{ "id": 8559927, "name": "CHARLIE R. COHEE v. WILLIE HAMPTON SLIGH", "name_abbreviation": "Cohee v. Sligh", "decision_date": "1963-04-10", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "248", "last_page": "249", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "259 N.C. 248" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "100 S.E. 2d 841", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "247 N.C. 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627118 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/247/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 S.E. 2d 402", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 N.C. 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624744 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/254/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 S.E. 2d 716", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "255 N.C. 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569543 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/255/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 S.E. 2d 765", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 N.C. 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626779 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/239/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 S.E. 2d 427", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 N.C. 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621213 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/252/0289-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 239, "char_count": 3241, "ocr_confidence": 0.517, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.135229224563894e-08, "percentile": 0.5074681960222391 }, "sha256": "04ece15aad14128bfbd150215f5de9535241020bff5f237495ea69a7edb6d861", "simhash": "1:a14f74b290a999f8", "word_count": 547 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:55:17.750134+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CHARLIE R. COHEE v. WILLIE HAMPTON SLIGH." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Per Curiam.\nIf the owner of an automobile is to be held liable for the manner in which it is operated, he must be charged with responsibility for the operation \u2014 'mere ownership is not sufficient. Responsibility may be imposed because of the personal negligence of the owner or because the owner acts through an agent or under the \u201cfamily purpose doctrine.\u201d Lynn v. Clark, 252 N.C. 289, 113 S.E. 2d 427; Parker v. Underwood, 239 N.C. 308, 79 S.E. 2d 765.\nA complaint which fails to state a cause of action is not sufficient to support a judgment for plaintiff. Morton v. Insurance Co., 255 N.C. 360, 121 S.E. 2d 716; Collins v. Simms, 254 N.C. 148, 118 S.E. 2d 402. The court erred in refusing to allow defendant\u2019s motion. It had a discretionary right to allow plaintiff\u2019s motion to amend; but any amendment so made could not relate back to the institution of the action and thereby deprive defendant of his opportunity to answer. Pruitt v. Taylor, 247 N.C. 380, 100 S.E. 2d 841.\nThe default and inquiry judgments will be vacated and defendant allowed time to answer the amended complaint.\nReversed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Per Curiam." } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert B. Wilson, Jr., and Motsinger & Pfefferkom by William G. Pfefferkom for plaintiff appellee.", "Deal, Hutchins cmd Minor by Fred S. Hutchins, Jr.., for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CHARLIE R. COHEE v. WILLIE HAMPTON SLIGH.\n(Filed 10 April 1963.)\n1. Automobiles \u00a7 52\u2014\nMere ownership of an automobile involved in a collision does not impose liability upon the owner, but the owner\u2019s liability must rest upon his personal negligence, or the negligence of his agent or employee, or upon the family purpose doctrine, and a complaint which fails to allege any one of these bases of liability fails to state a cause of action against the owner.\n2. Judgments \u00a7 13\u2014\nA default judgment may not be predicated on a complaint which fails to state a cause of action, and such judgment must be vacated upon defendant\u2019s motion notwithstanding the allowance of plaintiff\u2019s motion to amend, since the amendment may not relate bach so as to deprive defendant of his opportunity to answer.\nAppeal by defendant from Gambill J., November 19, 1962 Term of Forsyth.\nSummons issued 7 September 1961. It, with a verified copy of the complaint, was served 11 September 1961. Plaintiff alleged he sustained personal injuries and property damage in a collision between an automobile owned and operated by him and an automobile owned by defendant; the collision was caused by the negligence of Pauline G. Miller, who \u201cwas operating the defendant\u2019s automobile with the express permission of the defendant and Pauline G. Miller was operating said automobile for the purposes for which such permission was granted.\u201d\nJudgment by default .and inquiry was entered 17 October 1961. The amount of damage was determined in June 1962. Judgment was rendered on the verdict. Defendant moved to set aside the judgments because based on a complaint which failed to state a cause of action. The court declined to allow defendant\u2019s motion but allowed a motion of \u25a0plaintiff to amend the complaint so as to allege that Pauline G. Miller was operating defendant\u2019s car as his agent and in the course 'and scope of her employment.\nDefendant appealed from the court\u2019s refusal to allow its motion.\nRobert B. Wilson, Jr., and Motsinger & Pfefferkom by William G. Pfefferkom for plaintiff appellee.\nDeal, Hutchins cmd Minor by Fred S. Hutchins, Jr.., for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0248-01", "first_page_order": 292, "last_page_order": 293 }