{ "id": 8563886, "name": "ATLAS TABRON, Employee, v. GOLD LEAF FARMS, INC., Employer, and GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Insurer", "name_abbreviation": "Tabron v. Gold Leaf Farms, Inc.", "decision_date": "1967-02-03", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "393", "last_page": "399", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "269 N.C. 393" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "141 S.E. 2d 280", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 N.C. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571898, 8571940 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/264/0168-01", "/nc/264/0168-02" ] }, { "cite": "101 S.E. 2d 301", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "247 N.C. 434", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627344 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/247/0434-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 S.E. 2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 N.C. 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572765 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/261/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 S.E. 2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "244 N.C. 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2219548 ], "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/244/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 S.E. 2d 39", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "259 N.C. 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559609 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/259/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 S.E. 2d 559", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 N.C. 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8606005 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/245/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 S.E. 2d 109", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 N.C. 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8601196 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/233/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 S.E. 2d 215", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "258 N.C. 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559815 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/258/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 S.E. 2d 777", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "237 N.C. 660", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8617436 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/237/0660-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 627, "char_count": 16689, "ocr_confidence": 0.569, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.8746423533943714e-07, "percentile": 0.8430844809871154 }, "sha256": "87f4d938f4673b880f7367edfb875f09621e2ffe1652493fd544d334fad766df", "simhash": "1:2d53e7a064f6262f", "word_count": 2689 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:36:18.626474+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ATLAS TABRON, Employee, v. GOLD LEAF FARMS, INC., Employer, and GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Insurer." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Bobbitt, J.\nPlaintiff\u2019s brief states the question involved is whether the court committed \u201cprejudicial and reversible error by failing to find that the employer-employee relationship did not exist between appellant and appellee and that appellant\u2019s injury did not arise out of compensable employment.\u201d The judgment of Judge Peel is not based on findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to these questions. It is based on his conclusion, after consideration of-the full record, there was no evidence before the full Commission or before him to justify setting aside the \u201cAgreement for Compensation for Disability,\u201d approved by the Commission on March 16,. 1965, because of fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence, mutual mistake or excusable neglect.\nThe jurisdiction of the Commission may be invoked either by filing a claim for compensation or by submission of a voluntary settlement for approval before a claim is filed as provided by G.S. 97-82. Biddix v. Rex Mills, 237 N.C. 660, 75 S.E. 2d 777. \u201cIn approving settlements the Commission acts in its judicial capacity.\u201d Letterlough v. Atkins, 258 N.C. 166, 128 S.E. 2d 215. As stated in Biddix, supra at 663, by Barnhill, J. (later C.J.): \u201cIn a judicial proceeding the determinative facts upon which the rights of the parties must be made to rest must be found from admissions made by the joarties, facts agreed, stipulations entered into and noted at the hearing, and evidence offered in open court, after all parties have been given full opportunity to be heard.\u201d \u201cAn agreement for the payment of compensation when approved by the Commission is as binding on the parties as an order, decision or award of the Commission unappealed from, or an order of the Commission affirmed on appeal. G.S. 97-87.\u201d Tucker v. Lowdermilk, 233 N.C. 185, 188, 63 S.E. 2d 109, 111; Smith v. Red Cross, 245 N.C. 116, 120, 95 S.E. 2d 559, 562; Neal v. Clary, 259 N.C. 163, 166, 130 S.E. 2d 39, 41.\nUnquestionably, the matters set forth on I.C. Form 21, \u201cAgreement for Compensation for Disability,\u201d if true, conferred jurisdiction on the Commission.\nG.S. 97-17 provides: \u201cNothing herein contained shall be construed so as to prevent settlements made by and between the employee and employer so long as the amount of compensation and the time and manner of payment are in accordance with the provisions of this article. A copy of such settlement agreement shall be filed by employer with and approved by the Industrial Commission: Provided, however, that no party to any\u2022 agreement for compensation approved by the Industrial Commission shall thereafter be heard to deny the truth of the matters therein set forth, unless it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the Commission that there has been error due to fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence or mutual mistake, in which event the Industrial Commission may set aside such agreement.\u201d (Our italics.) The proviso was added to G.S. 97-17 (by Session Laws of 1963, Chapter 436) subsequent to our decision in Hart v. Motors, 244 N.C. 84, 92 S.E. 2d 673 (1956).\nIn Neal v. Clary, supra, a car operated by the defendant, in which the plaintiff was a passenger, was involved in a collision. The plaintiff alleged the collision and her injuries were proximately caused by the defendant\u2019s negligence. The defendant pleaded the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act in bar of the plaintiff\u2019s action. It was admitted that both the plaintiff and the defendant were employees of a corporation having more than five regular employees; also, that I.C. Form 21, \u201cAgreement for Compensation for Disability,\u201d signed by the plaintiff, her employer and its compensation carrier, had been approved by the Industrial Commission. A judgment dismissing the plaintiff\u2019s action for lack of jurisdiction was affirmed by this Court. With reference to the motion by the plaintiff for leave to amend her pleadings, Denny, J. (later C.J.), said: \u201cThe motion to amend filed in this Court is denied without prejudice to move before the Industrial Commission, after notice to all interested parties, to set aside the agreement contained in Form No. 21, ... as well as the award made pursuant thereto, on the grounds of mutual mistake, misrepresentation and fraudulent statements. (Citation) If such agreement is set aside by the Industrial Commission on the aforesaid grounds, the plaintiff may, if so advised, institute a new action and allege the facts with respect to jurisdiction as they may then exist.\u201d (Our italics.)\nReference is made to Stanley v. Brown, 261 N.C. 243, 134 S.E. 2d 321, for a full statement of the factual situation considered therein. The injured plaintiff, his employer and the employer\u2019s compensation carrier had executed an agreement on I.C. Form 21 which the Commission had approved on June 13, 1960. Defendant Brown, a fellow-employee of the plaintiff, was not subject to common law liability if the plaintiff and Brown were acting in the course of their employment when the plaintiff was injured. On March 8, 1962, based on stipulations then submitted by the plaintiff, his employer and the employer\u2019s compensation carrier, a deputy commissioner, without notice to Brown, signed an order purporting to set aside the 1960 agreement. This Court held the 1962 order was void as to Brown and that the plaintiff\u2019s action for personal injuries against Brown should have been nonsuited. Rodman, J., for the Court, said: \u201cThe Commission\u2019s approval of the stipulated facts and payment was as conclusive as if made upon a determination of facts in an adversary proceeding.\u201d Moore, J., in a concurring opinion, said: \u201cAn agreement for the payment of workmen\u2019s compensation, setting out jurisdictional facts and that the employee was injured by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, when approved by the Industrial Commission is as binding on the parties as an order, decision or award of the Commission unappealed from, or an award of the Commission affirmed on appeal. (Citation) Such agreement may be set aside for fraud, misrepresentation or mutual mistake at the instance of a party or parties thereto. (Citation)\u201d\nJudge Peel found, and rightly so, there was no evidence the \u201cAgreement for Compensation for Disability\" on I.C. Form 21, approved by the Commission on March 16, 1965, was entered into and executed by plaintiff because of fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence, mutual mistake, or excusable neglect. Indeed, plaintiff\u2019s motion was not predicated on such grounds; and, as stated in Judge Peel\u2019s order, plaintiff has not contended at any stage of the proceedings that said agreement should be set aside on any of these grounds or that there was evidence sufficient to support such contention if made. Plaintiff contends the Commission should \u201crescind and set' aside the jurisdiction it originally assumed in this matter\u201d on the ground the matters set forth in said agreement are untrue; that the Commission did not have jurisdiction because, contrary to the stipulations in said agreement, plaintiff was not an employee of Farms, Inc., and was not injured by accident arising out of and in the course of such employment.\nIf the matter were before us as an original proposition, a difficult question would confront us as to whether the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that the employer-employee relationship existed between Farms, Inc., and plaintiff at the time plaintiff was injured and, if so, whether plaintiff\u2019s injury was compensable.\nQuestions as to the Commission\u2019s jurisdiction have been presented often when an employer and its compensation carrier are contesting a claim by asserting nonliability under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, e. g., on the ground the injured person was an independent contractor and not an employee, etc. See decisions cited and discussed in Pearson v. Flooring Co., 247 N.C. 434, 101 S.E. 2d 301, and in Askew v. Tire Co., 264 N.C. 168, 141 S.E. 2d 280.\nHere plaintiff, having received all the benefits to which he would be entitled for an injury compensable under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, seeks to attack the jurisdiction of the Commission by asserting that the factual stipulations set forth in the \u201cAgreement for Compensation for Disability\u201d are untrue. The law will not permit him to deny the truth of the matters set forth in said agreement unless, as now provided in G.S. 97-17, there was error therein due to fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence or mutual mistake.\nIt is noteworthy, although not a basis of decision, that plaintiff\u2019s motion that the Commission \u201crescind or set aside the jurisdiction it originally assumed in this matter\u201d was made after the proceedings before the Industrial Commission had been pleaded as a defense in a negligence action instituted by plaintiff against C. S. Bunn in the Superior Court of Nash County.\nIn our opinion, Judge Peel\u2019s judgment is correct and is affirmed.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Bobbitt, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Herman L. Taylor and Mitchell & Murphy for plaintiff appellant.", "Battle, Winslow, Merrell, Scott & Wiley for defendant appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ATLAS TABRON, Employee, v. GOLD LEAF FARMS, INC., Employer, and GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Insurer.\n(Filed 3 February, 1967.)\n1. Master and Servant \u00a7 82\u2014\nThe jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission may be invoked either by filing a claim for compensation or by submission of a voluntary settlement for approval before a claim is filed. G.S. 97-82.\n2. Master and Servant \u00a7 91\u2014\nA voluntary settlement for the payment of compensation executed by the employer, employee, and insurance carrier, when duly approved by the Industrial Commission, is as binding on the parties as an award by the Commission in an adversary proceeding.\n3. Same; Master and Servant \u00a7 81\u2014\nWhere an employee has received benefits from an agreement for compensation executed by himself, his employer, and the insurance carrier, which agreement was duly approved by the Industrial Commission, he may attack and have such agreement set aside only for fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence or mutual mistake, G.S. 97-17, and he may not attack it on the ground that the jurisdictional facts therein alleged in regard to the relationship of employer and employee and that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment were untrue.\nAppeal by plaintiff from a judgment entered in chambers on June 22, 1966, by Peel, Jas Presiding Judge of the Seventh Judicial District. From Nash.\nOn Tuesday, January 26, 1965, about 7:30 a.m., Atlas Tabron, plaintiff herein, while riding on a pickup truck operated by C. S. Bunn, sustained personal injuries as the result of a collision on N. C. Highway No. 97 between said pickup and another motor vehicle.\nOn said date, a policy issued by defendant Insurance Company, covering the liability of defendant Farms, Inc., to its employees under the North Carolina Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, was in effect. Farms, Inc., filed with the North Carolina Industrial Commission I.C. Form 19, \u201cEmployer\u2019s Report of Accident to Employee,\u201d dated January 27, 1965, (defendants\u2019 Exhibit 1) in which it reported said accident as arising out of and in the course of plaintiff\u2019s employment by Farms, Inc., and that plaintiff\u2019s average weekly wage under his employment by Farms, Inc., was $24.00.\nI.C. Form 21, \u201cAgreement for Compensation for Disability,\u201d dated March 2, 1965, (defendants\u2019 Exhibit 2) was executed by plaintiff, as employee, by Farms, Inc., as employer, and by Insurance Company, as the employer\u2019s compensation carrier. The execution thereof by plaintiff was by making his mark. His name was written by Elizabeth Tabron, his wife.\nIn said agreement on I.C. Form 21, plaintiff, Farms, Inc., and defendant Insurance Company, stipulated and agreed: That all parties were subject to and bound by the provisions of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act; that plaintiff\u2019s said accident on January 26, 1965, arose out of and in the course of his employment by Farms, Inc.; that plaintiff received \"head lacerations and 4 rib fractures\u201d as a result of said accident; that plaintiff\u2019s actual average weekly wage at the time of said accident was $24.00; that, as of March 2, 1965, plaintiff had not returned to work; and that the employer and carrier agreed to pay compensation to the employee at the rate of $14.00 per week beginning February 2, 1965.\nThe agreement on I.C. Form 21 was approved by the Commission on March 16, 1965. Plaintiff received compensation payments in accordance therewith. On September 2, 1965, Insurance Company reported to the Commission (defendants\u2019 Exhibit 8) that plaintiff had returned to work on July 10, 1965; that the \u201ctotal amount of Compensation paid\u201d was $345.60; and that the \u201ctotal medical paid\u201d was $699.93.\nOn October 5, 1965, plaintiff, through counsel, moved that the Commission fix a date for a hearing to determine whether it had jurisdiction in respect of a claim based on injuries sustained by plaintiff as a result of said accident of January 26, 1965. Pursuant thereto, the matter was set for hearing on November 22, 1965, before J. M. Caldwell, Esq., Deputy Commissioner. At said hearing, prior to the introduction of evidence, counsel for plaintiff made a motion that the Commission \u201crescind or set aside the jurisdiction it originally assumed in this matter,\u201d on these grounds: (1) Relationship of employer and employee did not exist between plaintiff and Farms, Inc.; (2) plaintiff and C. S. Bunn, the driver of the pickup and also president of Farms, Inc., were neither in fact nor in law fellow employees; (3) plaintiff's injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment by Farms, Inc.; and (4) the routine procedures pursued by the employer and the carrier did not confer jurisdiction on the Industrial Commission. No ruling was made on said motion until the hearing was concluded.\nAt the hearing, evidence was offered both by plaintiff and by defendants bearing upon whether the relationship of employer and employee subsisted between Farms, Inc., and plaintiff, at the time of the accident of January 26, 1965, and, if so, whether plaintiff\u2019s injuries were by accident arising out of and in the course of said employment.\nThe hearing commissioner, based on particular findings of fact set forth in his order, found and concluded that the parties were subject to and bound by the provisions of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act; that plaintiff was injured by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by Farms, Inc.; that the agreement on I.C. Form 21 approved by the Commission on March 16, 1965, had the status of an award of the Commission; and that plaintiff had failed to show said agreement should be set aside on account of \u201cerror due to fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence, mutual mistake, or any other sufficient reason.\u201d On these grounds, the hearing commissioner denied plaintiff\u2019s motion to \u201crescind or set aside the jurisdiction it originally assumed in this matter.\u201d\nPlaintiff appealed to the full Commission, setting forth in his application for review that the hearing commissioner\u2019s said findings as to the employer-employee relationship, and as to plaintiff\u2019s injuries being by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by Farms, Inc., were not supported by evidence.\nThe full Commission overruled plaintiff\u2019s exceptions. It adopted as its own the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the hearing commissioner and affirmed his decision. Plaintiff appealed therefrom to the superior court, bringing forward his exceptions to said findings and conclusions.\nJudgment entered by Judge Peel, after reviewing the facts and proceedings narrated above, states that plaintiff did not contend before the hearing commissioner that the \u201cAgreement for Compensation for Disability\u201d should be set aside by reason of \u201cerror due to fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence or mutual mistake,\u201d or except to the findings and conclusions of the hearing commissioner, adopted by the full Commission, with reference thereto, and did not so contend before the full Commission or before the court.\nJudge Peel\u2019s findings of fact conclude as follows: \u201cIndependently of the findings of Commissioner Caldwell and the Full Commission, this Court concludes from the full record that there is no evidence before the Commission or this Court to justify the setting aside of the Agreement and Award hereinabove referred to, because of fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence, mutual mistake or excusable neglect.\u201d The judgment proper (1) denies plaintiff\u2019s motion to set aside the \u201cAgreement for Compensation for Disability\u201d; (2) dismisses plaintiff\u2019s appeal, and (3) remands the cause to the Commission.\nPlaintiff excepted and appealed.\nHerman L. Taylor and Mitchell & Murphy for plaintiff appellant.\nBattle, Winslow, Merrell, Scott & Wiley for defendant appellees." }, "file_name": "0393-01", "first_page_order": 425, "last_page_order": 431 }