entered below is\nReversed.", "type": "majority", "author": "PARKER, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Horace M. DuBose, III, -for plaintiff appellant.", "Mullen, Holland \u2022& Cooke by Philip V. Harrell for Harold Vaughn Bridges and Piedmont Motors, Inc., original defendants, appellees.", "No counsel for Aaron Hampton Cooke and Gastonia Transit Company, additional defendants, appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GRADY ROOSEVELT DELLINGER v. HAROLD VAUGHN BRIDGES and PIEDMONT MOTORS, INC., Defendants, and AARON HAMPTON COOKE and GASTONIA TRANSIT COMPANY, Additional Defendants.\n(Filed 20 March 1963.)\n1. Bailment \u00a7 1\u2014\nDelivery of possession of an automobile by an owner to a garage for repairs creates a bailment for mutual benefit.\n2. Bailment \u00a7 8\u2014\nA bailee for hire is not an insurer but is liable for his failure to return the property in good condition only when such failure is due to ordinary negligence.\n3. Same\u2014\nProof of delivery of property to a bailee for hire and failure of the bailee to return it in good condition mal\u00edes out a prima facie ease of actionable negligence against thie bailee, but does not shift the burden of proof on the issue of negligence, which remains on (the bailor throughout the trial.\n\u20224. Same; Automobiles \u00a7 41g\u2014 Evidence of negligence in entering intersection in front of approaching vehicle held for jury.\nEvidence tending to show that bailee\u2019s driver, in entering an intersection to make a left turn, was struck by a bus approaching along the intersecting street from his left and making a left tumi, held, sufficient to be submitted to .the jury on the -issue of the individual driver\u2019s negligence in failing to keep an adequate lookout and in driving into the intersection so nearly in front of the approaching bus 'that a collision could not be avoided, and held further, not to I\u2019ebut the prima facie showing of negligence on the part of the bailee in failing to return the car in good condition, even though 'the evidence showed that the bus, in turning left, encroached some three or four feet on its left side of the street.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Biddle, S.J., 13 August 1962 Jury Term of GASTON.\nCivil action to recover damages for injury to 'an automobile, for loss of its use, for expenses incurred for other transportation, and for finance charges due on the automobile to Universal C.I.T.\nPlaintiff brought his action against Piedmont Motors, Inc. \u2014 hereafter called Piedmont \u2014 and Harold Vaughn Bridges alleging that his automobile was damaged by the negligence of Bridges acting as an employee and agent of Piedmont within the scope of bis employment.\nPiedmont and Bridges filed a j oi-nt answer admitting that at all times complained of Bridges was an employee and agent of Piedmont acting within the scope of his employment, and denying any negligence on their part. In their answer they alleged a cross action against Gastonia Transit Company and Aaron Hampton Cooke, by virtue of the provisions of G.S. 1-240, wherein they averred that the damage to plaintiff\u2019s automobile was caused solely by the negligence of Cooke, an agent and employee of Gastonia Transit Company acting within the scope of his employment, but if they were negligent, then the damage to plaintiff\u2019s automobile was caused by the joint and concurring negligence of Gastonia Transit Company, Cooke and themselves, and Gastonia Transit Company and Cooke should be made parties defendant as joint tort-feasors and required to contribute to any damages plaintiff may recover against them.\nThe record contains no order making Gastonia Transit Company and Cooke parties defendant, but the record does contain a written motion by them to dismiss the cross action, and an order signed by a special superior court judge on 15 January 1962 denying the motion. The record also contains a j oint answer by Gastonia Transit Company and Cooke denying any negligence on their part.\nPlaintiff introduced evidence, Piedmont and Bridges introduced evidence, and Gastonia Transit Company and Cooke did not introduce evidence. From a judgment of involuntary nonsuit entered at the close of all the evidence, on motion of Piedmont and Bridges, plaintiff appeals.\nHorace M. DuBose, III, -for plaintiff appellant.\nMullen, Holland \u2022& Cooke by Philip V. Harrell for Harold Vaughn Bridges and Piedmont Motors, Inc., original defendants, appellees.\nNo counsel for Aaron Hampton Cooke and Gastonia Transit Company, additional defendants, appellees." }, "file_name": "0090-01", "first_page_order": 134, "last_page_order": 139 }