#### CELESTER H. SHAW v. THE J. F. WARD COMPANY.

(Filed 27 November 1963.)

1. Negligence § 37b—

A store proprietor is not an insurer of ¡the safety of customers but is under duty to exercise ordinary care to keep tbe premises in reasonably safe condition, and to give warning- of bidden perils or unsafe conditions so far as be can ascertain tbem by reasonable inspection and supervision, but be is not required to give warning of conditions that are obvious.

2. Negligence § 37Í—

Evidence that -the steps in defendant's store were illuminated by natural light from a glass, door and window in front and half a glass door in tbe rear- and by floureseent light, except to tbe extent of shadows caused by the guard rail, that the wooden step was worn to a depth of one-quarter to one-half inch by long use, -with testimony of plaintiff that she did not know at tbe time she fell what caused .her to fall ibirt 'that she concluded, based upon an inspection some 45 days after tbe accident, that she fell because tbe step was worn and slick, is held, insufficient to be submitted to the jury on the issue of negligence.

Appeal .by plaintiff from Gambill, J., February 25, 1963, Civil Session, DavidsoN Superior Court.

Civil action ¡to recover damages for personal injury. At the close of plaintiff’s evidence the ¡court entered judgment of .compulsory nonsuit, from which the plaintiff appealed.

Walser and Brinkley, by Gaither S. Walser for plaintiff appellant.. DeLapp & Ward for defendant appellee.

Higgins, J.

The plaintiff, an invitee, was injured in a fall as she descended the wooden steps between the first and the second floors of *575defendant's department store. She alleged: “That said second step was loose and would give under pressure and the cupped, loose, worn, depressed and uneven area, was very islick from constant wear.”

The plaintiff testified: “When I came down the stairway, I Lad my tend on the rai-l. When I got to the second step from this little platform where you step on -before you go down into the store, my foot ©lipped off the step "and I fell. It was my right foot that slipped off. . . . At that point the stepis were worn and slick and .on. the edge they were splintering; on .the edge of the step I slipped off of it is worn out in the middle where it has 'been walked on a lot. I 'did not observe the condition of the step1 that day but did go back on February 19th and again on February 23rd. . . . There was a sloping on the second step, and I ■would say the sloping was from a quarter of an inch to -a half incih due to the worn out condition. . . . The tend rail casts a shadow. ... I would ©ay that I have been trading there maybe four or five years, something like that, and during that time I have gone to- the upstairs department when I went to the store. Much of the ladies’ wear is upstairs and when I would go upstairs, I would walk up these steps and down these steps. ... As to how deep it was worn, I would say down where it is worn the most it would be -at least a quarter of an inch.”

In reply to a question- by the -.court, the plaintiff said ©he didn’t know at the time of her fall (January 3, 1962) what caused the fall. But when she returned to the store on February 19, 1962, and saw the condition o>f the steps she then concluded that their worn and slick condition caused the fall and resulting injury.

Does this evidence and the legitimate inferences from it disclose the injury was proximately caused by the -defendant’s negligence as alleged? If the answer is no, then we -need not consider defendant’s conditional -defense that plaintiff was familiar with the steps, inattentive to those conditions, which were obvious, and her inattention was a contributing cause to her fall and injury.

“The proprietor of a store is not an insurer of the safety of customers while ran the premises. But he does owe to them the duty to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition and to ‘give warning of hidden perils or unsafe conditions in so far as can be ascertained by reasonable inspection and supervision’.” Case v. Cato’s, 252 N.C. 224, 113 S.E. 2d 320; Hood v. Coach Co., 249 N.C. 534, 107 S.E. 2d 154; Ross v. Drug Store, 225 N.C. 226, 34 S.E. 2d 64. “Where -a condition of the premises is obvious . . . generally there is no duty on the part of the owner ... to warn of -that condition.” Garner v. Greyhound Corp., 250 N.C. 151, 108 S.E. 2d 461.

*576In the .Mutant case (tibe plaintiff wajs familiar with .the stairway. Sibe ¡bad been using .it regularly for four or five years. She bad gone up the steps moments before she fell on the way down. A glass door and windows in front, and a balf-glass door in (tibe rear (admitted natural Might. FloiUi’esoemt light illuminated the stairway except to the extent of shadows cast 'by the guard rail. The time was 12:00 o’clock noon. According to the plaintiff's own evidence sire did oof know at the time she fell what bad caused her -fall. The evidence she gave was a eomicluision she drew from an 'examination she made 45 days after her accident. At most the evidence indicated a wooden .step worn by long use to the 'depth of one-quarter (to one-half inch.

When tested by the rules of liability approved by this Court in the foregoing cases and many others which are cited therein, we conclude ■the evidence was insufficient to> permit any inference of actionable negligence on the part of the defendant. The judgment of nonsuit is

Affirmed.