{ "id": 8567119, "name": "STATE v. JIMMY LEVERNE EFIRD", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Efird", "decision_date": "1967-11-08", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "730", "last_page": "732", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "271 N.C. 730" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "106 S.E. 2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 N.C. 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8615951 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/249/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 S.E. 2d 734", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "243 N.C. 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8619824 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/243/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "35 S.E. 2d 169", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 N.C. 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8608263 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/225/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 S.E. 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 N.C. 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8604458 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/208/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 S.E. 2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 N.C. 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562687 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/271/0130-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 330, "char_count": 5095, "ocr_confidence": 0.549, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.644711811061791e-07, "percentile": 0.9271723949929127 }, "sha256": "6debadca19139d03316c56554ce6ce0b37c7c7b7ef9d71acb64391f5407df0c4", "simhash": "1:ab34856010a4d579", "word_count": 835 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:46:10.850261+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE v. JIMMY LEVERNE EFIRD." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Per Curiam.\nDefendant assigns as error (1) the denial of his motions for judgment as of nonsuit, and (2) the judgment (in respect of quantum of punishment) in the involuntary manslaughter case.\nDefendant\u2019s motions for judgment as of nonsuit were properly overruled. In brief, the State offered evidence tending to show: Oa January 6, 1967, about 11:45 p.m., defendant, who had no operator\u2019s license, was operating a 1962 Chevrolet on Aquadale Road, \u00e1 paved public highway in Stanly County. Notwithstanding protests of passengers in the car, he operated said car at a speed of 80 miles per hour in a 55-mile per hour speed zone. While so operating the car, defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The car operated by defendant failed to make a curve, ran off the road, crashed into a tree, etc., thereby causing Elon Deliliah Hall, one of the passengers, to sustain fatal injuries.\nDefendant contends involuntary manslaughter is a \u201cnoninfamous\u201d felony for which punishment was limited to two years under G.S. 14-2. This contention was considered and decided adversely to defendant in State v. Swinney, 271 N.C. 130, 155 S.E. 2d 545. In Swinney, a judgment imposing a sentence of 5-7 years for involuntary manslaughter was pronounced. The Court held: \u201cThe defendant\u2019s contention that involuntary manslaughter is a misdemeanor for which punishment cannot exceed two years is not sustained.\u201d The dissent in Swinney did not relate to this holding.\nIt is noteworthy that G.S. 14-2, as amended' by Chapter 1251, Session Laws of 1967, now provides: \u201cEvery person who shall be convicted of any felony for which \u2022 no specific punishment is prescribed by statute shall be punishable by fine, by imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, or by both, in the discretion of the court.\u201d (Our italics.)\nSeparate judgments, each imposing a prison sentence, were pronounced. Each judgment is complete within itself. Absent an order to the contrary, these sentences run concurrently as a matter of law. State v. Duncan, 208 N.C. 316, 180 S.E. 595; In re Parker, 225 N.C. 369, 35 S.E. 2d 169; State v. Stonestreet, 243 N.C. 28, 89 S.E. 2d 734; State v. Troutman, 249 N.C. 398, 106 S.E. 2d 572. It is noted that G.S. 15-6.2, based on Chapter 57, Session Laws of 1955, provides: \u201cWhen by a judgment of a court or by operation of law a prison sentence runs concurrently with any other sentence a prisoner shall not be required to serve any additional time in prison solely because the concurrent sentences are for different grades of offenses or that it is required that they be served in different places of confinement.\u201d\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "Per Curiam." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Bruton, Assistant Attorney General Melvin and Staff Attorney Costen for the State.", "B. L. Brown, Jr., for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE v. JIMMY LEVERNE EFIRD.\n(Filed 8 November, 1967.)\n1. Homicide \u00a7 20\u2014\nEvidence in this case held sufficient for the jury on the question of defendant\u2019s guilt of involuntary manslaughter.\n2. Homicide \u00a7 30\u2014\nPunishment for involuntary manslaughter may be by fine or imprisonment not to exceed 10 years, or both, in the discretion of the court G.S. 14-2, G.S. 14-18.\n3. Criminal Daw \u00a7 140\u2014\nWhere the court enters separate judgments imposing sentences of imprisonment, and each judgment is complete within itself, the sentences run concurrently as a matter of law, in the absence of a provision to the contrary in the judgment, even though the sentences are for different grades of offenses requiring different places of confinement, G.S. 15-6.2.\nAppeal by defendant from Johnston, J., March 27, 1967 Session of STANLY.\nCriminal prosecutions on (1) a bill of indictment charging involuntary manslaughter, to wit, the felonious killing of Elon Deli-liah Hall on January 6, 1967, (2) a warrant charging operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and (3) a warrant charging the operation of a motor vehicle without a valid operator\u2019s license. (In respect of the charges set forth in the two warrants, the trial in the superior court was de novo upon defendant\u2019s appeal from judgments of the Stanly County Recorder\u2019s Court.) The three cases were consolidated for trial. After trial, in which defendant was represented by court-appointed counsel, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as to each of said charges.\nIn the involuntary manslaughter case, the court pronounced judgment that defendant be confined in the State\u2019s Prison for a term of five years. In the case in which defendant was charged with the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, judgment imposing a sentence of two years was pronounced. In the case in which defendant was charged with operation of a motor vehicle without an operator\u2019s license, judgment imposing a sentence of sixty days was pronounced.\nDefendant excepted and appealed. Thereupon, orders were entered providing for the prosecution of defendant\u2019s said appeal by his court-appointed counsel and for the payment by Stanly County of the costs of mimeographing the record and defendant\u2019s brief incident to his appeal.\nAttorney General Bruton, Assistant Attorney General Melvin and Staff Attorney Costen for the State.\nB. L. Brown, Jr., for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0730-01", "first_page_order": 764, "last_page_order": 766 }