{ "id": 8575226, "name": "J. A. SHINGLETON v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA and NORTH CAROLINA WILDLIFE RESOURCES COMMISSION", "name_abbreviation": "Shingleton v. State", "decision_date": "1963-11-20", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "451", "last_page": "459", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "260 N.C. 451" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "90 A. 257", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.", "year": 1914, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Mass. 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 314694 ], "year": 1849, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/59/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 U.S. 333", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 407844 ], "year": 1910, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/217/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 S.E. 2d 782", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1910, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 N.C. 772", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625783 ], "year": 1910, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/252/0772-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 S.E. 355", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1910, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 N.C. 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625405 ], "year": 1910, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/201/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 S.E. 169", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1910, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 N.C. 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625973 ], "year": 1910, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/207/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 S.E. 2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "230 N.C. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630660 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/230/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 S.E. 2d 191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 N.C. 682", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12167626 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/229/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 S.E. 2d 700", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 N.C. 589", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8610935 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/232/0589-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 S.E. 2d 458", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 N.C. 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627722, 8627751 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/239/0537-01", "/nc/239/0537-02" ] }, { "cite": "97 S.E. 657", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "176 N.C. 660", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8657531 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/176/0660-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 S.E. 2d 539", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "257 N.C. 717", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570649 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/257/0717-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 A. L. R. 1189", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 S.E. 697", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 N.C. 589", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8654716 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/189/0589-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 892, "char_count": 22263, "ocr_confidence": 0.381, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.689679834674549e-07, "percentile": 0.9627007211617357 }, "sha256": "f56303d278a4c7128df9e34c48f555e7e808b244af7549afdbfdbf659484c2e0", "simhash": "1:c6230c048e80874b", "word_count": 3775 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:49:29.885963+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "J. A. SHINGLETON v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA and NORTH CAROLINA WILDLIFE RESOURCES COMMISSION." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MooRE, J.\nThe State of North Carolina owns a large .body of land in Pender County, known as the Holly Shelter Wildlife Area. It is managed ,by the North Carolina Wildlife Resource\u00ae Commission. No public roads or highway\u00ae adjoin or oros\u00ae any portion of the Wildlife Area involved in this action. The roads within the area are owned by defendants and used in connection with wildlife management.\nThere was a dispute between defendants and plaintiff Slhingleton with respect to- the ownership and location of certain land\u00ae- within the boundaries of the Area. A suit was instituted, but before trial a compromise settlement was reached. Pursuant to the compromise agreement, .plaintiff herein conveyed to the State a portion of the land -in dispute 'and the State deeded to Shingleiton a portion. After these deeds were executed and delivered, a consent judgment wias entered reciting generally the execution and delivery of the deeds, the payment of a sum of money by the State, and the satisfactory settlement of the matter\u00ae in controversy, and the action was dismissed.\nThe said conveyance by the State to plaintiff herein was by quitclaim deed. It-conveyed to J. A. Shinigleton and \u201cthis heirs and assigns\u201d 110 acres situate in Topsail Township, Pender County. This land is described by metes and bound\u2019s, and lies entirely within, and a considerable distance from, the boundaries of (the Wildlife Area. Immediately below \u00a1the description are the following easement provisions:\n\u201cThe party of the first part reserves from this conveyance the right to maintain and use the roiads existing on the above described lands; and the said J. A. Slhingleton is hereby granted the right to- use the roads existing on otiher lands of the Wildlife Resource\u00ae Commission for the purpose of ingreeis and egress to .and from \u00a1the above described lands by the moat direct route.\u201d\nThe present controversy \u201carose when the plaintiff\u2019s (J. A. Shingle-ton\u2019s) brother and other kinsmen were attempting to go .over (the) moad .in question which leads from the public road through the Wildlife Refuge of the defendants by the most direct route to the plaintiff\u2019s land and . . . defendants placed -a locked gate at the entrance to- the road -in question and mounted armed guards to keep out all persons except plaintiff.\u201d\nPlaintiff -contends the -right-of-way granted him by the State is an easement appurtenant. Defendants -contend it is an. \u00a9aisememt in gross \u25a0and may fee used and enjoyed -only by J. A. Shimgleton personally. J. A. -Shingleton instituted tlhe present action feo> have determined his rights under the grant of easement, and makes allegations which, he contends, entitles him to injunctive -relief.\nTriad by jury was waived -and -the judge made findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered judgment. It -was adjudged that the easement granted toy the State to- the plaintiff \u201c'is- am unlimited easement appurtenant to plaintiff\u2019s land, given to plaintiff for his use and the use of his -agents, servants, employees-, licensees, and this public generally Who- (have not been re-fused permission to- use- the easement toy the plaintiff,\u201d and \u201c\u00a1that the defendants, their agents, servants and employees . . . are enj oin-ed from interfering toy gate \u00a1or otherwise with the use -of said easement -or roiad as herein provided.\u201d\nAm appurtenant easement is one which is attached to and- passes with the dominant tenement as -an appurtenance thereof; it is owned in connection -with other real estate \u00a1and as am incident -to such ownership. An easement in gross is not appurtenant to any estate in land and does not belong to any person by virtue of his ownership of an estate in other land, tout -iis a mere personal 'interest in -or right to- use -the land of -another; it is purely personal -and usually ends -with the death of the grantee. Davis v. Robinson, 189 N.C. 589, 127 S.E. 697. An easement appurtenant is in-cap-ab-le of existence ap-art from tine particular 1-amd to which it is annexed, it -exists only if the same person has title to the easement and the dominant -estate; it must bear some relation to- the use of the dominant -estate, and it must agree in- mature and quality to the thing to- w/hi-ch it is claimed to- be appurtenant. Am easement appurtenant is incident to an elstate, and inheres in -the land, concern\u00a9 the premise\u00a9, pertains- -to- its enjoyment, -and passes with -the transfer of the title to the land, -including transfer -by descent. 17A Am. Jur., Easements, ss. 9, 11, pp. 624, 625, 627. If -am easement is -im gross there is no dominant tenement-; \u00a1an- easement is in gross and personal to -the grantee -because it iis- not appurtenant -to- -other premises. Ibid, pp. 626-7. A-n \u2022easement -in gross -attache\u00a9 to- the -person -and mot to land. 89 A. L. R. 1189.\nThe easement im the instant ease is by deed, which is of course a contract. \u201cThe controlling purpose o-f the -court -in construing a contract is to ascertain the -intention of the parties 'as of the time -the contract was made, and to do this consideration must be given to the purpose -to be accomplished, the -su-bj \u00a9ct-matter \u00a1of the -contract, -and -the situation of the parties.\u201d Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Light Co., 257 N.C. 717, 127 S.E. 2d 539. \u201cIf there is any doubt entertained as to the real intention, we should reject that interpretation which leads to injustice and \u00abadopt that one which conforms more to the presumed meaning, because it does not produce unusual and unjust results.\u201d Patrick v. Insurance Co., 176 N.C. 660, 97 S.E. 657; Hine v. Blumenthal, 239 N.C. 537, 547, 80 S.E. 2d 458. \u201cWhether an easement is appurtenant or in gross is controlled mainly by the nature of the right and the intention of the panties creating it, and must be determined iby the fair interpretation of the grant . . . creating the easement, aided if necessary by the situation of the property and the surrounding circumstances. If it appears from such a construction of the grant . . . that the panties intended to create a 'right in the nature of an easement in the property retained for the benefit of the property granted, . . . such right will be deemed an easement -appurtenant and not in gross, regardless oif the form in which \u00a9ucfh. intention is expressed. On the other hand, if it appears from isuch a construction that the parties intended to' create a right to be attached to -tire person to whom it was granted ..., it will be deemed to be -an easement in gross. An easement its appurtenant to land, if it is so in fact, although it its not declared to foe so in the deed or instrument creating it; and an easement, which in its nature is appropriate and a useful adjunct of land owned by the grantee of the easement, will be declared an \u2018easement 'appurtenant,\u2019 \u00a1and not \u2018in gross,\u2019 in the absence of a \u00a9bowing that the parties intended it to be a mere personal right.\u201d 28 C. J. S., Basements, s. 4c, pp. 636-7. In caste of doubt, an easement is presumed to- be appurtenant, and not in gross. 17A Am. Jur., Easements, s. 12, p. 628.\nDefendants contend that the easement of ingress tatnd egress granted by -them its in .gross and personal to J. A. Shingleton. The grant does not use the term \u201cappurtenant\u201d nor the term \u201cin gross.\u201d It does not qualify plaintiff\u2019s right by use of such terms as \u201cpersonally\u201d or \u201cin person.\u201d The language of the grant is that \u201cthe said J. A. Shingleton is \u2022hereby granted the right . . .\u201d The fact that the words \u201cheirs 'and assigns\u201d are not inserted after the name of the grantee does not control interpretation. G.S. 39-1; 28 C. J. S., Easements, s. 4c, p. 637. Defendants insist \u00a1that the consent judgment indicates that the easement was a right personal to plaintiff. We do not so- interpret it. The consent judgment makes no direct reference to the ea.sement, it merely refers to -the deed from \u00a1the State to plaintiff. The only writing bearing upon, the question is the provision in the deed. It will be observed that the deed, in addition to the .grant of easement to the plaintiff, reserves the .right to the State to \u201cMaintain and use the roads existing on\u201d the land conveyed to plaintiff. We do not understand \u00a1that defendants contend that the reads across plaintiff's 110-aore toot can be used curly by tibe individual members of tibe Wildlife Resources .Commission and that tibe agents, servants, employees and lioense.es of the Commission are excluded. Yeti tibe reservation and tlhe grant are written in. parallel moid'es of expression. It seems clear that the reservation of easement is appurtenant tio tihe lands retained by the State. In tihe .absence of express .provision in the grant restricting the easement to the personal use of plaintiff, tihe presumption is that it is an easement appurtenant to plaintiffls 110-acre \u00a1tract. Moreover, the situation of filie property \u00a1a/nd tihe surrounding \u00a1circumstances indicate beyond, question \u00a1that an easement appurtenant was intended. The original controversy, in tihe settlement of which the deed wais given, .arose from conflicting claims oif rights \u00a1and title to lands. The record \u00a1does mot disclose that plaintiff Ibas ever claimed \u00a1any personal rights, apart from land ownership, in the Wildlife Area. The deed \u00a1conveys to plaintiff a \u00a1tract of land which, without some adequate -access over defendants\u2019 lands, would 'be completely cut off from any public or private ro,ad. The grant of easement was so- clearly connected with .tire conveyance of the 110-aore tract \u00a1that in tihe deed it follows immediately tihe description of the land. The words \u201cingress\u201d \u00a1and \u201cegress\u201d as used in tihe grant of easement show clearly it was intended that tihe easement is connected with and is to be used for tihe \u00a1benefit -of \u00a1the land. The roiad in question is appurtenant to tihe land in .fact, anid- leads from the land across the Wildlife Area tio tihe public road beyond. Apart from tihe ownership of the 110-acre tract, the easement is worthless. If plaintiff did not own this land he would have no business or interest of any kind within the Wildlife A^ea. The land was conveyed tio plaintiff in fee. It iis not reasonable tio \u25a0conclude that the \u00a1State would undertake -to. grant and plaintiff to accept a right of .access to land which would end .at the death of -plaintiff and render the -land thereafter inaccessible \u00a1and worthless. Furthermore, it is not reasonable to- \u00a1suppose -that plaintiff could, \u00a1acting alone, cut \u25a0and remove timber .from \u00a1his land or cultivate, harvest and remove \u00a1crops, or -make other beneficial use of the land. Certainly the parties did! not intend that plaintiff\u2019s heirs, devisees \u00a1or -alssigns Should have no \u00a1ale-cess to -the \u00a1property. We hold that the easement granted by \u00a1the State to plaintiff is \u00a1appurtenant to plaintiff\u2019s land described in the deed.\nThe court below .adjudged that the \u00a1State .granted \u201can unlimited easement appurtenant to- plaintiff\u2019\u00a9 land . . . for his use \u00a1and tihe use of his agents, servants, employees, licensees, \u00a1and the public generally who have not been refused permission to use this easement \u00a1by plaintiff.\u201d In our \u00a1opinion tihe record -in this case does not \u00a9how that the general public \u00a1should ibe -permitted to use the road. \u201cIt is -an established principle that -th-e unrestricted grant of a\u00a9 easement gives -the grantee all su-ch rights as are incidental or -necessary to the reasonable and proper enjoyment -of the easement. A grant . . . of an easement in general terms is limited to >a use which is reasonably necessary .and loomveniant and as little burdensome to- the iservient estate ais possible for the use -contemplated. Am unlimited conveyance -of -an easement is in law a grant of unlimited reasonable use. Such grant is not restricted to use merely for the purposes of the -dominant estate .as -are reasonably required at .the d\u00edate of the grant, but the right may .be exercised by the owners of the dominant estate for any use to which the latter -estate may be subsequently devoted. Thus there may be -an increase in the volume and hind .of use of such an easement during the comise -o-f its enjoyment.\u201d 12A Am. Jur., Easements, s. 113, pp. 720, 721. \u201cThe reasonable use and enjoyment of an easement is to be determined in the light of the situation of the property and the surrounding circumstances.\u201d What is a reasonable use is a question of fact. Ibid., p. 721.\nIn -determining what uses of the easement are reasonably necessary and -convenient, consideration must be given to- the purposes for which the easement was granted. Sparrow v. Tobacco Co., 232 N.C. 589, 61 S.E. 2d 700. The owners of the servient estate may make any use of their property -and road not inconsistent with the reasonable use an-d enjoyment of the easement granted. Light Co. v. Bowman, 229 N.C. 682, 51 S.E. 2d 191. The easement was granted for the purpose of ingress and egress to and from p-laintiff\u2019s 110-acre tract of land. The ingress -and egress must have -some relation, directly or incidentally, to the actual use -of the land -by the owner. The record iis silent ais to what use is being made -o-f the land, but it is safe to assume that in its position oif isolation it is not being used for any business which would reasonably require that the general public .have -access thereto. It is suggested in plaintiff\u2019s brief that it is timberland or farmland. Plaintiff hais made- no showing which, justifies the us-e of the easement by the general public. Furthermore, defendants are maintaining a wil-dlife refuge on the lands -o-ver which the road passes. Access by the general public is -inimical to the maintenance of such refuge. I-t is no violation of plaintiff\u2019s nights under his easement that he b-e required to give permission to those wh-o travel the road in -connection with the use and enj oymen-t of the -dominant estate. The wo-rdis \u201cand the public generally who have not been refused permission to use this easement by the plaintiff,\u201d will be stricken from -th-e judgment belo-w.\nThe court below decreed \u201cthat the defendants, their -agents, servants and employees, be, and they are -hereby enjoined from interfering -by lo-cked gate o-r otherwise with the use -of said -easement or road as herein. provided.\u201d'This portion o\u00ed the judgment is mot sustained. The owner of property cannot maintain am notion against the State or any agency of the State in tort for damages to property (except -as provided 'by statute, G.S., Oh. 143, Art. 31). It follows that he cannot maintain an action .against it to restrain the commission of a tort. However, the landowner is not without a remedy. When public officers whose duty it is to supervise and direct a State agency attempt or threaten to invade the property rights of a citizen in disregard of law, they are not relieved of responsibility by the immunity o\u00ed the State from suit, even though they 'act or assume to act under (the authority and pursuant to the directions of the State. Schloss v. Highway Commission, 230 N.C. 489, 492, 53 S.E. 2d 517. In the instant action none of the officer's or agents of the State are parties. And even if they were p>arties, it should be borne in mind that the plaintiff in the use of the road in question may not impose unnecessary and unreasonable burdens upon the servient tenement. In the light of the meagre facts presented by the record, it would seem that defendants\u2019 officers would be acting within defendants\u2019 rights in intercepting and questioning users of the road to ascertain their .identity and status, \u2018and to- determine whether they have permission for such use, and in preventing them from molesting or talcing game, wildlife or trees from the lands of defendants, should such be attempted. Furthermore, the maintenance of a gate, even, a looked gate, would not necessarily be inconsistent with plaintiff\u2019s rights so long as the use of the road by himself and his agents, servants, employees and licensees is not unreasonably interfered with thereby. We Me not called upon on this appeal to. promulgate \u2018rules for the guidance of the parties. But reasonable men can most certainly arrive at an. understanding that will protect the rights of all.\nDefendants demur ore tenus to the complaint on the ground that the superior court is without jurisdiction of tire subject-matter of this action. They contend that the State 'has not consented to be .sued in an action such as that alleged. The demurrer' is overruled. G.S. 41-10.1, in pertinent part, provides that \u201cWhenever the State of North Carolina ox .any agency or department thereof, .asserts a claim of title to land which has not been taken by condemnation and any individual . , . likewise asserts a claim of title to said land, such individual . . . may (bring .an action in the superior court . . . against the State or any such agency or department thereof for the purpose of determining such .adverse claims.\u201d\nAh easement is an interest in land land is generally created by deed. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Light Co., supra; Morganton v. Hudson, 207 N.C. 360, 177 S.E. 169; Combs v. Brickhouse, 201 N.C. 366, 160 S.E. 355. An easement -appurtenant to- property is property. Williams v. Highway Commission, 252 N.C. 772, 114 S.E. 2d 782. A private rigihit-of-wiay is an easement and is land. United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333 (1910). Every right to land is a title. If \u00ae person hais the actual or constructive possession of property, or 'the right of possession, he has a title thereto-, though another person may be the owner. Roberts v. Wentworth, 59 Mass. 192 (1849); Brady v. Cartaret Realty Co., 90 A. 257 (N.J. 1914). In the instant case there are adverse -claims o>f title to land.\nThe judgment below wall be modified in accordance with this opinion.\nModified and affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "MooRE, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Isaac C. Wright and George Rountree, Jr., for plaintiff..", "Attorney General Brid\u00f3n (by Parks H. Icenhour, Real Property Attorney); Corbett & Fisler; and White and Ay cock for defendants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "J. A. SHINGLETON v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA and NORTH CAROLINA WILDLIFE RESOURCES COMMISSION.\n(Filed 20 November 1963.)\n1. Easements \u00a7 1\u2014\nAn easement appurtenant is incident to and exists only in connection with a dominant estate owned by the same person, and passes with the title to the dominant estate; an easement in gross is a mere personal interest or right to use the land of another, is not appurtenant to any estate and attaches only to the person, and ends with the death of the owner of the easement.\n2. Same\u2014\nWhether a deed creates an easement appurtenant or in gross must be determined by a construction of the language of the contract to ascertain ,the intention of the parties aided, if necessary, by the situation of the parties and the surrounding circumstances, and an easement which in its nature is appropriate and a useful adjunct of land owned by the grantee of the easement, in the absence of a \u00a1showing that 'the parties intended a mere personal right, will be declared \u00a1an easement appurtenant, regardless of the form in which such intention is expressed.\n3. Same\u2014\nThe fact that \u00a1the words \u201cheirs and assigns\u201d are not entered after the name of the grantee of an easement is not controlling in determining whether the easement granted is an easement appurtenant or in gross. G.S. 39-1.\n4. Same\u2014 Deed held to convey easement appurtenant and not merely in gross.\nSuit involving dispute between plaintiff and the Wildlife Resources Commission in regard to the ownership of certain lands was settled by an \u25a0agreement under which plaintiff: conveyed bo 'tine State a portion of the land in dispute and tlie State conveyed to plaintiff a portion, and thereafter a consent judgment was entered reciting generally the execution and delivery of the deeds, tihe payment of a sum of money by the \u00a9bate in settlement, and \u2018the action wias dismissed. The '.State\u2019s conveyance was by quitclaim deed to plaintiff, Ms heirs and assigns and, -after the description, provided that the 'State reserved 'the right to use the roads existing on tibe tract conveyed and that plaintiff was granted the right to use roads existing on the other lands of the Commission for the purpose of ingress and egress by the most direct route. Held: The easement granted was an easement appurtenant and not in gross.\n5. Easements \u00a7 8\u2014\nAn easement will ordinarily foe construed to embrace all uses which are treasonably necessary iamd convenient in connection with the enjoyment of the dominant estate not only for those purposes to which it is devoted at the time of the grant but also- those \u2018bo -which it may thereafter be reasonably devoted, without unnecessarily burdening the servient estate.\n6. Same\u2014\nThe grant of am easement 'appurtenant for ingress and egress to lands owned by ithe grantee, in the absence of a showing that -the lands of the grantee were used for business purposes, does not embrace the right of ingress a-nd egress by the public generally, but only to the grantee, his agents, servants, employees and licensees, and it is no violation of the grantee\u2019s rights that he be required to give permission to those who use the easement in connection with the use and enjoyment of the dominant estate.\n7. Easement \u00a7 6; State \u00a7 4\u2014\nI-n an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act to construe an easement granted by -the [State, judgment may not be entered enjoining the -State and its employees from interfering with the easement as defined by the court, since no action may foe maintained against the State or any agency thereof in tort or to restrain the commission of a tort.\n8. State \u00a7 4; Public Officers \u00a7 9\u2014\nA public officer, even -though he assumes to act under the -authority and pursuant to the direction of the State, may be held personally liable by an individual whose rights are invaded by such officer in disregard of laiw.\n9. State \u00a7 4; Courts \u00a7 3\u2014\nControversy between an individual and the -State as to the extent of an .easement granted to the individual by the -State may be made the basis of a suit against the 'State in the 'Superior Court under -the Declaratory Judgment Act, since such suit involves title to realty within the purview of G.S. 41-10.1.\nAppeal by defendants from Parker, J., April-May 1963 Session of Pender.\nAction to construe the easement provisions of a deed under the Declaratory Judgment Act, G.S., Oh. 1, Art. 26.\nIsaac C. Wright and George Rountree, Jr., for plaintiff..\nAttorney General Brid\u00f3n (by Parks H. Icenhour, Real Property Attorney); Corbett & Fisler; and White and Ay cock for defendants." }, "file_name": "0451-01", "first_page_order": 491, "last_page_order": 499 }