{
  "id": 8575696,
  "name": "MARVIN C. HULLETT and Wife, FRANCES C. HULLETT v. CLIFFORD LEE GRAYSON and Wife, BARBARA J. GRAYSON",
  "name_abbreviation": "Hullett v. Grayson",
  "decision_date": "1965-10-13",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "453",
  "last_page": "454",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "265 N.C. 453"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "114 S.E. 2d 74",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "252 N.C. 443",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8622822
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/252/0443-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:31:16.118019+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "MARVIN C. HULLETT and Wife, FRANCES C. HULLETT v. CLIFFORD LEE GRAYSON and Wife, BARBARA J. GRAYSON."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Pee Curiam.\nPlaintiffs sue for a mandatory injunction to require defendants to remove from their (defendants\u2019) property a garage. Plaintiffs allege that the structure violates a restrictive covenant which rims with the land.\nPlaintiffs own Lot 9 in Block A, and defendants own Lot 3 in Block A, of a subdivision as shown on a map recorded in Map Book 7, at page 593, Registry of Mecklenburg County. Defendants\u2019 residence is located on their lot. Plaintiffs\u2019 and defendants\u2019 lots are subject to restrictive covenants, among others the following:\n\u201cNo temporary building, garage, garage apartment or trailer shall be erected thereon for temporary or permanent use.\u201d\nDefendants have erected on their lot a building, detached from their dwelling. The building is of permanent, rather than temporary, construction and is for use as a garage.\nPlaintiffs contend that the garage violates the above restriction. They say that the adjective \u201ctemporary,\u201d which immediately precedes the noun \u201cbuilding,\u201d modifies \u201cbuilding,\u201d but not \u201cgarage,\u201d \u201cgarage apartment\u201d or \u201ctrailer,\u201d that the phrase \u201cfor temporary or permanent use\u201d bears out this construction, and that the restriction prohibits the erection of a separate detached garage, temporary or permanent, on the lot.\nOn the other hand, defendants insist that the adjective \u201ctemporary\u201d preceding the word \u201cbuilding,\u201d modifies \u201cbuilding,\u201d \u201cgarage,\u201d \u201cgarage apartment\u201d and \u201ctrailer,\u201d that the phrase relating to use means that any such temporary structure may not be used either temporarily or permanently, and that the restriction does not prevent the erection of a detached garage of permanent construction.\nThe facts are not in dispute; the controversy relates solely to the interpretation of the restriction quoted above. The court below, being of the opinion that \u201cthe restriction does not prevent the erection upon said property of a detached garage of permanent type construction,\u201d denied injunctive relief and dismissed the suit.\nThe restriction is ambiguous and its language is susceptible of various conflicting interpretations. When it is considered in relation to other restrictions imposed by the deed, its meaning becomes even more doubtful. Restrictive covenants are not favored and are to be strictly construed against limitation on use. In the absence of clear and unequivocal expressions, restrictive covenants are not to be expanded and all doubts are to be resolved in favor of the free use of the property. Scott v. Board of Missions, 252 N.C. 443, 114 S.E. 2d 74. The restriction in question is of such doubtful meaning that the court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, could not in good conscience grant the relief sought in this action.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Pee Curiam."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "James B. Ledford and L. Glenn Ledford for plaintiffs.",
      "Hasty, Hasty and Kratt for defendants."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "MARVIN C. HULLETT and Wife, FRANCES C. HULLETT v. CLIFFORD LEE GRAYSON and Wife, BARBARA J. GRAYSON.\n(Filed 13 October, 1965.)\n1. Deeds \u00a7 19\u2014\nRestrictive covenants are not favored and are to be strictly construed against limitation on use.\n2. Same\u2014\nA restrictive covenant against a temporary building, garage, garage apartment or trailer for temporary or permanent use held ambiguous, and the courts will not restrain the use by the grantee of a detached garage of permanent-type construction.\nAppeal by plaintiffs from Huskins, J., May 31, 1965, Regular Civil Session of Mecklenburg.\nJames B. Ledford and L. Glenn Ledford for plaintiffs.\nHasty, Hasty and Kratt for defendants."
  },
  "file_name": "0453-01",
  "first_page_order": 493,
  "last_page_order": 494
}