{ "id": 8575354, "name": "REDEVELOPMENT COMMISSION OF HIGH POINT v. DENNY ROLL AND PANEL COMPANY; EDWARD N. POST; Substituted Trustee; HIGH POINT BANK AND TRUST COMPANY; GUILFORD COUNTY and CITY OF HIGH POINT", "name_abbreviation": "Redevelopment Commission of High Point v. Denny Roll & Panel Co.", "decision_date": "1968-03-27", "docket_number": "No. 691", "first_page": "368", "last_page": "377", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "273 N.C. 368" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "139 S.E. 2d 553", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 N.C. 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570177 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/263/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 S.E. 2d 265", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "262 N.C. 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565180 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/262/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 S.E. 2d 71", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 N.C. 760", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575562 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/261/0760-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 S.E. 2d 219", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "250 N.C. 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8623661 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/250/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 S.E. 2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 N.C. 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572485 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/272/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 S.E. 2d 392", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8610333 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 S.E. 2d 479", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "230 N.C. 687", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8631970 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/230/0687-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 922, "char_count": 23717, "ocr_confidence": 0.568, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.41203437511961e-07, "percentile": 0.8000508909978922 }, "sha256": "c9e70134a9e2dead8702805df10d1754f17b5012637c560ac8e244fa62e70b07", "simhash": "1:8d0cb849653b7846", "word_count": 3823 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:52:42.272754+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "HusKiNS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "REDEVELOPMENT COMMISSION OF HIGH POINT v. DENNY ROLL AND PANEL COMPANY; EDWARD N. POST; Substituted Trustee; HIGH POINT BANK AND TRUST COMPANY; GUILFORD COUNTY and CITY OF HIGH POINT." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Bobbitt, J.\nThe issue as to the amount of damages or compensation was for determination de novo by jury trial in the superior court. G.S. 40-19; G.S. 40-20; Proctor v. Highway Commission, 230 N.C. 687, 55 S.E. 2d 479; Gallimore v. Highway Comm., 241 N.C. 350, 85 S.E. 2d 392; Redevelopment Commission v. Smith, 272 N.C. 250, 158 S.E. 2d 65.\nThere was evidence that, in the appraisal of property, there are three standard approaches, namely, (1) the cost approach, (2) the income approach, and (3) the market comparison approach; that the cost approach involves a determination of the fair market value of the (vacant) land, the cost of reproduction of the buildings or replacement thereof by new buildings of modern design and materials less depreciation; and that the income and market approaches include a consideration of the rentals and prices obtained from the lease or sale of comparable properties reasonably related in respect of location and time. Expert witnesses for respondent and for petitioner were in substantial accord that all of these approaches should be considered in forming an opinion as to the fair market value of the subject property as of November 8, 1965.\nThere was conflicting evidence as to each of the elements involved in the cost approach. The income approach was stressed by petitioner\u2019s evidence. It was minimized by respondent\u2019s evidence on the ground the buildings on the subject property were for a special purpose and therefore not readily rentable. Expert witnesses for respondent and for petitioner testified that, with reference to the market approach, they had taken into consideration the sale prices of comparable properties.\nThe legal principles governing the admissibility of evidence as to sales of comparable properties are set forth fully in prior decisions. Barnes v. Highway Commission, 250 N.C. 378, 109 S.E. 2d 219; Highway Commission v. Pearce, 261 N.C. 760, 136 S.E. 2d 71; Highway Commission v. Coggins, 262 N.C. 25, 136 S.E. 2d 265; Highway Commission v. Conrad, 263 N.C. 394, 139 S.E. 2d 553.\n\u201cActually no two parcels of land are exactly alike. Only such parcels may be compared where the dissimilarities are reduced to a minimum and allowance is made for such dissimilarities.\u201d Barnes v. Highway Commission, supra. Ordinarily, the dissimilarities are greater between two sites on each of which is located a complex of buildings in use for manufacturing purposes. In Highway Commission v. Coggins, supra, Moore, J., for the Court, stated the basic general principle as follows: \u201cWhether property involved in a voluntary sale is sufficiently similar in nature, location and condition to the property appropriated by condemnation to admit evidence of its sale and the price paid therefor as a guide to the value of the condemned property is a question to be determined by the trial judge in the exercise of his sound discretion.\u201d\nPetitioner assigns as error rulings of the court sustaining objections to questions asked Mr. Mendenhall, petitioner\u2019s witness, on direct examination. These questions, set forth below, do not relate directly to the subject property. They relate to specific transactions involving the Thomas Mills property and the Continental Furniture Company property.\nWitnesses for respondent had testified that, in forming an opinion as to the fair market value of the subject property on November 8, 1965, they had considered, inter alia, the prices at which compar able properties had been sold. For example, Mr. Hylton had testified that, in the market comparison approach, he had considered the prices at which eighteen different pieces of property had been sold, sixteen being vacant lots and two with buildings thereon. The proximity of each of these eighteen properties to the subject property is shown on a map offered in evidence and identified as respondent\u2019s Exhibit No. 6. Respondent\u2019s witnesses were not asked the sale price of any of these properties.\nMr. Mendenhall testified that, in the market comparison approach, he had considered sales of \u201cfifteen, twenty, twenty-five properties,\u201d but \u201cspecifically\u201d had \u201cconsidered perhaps four.\u201d Only five properties, inclusive of the Thomas Mills property and the Continental Furniture Company property, were identified in Mr. Mendenhall\u2019s testimony.\nThe Thomas Mills property, to which petitioner\u2019s Exception No. 1 refers, is located some three and one-half blocks from the subject property. Mr. Mendenhall was permitted to testify the Thomas Mills property was rented on November 8, 1965, and as to the amount of rental paid therefor; and that this was one of the factors upon which he based his opinion. He testified the Thomas Mills property had been sold in January of 1960, and again in July of 1963, and that he had considered the sale prices on these occasions as one of the factors on which he based his opinion. He was asked, \u201cWhat was the sale price in January, 1960, Mr. Mendenhall?\u201d The court sustained respondent\u2019s objection to this question. If permitted to do so, Mr. Mendenhall would have answered: \u201cEighty-Five Thousand Dollars.\u201d Petitioner\u2019s Exception No. 1 is directed to this ruling. Thereafter, Mr. Mendenhall was permitted to testify, over objection by respondent, that the Thomas Mills property had sold in July of 1963 for $65,000.00.\nIt would seem that, on account of differences in location and otherwise, the trial judge, in his discretion, would have been justified in finding that the Thomas Mills property was not sufficiently comparable to permit evidence as to the rental or sale prices therer for. Certainly, the exclusion of evidence with reference thereto could not be considered an arbitrary exercise of discretionary power.\nPetitioner contends the proffered testimony of Mr. Mendenhall as to the sale price in January, 1960, should have been admitted as tending to show a downward trend in the market value for property in this section of High Point. Petitioner calls attention to the fact that Mr. Hylton had testified (on cross-examination by petitioner\u2019s counsel) that \u201cthe market for old industrial plants here in High Point\u201d was good as of November, 1965. Mr. Mendenhall expressed the opinion \u201cthere was as of November 8, 1965, a limited market for older industrial properties comparable to\u201d the subject property, and that he believed \u201cthe market was less strong than it might have been two years before that.\u201d\nIn our view, petitioner\u2019s said contention lacks substantial merit. In the first place, all relevant factors involved in and explanatory of the two sales are not disclosed. Be that as it may, the evidence, if admitted, would tend to show at most a downward trend in the market value of the Thomas Mills property. A downward trend in the market value of one piece of property some three and one-half blocks from the subject property is insufficient to show a general downward trend in property values in this section of High Point. As stated in our prior decisions, the admissibility of evidence in relation to specific facts concerning so-called comparable properties must be left in large measure to the discretion of the trial judge. Manifestly, to explore the status of each such comparable property in depth would be diversionary rather than helpful in evaluating the subject property.\nThe Continental Furniture Company property, to which petitioner\u2019s Exception No. 2 relates, was \u201cwithin sight of,\u201d and \u201cright across Green Street from,\u201d the subject property. Mr. Mendenhall was asked: \u201cDo you know of your own knowledge as to the actual sale price for the land and buildings of Continental Furniture Company?\u201d Mr. Mendenhall answered: \u201cI know of my own knowledge that they put a price of two hundred thousand \u2022 \u2014 \u201d At this point respondent\u2019s counsel objected. The court sustained the objection and instructed the jury not to consider said partial answer of the witness. Thereafter, for the record, petitioner\u2019s counsel was permitted to ask the following question: \u201cI asked you if you knew of your own knowledge that a price was placed on the land and buildings only by the parties and I want you to give your answer to the reporter, please.\u201d The record shows the witness whispered the following answer to the reporter: \u201cThe purchasers placed a value of two hundred thousand dollars on the land and buildings.\u201d\nThe transaction to which Mr. Mendenhall was referring involved the conveyance of the subject property by Continental Furniture Company to Globe Furniture Corporation, a subsidiary of Burlington Industries, in January, 1967. The exact nature of the Continental-Globe transaction is unclear. The whispered answer relates to the value placed on the land and buildings by the purchasers. Mr. Hylton, respondent\u2019s witness, testified that he did not consider said 1967 transaction in forming his opinion \u201cdue to the fact that this sale was made because of the corporate sale of stock and the value that was placed on the land and buildings was a mutually agreed figure, and not from an actual sales figure, for the benefit of each one from the standpoint of income tax and what-have-you.\u201d He testified the Continental property \u201cwas not sold as a piece of land,\u201d but that it was a sale consisting \u201cof buying and selling of assets, liabilities, business, good will, the whole works.\u201d Mr. Hylton\u2019s testimony seems to explain Mr. Mendenhall\u2019s testimony to the effect that two hundred thousand dollars was a valuation the purchasers had placed on the land and buildings in the Continental-Globe transaction.\nMr. Mendenhall testified he had taken into consideration the Continental-Globe transaction in forming his opinion as to the fair market value of the subject property on November 8, 1965. Although the jury was instructed to disregard it, the incomplete answer of Mr. Mendenhall in the hearing of the jury was to the effect that, in the Continental-Globe transaction of 1967, \u201ca price of two hundred thousand\u201d had been placed on the land and buildings. Error, if any, with reference to the exclusion of this evidence relating to the Continental property is not considered of such prejudicial nature as to justify the award of a new trial.\nThe court sustained respondent\u2019s objections to certain questions asked John Adams, petitioner\u2019s witness, on direct examination. Petitioner\u2019s Exceptions Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 relate to these rulings.\nPetitioner\u2019s Exception No. 3 is not brought forward in petitioner\u2019s assignments of error. Moreover, consideration thereof discloses it is without merit.\nMr. Adams was offered as an expert in \u201cindustrial plant layouts\u201d and was permitted to give opinion evidence as such expert. He was permitted to testify, over respondent\u2019s objection, that, in his opinion, as of November 8, 1965, the subject property was best suited for \u201cwarehousing.\u201d Thereupon, he was asked to explain his reasons for that opinion. Respondent\u2019s objection was overruled and Mr. Adams testified: \u201cThe physical layout is too cut up and too varied. The buildings \u2014 the physical layout of the buildings makes it virtually impossible to efficiently manufacture a product such as furniture or plywood at a profit. You have many levels.\u201d When asked the further question by petitioner\u2019s counsel \u2014 \u201cDo you mean many different floor levels?\u201d \u2014 counsel for respondent again objected. This objection was sustained, the court stating to counsel for petitioner that he would \u201chave to pursue his reasons for concluding that the highest and best use is for warehousing.\u201d Thereupon the court instructed the jury as follows: \u201c(Y)ou will not consider this testimony as to the inefficiency as to the manufacturing that he has just related.\u201d Petitioner\u2019s Exceptions Nos. 4 and 5 are directed to this ruling.\nThereafter, Mr. Adams was asked: \u201cMr. Adams, did you form an opinion satisfactory to yourself as to the suitability or desirability of the Denny Roll and Panel Company property, that is as to the layout of the land, the buildings, the design of the buildings, in relation to its suitability for industrial manufacturing purposes?\u201d Respondent\u2019s objection was overruled and Mr. Adams testified: \u201cThe layout is not a satisfactory layout to efficiently run a manufacturing plant for the purpose of making a profit.\u201d Mr. Adams was also permitted to testify over respondent\u2019s objection that \u201cthe physical layout of the plant and the buildings makes it virtually impossible to efficiently process raw materials, manufacturing a finished product of the nature and make a profit.\u201d\nMr. Adams was asked: \u201cMr. Adams, my question is are there any particular things about this property as of November 8, 1965, that you point out as helping you arrive at your opinion?\u201d No objection was interposed to this question. Mr. Adams answered: \u201cWell, I said the different levels, the cut up nature of the main plant, and there are posts everywhere. I can\u2019t conceive of how a supervisor can supervise.\u201d Upon motion of respondent\u2019s counsel, the court instructed the jury: \u201c(Y)ou will not consider what he conceives of as to a supervisor.\u201d Petitioner\u2019s Exception No. 6 is directed to this ruling.\nMr. Adams was asked: \u201cNow Mr. Adams, can you explain how the cut up nature of the buildings which you have referred interferes with the efficiency in operation in this layout?\u201d Respondent\u2019s objection was sustained. Petitioner\u2019s Exception No. 7 is directed to this ruling. Thereafter, whispering his answer to the reporter, Mr. Adams said: \u201cExcessive handling.\u201d\nThe impression prevails that Mr. Adams\u2019 admitted testimony was sufficient to convey to the jury his opinion that the subject property was not adapted to efficient use as a manufacturing plant and the reasons for his opinion. The upshot of the matter seems to be that petitioner elicited from Mr. Adams virtually everything it sought to elicit from him. Moreover, \u201cthe cut up nature of the buildings,\u201d if such be the case, was plainly observable by the jurors when they viewed the subject property.\nThe court sustained respondent\u2019s objection to a question asked Joe Robb, petitioner\u2019s witness, on direct examination. Petitioner\u2019s Exception No. 9 is directed to this ruling.\nMr. Robb was offered and testified as an expert in the field of real estate appraisals. He testified, inter alia, that in his opinion \u201cthe highest and best use to which (the subject property) could be put was for warehousing purposes\u201d; that in his opinion the fair market value of the subject property as of November 8, 1965, was $135,000.00, $84,000.00 representing the value of the land and $51,-000.00 representing the value of the buildings; and that, when considering the cost approach of appraisal, he used \u201ca replacement cost approach as opposed to a reproduction cost approach.\u201d\nWith further reference to the replacement cost approach, Mr. Robb referred to \u201cfunctional obsolescence\u201d and \u201csuperfluous or su-peradequate construction.\u201d The record shows the following occurred:\n\u201cQ. Can you tell us what some of those superfluous items are? A. One of those that come to mind immediately is the type of wall construction in the brick portion of the building. Today they build with eight-inch block and one four-inch course of brick on the veneer. This is primarily on the front. Most manufacturers on the side and rear just put the block. They don\u2019t veneer it. The floor structure is\u2014 Me. BeRnhaedt: I believe I will object. I don\u2019t think he is qualified in this area. I object and move to strike. Mr. Post: On his own testimony, he said he was not qualified. Court: Well, I have forgotten what the question was now. Read the question. (The question was read by the Reporter as follows: \u2018Can you tell us what some of those superfluous items are?\u2019 Court: The objection is sustained. Petitioner\u2019s Exception No. 9. Mr. Haworth: We would like to get his answer into the record. Court: Let him wbjsper his answer to the Rep\u00f3rter so that the jury can\u2019t hear it. (The witness whispered his answer to the Reporter as follows: T mentioned the brick walls and floor system, the roof structure, that will be enough.\u2019)\u201d\nPetitioner had not offered Mr. Robb as an expert construction engineer or an expert in respect of construction costs. It is noted that when the question, \u201cCan you tell us what some of those superfluous items are,\u201d was first asked, respondent did not object; and a rather extensive answer was given by Mr. Robb before any objection was interposed. The court did not at any time instruct the jury not to consider the testimony Mr. Robb had given. This testimony was far more extensive than the answer Mr. Robb later whispered to the reporter. Each of the buildings had been described in considerable detail and the jurors had observed them. Mr. Robb testified he \u201ctook the approach of replacement rather than reproduction,\u201d and \u201cestimated the depreciation or the loss of value that had occurred in this property due to age, due to functional deficiencies, not being of modern construction.\u201d\nMuch testimony was offered during the course of a long trial. Conceding there may have been technical errors in rulings on evi-denoe, some adverse to petitioner and others adverse to respondent, petitioner\u2019s assignments of error based on the exceptions discussed above do not disclose any error of such prejudicial nature (to petitioner) as to justify the award of a new trial.\nPlaintiff\u2019s remaining assignments of error, other than formal assignments, involve (1) two instances where plaintiff asserts the presiding judge made prejudicial comments, and (2) an excerpt from the court\u2019s charge. After careful consideration of each, the conclusion reached is that these assignments do not disclose prejudicial error or present questions of sufficient substance to merit discussion thereof in detail.\nPetitioner having failed to show prejudicial error, the verdict and judgment will not be disturbed.\nNo error.\nHusKiNS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "Bobbitt, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Haworth, Riggs, Kuhn & Haiuorth and Walter W. Baker, Jr., for \u2022petitioner appellant.", "Smith, Moore, Smith, Schell & Hunter; Richmond G. Bernhardt, Jr.; and Morgan, Byerly, Post & Keziah for Denny Roll and Panel Company, respondent appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "REDEVELOPMENT COMMISSION OF HIGH POINT v. DENNY ROLL AND PANEL COMPANY; EDWARD N. POST; Substituted Trustee; HIGH POINT BANK AND TRUST COMPANY; GUILFORD COUNTY and CITY OF HIGH POINT.\n(Filed 27 March 1968.)\n1. Eminent Domain \u00a7 11\u2014\nIn condemnation proceedings the issue as to the amount \u00f3f damages or compensation is for determination de novo by jury trial in the Superior Court. G.S. 40-19, G.S. 40-20.\n2. Eminent Domain \u00a7 6\u2014\nWhether property involved in a voluntary sale is sufficiently similar in nature, location and condition to the property appropriated by condemnation to admit evidence of its sale and the price paid therefor as a guide to the value of the condemned property is a question to be determined by the trial judge in the exercise of his sound discretion.\n8. Same\u2014\nEvidence tending to show a decrease in the market value of one piece of property some three and one-half blocks from the property sought to be condemned is held properly excluded by the trial court in the exercise of its discretion.\n4. Same\u2014\nThe exclusion of testimony relating to the value of property sought to be condemned by a municipal redevelopment commission is held without error where testimony of similar import was admitted without objection.\nHuskins, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.\nAppeal by petitioner from Crissman, J., March 20, 1967 Civil Session of GuileoRO, High Point Division, docketed and argued as No. 691 at Fall Term 1967.\nPetitioner, Redevelopment Commission of High Point (Commission), pursuant to authority conferred by the \u201cUrban Redevelopment Law,\u201d G.S. Chapter 160, Article 37, instituted this special proceeding, as authorized by G.S. 160-465, in accordance with the procedure prescribed by G.S. Chapter 40, Article 2, to acquire by condemnation the fee simple title to described property known as 215 South Centennial Avenue, High Point, North Carolina, owned by defendant Denny Roll and Panel Company (Panel Company). Edward N. Post, substituted trustee, and High Point Bank and Trust Company, were joined as respondents on account of their respective interests under a deed of trust on said property. The City of High Point and Guilford County were joined as respondents on account of their claims for ad valorem taxes. Hereafter the word \u201crespondent\u201d will refer only to respondent Panel Company.\nIt was stipulated November 8, 1965, the date the petition was filed, was \u201cthe date of taking\u201d; and that the only issue for determination was the issue of damages. The assistant clerk of superior court, by order consented to by counsel for petitioner and for respondent, appointed Commissioners. They assessed respondent\u2019s damages at $195,000.00. The assistant clerk affirmed their report and entered judgment in accordance therewith. Both petitioner and respondent excepted and appealed to the superior court for trial by jury of the issue of damages.\nUpon trial in the superior court, evidence was offered by respondent and by petitioner.\nThe subject property is located in the City of High Point, approximately two blocks from the courthouse. It fronts 294.4 feet on South Centennial Avenue and extends east, at varying widths, to Mangum Street, the frontage on Mangum being 390 feet. It is approximately in the center of the block bounded on the north by East Commerce Street and on the south by East Green Street.\nOn November 8, 1965, the subject property, then the site of respondent\u2019s operations as a plywood manufacturing plant, consisted of a land area of 98,394 square feet and of a complex of buildings. The oldest buildings were erected in 1902 and others were added from time to time through the years. The buildings, including balconies and basements, had a total floor space of 65,691 square feet.\nThere was evidence describing the subject property in detail. Each of the thirteen buildings and additions thereto, including its age, composition, location, function, etc., was described. Fixtures, including the heating, sprinkler and wiring systems, were described. Outside facilities, including retaining walls, fencing, paved driveways and parking lots, railroad spur track, etc., were described. In addition to this descriptive testimony, the jurors, under the court\u2019s order and supervision, saw for themselves the land, buildings and facilities constituting the subject property.\nThere was conflicting evidence as to the use for which the subject property was best suited. Evidence offered by respondent was to the effect that as of November 8, 1965, the best use was for light industry, such as furniture manufacturing. Evidence offered by petitioner was to the effect its best use as of that date was for warehouse purposes.\nOpinion evidence of five witnesses offered by respondent as to the fair market value of the subject property as of November 8, 1965, was as follows: Hylton, $282,500.00; Shavitz, $290,000.00; Conrad, $298,000.00; Samet, $321,129.00; Smith, $425,000.00.\nThe opinion evidence of two witnesses offered by petitioner as to the fair market value of the subject property as of November 8, 1965, was as follows: Mendenhall, $150,500.00; Robb, $135,000.00.\nThe issue submitted, and the jury\u2019s answer thereto, were as follows: \u201cWhat is the total fair market value of the real property described in the petition? ANSWER: $240,000.00.\u201d\nThe court entered judgment providing that, upon payment of $240,000.00 plus interest and costs, including a fee to respondent\u2019s attorneys, the title of respondent would be divested and petitioner would be the owner in fee simple of the subject property.\nPetitioner excepted and appealed.\nHaworth, Riggs, Kuhn & Haiuorth and Walter W. Baker, Jr., for \u2022petitioner appellant.\nSmith, Moore, Smith, Schell & Hunter; Richmond G. Bernhardt, Jr.; and Morgan, Byerly, Post & Keziah for Denny Roll and Panel Company, respondent appellee." }, "file_name": "0368-01", "first_page_order": 404, "last_page_order": 413 }