{ "id": 8561528, "name": "ROLAND J. BROWN, Administrator of the Estate of OSSIE D. BROWN, Deceased, v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY; - and - WILLIAM E. PHILLIPS, SR., Administrator of the Estate of WILLIAM E. PHILLIPS, JR., Deceased, v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY", "name_abbreviation": "Brown v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad", "decision_date": "1970-03-11", "docket_number": "No. 25", "first_page": "398", "last_page": "404", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "276 N.C. 398" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "166 S.E. 2d 535", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "4 N.C. App. 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552167 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/4/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 S.E. 2d 580", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "255 N.C. 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569744 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/255/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 F. Supp. 693", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 4248730 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/123/0693-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 S.E. 2d 227", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "219 N.C. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621817 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/219/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 S.E. 2d 328", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "247 N.C. 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626012 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/247/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 S.E. 2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "221 N.C. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627298 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/221/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "14 S.E. 2d 500", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "219 N.C. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625129 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/219/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 S.E. 2d 561", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "221 N.C. 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627995 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/221/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 S.E. 555", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 N.C. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627248 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/202/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 S.E. 2d 669", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 N.C. 640", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626441 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/235/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 S.E. 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "205 N.C. 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627142 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/205/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 S.E. 750", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 N.C. 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627160 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/211/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 S.E. 2d 561", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "256 N.C. 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573854 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/256/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 S.E. 2d 329", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 N.C. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561972 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/269/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 S.E. 2d 162", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "238 N.C. 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8611037 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/238/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 S.E. 2d 498", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 N.C. 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8623694 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/248/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 S.E. 2d 383", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 N.C. 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627010 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/254/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 S.E. 2d 616", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 N.C. 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559822 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/267/0537-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 851, "char_count": 17700, "ocr_confidence": 0.599, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.796866502846844e-07, "percentile": 0.8365173027462219 }, "sha256": "7ee7242390c7bdd166da75ba825577341b73c46a3b071909e4a24a06fc6bc33a", "simhash": "1:b80cf5226303ad4f", "word_count": 2922 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:14:31.974326+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "MooRE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "ROLAND J. BROWN, Administrator of the Estate of OSSIE D. BROWN, Deceased, v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY \u2014 and \u2014 WILLIAM E. PHILLIPS, SR., Administrator of the Estate of WILLIAM E. PHILLIPS, JR., Deceased, v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "SHARP, J.\nDefendant Railroad was under a duty to give timely warning when its train approached the visually obstructed and much traveled Rose Street crossing. Cox v. Gallamore, 267 N.C. 537, 148 S.E. 2d 616; Jarrett v. R. R., 254 N.C. 493, 119 S.E. 2d 383; High v. R. R., 248 N.C. 414; 103 S.E. 2d 498; Summerlin v. R. R., 238 N.C. 438, 78 S.E. 2d 162; 6 Strong, N. C. Index Railroads \u00a7 6 (2d ed. 1968). Assuming the truth of plaintiffs\u2019 evidence, as we must in passing upon a motion for nonsuit, it would justify a finding by the jury that defendant failed to give any warning as its locomotive approached the crossing. Kinlaw v. R. R., 269 N.C. 110, 152 S.E. 2d 329. Plaintiffs\u2019 evidence establishes the negligence of Mrs. Phillips. With full-knowledge of the obstructed crossing, she drove toward it at an undiminished speed of 30-35 MPH. Carter v. R. R., 256 N.C. 545, 124 S.E. 2d 561; Summerlin v. R. R., supra.\nOn this evidence the negligence of the driver cannot be imputed to plaintiffs\u2019 intestates, and they were guilty of no contributory negligence. Harper v. R. R., 211 N.C. 398, 190 S.E. 750; Johnson v. R. R., 205 N.C. 127, 170 S.E. 120; 6 Strong, N. C. Index Railroads \u00a7 7 (2d ed. 1968). Therefore, unless Mrs. Phillips\u2019 negligence relieves defendant Railroad from liability, the judgments of nonsuit were erroneously entered. Defendant contends that even if plaintiffs\u2019 evidence shows it to have been \u201cin some respect negligent,\u201d it also shows the death of plaintiffs\u2019 intestates to have been \u201cindependently and proximately produced by the wrongful act, neglect or default of a responsible third person, to-wit: Mrs. Phillips, the operator of the pickup truck.\u201d In support of this proposition, defendant relies, inter alia, upon Jones v. R. R., 235 N.C. 640, 70 S.E. 2d 669; Hinnant v. R. R., 202 N.C. 489, 163 S.E. 555, and\u2014most heavily\u2014upon Jeffries v. Powell and Branch v. Powell, 221 N.C. 415, 20 S.E. 2d 561.\nJeffries v. Powell and Branch v. Powell, supra, were suits against a railroad by the driver of an automobile and the administrator of his deceased passenger. The driver was injured and the passenger killed when a train struck the vehicle at a grade crossing. Plaintiffs\u2019 evidence tended to show that the \u201cwhistle didn\u2019t blow and the bell didn\u2019t ring.\u201d In affirming judgments of nonsuit, Winborne, J. (later C.J.), said: \u201c[I]t is clear from the evidence that the negligence of Branch (the driver) was such as to insulate the negligence of defendants, and that his negligence was the sole proximate cause of the collision between his automobile and the train of defendants in which Jeffries lost his life.\u201d In concluding the opinion he quoted from Chinnis v. R. R., 219 N.C. 528, 531, 14 S.E. 2d 500, 502: \u201cConceding that there was evidence of failure on the part of defendant to sound whistle or bell to give warning of the approach of the train to the crossing, it is clear that the active negligence of the driver of the automobile, subsequently operating, was the real efficient cause of the injury to plaintiff\u2019s intestate. . . . The negligence of the driver of the automobile was patent. It intervened between the failure of the defendant to give warning of the approach of the train to the crossing and the injury to plaintiff\u2019s intestate, and it began to operate subsequent to any act of negligence on the part of defendant, and continued to operate to the instant of injury.\u201d\nPlaintiffs in the instant case, contending that intestates\u2019 deaths were proximately caused by the joint and concurring negligence of defendant Railroad and the driver of the truck, rely, inter alia, upon Cox v. Gallamore, 267 N.C. 537, 148 S.E. 2d 616; Henderson v. Powell and Rattley v. Powell, 221 N.C. 239, 19 S.E. 2d 876; Harper v. R. R., 211 N.C. 398, 190 S.E. 750; Johnson v. R. R., 205 N.C. 127, 170 S.E. 120.\nIn Henderson and Battley, supra, two passengers were injured, one fatally, when McCrimmon, the operator of the automobile in which they were riding, drove upon a blind crossing over a much used public street. There was no watchman or automatic signaling device to give warning of an approaching train. The driver testified that he stopped his car, looked and listened. Then, seeing nothing and hearing no whistle, bell, or signal, he drove upon the tracks and was struck by a speeding train. The trial judge nonsuited the plaintiffs, who appealed. In overruling the nonsuit and disposing of defendant\u2019s contention that \u201cthe intervening negligence\u201d of the driver of the car \u201cinsulated\u201d the defendant\u2019s negligence and became the \u201csole proximate cause,\u201d Seawell, J., speaking for the Court, reasoned: \u201cIt took the combined activities of the railroad company and Mc-Crimmon to bring their respective vehicles into the collision. . . . The formula proposed by defendants would exonerate both of them with equal impartiality.\u201d The duties of the railroad and those using the crossing \u201care reciprocal, interrelated, and immediate; and, whatever the previous history of neglect, are concurrently in force and effect as soon as the zone of danger is created by simultaneous approach to the intersection.\u201d No negligence is \u201cinsulated\u201d so long as it plays a substantial and proximate part in the injury. The legal effect of the active negligence of two independent agencies, simultaneously occurring, and inflicting injury upon a third person hinges upon the question of foreseeability. The test is whether the intervening act and the resultant injury is one that the original actor could have reasonably foreseen and expected. The negligence of McCrim-mon was not \u201cof such an extraordinary character as to be beyond the limits of foreseeability.\u201d\nAs opinion writers have frequently noted, cases involving grade-crossing accidents are myriad, and \u201cno good can be obtained from attempting to analyze the close distinctions drawn in the decisions of these cases for each case must ... be governed by the controlling facts there appearing.\u201d Fairdoth v. R. R., 247 N.C. 190, 193, 100 S.E. 2d 328, 331, and Hampton v. Hawkins, 219 N.C. 205, 209, 13 S.E. 2d 227, 229. Gilliam, District Judge, put it succinctly: \u201cAny effort to reconcile the North Carolina law on the subject of insulating negligence seems futile.\u201d Cronenberg v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 693, 699.\nProsser, in his treatise on Torts \u00a7 51 (3d ed. 1964) analyzes the problems of intervening causes with his usual clarity. Except when quoted, we summarize pertinent portions of his discussion:\nThe question is not one of actual causation because the problem never arises until causation is established. The query is \u201cwhether the defendant is to be held liable for an injury to which he has in fact made a substantial contribution, when it is brought about by a later cause of independent origin. . . . The older cases tend to ask the question, why should the defendant be held liable for harm brought about by something for which he is not responsible? The later ones tended to ask instead, why should he be relieved of liability for something that he has caused, along with other causes?\u201d Since an infinite number and variety of causes may intervent after the defendant\u2019s negligence is an accomplished fact, \u201cout of sheer necessity and in default of anything better,\u201d the courts have had \u201cto fall back upon the scope of the original foreseeable risk which he has created.\u201d They say, therefore, that the defendant is to be held liable only if the intervening cause is foreseeable. \u201cIf the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated, or one which the defendant had reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances, he may be negligent among other reasons because he failed to guard against it; or he may be negligent only for that reason.\u201d If it be determined \u201cthat the defendant\u2019s duty requires him to anticipate the intervening misconduct, and guard against it, it follows that it cannot supersede his liability.\u201d\nThere are many situations in which the reasonably prudent man is expected to anticipate and guard against the conduct of others. Prosser, supra, \u00a7 33. \u201c[H]e is required to realize that there will be a certain amount of negligence in the world. In general, where the risk is relatively slight, he is free to proceed upon the assumption that other people will exercise proper care. . . . But wh\u00e9n the risk becomes a serious one, either because the threatened harm is great, or because there is an especial likelihood that it will occur, reasonable care may demand precautions against \u2018that occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary incidents of human life and therefore to be anticipated.\u2019 \u2018It is not due care to depend upon the exercise of care by another when such reliance is accompanied by obvious danger.\u2019 Thus an automobile driver may not proceed blindly across a railway track, upon the assumption that any approaching train will sound bell and whistle. . . .\u201d Prosser, supra at p. 174. Conversely, even though the train crew knows that a motorist approaching a railroad crossing is charged with the duty of keeping a vigilant lookout for an approaching train, it likewise has the duty to keep a lookout for the motorist and to give a timely warning of the train's approach. Johnson v. R. R., 255 N.C. 386, 121 S.E. 2d 580.\nWe think \u201cordinary human experience\u201d demonstrates that a train crew should reasonably foresee that the driver of an automobile nearing a railroad crossing may be unaware of the train\u2019s approach and drive upon the track unless he receives timely warning that the train is coming. Inattention on the part of the operator of a motor vehicle is all the more likely if the crossing is obstructed, little used by the railroad and much used by the public. A railroad\u2019s failure to protect the traveling public against that very risk is negligence. \u201cForeseeable intervening forces are within the scope of the original risk, and hence of the defendant\u2019s negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant\u2019s responsibility.\u201d Prosser, supra, \u00a7 51, p. 312. This is the rationale of Henderson and Rattley, supra, and of Cox v. Gallamore, supra.\nAt this stage of the proceedings, only plaintiffs\u2019 evidence has been heard. We express no opinion as to its veracity or the inferences which arise from it. We merely hold that plaintiffs\u2019 evidence was sufficient to support a finding that defendant failed to signal the approach of its train to the crossing and that its negligence concurred with that of Mrs. Phillips in proximately causing the deaths of plaintiffs\u2019 intestates. The judgment of nonsuit is\nReversed.\nMooRE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "SHARP, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Pittman, Staton & Betts for plaintiff appellants.", "Henry & Henry and Cameron, Harrington & Love for defendant appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ROLAND J. BROWN, Administrator of the Estate of OSSIE D. BROWN, Deceased, v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY \u2014 and \u2014 WILLIAM E. PHILLIPS, SR., Administrator of the Estate of WILLIAM E. PHILLIPS, JR., Deceased, v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY\nNo. 25\n(Filed 11 March 1970)\n1. Railroads \u00a7 6\u2014 railroad\u2019s duty to give warning at obstructed crossing\nA railroad is under a duty to give timely warning when its train approaches a visually obstructed and much traveled crossing.\n2. Railroads \u00a7 6; Evidence \u00a7 17\u2014 crossing accident \u2014 evidence that locomotive failed to give signal\nPlaintiffs\u2019 evidence that none of the survivors of a crossing accident heard a bell, horn, or whistle prior to the collision between defendant\u2019s locomotive and the truck in which the survivors were riding as passengers, and that a nearby householder heard the collision and then a long whistle but had heard no signal from the train prior to the collision, held sufficient to justify a jury finding that defendant failed to give any warning as its locomotive approached the crossing.\n3. Railroads \u00a7 5\u2014 crossing accident \u2014 negligence of driver \u2014 knowledge of obstruction\nEvidence that the driver of a truck drove toward a railroad crossing at an undiminished speed of 30 to 35 mph despite her knowledge that the crossing was visually obstructed, held sufficient to establish the negligence of the driver.\n4. Railroads \u00a7 7\u2014 crossing accident \u2014 death of passengers-imputation of driver\u2019s negligence\nUnder the facts of this wrongful death action resulting from a collision between defendant\u2019s locomotive and the truck in which plaintiff\u2019s in-testates were passengers, the negligence of the truck driver in approaching the crossing at an undiminished speed of 30 to 35 mph despite her knowledge that the view of the crossing was visually obstructed, held not imputable to the intestates.\n5. Railroads \u00a7 6\u2014 railroad crossing \u2014 duty of railroad to warn motorist\nOrdinary human experience demonstrates that a train crew should reasonably foresee that the driver of an automobile nearing a railroad crossing may be unaware of the train\u2019s approach and drive upon the track unless he receives timely warning that the train is coming \u2014 inattention of the motorist being more likely if the crossing is obstructed, little used by the railroad, and much used by the public; the railroad\u2019s failure to protect the traveling public against this risk is negligence.\n6. Negligence \u00a7 40\u2014 foreseeable intervening forces \u2014 effect on original risk\nForeseeable intervening forces are within the scope of the original risk, and hence of defendant\u2019s negligence; intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant\u2019s responsibility.\n7. Railroads \u00a7\u00a7 5, 7\u2014 crossing accident \u2014 death, of truck passengers \u2014 concurring negligence of driver and railroad \u2014 nonsuit\nIn an action for wrongful death resulting from a collision between defendant\u2019s locomotive and the truck in which plaintiffs\u2019 intestates were riding as passengers, plaintiffs\u2019 evidence that the defendant\u2019s locomotive approached the crossing without giving any warning or signal and that the driver of the truck, with full knowledge that her view of the crossing was obstructed, drove toward the crossing at an undiminished speed of 30 to 35 mph, held sufficient to support a jury finding that defendant\u2019s negligence concurred with that of the truck driver in proximately causing the deaths of the intestates; and the defendant\u2019s motion for nonsuit was improperly granted.\nMoore, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\nON certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals reported in 4 N.C. App. 169, 166 S.E. 2d 535, which affirmed the judgment of nonsuit entered by Godwin, S.J., in the Superior Court of Lee, docketed and argued in the Supreme Court as Case No. 54 at the Fall Term 1969.\nThese two actions for wrongful death, which were consolidated for trial, result from a collision between defendant\u2019s train and the truck in which plaintiffs\u2019 intestates, Ossie D. Brown and William E. Phillips, Jr., were passengers.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 evidence tended to show: On 12 November 1966 at 10:30 p.m., Mrs. Jean Phillips was driving her husband\u2019s pickup truck westerly on Rose Street in the town of Sanford. Ossie Brown, the mother of the driver, was seated beside her in the cab. Mrs. Phillips\u2019 husband, her brother, Gordon Brown, and her 12-year-old son, William E. Phillips, Jr., were seated in the open bed of the truck. Rose Street is a four-lane highway, \u201ca major thoroughfare\u201d forty-eight feet wide, which runs generally east and west. Two lines of defendant\u2019s railroad tracks, running approximately north and south, intersect Rose Street at right angles twenty-eight feet west of the west edge of Chatham Street. Chatham, a two-lane street twenty feet wide, intersects Rose Street from the north to form a \u201cT\u201d intersection. There are no obstructions between Chatham Street and the railroad tracks. However, an oil company\u2019s tanks and warehouse, located in the northeast corner of the Rose-Chatham intersection, obstruct the view to the north. A motorist traveling west on Rose Street cannot see a train approaching from the north until he enters the intersection. The speed limit for this area is 35 MPH.\nMrs. Phillips entered Rose Street three blocks east of the railroad crossing. She knew the location of the crossing but had never seen a train on it. Traveling at 30-35 MPH in the northernmost lane of Rose Street, she approached the crossing without slowing down. When she entered the intersection she looked to the right. She saw a swirling light bearing down from the north when she was between Chatham Street and the railroad. At that point she was \u201cprobably twenty feet\u201d from the train. Knowing that she was too close to stop, she \u201cswerved to the left and speeded up, trying to get across before the train hit.\u201d The engine hit the truck broadside on the right. In the collision Mrs. Brown and William E. Phillips, Jr., were killed. None of the survivors heard a bell, horn, or whistle before the impact. Mr. Phillips heard the roar of the diesel engine when the truck swerved, about two seconds before the crash. He was thrown about sixty feet and, as he was \u201csailing through the air,\u201d he heard a whistle blowing. A householder, living forty yards from the Rose-Chatham intersection, heard the collision and immediately thereafter, a long whistle. Prior to the impact he had heard no signal from the train.\nThe transcript does not reveal the frequency with which trains traversed the Rose Street crossing. However, upon the argument before us, counsel stated that two trains (one each way) used the crossing daily.\nAt the conclusion of plaintiffs\u2019 evidence, the court allowed defendant\u2019s motion for nonsuit, and plaintiffs appealed.\nPittman, Staton & Betts for plaintiff appellants.\nHenry & Henry and Cameron, Harrington & Love for defendant appellee." }, "file_name": "0398-01", "first_page_order": 424, "last_page_order": 430 }