{
  "id": 8574842,
  "name": "In re JAMES EDWARD DONNELLY",
  "name_abbreviation": "In re Donnelly",
  "decision_date": "1963-10-30",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "375",
  "last_page": "382",
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    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
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      "cite": "228 N.C. 584",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:49:29.885963+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "In re JAMES EDWARD DONNELLY."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Moore, J.\nN.C.G.S. 20-23 provides that \u201cThe Department is authorized to suspend or revoke the license of any resident of this State upon receiving notice of the conviction of such person in another state of amy offense therein which, if committed in this State, would be grounds for the suspension or -revocation of -the license. . . .\u201d Such authority to suspend a driver\u2019s license may be exercised either \u201cwith or without preliminary 'hearing.\u201d -G.S. 20-16 (-a) (7). A forfeiture of -bail or collateral deposited to -secure a -defendant\u2019s appearance in .court is, for the purposes -of the foregoing sections, -equivalent to- -a eom/victi-om\u2014 provided the forfeiture has not been vacated. G.S. 20-24(c).\nThe criminal -offense, opera-ting a motor vehicle upon a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, as -defined 'by the South -Carolina -statute, is in all material aspects the -same as set out in the North Carolina statute. Code of S. C., s. 46-343; N.C.G.S. 20-138.\nOn this appeal -the inquiry is -whether -there was a judicial forfeiture of -petitioner\u2019s bail upo-n which to- predicate a -suspension or revocation of his North Carolina driver\u2019s license.\nThe -count below found as -a f-a-ct \u201cthat petitioner received -a copy of official -summons .and arrest report signed by -the arresting -officer.\u201d If this finding means that the arresting officer put the indicated document in an envelope -containing some of petitioner\u2019s personal 'belongings, the finding is snpp-orted -by evidence. But the evidence is positive that no \u25a0warrant, summons, arrest report -or -other lawful process w-as served on or -delivered to petitioner, to -bring to his notice or knowledge the offense with which he was charged, -the court .befo-re which he was to appear\u2019, or the time and place of trial. Furthermore, it appears -on the \u2022face of the \u201cofficial summons -and arrest -report\u201d that it -could not have been served on or -delivered to petitioner before the purported forfeiture of bail took place. It is dated \u201cMarch 20, 1963\u201d \u2014 this date is ten -days subsequent ,to the -arrest, and nine day-s after the purported forfeiture. Ind-ee-d, it -does not appear that respondent, North Carolina Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, contends that -any warrant or other lawful process was served on petitioner. Respondent contends only that petitioner\u2019s 'bail w-as forfeited, and that under the provisions -of G.S. 20-24 (e) -such forfeiture is equivalent to a -conviction.\nThis Court has had occasion: to decide -this -exact question in a prior opinion. In re Wright, 228 N.C. 301, 45 S.E. 2d 370, rehearing 228 N.C. 584, 46 S.E. 2d 696. A North Carolina citizen, -bolder of -a North Carolina -driver\u2019s license, was -arrested in South Carolina on a charge of driving while under .the -influence -o-f intoxicants. He gave bond. No warrant was served. He -did not a-ppear for trial, -and his bond was forfeited. Upon receipt -o-f notice of .the forfeiture the North Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles -suspended his license. Thi-s -court held that where no- warrant is served no leg-al action is pending in- court, and when mo legal action is pending -there can be no valid judgment \u25a0of forfeiture of bail. Further, the mere deposit of security with an 'arresting officer or magistrate pending issuance and service of warrant, which deposit is retained without the semblance of judicial or legal forfeiture is not a forfeiture of bail within the meaning of G.S. 20-24(c).\nRespondent deed-res that we reconsider the matter in the light of a decision of the South Carolina Court in the case of State v. Langford, 223 S.C. 20, 73 S.E. 2d 854 (1952), in which our opinion in- the Wright case dis discussed and a contrary result is reached. In the Langford case defendant was \u00a1arrested \u00a1and orally .advised that he was -charged with operating \u00a1a motor vehicle while under the .influence of intoxicants. The charge was entered on the criminal docket of the Municipal Court of Greenville, South Carolina, but -no warrant was ever served. Defendant posted 'bond, but failed to appear when the court convened later in the day. The bond was forfeited. The South Carolina law provides that \u25a0all proceedings before a magistrate in criminal oases shall be -com-meniced on information under oath, upon which, and only which, shall a warrant -of arrest issue. The Court \u00a9aid: \u201c. . . (Jurisdiction of the offense charged \u00a1and \u00a1of the person, accused is indispensable to a valid -conviction'. \u2018It has been -said that jurisdiction of the \u00a1subject matter of a -particular case iis vested in tire court when the appropriate charge is filed, while the jurisdiction of the -person is acquired when the party charged is arrested or voluntarily appeal\u2019s in court and submits himself to its jurisdiction.\u2019 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, s. 143, p. 235. While jurisdiction of (the \u00a1offense or subject matter may not be waived, the objection that the court has no. jurisdiction of the person may be waived, and \u00a1as a general rule \u2018is waived when accused submits to\u00a1 the jurisdiction of the court by poisting bail or entering -a recognizance without objection.\u2019 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, s. 161, p. 259.\u201d Further: \u201cIt is our conclusion that -respondent (defendant) has waived any right to\u00a1 attack, upon, the ground that no. warrant has been issued for him, the judgment of forfeiture entered in the Greenville Municipal Court.\u201d\nRespondent implies that the opinion of the South Carolina Court in Langford, as to the validity of the forfeiture of bail when no warrant has been- served, is binding \u00a1on .this \u00a1Court -in the case at bar. We are not dealing here with the South Carolina statute authorizing the suspension of driver\u2019s license upon forfeiture of \u00a1bail. We are concerned only with the force and effect of the North Carolina statute, G.S. 20-24(c). We adhere to our holding in the Wright case. In the text from which the South Carolina Go-urt quotes we find the following: \u201cWhere a court has jurisdiction of the offense or subject matter, the objection that it 'has no jurisdiction of the person of accused may be waived.\u201d 'Emphasis added. 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, s. 161, p. 418. A license to operate motor vehicles on the public 'highways of North Carolina is a personal privilege and property right which may not be denied a citizen of this State who is qualified therefor under our statutes. It may \u25a0be suspended or revoked only -ini accordance with statutory provisions as they are written and 'construed in this jurisdiction.\nAs a matter of law the finding of the court below that \u201cthe cash bond deposited by the petitioner was forfeited\u201d cannot be sustained on this record. It was not such judicial forfeiture as will support the suspension or revocation of a North Carolina driver\u2019s license.\nThe court below also found as a fact that petitioner \u201cwas guilty of operating a motor vehicle on the highways in the State of South Carolina on March 10, 1963, while under the influence of intoxicating liquors.\u201d Respondent contends that this finding, taken .alone, is sufficient to sustain the judgment. He relies upon the following language of G.S. 20-16 (a) (7): \u201cThe Department shall have the authority to suspend the license . . . upon a showing -by its records or other satisfactory evidence that the licensee ... (7) Has committed an offense in 'another state. . . .\u201d He insists that this authorizes the court, in a hearing pursuant to\u00a1 G.S. 20-25, to- determine the guilt or innocence of petitioner as the sole basis for withholding .oar granting him relief from the suspension or revocation. It is -true that the superior court in the Wright case found as a fact that Wright was not guilty, and the Supreme Court held that the facts found, including incidentally the finding of innocence, were sufficient to support the judgment that petitioner\u2019s license be restored. It is not stated or even intimated in that opinion that the superior court of North Carolina may determine the guilt of a lioenseholder, with respect to offenses alleged to' have been committed in another state, as the sole predicate for suspension or revocation of his license. It is proper for the Department\u2019s hearing agent to hear and consider evidence bearing on guilt and innocence, among other things, relative to offenses outside the State, to assist him in reaching a decision in the exercise of discretionary authority. In its finding as to guilt the court .below was merely reviewing this aspect of the Department\u2019s decision. On appeal and hearing de novo in superior court, that court is not vested with discretionary authority. It makes judicial review of the facts, and if it finds that the license of petitioner is 'in fact and in law subject to suspension or revocation the order of the Department must be affirmed, otherwise not. In re Wright, supra (rehearing opinion, p. 589). The Department may not suspend or revoke license in the first instance until it receives \u201cnotice of the conviction . . . in another state.\u201d G.S. 20-23. It is therefore the conviction- in another state that is under \u00a1review in superior court. The statutes do not contemplate a suspension' or revocation of license by reason of a conviction in North Carolina of 'an alleged offense committed beyond its 'borders. In criminal matters the courts of North Carolina have no original extraterritorial jurisdiction. State v. Carson, 228 N.C. 151, 44 S.E. 2d 721; State v. Hall, 114 N.C. 639, 19 S.E. 602. The words \u201cother satisfactory evidence,\u201d in G.S. 20-16 (a) (7) refer to- the form of notice of conviction in another state, and confer no extraterritorial jurisdiction of the offense itself.\nThe judgment below is\nReversed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Moore, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Mullen, Holland \u25a0& Cooke for petitioner.",
      "Attorney General Bruton and Assistant Attorney General Brady for Respondent."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "In re JAMES EDWARD DONNELLY.\n(Filed 30 October 1963.)\n1. Automobiles \u00a7 2\u2014\nWhere no warrant, summons, arrest report, or other lawful process is served on or delivered to the driver of an automobile arrested in another state, evidence that a copy of the arrest report was placed among his personal effects 'asad that he delivered a sum in cash to an official to obtain his release, which sum was not returned, is insufficient to show a judicial forfeiture of hail or collateral deposited to secure defendant\u2019s presence in court. G.'S. 20-16(a) (7), and the Department of Motor Vehicles is not authorized to suspend or revoke the operator\u2019s license upon such evidence. G.S. 20-23.\n2. Same\u2014\nA license to operate a motor vehicle on public highways of this State is a personal privilege and property right of which a person may not be deprived1 except in accordance with statutory provisions as they are written \u25a0and construed in this jurisdiction, and a contrary holding in another jurisdiction is not conclusive here.\n3. Same\u2014\nThe provisions of G.S. 20-16(a) (7) that the Department of Motor Vehicles shall have authority to suspend an operator\u2019s license upon a showing by its records or \u201cother satisfactory evidence\u201d that the licensee has committed an offense in another state which, if committed here, would warrant revocation, held to refer to the form of notice of conviction in another state and does not purport to confer extra territorial jurisdiction on our courts to determine the guilt or innocence of a person charged with committing an offense in another state.\n4. Same\u2014\nOn appeal from the discretionary suspension of an automobile driver\u2019s license, the hearing in the Superior Court is de novo, and the 'Superior Court is not vested with any discretionary authority but is empowered to make only judicial review of the facts to .ascertain whether the licensee is in fact and in law subject to suspension or revocation.\nAppeal by petitioner from Froneberger, J.., July 1963 Session of GASTON.\nPetition for restoration of motor vehicle operator\u2019s license.\nJames Edward Donnelly, petitioner, is a resident of Gaston County, North Carolina, and on 10 March 1963 was holder of .a driver\u2019s license duly issued to Mm -by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles of the State of North Carolina. On said date he was operating a motor vehicle on a public highway of the State of South Carolina. He was stopped by a highway patrolman of that State, placed under arrest and lodged in the common j ail .at Clover, South Carolina. He was advised that the cause of arrest was drunken driving. He remained in j ail several hours, and was released when he delivered $50 in cash to an official. Thereafter he received by mail a notice from the South Carolina State Highway Department, dated 19 March 1963, advising that his privilege of operating a motor vehicle in South Carolina was suspended for 12 months for driving while under the influence of intoxicants. Attached to the notice was a copy o\u00ed -a letter to the North Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles stating that he had .been arrested for drunken driving and had forfeited bail on 11 March 1963. The North Carolina Department entered an order on 26 March 1963 suspending his driver\u2019s license for one year. G.S. 20-16 (a) (7); G.S. 20-23. In the meanwhile petitioner had employed 'counsel and by letter of 25 March 1963 requested a hearing as provided in G.S. 20-16 (d). A hearing was held on 23 April 'in Gaston Oounty by an agent of the North Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles. On 24 April petitioner was advised that his l\u00e1cense would \u201cremain in a state of suspension\u201d until 28 March 1964. On 13 May he filed petition for a hearing de novo in the Superior Court of Gaston County. G.S. 20-25. The Commissioner filed answer to (the petition and a hearing was had in superior court on 8 July.\nAt the hearing petitioner testified in (substance as follows: He was driving on -a South Carolina highway. He was in a line of traffic which had been stopped by patrolmen to check drivers\u2019 licenses. Patrolman B. M. Poore examined his license, required him to get out of the car, and asked if he had been' drinking. He stated he had drunk two beers. The patrolman- had him to- walk a few pacas and told him he had bad too much to drink. Petitioner denied this. He was taken to jail .by another patrolman, who told him he had been .arrested for driving while under the influence -of intoxicants. Later patrolman Poore came to1 his jail cell and told him he was charged with \u201cbeing drunk.\u201d Thereafter petitioner called his -wife. She came for him. He got $50 -in cash from her and delivered it to an official -and was released. He did not get a receipt for the money and had no trial He signed no papers. No warrant, citation or other paper was served on or delivered to- him. No one informed him of a time or place for -trial. No- one took lanything out \u2022of his pockets at the jail. He was not searched. He retained his -pocketbook, cigarettes, matches and -other personal belongings. He thought the $50 was taken for a fine.\nThe respondent, North Carolina Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, introduced in evidence a -document, marked \u201cExhibit A,\u201d and entitled \u201cOfficial Summons -and Arrest Report,\u201d with the heading \u201cSouth Carolina State Highway Patrol,\u201d date \u201cMarch 20, 1963,\u201d -and -case designation \u201cSouth Carolina versus James Edward Donnelly.\u201d It sets out petitioner\u2019s address, occupation, driver's license number, and his vehicle\u2019s make, model -and license number. It directs defendant to appear before Magistrate Joe F. Youngblood at Glover, S. C., at 11:00 A.M. on March 11, 1963, to answer a -charge of driving -under the -influence of -intoxicating liquor. It gives the -date of arrest, 10 March 1963, and the name of the arresting officer, B. M. Poore. At the bottom it has these entries: \u201cAmount of Fine $50.00 . . . Certified correct Joe Youngblood \u2014 3-11-63.\u201d\nB. M. Poore, South Carolina highway patrolman, testified in substance: In his opinion, petitioner was under\u2019 the influence of intoxicants when arrested. He staggered when he walked and had the odor of intoxicants on his breath. He advised Donnelly -that he was under arrest for drunken driving. He did not advise Donnelly the date he would be required to appear .before the Magistrate. At the jail Donnelly\u2019s personal belongings were taken, in Poore\u2019s presence, and placed in an envelope. Poore filled out the \u201cSummons ticket\u201d (Exhibit A above) and placed it in the envelope with Donnelly\u2019s belongings, and told him his bail was $50. Poore was not present when petitioner was released from jail. Poore did not sign a warrant; he signed Exhibit A, .but not under oath. It w.as placed in- petitioner\u2019s envelope, but Poore does not know whether it was given to \u00a1him or not. No warrant, notice or summons was officially served on petitioner. Exhibit A was not handed to him.\nThe judge made full findings of fact, including such of the facts recited above as are not in dispute and also the following:\n\u201c. . . (P) etitioner received a copy of official summons1 and arrest report signed by the .arresting officer. . . .\u201d\n. . (P) etitioner failed to appear in .the Magistrate\u2019s Court at the time 'and place designated in the summons and arrest report and . . . the case was called for a hearing; . . . the petitioner failed to appear\u2019 and the cash 'bond deposited by the petitioner was forfeited. ...\u201d\nPetitioner \u201ccommitted the offense of arid was guilty of operating a motor vehicle on the highways in the State of South Carolina on March 10, 1963, while under\u2019 .the influence of intoxicating liquors ))\nThe court was of the opinion \u201cThat the North Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles acted within its lawful authority in suspending the petitioner\u2019s . . . operator\u2019s -permit . . .,\u201d and adjudged that respondent's suspension order of 26 March 1963 is affirmed.\nPetitioner\u2019 appeals.\nMullen, Holland \u25a0& Cooke for petitioner.\nAttorney General Bruton and Assistant Attorney General Brady for Respondent."
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