{
  "id": 8575774,
  "name": "CHARLES EDWARD HUTCHINS, JR. v. CAROLYN GENEVIEVE DAVIS HUTCHINS",
  "name_abbreviation": "Hutchins v. Hutchins",
  "decision_date": "1963-12-11",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "628",
  "last_page": "635",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "260 N.C. 628"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "6 S.E. 2d 812",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "217 N.C. 70",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8598591
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/217/0070-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "92 S.E. 2d 682",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "244 N.C. 95",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        2219527
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/244/0095-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "97 S.E. 2d 105",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "245 N.C. 687",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8618824
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "691"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/245/0687-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "31 S.E. 2d 440",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "224 N.C. 421",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8604450
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "427"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/224/0421-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "97 S.E. 2d 267",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "245 N.C. 621",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8616774
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "625"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/245/0621-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "109 S.E. 2d 205",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "250 N.C. 500",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8624577
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "506"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/250/0500-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "117 S.E. 2d 826",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "253 N.C. 620",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8626659
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "629"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/253/0620-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "112 S.E. 2d 81",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "251 N.C. 636",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8626795
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "641"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/251/0636-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "90 S.E. 2d 547",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "243 N.C. 259",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8623607
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "261"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/243/0259-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 709,
    "char_count": 16694,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.416,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.1832030219257932e-07,
      "percentile": 0.5891476684548018
    },
    "sha256": "f96d1fa06527b6d88c4a5bdfc58ae4809c60665938728fa5bd2e1377d864a7aa",
    "simhash": "1:a54ba726f6df7a66",
    "word_count": 2751
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:49:29.885963+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "CHARLES EDWARD HUTCHINS, JR. v. CAROLYN GENEVIEVE DAVIS HUTCHINS."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Bobbitt, J.\n\u201cIt is weld established in this jurisdiction that where a husband and wife enter into -a separation -agreement and thereafter become reconciled and renew their marital relations, the agreement is terminated for every pmpo.se in so- far as if remains executory. (Citations) . Even \u00a1so, a -reconciliation and resumption of marital relations by the parties to' .a separation agreement would not revoke or -invalidate a duly executed deed of conveyance in .a property settlement between the parties.\u201d Jones v. Lewis, 243 N.C. 259, 261, 90 S.E. 2d 547, and cases cited; Harrell v. Powell, 251 N.C. 636, 641, 112 S.E. 2d 81; Stanley v. Cox, 253 N.C. 620, 629, 117 S.E. 2d 826.\nToo, \u201c(i)t is well settled in .this State that a conveyance from one spouse to. the other of an 'interest in an estate held 'by the entireties is valid as an estoppel when the requirements of the law .are complied with in the execution thereof.\u201d Jones v. Lewis, supra, p. 262, and cases cited; Edwards v. Arnold, 250 N.C. 500, 506, 109 S.E. 2d 205.\nPrior to the separation -agreement of July 26, 1958, .plaintiff and defendant, husband and wife, owned the subject property as tenants by the entirety.\nPlaintiff contends 'defendant, .by the -terms of the separation -agreement of July 26, 1958, -conveyed to- him, as part of the property settlement then made, all ih-er right, title and -interest in- the subject property. If so, under Jones v. Lewis, supra, -the subsequent reconciliation (is) and -resumption (is) of marital relations did not revoke or invalidate such oonveyan.ee.\nIn paragraph 2 <otf .the separation 'agreement of July 26, 1958, it is provided that \u201cshe (defendant) does hereby quitclaim 'and release any land rail right, title and interest\u201d iin rand to the subject property. In addition, defendant agreed \u201cto execute a warranty deed conveying any \u25a0and all right, title .and interest\u201d she owned in the subject property, \u201csaid deed to be \u00a1simultaneously executed with the execution of this contract.\u201d\nOn July 26, 1958, the date .of the separation agreement, plaintiff and defendant executed a warranty deed for the subject property to Thomas M. Fatw; and 'thereafter, under date of July 28, 1958, Thomas M. Faw and wife, Virginia S. Fatw, conveyed the subject property to plaintiff.\nThe only reasonable inference is that the deed to* Faw and the separation agreement were executed simultaneously in accordance with the express terms <of the .separation agreement. The tennis of these documents disclose their interrelation as parts of a \u2018Single transaction. Sales Co. v. Weston, 245 N.C. 621, 625, 97 S.E. 2d 267.\nIt is alleged and admitted that the separation agreement of July 26, 1958, \u201cwas duly 'executed by both par,ties, with privy examination and \u2018acknowledgment of the defendant before Justice of the Peace H. M. Foy.\u201d Defendant\u2019s brief states \u201c (t)-he certificate required by G.S. 52-12 appears on 'both separation agreements.\u201d\n\u201cThe title to- \u00a1real property may be as effectually conveyed or transferred by a quitclaim dead -as by a warranty deed or any other form off conveyance.\u201d 26 C. J. S., Deeds \u00a7 118; Peel v. Calais, 224 N.C. 421, 427, 31 S.E. 2d 440; Hayes v. Ricard, 245 N.C. 687, 691, 97 S.E. 2d 105.\nMindful of the -es'semtiiail parts of a valid deed, Griffin v. Springer, 244 N.C. 95, 92 S.E. 2d 682, and cases cited, it \u00a1is our opinion, and we so hold, that defendant by the terms of paragraph 2 of the separation agreement of July 26, 1958, conveyed to plaintiff all of her right, title and interest in the subject property.\nWhether, as .contended by defendant, the deed of July 26, 1958, to Faiw is void because not executed and acknowledged in accordance with G.S. 52-12 is not determinative. However, with reference thereto, it should be noted that this deed may not be considered a separate and distinct 'transaction. Rather, the agreement for the execution of such deed \u00a1is an integral part of -the separation agreement of July 26, 1958, and defendant\u2019s obligation \u00a1to execute such deed wias\u00a1 necessarily considered by the justice of .the peace before 'he executed the certificate (required by G.S. 52-12) -attached to said separation agreement of July 26, 1958.\nIn Fisher v. Fisher, 217 N.C. 70, 6 S.E. 2d 812, beard on demurrer to complaint, tihiiis Count 'considered a different factual situation.. The separation agreement then 'considered contained no \u2022reference to. the specific property .in 'controversy. Nor did it refer to property held iby the parties thereto, as tenants by the entirety. The separation, agreement provided that the wife was to. hold \u201call real estate ;and personal property which she may now own, or hereafter acquire,\u201d free from all rights of the husband, and that the \u00a1husband was to hold \u201cany real or personal property which he may now own, or hereafter acquire, other than that hereby specifically mentioned,\u201d free from any claim on the part of his wife. Moreover, as stated in the opinion of Winiborme, J. (later C.J.): \u201cCareful examination fails to reveal 'any indicia in the dead of separation that the deed to the trustee should be executed as a pant of the separation agreement, nor is there in, the deed to the trustee any reference to the deed of separation.\u201d\nHaving reached the conclusion thait defendant, by said separation \u2022agreement of July 26, 1958, whether considered -alone or in conjunction with said deed of July 26, 1958, conveyed to plaintiff all her right, title and. interest in the subject property, we need not consider defendant\u2019s contention that G.S. 52-12.2, a curative statute, is unconstitutional. Decision on this appeal is not based on G.S. 52-12.2.\nIn passing upon plaintiff\u2019s motion for judgment on .the pleadings, we must accept as true the facts alleged in defendant\u2019s further answer and defense. It appears therefrom that Judge Gwyn in an- order dated November 30, 1959, granted defendant the possession of the subject property as ,a place of residence for herself and two- 'children. Tire facts with reference to- the .present status of the action in which such order' was entered 'are not disclosed. For present purposes, we must assume there has been no modification of Judge Gwynis order. Whether such order, if presently in effect, should) be modified in the light of subsequent events is properly determinable upon morion in the cause in which it was entered. Suffice to say, until the facts with reference to' the present status of \u00a9aid order\u2019 land of the action in which it was entered are ascertained, no judgment or writ of 'ejectment should foe entered or issued in this cause.\nThere is error in the portion of the judgment in which it is adjudged that plaintiff is entitled to \u00a1have defendant ejected from tire subject property. Hence, the judgment is modified by striking therefrom the paragraph containing these provisions, to wit, the second (final) paragraph of the judgment proper. As so modified, the judgment of the court 'beloiw is affirmed.\nIn -tile circumstances, it is ordered that eaob party 'be and is taxed with one-haJif of the 'cost\u00a9 incident to the appeal.\nModified 'and 'affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Bobbitt, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Craige, Brawley, Lucas & Horton for 'plaintiff appellee.",
      "Otis M. Oliver and Foy Clark for defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "CHARLES EDWARD HUTCHINS, JR. v. CAROLYN GENEVIEVE DAVIS HUTCHINS.\n(Filed 11 December 1963.)\n1. Deeds \u00a7 IS\u2014\nA quitclaim deed transfers tbe grantor\u2019s title ias effectively as any other form of conveyance.\n3. Husband and Wife \u00a7 13\u2014\nSeparation agreements ordinarily are revoked by tbe subsequent renewal of marital relations by tbe parties, but a duly executed conveyance of property in accordance with tbe settlement is mot revoked.\n3. Same: Husband and Wife \u00a7\u00a7 11, 17\u2014\nTbe separation agreement between tbe parties, duly acknowledged as required by G.S. 52-12, provided that the wife did thereby quitclaim any and all night, title and interest in particularly described property held by the entireties, and she therein agreed to execute a warranty deed conveying such interest, but 'the deed wias not acknowledged in conformity with G.iS. 52-12. The parties thereafter resumed the marital relationship. Reid: The deed of separation constituted a conveyance (to the husband all of the wife\u2019s right, title, and interest in such property, and the resumption of the marital (relationship did not affect the executed conveyance.\n4. Pleadings \u00a7 30\u2014\nIn passing upon plaintiff\u2019s motion for judgment on the pleadings, the facts alleged in defendant\u2019s pleadings must be accepted as true.\n5. Assistance, Writ of; Courts \u00a7 9; Judgments \u00a7 20\u2014\nEven though judgment that 'the husband is the owner of the property in question is proper upon the facts admitted in the pleadings, the judgment may not provide that the wife be ejected from the premises so long as a prior order in an independent action giving the wife possession of the property remains in effect, since even if modification of such prior order be proper, it may be done only by motion in the cause in which it was entered.\nAppeal by defendant from Walker, Special Judge, April 1963 Session Oif SURRY.\nCivil action to establish plaintiff\u2019s ownierisihip and right to possession of real property in wbicih the court, granting plaintiff\u2019s motion therefor, entered judgment on the pleadings.\nThere \u00abre thirteen numbered paragraphs (exclusive of the prayer for relief) in the (Complaint. Answering, 'defendant admitted categorically the allegations of paragraphs Nos. 1-9, inclusive, and of -paragraphs Nos. 11 and 13.\nThe facts so admitted are summarized, except when quoted, as follows:\nFormerly, plaintiff -and defendant were husband and wife. On November 6, 1961, in an (action in the Superior Court of Surry County, North Carolina, (defendant obtained an absolute divorce on the ground of two years\u2019 separation.\nOn or 'about July 26, 1958, plaintiff and defendant, then husband and wife, separated; and on that date they entered into a separation \u25a0agreement \u201cwhich w-as duly executed iby both parties, with privy examination and -acknowledgment of the defendant before Justice of the Peace H. M. Foy.\u201d\nParagraph 2 of \u00a9aid separation agreement of July 26, 1958, provides:\n\u201cIt is further understood and agreed that the husband will pay to the wife in a lump sum 'the amount of Two Thousand and Five Hundred ($2,500.00) Dollars simultaneously -with -the execution of this agreement and in consideration of the payment of the sum of $2,500.00 by the husband to'the wife, the wife does hereby release, -discharge and quitclaim any right to support, maintenance, alimony, alimony pen- dente lite, and any and aid fights of 'action, muses of action, claims or demands which she might or .could hereafter assert .against the said llnuisband by virtue of the marital relationship \u00a1presently existing between the said husband and wife, the parties herein. In addition to- the \u25a0foregoing and in consideration of the payment of the aforementioned \u00a9um by the husband to. the wife, the wife does hereby covenant, contract and agree to execute a warranty deed conveying any and all right, title and interest which she now owns in and to the home heretofore occupied by the parties as husband and wife, said deed to be simultaneously executed with the execution of this contract, and she does hereby quitclaim and release any and all right, title and interest in and to that certain dwelling house heretofore occupied by the parties, situated on the south side of Highway #601, in White Plains, as described in Deed Book 181, page 421 and 440, Surry County Registry, to which reference is hereby made, and said deed is hereby incorporated by reference.!\u2019 (Our italics).\nOn July 26, 1958, plaintiff and defendant executed a warranty deed conveying to Thomas M. Faw the property in White Plains described in paragraph 2 of the separation 'agreement of July 26, 1958, referred to 'hereafter as the subject property; and on July 28, 1958, Thomas M. Eaiw and wife, Virginia S. Faw, conveyed the subject property to plaintiff.\nOn some date between July 28, 1958, and August 27, 1958, plaintiff \u25a0and defendant resumed marital relations. They separated again on August 27,1958, at which .time .they \u201cduly executed and acknowledged\u201d another separation agreement. Paragraph 2 of the separation agreement of August 27, 1958, in part, provides: \u201cIn addition to the foregoing and in consideration of the payment of the .aforementioned sum by the husband to. the wife, the wife does hereby release, quitclaim, and discharge any and all right, title aand interest in and to any of the real property now owned by the .husband or heretofore owned by the parties as tenants by the entireties 'and does specifically release her inchoate right of dower in and to the real property owned by the husband, party of the first piart herein.\"\nOn August 27, 1958, simultaneous with the execution of the separation agreement of that date, plaintiff and defendant again conveyed the 'Subject property to Thomas M. Faw; and on the same date Thomas M. Faw and wife, Virginia S. Paw, conveyed -the subject property to plaintiff. '\nIn November, 1958, plaintiff and defendant again resumed marital relations. They separated again in 1959.\nThe said separation agreements and deeds were recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds of Surry County.\nIn the deeds to Faw, the property is described by metes and bounds and also by reference to the deeds by which it was conveyed to plaintiff and defendant, to wit, the deeds recorded in Book 181, Page 421, and in Book 181, Page 440, said Registry.\nThere was no private examination of the wife or certificate in accordance with G.S. 52-12 in connection with the execution and acknowledgment of the deeds to Faw.\nPlaintiff\u2019s controverted allegations are summarized below.\nPlaintiff -alleged he was ousted from -the subject property in 1959; that defendant ihais hiad possession thereof b-u-t has paid no rent; and that a- fair rental value is $125.00 per month. Answering, defendant admitted she had 'had possession; that she had paid no- rent; and that $125.00 par month is a fair rental value. She alleged plaintiff wais not unlawfully ousted but that defendant was given possession oif the subject property in November, 1959, iby an order -of the Superior Court of Surry County.\nPlaintiff\u2019s allegations that he is the owner of the subject property, subject to outstanding deeds of trust thereon, and is entitled to possession thereof, and that defendant has no right, title or interest therein or to possession- thereof, are denied by defendant.\nDefendant, for a further lanswer and defense, alleged in sub-stance the following: Two children, -then 13 and 18 years of age, were bom of the marriage -of -pl-ainitiff and defendant. At the November Term, 1959, of the Superior Court of Surry County, his Honor, Allen H. Gwyn, the Presiding J-udge, -upon motion of the present defendant, entered an order, after a hearing for relief pendente lite, in which the present defendant was granted possession \u201cof the honxeplace,\u201d to wit, the subject property, as -a place of residence for -the present defendant 'and -her minor children. There has been no final judgment in the cause in which s-aid order was entered. The separation -agreements w-ere nullified by the resumption (s) of marital relations. Plaintiff -and -defendant, since \u00a1said absolute divorce, have been and are owners of the subj ect property a-s tenants in common. In any event, -defendant is -entitled to possession under Judge Gwyn\u2019s order unless and until it is modified.\nPlaintiff did not reply to the allegations -o-f defendant\u2019s s-aid further answer and defense.\nPlaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings on the assarted ground -that \u201cthe -properly pleaded allegations of the answer, even if taken to be true for the purpose of this motion, -do not constitute a valid and legal defense to the claim and demands -set forth in the -complaint or to any part .thereof.\u201d After a hearing on plaintiffs said motion Judge Walker entered judgment which, after recitals, provides:\n\u201cNOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the plaintiff is owner of the previously described realty herein, to the exclusion of the defendant; .and that the defendant is taxed with the costs of 'this -action.\n\u201cIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no ej ectment .should issue in this caise against the defendant until the time for .appealing this judgment has expired, or, should the judgment be .appealed, until this case has been decided upon appeal. Should said appeal not be perfected, the plaintiff is entitled to- have the defendant ejected from the premises.\u201d\nDefendant excepted, appealed .and assigns as error \u201cthe granting of plaintiffs motion for judgment on the pleadings ...\u201d\nCraige, Brawley, Lucas & Horton for 'plaintiff appellee.\nOtis M. Oliver and Foy Clark for defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0628-01",
  "first_page_order": 668,
  "last_page_order": 675
}