{ "id": 8567780, "name": "STATE v. JOHN FISHER and BRADFORD LITTLE", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Fisher", "decision_date": "1967-05-10", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "315", "last_page": "319", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "270 N.C. 315" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "118 S.E. 2d 758", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 N.C. 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625987 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/254/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 S.E. 2d 757", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 N.C. 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626185 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/239/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 S.E. 2d 327", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 N.C. 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566436 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/270/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 S.E. 2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "244 N.C. 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2219548 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/244/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 S.E. 2d 5", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575298 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 S.E. 2d 140", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 N.C. 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8610537 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/223/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 S.E. 2d 299", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 N.C. 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624810 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/251/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 S.E. 738", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 N.C. 610", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8616638 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/203/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 S.E. 2d 354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "228 N.C. 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8622481 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/228/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 S.E. 2d 907", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 N.C. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621152 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/234/0236-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 462, "char_count": 9274, "ocr_confidence": 0.539, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7130925699588701e-07, "percentile": 0.7026944428034221 }, "sha256": "0f2d33e9dd2ca36618c3cd65dfbfa3ad7e515f3f82b8b35714f693980783eae7", "simhash": "1:c220d2f120570492", "word_count": 1568 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:31:56.885447+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE v. JOHN FISHER and BRADFORD LITTLE." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PARKER, C.J.\nDefendant Fisher assigns as error the denial of the motion by both Little and himself to remand the proceeding back to the Recorder\u2019s Court of Columbus County for a jury trial. Little does not appeal.\nDefendant Fisher in his brief contends, and the State in its brief admits, that the Recorder\u2019s Court of Columbus County and the Superior Court of Columbus County have concurrent jurisdiction over all misdemeanor cases arising in Columbus County.\nG.S. 7-64 reads in relevant part:\n\u201cIn all cases in which by statute original jurisdiction of criminal action has been, or may hereafter be, taken from the superior court and vested exclusively in courts of inferior jurisdiction, such exclusive jurisdiction is hereby divested, and jurisdiction of such actions shall be concurrent and exercised by the court first taking cognizance thereof.\u201d\nThis statute applies to Columbus County.\nWe have held repeatedly and uniformly, and G.S. 7-64 expressly states, in criminal actions where two courts have concurrent jurisdiction the court first acquiring jurisdiction of a case, its power being adequate to the administration of complete justice, retains its jurisdiction of the case and may dispose of the whole case, subject to appellate review, and no court, of co-ordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. This principle is essential to the orderly administration of the law, and is enforced to avoid unseemly, expensive and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and process. S. v. Parker, 234 N.C. 236, 66 S.E. 2d 907, and cases cited; S. v. Reavis, 228 N.C. 18, 44 S.E. 2d 354; S. v. Everhardt, 203 N.C. 610, 166 S.E. 738; 1 McIntosh, N. C. Practice and Procedure, 2d ed., \u00a7 162; 20 Am. Jur., Courts, \u00a7 128; 21 C.J.S., Courts, \u00a7 492. See also, S. v. Clayton, 251 N.C. 261, 111 S.E. 2d 299.\nThe Recorder\u2019s Court of Columbus County took jurisdiction over the offenses charged in the warrant in the instant case against defendants before the Superior Court of Columbus County did, and both offenses charged in the warrant were misdemeanors, to wit: an assault upon I. A. Matthews with deadly weapons, to wit, a rifle and a shotgun, with the felonious intent to kill and murder him, S. v. Gregory, 223 N.C. 415, 27 S.E. 2d 140; S. v. Braxton, 265 N.C. 342, 144 S.E. 2d 5, and damage to personal property of I. A. Matthews, G.S. 14-160. The warrant does not charge \u201ca wanton and malicious\u201d injury to personal property. Consequently, the Recorder\u2019s Court of Columbus County acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case set forth in the warrant to proceed further in the case.\nIt is well established law that the parties cannot, by consent, give a court jurisdiction over subject matter of which it would otherwise not have jurisdiction. Jurisdiction in this sense cannot be obtained by consent of the parties, waiver or estoppel. Hart v. Motors, 244 N.C. 84, 92 S.E. 2d 673, and the numerous cases there cited; In re Custody of Sauls, 270 N.C. 180, 154 S.E. 2d 327; 20 Am: Jur. 2d, Courts, \u00a7 95; 21 C.J.S., Courts, \u00a7 85; 1 Strong\u2019s N. C. Index, Courts, \u00a7 2. Where a court lacks jurisdiction over a party, see 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, \u00a7 97.\nJurisdiction is essential to a valid judgment. Baker v. Varser, 239 N.C. 180, 79 S.E. 2d 757. The Superior Court of Columbus County was without jurisdiction to render the judgment of imprisonment for eighteen months as to Fisher on the first, count in the indictment, and the verdict and judgment are vacated. Jurisdiction to try the charge of assault with deadly weapons, to wit, a rifle and a shotgun, upon I. A. Matthews with intent to kill and murder him is vested in the Recorder\u2019s Court of Columbus County.\nThe warrant in the instant case defectively charges damage to personal property of I. A. Matthews, a violation of G.S. 14-160. The indictment in the instant case in the second count defectively charges damage to real property of I. A. Matthews, a violation of G.S. 14-127 \u2014 two different offenses. All the evidence in the case-showed damage to a building. The Superior Court of Columbus County first took jurisdiction over the offense defectively charged-in the second count in the indictment of an injury to a building, real property.\nThe judgment on the second count in the indictment is arrested, ex mero mo tu, for the reason that the second count in the indictment is fatally defective in failing to charge a malicious injury to real property, G.S. 14-127, and the verdict as returned on the second count in the indictment of \u201cguilty of malicious injury to real property of $10.00 or less\u201d is not sufficient to support the judgment on the second count in the indictment, a fatal defect appearing on the face of the record proper. S. v. Barefoot, 254 N.C. 308, 118 S.E. 2d 758.\nJudgment on the first count in the indictment vacated. Judgment on the second count in the indictment arrested.", "type": "majority", "author": "PARKER, C.J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General T. W. Bruton and Assistant Attorney General George A. Goodwyn for the State.", "D. F. McGougan, Jr., for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE v. JOHN FISHER and BRADFORD LITTLE.\n(Filed 10 May, 1967.)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 16\u2014\nIn those counties in which the Superior Court has concurrent jurisdiction of misdemeanors, G.S. 7-64. the court first acquiring jurisdiction of a particular case retains jurisdiction thereof, subject to appellate review.\n3. Same\u2014\nWarrant was issued in the Recorder\u2019s Court of Columbus County charging a misdemeanor. Defendant paid into that court the jury fee and demanded a jury trial. Through inadvertence the case was transferred to the Superior Court, and defendant moved that the cause be remanded to the Recorder\u2019s Court. Held: The motion to remand to the Recorder\u2019s Court should have been allowed.\n3. Courts \u00a7 2\u2014\nJurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may not he conferred by the parties by consent, waiver, or estoppel.\n4. Property \u00a7 4\u2014\nA warrant which fails to charge that defendants unlawful and wilful injury or damage to property was malicious, is fatally defective, and judgment thereon will be arrested ew mero motu. G.S. 14-127.\nAppeal by defendant Fisher from Carr, J., September Criminal Session 1966 of Columbus.\nCriminal prosecution upon an indictment containing two counts. The first count charges John Fisher and Bradford Little on 22 April 1966 with unlawfully and wilfully assaulting I. A. Matthews with deadly weapons, to wit, a rifle and a shotgun, and inflicting upon him \u201cgreat damage.\u201d The second count charges the same defendants at the same time with unlawfully and wilfully (the second count leaves out the word \u201cmaliciously\u201d) greatly injuring, defacing and damaging a certain store building (emphasis ours), the property of one I. A. Matthews, by shooting the said store building with a rifle and a shotgun, the said damage being in an amount in excess of $10.00.\nWhen the case was called for trial, before pleading to the indictment, defendants made a motion to remand the case to the Recorder\u2019s Court of Columbus County for trial for the following reasons: The criminal prosecution in the instant case was initiated by a warrant sworn out 23 April 1966 in the court of a justice of the peace of Columbus County by I. A. Matthews charging defendants on 22 April 1966 with unlawfully and wilfully assaulting I. A. Matthews with deadly weapons, to wit, a rifle and a shotgun, with the felonious intent to kill and murder I. A. Matthews, \u201ccausing an estimated damage of one hundred fifty and no/100 dollars to the 'personal property of I. A. Matthews.\u201d (Emphasis ours.) This warrant was executed on 26 April 1966.\nOn 26 April 1966 defendants requested in writing that the hearing of the case against them be transferred to the Recorder\u2019s Court of Columbus County. On 16 May 1966 defendants, pursuant to Chapter 147, Session Laws 1947, demanded a jury trial in the Recorder\u2019s Court of Columbus County of the case against them in that court, and paid into that court a jury fee of $25.00 each as required by that statute. The request for a jury trial was granted.\nAt the next sitting of the Recorder\u2019s Court for jury trials, the \u201cjacket\u201d of the case against defendants in that court shows that in the Recorder\u2019s Court \u201cjury trial was waived and the case was transferred to Superior Court.\u201d Counsel for defendants stated in his motion aforesaid that defendants were in custody and that it did not., make any difference to him whether or not the case against defendants was tried in the Recorder\u2019s Court or the Superior Court, ;Cpun-sel for defendants stated to Judge Carr in his motion that the Recorder\u2019s Court had the case first and had jurisdiction.\nJudge Carr denied defendants\u2019 motion, and -defendants excepted.\nThen the defendants pleaded not guilty. At the end of the State\u2019s evidence, defendant Little\u2019s motion for judgment of compulsory non-suit was allowed. A similar motion by defendant Fisher was denied. Verdict as to Fisher: guilty as charged of assault with a deadly weapon and \u201cguilty of malicious injury to real property of $10.00 or less.\u201d\nFrom a judgment of imprisonment for eighteen months on the first count in the indictment, and from a judgment of imprisonment for thirty days on the second count in the indictment to run concurrently with the first count in the indictment, defendant Fisher appeals.\nAttorney General T. W. Bruton and Assistant Attorney General George A. Goodwyn for the State.\nD. F. McGougan, Jr., for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0315-01", "first_page_order": 355, "last_page_order": 359 }