{ "id": 8576195, "name": "MITTIE MAE COPPLE v. DUNCAN TALMADGE WARNER, JR. and JERRY WAYNE WEST", "name_abbreviation": "Copple v. Warner", "decision_date": "1963-12-19", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "727", "last_page": "731", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "260 N.C. 727" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "80 S.E. 2d 383", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 N.C. 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627410 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/239/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 S.E. 2d 688", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 N.C. 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621386 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/227/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 S.E. 2d 625", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 N.C. 706", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621351 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "710" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/249/0706-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 S.E. 2d 282", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 N.C. 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8608424 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/249/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 S.E. 642", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8658805 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/136/0089-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 485, "char_count": 10446, "ocr_confidence": 0.373, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.490732193069179e-08, "percentile": 0.48624746075929526 }, "sha256": "46b061749e4d6c4ecd24c28c4683ed0d023d9483f1be6a07283ab79fbe6f28b2", "simhash": "1:9cd1f544aa2172fe", "word_count": 1702 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:49:29.885963+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MITTIE MAE COPPLE v. DUNCAN TALMADGE WARNER, JR. and JERRY WAYNE WEST." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Bobbitt, J.\nWe consider first the demurrer of Warner.\nPlaintiff alleges her injuries were proximately caused by the second col'lisiion, that is, when 'the West car collided with the Copple and Warner cars. Whether there is a misjoinder of parties and causes of action depends upon legal principles stated in Batts v. Faggart, ante, 641, and cas\u00e9is citad. If, as defendant Warner asserts, the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against him, there is no misjoinder of parties and causes of action.\nA cause of action consists of the facts alleged -in the complaint. G.S. 1-122(2); Lassiter v. R.R., 136 N.C. 89, 48 S.E. 642; Stamey v. Membership Corp., 249 N.C. 90, 94, 105 S.E. 2d 282. The facts alleged, but not the pleader\u2019s legal conclusions, are deemed admitted where the sufficiency of a complaint is tested by demurrer. Skipper v. Cheatham, 249 N.C. 706, 710, 107 S.E. 2d 625.\nThe crucial question is whether, upon the facts alleged, the alleged negligence of Warner, conceding Warner\u2019s negligence proximately caused the first collision, may be considerad a (concurring) proximate cause of the second collision.\nWhile plaintiff alleged the second collision occurred \u201calmost immediately following\u201d the first collision, there was sufficient time between the first and second collisions according to. plaintiff\u2019s allegations for Oopple to get out of his car* 'and engage in an attempt to pull loose tiie fenders of the Oopple and Warner cars. The only reasonable inference to foe drawn from plaintiff\u2019s allegations is that the Oopple and Warner cans had collided and were at a 'standstill before West was in close proximity to said intersection.\nPlaintiff does not allege .the (right) lane for westbound travel on No. 62 was in any manner or to any extent blocked by the Oopple oar, the Warner car or otherwise. She alleges West traveling west on No. 62 did not yield at least one-half of the main traveled portion of the highway but negligently and wrongfully drove his car across the center line of No.. 62 \u00a1and there collided with the Copple 'and Warner oars.\nIn our view, .plaintiff\u2019s factual allegations are insufficient to show that negligence on the part of Warmer in proximately causing the first collision was a (concurring) proximate cause of the second collision. The presentee of the Oopple and Warner cars in the (right) lane for eastbound travel on N>o. 62 must be regarded as a circumstance of the accident and not its proximate canse. Lee v. Upholstery Co., 227 N.C. 88, 90, 40 S.E. 2d 688, and. oases cited; Henderson v. Henderson, 239 N.C. 487, 492, 80 S.E. 2d 383. Warner\u2019s demurrer should have been sustained on the ground the complaint as to Warner did not 'allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of 'action, thereby eliminating the question as to the misjoinder of parties and causes of action.\nThe court\u2019s order does not indicate the ground on which Warner\u2019s demurrer was sustained. Presumably, since the order dismisses the action, the demurrer was sustained on the ground of misjoinder of parties and causes of 'action. As indicated, such ruling was erroneous. In these circumstances, the order relating to Warner\u2019s demurrer is vacated and the cause is remanded for the entry of an order sustaining Warner\u2019s demurrer on the specific ground' that, ias to Warner, the complaint does not \u2018allege facts 'Sufficient to constitute a cause of \u00a1action.\nAs to the demurrer of defendant West: Obviously, the complaint alleges facts sufficient to constitute a 'cause of action against West for the injuries plaintiff alleges she sustained, namely, injuries proximately caused by said second collision. Moreover, since plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action as to Warner, there is no misjoinder -of causes of actiomi. The court erred in sustaining West's demurrer and in. dismissing the action as to West. Hence, the order relating to West\u2019s demurrer is vacated and the cause remanded for the entry of \u2018an order overruling West\u2019s demurrer in its entirety.\nError -and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "Bobbitt, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Harold T. Dodge for plaintiff appellant.", "Sanders \u25a0& Holt for defendant appellee Warner.", "Thomas D. Cooper for defendant appellee West." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MITTIE MAE COPPLE v. DUNCAN TALMADGE WARNER, JR. and JERRY WAYNE WEST.\n(Filed 19 December 1963.)\n1. Pleadings \u00a7 2\u2014\nA cause of action consists of the facts alleged1 in the complaint. G.S. 1-122(2).\n2. Pleadings \u00a7 12\u2014\nA demurrer admits the facts alleged in the pleading but not the pleader\u2019s legal conclusions.\n3. Automobiles \u00a7\u00a7 35, 43\u2014 Author of negligence causing first collision not resulting in injury is not jointly liable with author of negligence independently causing second collision.\nPlaintiff passenger\u2019s complaint alleged that while she wias sitting in a stationary car on her right side of the highway after it had collided with another ear which had (approached: the intersection, from plaintiff\u2019s right, .and- after the driver of the car in which she was riding had gotten out to disengage \u2018the cars, a third car, approaching from the opposite direction at excessive speed, was driven ,to its left of the center of the highway and collided with the stationary cars, resulting in personal injuries to plaintiff. Held: There 'being no allegation tirat plaintiff suffered any injury from the first ,collision, and no allegation that either of the stationary ears blocked to any extent the lane of travel of the third vehicle, the position of the (Stationary ears on the highway was a mere circumstance and not a proximate cause of the second collision, and the complaint fails to state a cause of action against the driver of the other car involved in the first collision.\n4. Pleadings \u00a7 18\u2014\nWhere the complaint fails to state a cause of action against one of two defendants and such defendant\u2019s demurrer on this ground is sustained, the question raised by demurrer for \u00a1misjoinder- of parties and canses of action is eliminated.\n5. Pleadings \u00a7 21.1\u2014\nWhere the record indicates that a demurrer was sustained on incorrect grounds, the cause will be remanded for order sustaining the demurrer for the correct reason.\n6. Automobiles \u00a7 35\u2014\nComplaint alleging that a driver approaching from the opposite direction drove to, his left of the center line of the highway and collided with two stationary ears, inflicting injuries to plaintiff, who was sitting in one of them, held to state a cause of action against such driver.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Latham, Special Judge, July 1963 Regular Session of AlamaNCe.\nPlaintiff\u2019s action is to recover damages from defendants, jointly and severally, for ipansomal injurias \u00a1sihe alleges sire sustained on -account of their j oirnt 'and 'concurrent negligence. The 'hearing below was on defendants\u2019 (.separate) demurrers to the complaint.\nPlaintiff's factual \u00a1allegations,, summarized except When quoted, are as follows:\nOn March 17, 1963, about 9:00 p.m., Charles A. Copple, plaintiff\u2019s husband, was operating his Studebaker automobile in a general easterly direction along N. C. Highway No'. 62, \u00a1a. two-lane \u00a1highway, approaching its intersection with Rural Paved Road No.. 1129. Plaintiff was a gu-eist passenger in her husband\u2019s car.\nOn the said occasion, defendant Warner was operating his Ford automobile in a general northerly .direction on Rural Paved Road No. 1129 approaching its intersection with N. C. Highway No.. 62. Warner did not stop in obedience to. a stop sign facing \u00a1him but drove- upon No. 62 -and collided with the Copple Studebaker.\nThe 'collision between 'the Oopple 'amid Warner oars \u201coccurred in the east bound lane of N. C. Hwy. No. 62.\u201d The \u201cright front fender\u201d of the Copple oar \u201c'Collided with the left rear fender\u201d of the Warner car. Plaintiff\u2019s husband \u201cgot out of his oar and attempted to pull his \u00a1auto\u00a1mobile\u2019s fender 'loose from that oif defendant Warner\u2019s automobile.\u201d Plaintiff remained \u201cseated in the right front seat of her husband\u2019s oar.\u201d\n\u201c(A) lmost immediately following\u201d the said collision between the Copple and Warner oars, defendant West, operating his Ford in a general westerly direction on N. C. Highway No. 62, approached said intersection \u201cat a high, dangerous 'and unlawful rate of 'speed\u201d and \u201cnegligently, earelessly and wrongfully drove his automobile across the center line of said Hwy. No. 62 and collided with defendant Warner\u2019s 1950 Ford and with the automobile in which plaintiff was seated 'a\u00ae aforesaid, causing plaintiff\u2019s head to be propelled into and through \u00a1the windshield of said 1959 Studebakar automobile and inflicting upon her the \u00a1severe and permanent injuries hereinafter set forth.\u201d\nPlaintiff alleges rtihe respects in which Warner was negligent, alleges the respects in which West was negligent, and \u00a1alleges the negligent acts of the -defendants, \u201cacting jointly, concurrently and successively,\u201d \u00a1proxiroately caused plaintiff\u2019s injuries.\nPlaintiff\u2019s \u00a1allegations as to the negligent acts of West include the following: He \u201cfailed and neglected to 'drive his automobile upon- the right half \u00a1of the highway, in that (he) drove his automobile across the center -line of -said Hwy. No\u00a1. 62 and into the lane of travel in which the automobile in which plaintiff w-ais riding was \u00a1situated . . .\u201d He \u201cfailed and neglected to yield at least one half of the main travelled portion of the highway to the automobile in which plaintiff wa's riding, by driving hie automobile across the center line of Hwy. No. 62 into plaintiff\u2019s husband\u2019s lane \u00a1of travel . . .\u201d\nWarner 'demurred on two grounds, namely: 1. That the complaint does not allege facts \u00a1sufficient to constitute \u00a1a cause of action against him -in that (a,) plaintiff does not allege she was injured as -a result of the first collision, and (b) the facts alleged disclose \u00a1the negligence of West was the sole proximate cause of the \u00a1second collision and of plaintiff\u2019s injuries. 2. That there is a misjoinder of parties \u00a1and causes of action.\nWest demurred on two grounds, namely: 1. That the complaint does not \u00a1state facts sufficient to constitute -a cause of action against him in that it -appears upon the face of the complaint that the negligence of Warner \u201cwas the sole proximate cause of the \u00a1collision and the resulting damages.\u201d 2. That \u201cthere i-s a misjoinder of causes of actions.\u201d\nIn separate orders, the court sustained the demurrer of each defendant and dismissed the action as to 'him. Plaintiff excepted .to each oif these orders and appealed.\nHarold T. Dodge for plaintiff appellant.\nSanders \u25a0& Holt for defendant appellee Warner.\nThomas D. Cooper for defendant appellee West." }, "file_name": "0727-01", "first_page_order": 767, "last_page_order": 771 }