{ "id": 8559424, "name": "LOCAL FINANCE COMPANY OF SHELBY v. DELBERT N. JORDAN", "name_abbreviation": "Local Finance Co. v. Jordan", "decision_date": "1963-03-20", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "127", "last_page": "129", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "259 N.C. 127" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "49 S.E. 80", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8655943 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/137/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 S.E. 2d 383", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "217 N.C. 722", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8616930 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/217/0722-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 S.E. 2d 37", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 N.C. 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624335 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/254/0060-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 277, "char_count": 3586, "ocr_confidence": 0.539, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.887515551086852e-08, "percentile": 0.535128302847 }, "sha256": "6947d746217443b46634c7d6fa5156539285dcbfbbe1c1a748ceb547b3257a15", "simhash": "1:30c9e5845abaa97c", "word_count": 577 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:55:17.750134+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Bobbitt, J. concurs in result." ], "parties": [ "LOCAL FINANCE COMPANY OF SHELBY v. DELBERT N. JORDAN." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HiggiNS, J.\nThe plaintiff seeks to restrain the breach of a written contract the parties executed. True, the validity of that contract is in dispute. Ordinarily, a -court of equity should not resolve a serious dispute without a full hearing on the merits. \u201cIt is generally proper, when the parties are at issue concerning the legal or equitable right, to grant an interlocutory injunction to preserve the right in statu quo until the determination of the controversy, an-d especially is this the rule when the principal relie-f sought is in itself an injunction, because a dissolution of a pending interlocutory injunction, or the refusal of one, upon application therefor in the first instance, will virtually decide the case upon its merits and deprive the plaintiff of all remedy or relief, even though he should be afterwards able to show ever so good a case.\u201d Coach Lines v. Brotherhood, 254 N.C. 60, 118 S.E. 2d 37; Boone v. Boone, 217 N.C. 722, 9 S.E. 2d 383; Cobb v. Clegg, 137 N.C. 153, 49 S.E. 80.\nUnder the circumstances, Judge Pless was justified in continuing the restraining order to the final hearing. Consequently .the order is\nAffirmed.\nBobbitt, J. concurs in result.", "type": "majority", "author": "HiggiNS, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Joyner & Howison, by Walton K. Joyner, for plaintiff, appellee.", "Mullen, Holland & Cooke, by Frank P.. Cooke, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LOCAL FINANCE COMPANY OF SHELBY v. DELBERT N. JORDAN.\n(Filed 20 March 1963.)\nInjunctions \u00a7 13\u2014\nIn a suit to restrain the threatened breach of a written contract, order continuing the temporary restraining order to the hearing upon the filing of bond by plaintiff will ordinarily be affirmed on appeal, even though defendant challenges the validity of the contract, since the refusal to continue the temporary order would virtually determine the ease upon its merits.\nBobbitt, J., concurs in result.\nAppeal by defendant from Pless, J., October 1962 Term, CLEVELAND Superior Court.\nThe plaintiff instituted this civil action to restrain the defendant from violating his written contract not to accept employment from a competitor within one year after leaving plaintiff\u2019s employment. The contract, dated September 12, 1961, provided:\n\u201c13. That for a period of one year after the termination of my employment for any reason I will not engage in any way, directly or indirectly, in any business competitive with the Employer\u2019s business, nor solicit or in any other way or manner work for or assist any competitive business, in any city or the environs or trade territory thereof in which I shall have been located or employed within one year prior to- such termination.\u201d\nThe -contract further provided:\n\u201c2. That the services to be rendered by me require special training, skill -and experience, and that this contract is made to obtain such skilled services for the Employer.\u201d\nThe plaintiff\u2019s verified complaint alleged that defendant voluntarily left plaintiff\u2019s employment as manager of its Shelby, North Carolina, small loan office and immediately accepted employment by a competitor in the same business in Shelby. By verified -answer, the defendant admitted (1) that he executed the contract, (2) that he left plaintiff\u2019s employment in Shelby and -accepted similar employment by a competitor.\nHe defended upon two grounds: (1) He was required to execute the contract after the employment began, hence it was without consideration. (2) The contract is void for indefiniteness and is -an unlawful restraint of trade.\nAfter hearing, Judge Pless continued the restraining order, requiring the plaintiff to execute a bond in the sum of $5,000.00. The defendant appealed.\nJoyner & Howison, by Walton K. Joyner, for plaintiff, appellee.\nMullen, Holland & Cooke, by Frank P.. Cooke, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0127-01", "first_page_order": 171, "last_page_order": 173 }