{ "id": 8572630, "name": "VIRGINIA R. KING, Plaintiff, v. JOHN J. HIGGINS and T & A TRUCKING COMPANY, a Corporation, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "King v. Higgins", "decision_date": "1967-12-13", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "267", "last_page": "270", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "272 N.C. 267" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "60 S.E. 900", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 N.C. 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11269105 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/147/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 S.E. 941", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 N.C. 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11269064 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/171/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 S.E. 797", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "170 N.C. 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8658285 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/170/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 S.E. 2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 N.C. 731", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625588 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/252/0731-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 S.E. 2d 157", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 N.C. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8619601 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/218/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 S.E. 2d 349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "260 N.C. 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573336 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/260/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 S.E. 2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 N.C. 607", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8614265 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "611" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/233/0607-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 S.E. 2d 594", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 N.C. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559987 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/267/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 S.E. 2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 N.C. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626336 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/251/0498-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 447, "char_count": 8475, "ocr_confidence": 0.547, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.694035334392479e-07, "percentile": 0.8926078315762811 }, "sha256": "103affff657d35590e46e97776088c0a71c5482105bcb24efb1427535b32a7d8", "simhash": "1:f3e14cc6b005146d", "word_count": 1454 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:31:35.058336+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "VIRGINIA R. KING, Plaintiff, v. JOHN J. HIGGINS and T & A TRUCKING COMPANY, a Corporation, Defendants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PER Cueiam.\n\u201cIt is almost the universal opinion that recovery may be had for mental or emotional disturbance in ordinary negligence cases where, coincident in time and place with the occurrence producing the mental stress, some actual physical impact or genuine physical injury also resulted directly from defendant\u2019s negligence.\u201d Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 132 S.E. 2d 48. See also King v. Britt, 267 N.C. 594, 148 S.E. 2d 594. In the present case the jury was instructed that the plaintiff, if entitled to recover at all, was to be awarded in a lump sum a fair and reasonable compensation for all of her injuries, past and prospective, including \u201cactual suffering both of body and mind.\u201d There is no error in that portion of the charge quoted above in the statement of facts, to which the plaintiff excepted. It is in accord with the decision of this Court in Mintz v. R. R., 233 N.C. 607, 611, 65 S.E. 2d 120. Furthermore, the plaintiff, having requested an instruction in almost the exact language used, cannot complain of it as error entitling her to a new trial. Overton v. Overton, 260 N.C. 139, 144, 132 S.E. 2d 349; Carruthers v. R. R., 218 N.C. 377, 11 S.E. 2d 157.\nThe contention that the court did not give the remainder of the instruction requested by the plaintiff is also without merit. Much of such remainder of the requested instruction was given in substance though not in the precise language of the request. In this there was no error since the court is not required to charge the jury in the precise language of the request so long as the substance of the request is included in language which does not weaken its force. Dinkins v. Booe, 252 N.C. 731, 114 S.E. 2d 672; Lloyd v. Bowen, 170 N.C. 216, 86 S.E. 797.\nIt was not error for the court to refuse to give the definition of \u2018\u2022'mental suffering\u201d contained in the request. The definition or explanation of the term so requested included, among other things, \u201cmortification\u201d, \u201cembarrassment\u201d, \u201chumiliation\u201d, \u201cgrief,\u201d and \u201cdisfiguring or humiliating\u201d injuries. The plaintiff did not testify to any feeling or humiliation or embarrassment as a result of her injuries, and since there was no evidence of any disfiguring injury, there was no basis for an implication of this type of mental suffering such as was present in King v. Britt, supra. There being no evidence of this type of mental suffering, the plaintiff was not entitled to her request that the jury might consider it in determining the amount to be awarded as damages. A requested instruction which is not, in its entirety, a correct statement of the law applicable to the evidence may be refused, the court being under no duty to modify or qualify it so as to remedy the defect therein. Horse Exchange v. R. R., 171 N.C. 65, 87 S.E. 941; Edwards v. Telegraph Co., 147 N.C. 126, 60 S.E. 900.\nThe charge of the court below, considered in its entirety, properly states the measure of damages and the elements of the plaintiff\u2019s injury to be considered by the jury in the light of the evidence in the record. We find in it no error which would justify a new trial.\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "PER Cueiam." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hines and Dettor for plaintiff appellant.", "Smith, Moore, Smith, Schell <& Hunter for defendant appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "VIRGINIA R. KING, Plaintiff, v. JOHN J. HIGGINS and T & A TRUCKING COMPANY, a Corporation, Defendants.\n(Filed 13 December, 1967.)\n1. Damages \u00a7 S\u2014\nWhen negligence produces some actual physical impact or genuine physical injury, damages may be recovered also for mental or emotional disturbance naturally and proximately resulting therefrom.\n3. Damages \u00a7 16\u2014\nIn a personal injury action, an instruction that the plaintiff, if entitled to recover at all, was to be awarded as damages one compensation in a lump sum for all injuries, past and prospective, caused by defendant\u2019s wrongful act, including loss of both bodily and mental powers or for actual suffering both of body and mind, held, without error.\n3. Appeal and Error \u00a7 50\u2014\nA party may not complain of an asserted error in the charge when the instruction complained of is embodied in almost the identical language in his own request for instructions.\n4. Trial \u00a7 38\u2014\nThe court is not required to charge the jury in the precise language of the instructions requested so long as the substance of the request is included in the charge.\n5. Damages \u00a7 16\u2014\nThe failure of the court to define mental suffering as including embarrassment, mortification, and disfiguring or humiliating injuries, as requested by plaintiff in her prayer for instructions, is not error in the absence of any evidence that plaintiff had undergone this type of mental suffering.\n6. Trial \u00a7 38\u2014\nThe court may properly refuse a requested instruction which is not a correct statement of the law applicable to the evidence, and the court is under no duty to modify or qualify it so as to remedy the defect therein.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Crissman, J., at the 6 March 1967 Civil Session of Guilpoed.\nThe plaintiff sues for personal injuries and property damage alleged to have been sustained by her when her automobile, which she was driving, was struck from the rear by a truck, owned by the corporate defendant and driven by the individual defendant in the course of his employment. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff upon the issue of negligence and awarded her $1,300 for damage to her automobile and $12,500 for her personal injuries. Judgment was entered in accordance with the verdict. The plaintiff seeks a new trial upon the issue of damages only and assigns as error the charge of the court upon the question of damages recoverable for personal injury, the failure of the court to give the instruction requested by the plaintiff upon this question, and the failure of the court to declare and explain the law arising upon the evidence as required by G.S. 1-180.\nThere was evidence tending to show that the plaintiff sustained what is commonly called a whiplash injury to her neck and back. The plaintiff testified to substantial and continuing pain and weakness in her arm and back, continuing headaches, her inability to perform work which she had previously done, and substantial restrictions upon her ability to move various parts of her body. She offered medical testimony attributing these pains and disabilities to the injury received by her in this collision and the testimony of a psychiatrist that she suffered from a \u201cdepressive reaction\u201d which was \u201cnearly completely incapacitating to her,\u201d which had a 30 per cent chance of permanency and which the psychiatrist believed \u201cwas related to the accident in which she was involved,\u201d although there are many other possible causes of such condition.\nThe plaintiff assigns as error the following instruction upon the question of damages for personal injury:\n\u201cNow, the Court charges you that in cases like this one, if the Plaintiff be entitled to recover at all, that she is entitled to recover as damages one compensation in a lump sum for all injuries, past and prospective, in consequence of the defendants\u2019 wrongful act. Now, these are understood to embrace indemnity for actual nursing and medical expenses and loss of.time from inability to perform ordinary labor or capacity to earn money. The plaintiff is to have a reasonable satisfaction, \u25a0 if she be entitled to recover at all, for loss of both bodily and mental powers or for actual suffering both of body and mind which are the immediate and necessary consequences of the injury that she sustained in this accident or in this collision, and it is for you, members of the jury, to say under all the circumstances what is a fair and reasonable sum which the defendants should pay the plaintiff by way of compensation for the injury that she sustained.\u201d\nThis portion of the charge to the jury is virtually a verbatim quotation of the first portion of the plaintiff\u2019s requested instruction on this issue. The court further instructed the jury that it was to consider the age of the plaintiff, her life expectancy as shown in the Mortuary Tables, the nature of the work and value of her services at the time of her injury, \u201calong with the other evidence in arriving at what would be fair and reasonable compensation to her.\u201d The court then reviewed the contentions of the parties as to the nature and extent of the plaintiff\u2019s injuries and pain and resulting inability, past and prospective, to work as she did prior to the collision, and as to the expenses incurred by her as a consequence of such injury.\nHines and Dettor for plaintiff appellant.\nSmith, Moore, Smith, Schell <& Hunter for defendant appellee." }, "file_name": "0267-01", "first_page_order": 303, "last_page_order": 306 }