{
  "id": 8571539,
  "name": "JAMES L. GOODING v. MACK MANUEL TUCKER",
  "name_abbreviation": "Gooding v. Tucker",
  "decision_date": "1965-03-24",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "142",
  "last_page": "144",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "264 N.C. 142"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
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    "char_count": 5948,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.563,
    "sha256": "29ee09471b5cf43c2dcb2d7154d3e828f6135b8691b4489deb34087281b88ebb",
    "simhash": "1:9675389190d1cc6a",
    "word_count": 1022
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:18:06.877661+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "JAMES L. GOODING v. MACK MANUEL TUCKER."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PeR Cueiam.\nPlaintiff\u2019s assignments of error relate to the admission of evidence.\n(1) E. A. Brooks, the investigating police officer, testified for defendant as follows (over plaintiff\u2019s objection): \u201cI examined the latching mechanism\u201d of the left front door of plaintiff\u2019s car. \u201cI found after the accident that the latch on the door would not work. It would come to but I couldn\u2019t fasten it.\u201d The latch was worn. \u201cAs I recall, the striking part of the car door was worn to the extent that, when you closed the door, it would not stay closed.\u201d\nThis testimony is relevant and competent. Defendant\u2019s principal defense is that the door was defective, plaintiff was attempting to hold it closed with his arm, and as the car was turning to the right on the curve the door slipped from under plaintiff\u2019s arm and swung open. The officer was testifying from his own observation. He found the latching mechanism \u201cworn.\u201d This is a condition which is not caused by a sudden impact; it requires comparatively long use; the car was old. The witness was testifying to a condition which, if it existed at all, existed prior to the accident. He found further that the mechanism would not fasten the door. If the fact that the door would not stay closed resulted in whole or in part from any injury to the door caused by the collision, plaintiff was at liberty to make the explanation. The cases relied on by plaintiff are inapposite.\n(2) Manley Hatcher, an eyewitness to the collision, testified for defendant: \u201cI saw the Gooding (plaintiff\u2019s) car before the collision and at that time, the left door was not closed. It was open a few inches; and I continued to observe the car until the impact.\u201d The door was not closed before the two cars came together; \u201che (plaintiff) couldn\u2019t close it, I have known James Gooding a good many years; and I have seen him driving this very car before.\u201d\nQ. \u201cWhen you have seen him drive this car before, how did he drive it; was the left front door open or closed?\nA. \u201cOpen.\u201d\nPlaintiff objected to the italicized portion of the testimony and to the question and answer expressly set out above.\n(3) G. H. Sparrow also testified that he had seen plaintiff on previous occasions driving his car with the left front door open.\nWe do not agree with the contention of plaintiff that the statement of the witness Hatcher, \u201che could not close it,\u201d is an expression of opinion. When considered with his entire testimony, it appears that he was testifying from his knowledge of the car, which he had seen plaintiff operate many times. It was a \u201cshorthand statement of fact\u201d or \u201cthe statement of a physical fact rather than the expression of a theoretical opinion.\u201d Stansbury: North Carolina Evidence, 2d Ed., \u00a7 125, p. 287.\nThe testimony of witnesses Hatcher and Sparrow that they had seen plaintiff on occasions prior to the collision driving his car with the left 'front door open is competent as bearing upon the condition of the car and tends to corroborate the testimony of the police officer and defendant.\nNo error.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PeR Cueiam."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Turner and Harrison for plaintiff.",
      "Ward and Tucker for defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "JAMES L. GOODING v. MACK MANUEL TUCKER.\n(Filed 24 March, 1965.)\n1. Automobiles \u00a7\u00a7 21, 37\u2014\nWhere defendant contends that the door of plaintiff\u2019s vehicle was defective, causing the door to come open and strike defendant\u2019s car, it. is competent for an officer to testify from an inspection of plaintiff\u2019s car that the latching mechanism of the door was worn so that the door would not stay closed, since such defect would perforce be caused by long use rather than a sudden impact, and the witness was testifying from personal observation.\n2. Evidence \u00a7 86\u2014\nThe statement of a witness that plaintiff \u201ccould not close\u201d the door to his car held, not incompetent as an expression of opinion by the witness when in context it appears that the statement referred to the condition of the door of which the witness had personal knowledge, and therefore was a \u201cshorthand statement of fact.\u201d\n8. Automobiles \u00a7\u00a7 21, 37\u2014\nWhere there is competent evidence that the door of plaintiff\u2019s vehicle was defective so that the latch would not hold it closed, testimony of other witnesses that on prior occasions they had seen plaintiff driving the car with the door open is competent as bearing upon the condition of the car and as corroborating the other testimony.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Parker, J., October 19, 1964, Session of LENOIR.\nAction to recover damages for injuries sustained in an automobile collision.\nThe collision occurred about 9:45 A.M., 25 August 1963, on Adkin Street in the city of Kinston. Plaintiff was driving his automobile south-wardly on said street; defendant was driving his automobile north-wardly. The vehicles collided near the center of the street and at a point where the street curves to the left for northbound traffic and to the right for southbound traffic. The left front door of plaintiff\u2019s car was damaged, and plaintiff suffered personal injuries. The left front fender of defendant\u2019s car was damaged.\nPlaintiff\u2019s pleadings and evidence furnish this account of the occurrence: Defendant\u2019s car veered to plaintiff\u2019s side of the street and struck the left front door of plaintiff\u2019s car, causing the door to open and plaintiff to fall from the car. Plaintiff\u2019s car was a 1951 Chevrolet, he had owned it six years. \u201cThere was nothing wrong with the door\u201d; it was closed prior to the impact; plaintiff was not holding it closed with his arm.\nDefendant\u2019s version: As the cars were meeting on the curve, the left front door of plaintiff\u2019s car came open, all the way open, and banged into the left front fender of defendant\u2019s car. Plaintiff had his arm on the door; as the car came around the curve the door slipped from under plaintiff\u2019s arm and came open. Defendant was on his proper side of the street.\nThe jury found that the collision was not caused by the negligence of defendant. Judgment was entered accordingly. Plaintiff appeals.\nTurner and Harrison for plaintiff.\nWard and Tucker for defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0142-01",
  "first_page_order": 178,
  "last_page_order": 180
}
