{ "id": 8572311, "name": "WILLIE A. BLANTON v. DORIS MUNDAY FRYE", "name_abbreviation": "Blanton v. Frye", "decision_date": "1967-12-13", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "231", "last_page": "235", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "272 N.C. 231" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "70 S.E. 2d 845", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 N.C. 568", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626074 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/235/0568-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 S.E. 2d 623", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 N.C. 352", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12165992 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/229/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 S.E. 2d 806", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628576 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 S.E. 2d 885", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "255 N.C. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570562 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/255/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 S.E. 2d 330", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 N.C. 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630446 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/222/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 S.E. 2d 578", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 N.C. 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621287 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/252/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 S.E. 2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "257 N.C. 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566050 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/257/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 S.E. 2d 308", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 N.C. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572113 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/264/0200-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 543, "char_count": 11143, "ocr_confidence": 0.566, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5067271184448039e-07, "percentile": 0.6666629984991403 }, "sha256": "c7034c1e67f0a82d027698c6bafbbfe913db6c49e7fea5f18335620626241c8d", "simhash": "1:f7004e530e24a57a", "word_count": 1958 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:31:35.058336+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "WILLIE A. BLANTON v. DORIS MUNDAY FRYE." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HiggiNS, J.\nThe pleadings present issues of defendant\u2019s negligence and plaintiff\u2019s contributory negligence. At the close of all the evidence, the Court, without assigning any reason, entered judgment of compulsory nonsuit. Either insufficient evidence of- defendant\u2019s negligence or evidence of plaintiff\u2019s contributory negligence as a matter of law would sustain the judgment.\nThe parties admitted the accident occurred at night. At the time the plaintiff approached the scene of the accident, the defendant\u2019s Oldsmobile was at an angle across the south lane of-U. S. Highway 70. The rear end was about 3 feet from the south shoulder. The front was 1 or 2 feet across the center line. The plaintiff was blinded by the lights of vehicles meeting him and failed to see the defendant\u2019s disabled automobile until he was \u201cwithin 50 feet\u201d or as he told the officer \u201cuntil he was right on it\u201d.\nAll the evidence disclosed the defendant had left the home of her mother-in-law and attempted to enter U. S. Highway 70 from the south, intending to cross the south lane and travel west. However, as she entered the highway, the motor suddenly cut off. Her attempts to start the motor failed. The gears were released and the vehicle would not coast in either direction. The plaintiff cut sharply to his right, missed the defendant\u2019s vehicle, but struck a bank and sustained injuries.\nAll the evidence disclosed the defendant\u2019s efforts to start the engine failed. She released the gears but the force of gravity was not sufficient to move the vehicle. The defendant could not avoid stopping (stalling) on the highway. Her conduct was not in violation of the law against parking or obstructing the highway. Saunders v. Warren, 264 N.C. 200, 141 S.E. 2d 308; Melton v. Crotts, 257 N.C. 121, 125 S.E. 2d 396; Meece v. Dickson, 252 N.C. 300, 113 S.E. 2d 578.\nIn the emergency which had suddenly arisen, without fault on her part, it was the defendant\u2019s duty to give passing motorists such notice of the danger her vehicle created as the occasion permitted. She continued her efforts to start the engine and, according to her evidence, kept her lights on. The plaintiff alleged she had parked without lights. He testified he saw the automobile blocking his traffic lane. \u201cI did not see any lights. ... I cut to the right to avoid hitting her in the side\u201d. Not once did the plaintiff say the lights were not on, or that he could have seen lights had they been on. Obviously, the side view did not readily expose either the front or the rear lights. His statement that he did not see lights is without probative force. The physical evidence, in the light of the plaintiff\u2019s testimony, indicate he was not in a position to see lights on the defendant\u2019s vehicle. His testimony goes no further than to say \u201cI did not see any lights\u201d. Had he gone further and testified he was in a position to see lights and did not see them, a different question probably would have confronted Judge Latham. The plaintiff did not see the vehicle until he was right on it, according to his own statement. His attention thereafter was devoted to his efforts (happily successful) to avoid \u201cstriking her in the side\u201d.\nMotion to nonsuit does not permit the Court to weigh the evidence; that is the exclusive province of the jury. Wall v. Bain, 222 N.C. 375, 23 S.E. 2d 330. However, when nonsuit is denied at the close of the plaintiff\u2019s evidence (as in this case) the defendant\u2019s evidence, which is not in conflict with the plaintiff's, is taken into account. Eason v. Grimsley, 255 N.C. 494, 121 S.E. 2d 885. The defendant, and one of her witnesses, gave positive testimony that lights on the Oldsmobile were on. The mere statement that plaintiff did not see a light is not enough if he omits to go further and say he was keeping a lookout and was in a position to see lights. Hollingsworth v. Grier, 231 N.C. 108, 55 S.E. 2d 806; Parkway Bus Co. v. Coble Dairy Products Co., 229 N.C. 352, 49 S.E. 2d 623.\nThe plaintiff\u2019s evidence raises serious doubt whether the presence or absence of lights on the Oldsmobile could have influenced the plaintiff\u2019s evasive action. He could see neither his traffic lane nor the stalled automobile until the lights facing him had passed. According to the evidence, when he applied brakes, his vehicle missed the Oldsmobile, spun around twice, and landed against the bank of the road. Whether the absence or presence of lights could have been a proximate cause of the accident is problematical. Morris v. Jenrette Transp. Co., 235 N.C. 568, 70 S.E. 2d 845. Suffice it to say that all the positive evidence discloses the disabled vehicle\u2019s lights were on. Evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant is not disclosed. Nonsuit was proper. Judgment of the Superior Court is\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "HiggiNS, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Byrd, Byrd & Ervin Law Firm /&/ John W. Ervin, Jr., for plaintiff appellant.", "Patton \u25a0& Starnes by Thomas M. Starnes for defendant appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WILLIE A. BLANTON v. DORIS MUNDAY FRYE.\n(Filed 13 December, 1967.)\n1. Automobiles \u00a7 10\u2014\nThe fact that a motorist in driving- her vehicle onto the highway from a driveway with the intention of crossing the first lane and turning left, has her vehicle stall so as to block the first lane, that she then releases the gears in hope that the vehicle would roll across the highway and attempts to restart the motor, both without avail, does not constitute a violation of the law against parking or obstructing the highway, and such motorist has only the duty to give passing motorists such notice of the danger created by her vehicle as the occasion permits.\n2. Evidence \u00a7 17\u2014\nWhen the evidence tends to show that plaintiff was traveling east and approached a vehicle which had entered the highway from the south from a driveway and was standing where it had stalled in attempting to make a left turn on a highway, with its rear some three feet from the south shoulder and its front some one or two feet across the center line, the psysical evidence discloses that plaintiff driver was not in a position to see lights on the stationary vehicle if they had been burning, and his testimony that he did not see any lights on the stationary vehicle, is without probative force.\n3. Trial \u00a7 21\u2014\nThe court may not weigh the defendant\u2019s evidence on motion to nonsuit, but it may consider defendant\u2019s evidence which is not in conflict with that of plaintiff in ascertaining whether the evidence is sufficient to raise the issue for the jury.\n1. Automobiles \u00a7 75\u2014 Evidence held insufficient to show negligence on part of motorist having car stall on highway.\nThe evidence tended to show that defendant entered the highway from a driveway on the south side of the highway, intending to make a left turn, and that when the rear of defendant\u2019s car was some two feet from the south shoulder of the road, the engine stalled and defendant was unable to restart the motor, and that the car would not roll by gravity when the gears were released. There was positive evidence that the lights were burning on defendant\u2019s vehicle. Plaintiff, traveling east, was blinded by the lights of oncoming traffic and did not see the stationary vehicle until he was some 50 feet therefrom, and, to avoid collision, drove off the highway to his right into the bank on the shoulder of the road, resulting in the injury in suit. Held: The evidence is insufficient to raise the issue of negligence for the jury, and nonsuit was properly entered.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Latham, S.J., March 1967 Session, Buree Superior Court.\nThis is a civil action to recover damages for injuries the plaintiff sustained when his automobile ran into the bank of Highway No. 70 in Burke County. The accident occurred at 9:30 p.m. on May 20, 1966. The plaintiff alleged his lane of travel east was completely blocked by the defendant\u2019s dark red Oldsmobile automobile which was negligently parked in the highway without lights or flares, and that, in order to avoid a collision, he was forced off the highway, and suffered injury.\nThe plaintiff alleged, and testified, that a curve in the road, the dark color of the defendant\u2019s vehicle, and the blinding effect of lights on vehicles approaching from the east prevented his discovery of the defendant\u2019s vehicle until he was within 50 feet of the roadblock. \u201c. . . I saw the red automobile in the road. I cut to the right to avoid hitting her right in the side and then I don\u2019t remember a thing until I was in the hospital. I was approximately 50 feet from the car, in the road, when I was no longer blinded. . . . Just as I saw the red automobile, ... or whatever color it was, I didn\u2019t see any lights whatsoever on the automobile. . . .\u201d\nOn cross-examination, the plaintiff admitted that 5 days after the accident he signed a statement which recited, . . When I first saw the car, I thought it was on my right in a road or driveway. I did hit my brakes before I cut to my right to avoid hitting it broadside. . . . (I)t was not moving at all. It did have the headlights on and sitting at an angle at about northwest.\u201d He testified the statement about the lights was not correct. The plaintiff\u2019s only other witness, Patrolman Chambers, arrived at the scene of the accident 3 or 4 minutes after it happened. He found the defendant\u2019s red automobile at an angle across the road. The rear was about 3 feet from the right edge of the surface and the front was 1 or 2 feet over the center line. He did not remember whether there were lights on any of the vehicles. Neither vehicle showed any observable damages. \u201cHe (plaintiff) told me that he didn\u2019t see the Frye car until he was right on it. . . .1 can\u2019t definitely say . . . whether or not there was (sic) any lights on the car being driven by the defendant.\u201d The parties, by stipulation, admitted the doctor\u2019s report as evidence of the plaintiff\u2019s injuries.\nThe defendant testified: \"... I pulled my car away from my mother-in-law\u2019s residence, pulled out into the highway on the main road and my car stopped. I was about crossways of the middle line. My motor just quit and I couldn\u2019t get it started, but I still had my lights on. I never did turn them off. I kept trying to start it and I saw the car coming toward me. He was coming pretty fast and it wouldn\u2019t roll back. I put it in park to try to re-start. It would not roll back and wouldn\u2019t start.\u201d On cross-examination, defendant admitted she went to a Justice of the Peace and paid off a ticket for failure to yield right-of-way. \"... I couldn\u2019t hardly get off from work. I just went to the Justice of Peace and paid it off. On the day that I paid it off, I didn\u2019t feel ... I was guilty. . . .\u201d\nThe defendant\u2019s sister-in-law, a passenger in the Oldsmobile, testified: \u201c. . . She pulled out and the car stalled. We were at an angle and she tried to get it parked. I mean she tried to get it cranked and it wouldn\u2019t crank. So she tried to get it to roll and it wouldn\u2019t roll. . . . The lights were on the car in which I was riding and they were never turned off. . . .\u201d\nThe Court sustained defendant\u2019s motion for nonsuit when renewed at the close of all the evidence. From the judgment dismissing the action, the plaintiff appealed.\nByrd, Byrd & Ervin Law Firm /&/ John W. Ervin, Jr., for plaintiff appellant.\nPatton \u25a0& Starnes by Thomas M. Starnes for defendant appellee." }, "file_name": "0231-01", "first_page_order": 267, "last_page_order": 271 }