{ "id": 8561636, "name": "MRS. RUBY W. PETTY, Widow, EDGAR PETTY, Deceased, Employee v. ASSOCIATED TRANSPORT, INC., Self-Insurer", "name_abbreviation": "Petty v. Associated Transport, Inc.", "decision_date": "1970-04-15", "docket_number": "No. 20", "first_page": "417", "last_page": "430", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "276 N.C. 417" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "258 N.C. 741", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562656 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/258/0741-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 S.E. 2d 38", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "4 N.C. App. 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553502 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/4/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 S.E. 2d 28", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 N.C. 680", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574296 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "684" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/272/0680-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 Iowa L. Rev. 669", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Iowa L. Rev.", "weight": 2, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675-676" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "243 F. Supp. 915", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 407458 ], "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/243/0915-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 Ariz. 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 635604 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/97/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 N.W. 2d 497", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Wis. 2d 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8671065 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/38/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 Cal. Rptr. 786", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "790" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Cal. App. 2d 816", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4381468 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "821" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-2d/181/0816-01" ] }, { "cite": "43 So. 2d 464", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "6 N.W. 2d 199", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "a decision which applied Sponatski" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 Wis. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis.", "case_ids": [ 8681029 ], "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "a decision which applied Sponatski" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis/241/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 A. L. R. 3d 616", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "622" }, { "page": "622", "parenthetical": "a decision which applied Sponatski" }, { "page": "631-637" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "180 N.E. 2d 480", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill. 2d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2800975 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/24/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 S.E. 2d 598", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "258 N.C. 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560408 ], "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/258/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 S.E. 2d 604", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 N.C. 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559875 ], "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/267/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 S.E. 2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "882" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575029 ], "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 N. C. L. Rev. 611", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "N.C. L. Rev.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 S.E. 2d 802", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "814" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 N.C. 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562331 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38-39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/271/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 A.L.R. 3d 616", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 N.E. 466", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530" }, { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "220 Mass. 526", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 3462066 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/220/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 S.E. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "258 N.C. 741", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562656 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/258/0741-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1467, "char_count": 35935, "ocr_confidence": 0.597, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.270251476013423e-07, "percentile": 0.968152776474613 }, "sha256": "dab6067351a2d20b43cf4621edc96f27780754533464e01d4ca6ce80d75c5544", "simhash": "1:1703e8d25cb3e4d5", "word_count": 5994 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:14:31.974326+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Moore, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "MRS. RUBY W. PETTY, Widow, EDGAR PETTY, Deceased, Employee v. ASSOCIATED TRANSPORT, INC., Self-Insurer" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "SHARP, J.\nThe opinion and award of the full Commission, which struck Commissioner Marshall\u2019s finding that there was no causal relation between Petty\u2019s suicide and the accident on 13 February 1966, discloses: (1) As to the facts, the Commission was convinced that Petty intentionally took his own life, but that his death was directly attributable to the injuries he received in the accident. (2) As to the law, upon these facts, the Commission thought G. S. 97-12 denied to plaintiff any compensation for Petty\u2019s death.\nG. S. 97-12, in pertinent part, provides: \u201cNo compensation shall be payable if the injury or death was occasioned by the . . . willful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or another.\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s assignments of error raise this question: Does an employee who intentionally takes his own life because of a mental derangement produced by a compensable injury act mllfully within the meaning of G.S. 97-12?\nPrior to Painter v. Mead Corporation, 258 N.C. 741, 129 S.E. 2d 482 (1963)\u2019, this Court had not passed upon a claim for compensation for the death of an employee who committed suicide while-totally disabled from a compensable accident. In that case, the deceased employee suffered a blow to his head in an accident arising: out of and in the course of his employment. Headaches of increasing, intensity followed, and twenty days later a cranial operation was-performed to relieve pressure on the brain. Thereafter he was never himself; he was the victim of headaches, sleeplessness, emotional instability, and periods of blankness. On the morning of 2 September 1960, after a sleepless night,. Painter hung himself. A psychiatrist testified that, in his opinion, Painter was so depressed, upset, and bereaved of judgment as a result of his head injury that he would be considered -insane; in committing suicide he was dominated by a disturbance of mind directly caused by the injury and its consequences; and, \u201cin that sense,\u201d his act was involuntary. The hearing commissioner found the following facts, which the full Commission adopted:\n\u201cThat the accidental injury of deceased employee, Tolvin Edgar Painter, on July 21, 1960, caused the deceased to become insane and mentally deranged to such an extent that he had an uncontrollable and irresistible impulse to such an extent that he become delirious and frenzied without rational knowledge of the physical consequences of his act, without conscious volition to produce death on September 2, 1960.\u201d\nIn using the foregoing words to express its finding in Painter\u2019s case, the Commission was obviously paraphrasing the \u201cSponatski rule,\u201d formulated in 1915 by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in In Re Sponatski, 220 Mass. 526, 108 N.E. 466. In that case the court said that under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act the right of dependents of a mentally disturbed employee to recover compensation for his death by suicide was determined by the following rule:\n\u201c. . . [Wjhere there follows as the direct result of a physical injury an insanity of such violence as to cause the victim to take his own life through an uncontrollable impulse or in a delirium of frenzy 'without conscious volition to produce death, having knowledge of the physical consequences of the act,\u2019 then there is a direct and unbroken causal connection between the physical injury and the death. But where the resulting insanity is such as to cause suicide through a voluntary willful choice determined by a moderately intelligent mental power which knows the purpose and the physical effect of the suicidal act even though choice is dominated and ruled iby a disordered mind, then there is a new and independent agency which breaks the chain of causation arising from the injury.\u201d Id. at 530, 108 N.E. at 468. (In 1958 Massachusetts rejected the Sponatski Tule by legislation. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 152, \u00a7 26(A), (1958).)\nThereafter, for many years, the majority of American courts deciding the question here presented followed the Sponatski-rule, or at least gave it lip service. Painter v. Mead Corporation, supra at 747; 1A Larson\u2019s Workmen\u2019s Compensation Laws \u00a7 36.20 (1967); Annot., Suicide as Compensable Under Workmen\u2019s Compensation Acts, 15 A.L.R. 3d 616; Comment, 31 U. of Cinn. L. Rev. 187.\nIn effect that rule incorporates the M\u2019Naghten test for criminal Responsibility. Under M\u2019Naghten, if the accused should be in such a state of mental derangement as not to know the nature and quality \u25a0of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, as not to know he was \u25a0doing wrong, the law does not hold him accountable for his acts, for guilt arises from volition and not from a diseased mind. State v. Spence, 271 N.C. 23, 38-39, 155 S.E. 2d 802, 814. Also it should be noted that the Sponatski rule was predicated upon the tort concept of an independent intervening cause. It eliminates the accident as the proximate cause of death if the employee had sufficient mental \u25a0capacity to know the purpose and effect of his suicidal act notwithstanding he was dominated by a disordered mind directly caused by the injury and its consequences.\nAt the time we decided Painter, the Sponatski rule was still the majority rule. However, in writing the Court\u2019s opinion, which affirmed an award to Painter\u2019s dependents, Higgins, J., noted: (1) Sponatski\u2019s is a harsh rule which has been widely criticized as \u201can application of the test of criminal responsibility not justified in workmen\u2019s compensation cases\u201d and as confusing \u201can intervening act with an intervening cause\u201d; and (2) a growing minority of jurisdictions in this country are holding that the death of an employee is compensable if a work-connected injury causes insanity which in turn induces suicide. In Painter it was carefully pointed out that in affirming the Commission\u2019s award, we were not to be understood \u201cas fixing as our standard the rigid rule of the Sponatski case\u201d; we merely held that the evidence met Sponatski requirements, the most stringent of all tests, and that further discussion was therefore unnecessary. See Case Law Comment, 42 N. C. L. Rev. 611.\nDespite our intimation in Painter, however, the Commission cited that case in support of its conclusion that G. S. 97-12 prohibited compensation to the dependents of an employee who intentionally killed himself. We do not think such an interpretation is compatible with the objective of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, which is to provide for the injured workman, or his dependents in the event of his death, at the cost of the industry which he was serving. To this end, the rule is that benefits under the Act \u201cshould not be denied by a technical, narrow, and strict construction.\u201d Hollman v. City of Raleigh, 273 N.C. 240, 252, 159 S.E. 2d 874, 882. Accord, Cates v. Construction Co., 267 N.C. 560, 148 S.E. 2d 604; Hartley v. Prison Department, 258 N.C. 287, 128 S.E. 2d 598; see Comment in 45 Iowa Law Rev. 669 (1960).\nTo say, as a matter of law, that one who intentionally takes his own life acts willfully is to ignore \u201cthe role which pain or despair may play in breaking down a rational, mental process. Harper v. Industrial Commission, 24 Ill. 2d 103, 107, 180 N.E. 2d 480, 482. Annot., 15 A. L. R. 3d 616, 622. \u201cIf the sole motivation controlling the will of the employee when he knowingly decides to kill himself is the pain and despair caused by the injury, and if the will itself is deranged and disordered by these consequences of the injury, then it seems wrong to say that this exercise of will is \u2018independent,\u2019 or that it breaks the chain of causation. Rather, it seems to be in the direct line of causation.\u201d 1A Larson\u2019s Workmen\u2019s Compensation Law \u00a7 36.30 (1967); Annot., 15 A. L. R. 3d 616, 622. As Fowler, J., pointed out in his dissent in Barber v. Industrial Commission, 241 Wis. 462, 6 N.W. 2d 199 (1942) (a decision which applied Sponatski), when suicide is the \u201cend result\u201d of an injury sustained in a compensable accident, it is \u201can intervening act but not an intervening cause. An intervening cause is one occurring entirely independent of a prior cause. When a first cause produces a second cause that produces a result, the first cause is a cause of that result.\u201d\nIn 1949 the Supreme Court of Florida adopted the chain-of-causation test. Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co., 43 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1949). See Comment in 16 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 275 (1960). Whitehead involved facts and a statute practically identical with those we now consider. Whitehead, an employee, sustained serious injuries in a compensable accident. Three months thereafter he committed suicide by swallowing poison. He knew the consequences of his act, but at the time he was suffering from a mental disturbance directly attributable to the injuries he received in the accident. The Florida Act provided: \u201cNo compensation shall be payable if the injury was occasioned primarily ... by the willful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself.\u201d In reversing the Circuit Court\u2019s judgment denying death benefits to Whitehead\u2019s dependents, the Florida Supreme Court said:\n\u201cFrom the evidence, there can be no doubt that the death of the deceased was directly attributable to the injuries he sustained in the fall, from the roof. . . .\n\u201c [W] e are not persuaded that the fact that a workman knew that he was inflicting upon himself a mortal wound will, in all cases, amount to a \u2018willful intention\u2019 to kill himself, within the meaning of the statute. We believe that in those cases where the injuries suffered by the deceased result in his becoming devoid of normal judgment and dominated by a disturbance of mind directly caused by his injury and its consequences, his suicide cannot be considered \u25a0\u2018willful\u2019 within the meaning and intent of the Act. . . .\n\u201cWhile it may be an independent intervening cause in some cases, it is certainly not so in those cases where the incontrovertible \u2022evidence shows that, without the injury, there would have been no suicide. . . .\u201d Id. at 465.\nOther jurisdictions having statutes which prohibit compensation for willfully inflicted injuries and death have followed the \u201crealistic and reasonable view\u201d of the Florida Court in Whitehead, supra.\nIn Burnight v. Industrial Ace. Com., 181 Cal. App. 2d 816, 821, 5 Cal. Rptr. 786, 790, Bray, P.J., said: \u201c[S]uicide cannot be intentionally self-inflicted if, in spite of his act being one of conscious volition, the suicide, because of mental condition resulting from the injury, is unable to control the impulse to kill himself. . . .\u201d\nTwenty-six years after the decision in Barber, supra, the dissent of Fowler, J., became the law in Wisconsin. In Brenne v. Department of Industry, Labor & Hum. Rel., 38 Wis. 2d 84, 156 N.W. 2d 497, a lineman received a severe electrical shock in the course of his employment and suffered multiple burns to various parts of his body. Thereafter he committed suicide. The hearing examiner, relying upon Barber and the Wisconsin Act allowing recovery only \u201cwhere the injury is not intentionally self-inflicted,\u201d denied plaintiff\u2019s claim for direct benefits. In remanding the case to the Department for reconsideration and further hearing, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin (citing Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co., supra), said: \u201cThe burden of proof is on the claimant to establish by substantial evidence that the \u2018chain-of-causation\u2019 exists. The claimant does this by showing that the industrial injury caused the suicide. . . .\n\u201c. . . The act of suicide cannot then be said to be willful or intentional within the meaning of the statute since its causation ultimately relates back to the original injury, rather than existing as an independent and intervening cause.\u201d Accord, Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 97 Ariz. 256, 399 P. 2d 664 (1965). Terminal Shipping Co. v. Traynor, 243 F. Supp. 915 (1965). See Annot., 15 A. L. R. 3d 616, 631-637 (1965) and 29 N. A. C. C. A. Law Journal 212, 216-219 (1963), where the cases adopting the chain-of-causation test are collected. Another perceptive argument for the rejection of the Sponatski rule and the adoption of the chain-of-causation test appears in the following comment in 45 Iowa L. Rev. 669 (1960):\n\u201cIn spite of the fact that the majority rule (Sponatski) is a departure from the conventional rules of causation, the plain wording of the wilful -self-injury statutes appears at first glance to be a convincing argument for the rule\u2019s adoption. It might seem that the lack of conscious volition which is the basis of that rule is quite in accord with these statutory limitations. An examination of the purpose to be served by these statutes, however, would indicate that their application is inappropriate in cases of this type. As has been pointed out the law of workmen\u2019s compensation does not, at the time of the initial injury, employ the common-law concepts of legal cause in determining liability. Work-connection rather than fault underlies recovery. This absence of the traditional safeguards of the common law may necessitate these statutory safeguards when the level of inquiry is the primary source of injury. Certainly, however, there is no reason for these statutes to be applied in determining the range of compensable consequences stemming from the initial injury. Here the employer and his insurer are protected by the common-law concepts of causation which will prevent recovery for additional self-injury which is not connected with the employment. Using the statute to deny compensation for suicides arising out of the employment is anomalous because to do so produces a narrower basis for recovery under the remedial workmen\u2019s compensation acts than would have been possible under common-law tort doctrine.\u201d Id. at 675-676.\nWe conclude that the chain-of-causation test effectuates the purpose and intent of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act. We hold, therefore, that an employee who becomes mentally deranged and deprived of normal judgment as the result of a compensable accident and commits suicide in consequence does not act wilfully within the meaning of G. S. 97-12.\nThe evidence in this case tends to show that Petty\u2019s death was directly attributable to the accident on 13 February 1966, in that the agitated depression resulting from the accident caused his suicide. This, it seems, the full Commission recognized when it struck Commissioner Marshall\u2019s finding that there was no causal relation between the accident and death. The Commission\u2019s belief that, because Petty planned his own destruction causation was immaterial, no doubt explains its failure to make a specific finding with reference to causation.\nThe transcript does not support Commissioner Marshall\u2019s findings (contained in No. 6) that \u201call evidentiary medical records and all medical evidence points to the fact that plaintiff (sic) did not suffer any brain injury in the accident . . . and that the depression experienced was the normal reaction to the nature and length of time of recovery for the accident and subsequent operation . . .\" (Italics ours.) The record contains evidence to the contrary. Although we do not regard the finding that Petty did not suffer any physical injury to his brain as being determinative of whether his agitated depression was related to his injuries, there is evidence that he was unconscious after the accident and that he had a concussion of the brain. The commissioner\u2019s finding that Petty\u2019s depression was \u201cthe natural reaction\u201d to his injury and subsequent operations ignores certain statements in the testimony of each of the three doctors.\nIt is clear that this proceeding has been heard and reviewed' upon a misapprehension of the applicable principle of law. The opinion and award of the Commission is vacated and the cause is remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions that it be returned to the Industrial Commission, the only tribunal which can find the facts, for a specific finding whether Petty\u2019s suicide was attributable to an abnormal mental condition resulting from his accident on 13 February 1966. \u201c[WJhere facts are found or where the Commission fails to find facts under a misapprehension of law, the court will, when the ends of justice require, remand the cause so that the evidence may be considered in its true legal light.\u201d Bailey v. Department of Mental Health, 272 N.C. 680, 684, 159 S.E. 2d 28, 31. \u201cFurthermore, the Industrial Commission, in a proper case, may grant a rehearing and hear additional evidence.\u201d Id. at 686, 159 S.E. 2d at 32.\nIn view of the manner in which objections to Dr. Clarkson\u2019s testimony were handled at the second hearing, it would seem that, upon the request of either party, the Commission should reopen the case to permit his re-examination. We note, however, that on the first hearing Dr. Clarkson gave evidence similar to much of that sought to be adduced by the hypothetical question. When defendant objected to questions propounded by plaintiff\u2019s counsel to Dr. Clark-son, the hearing commissioner deferred his ruling and instructed the doctor to answer \u201cfor the record.\u201d The deferred rulings, however, were never entered in the record. Obviously this modus operandi is unsatisfactory. Ordinarily, the proper procedure is for the commissioner to require counsel to state the grounds of objection and then to make his ruling. If there is a valid objection to the form of the question, counsel can rephrase it; if the objection is made on other grounds, the Commission and opposing counsel are alerted to the legal principle invoked and can appraise it. In any event, when a ruling is deferred it should be entered in the transcript before the hearing commissioner makes his award. Only in this way can the parties, the full Commission, and the court (if there is an appeal) intelligently review the decision. Apparently the full Commission failed to enter rulings on the evidence because of its interpretation of G. S. 97-12.\nIn justice to the hearing commissioner we are compelled to say that he probably felt driven to the procedure he adopted by the hypothetical question which plaintiff\u2019s counsel propounded. Seemingly it was articulated on the spur of the moment and, like Topsy, it just grew. Its form changed as the objections and pages multiplied and confusion became worse confounded.\nAll the testimony of the lay witnesses tended to establish a direct causal relation between Petty\u2019s accident and suicide. The purpose of the hypothetical question was to establish this relationship by expert testimony also. By and large, the doctor\u2019s \u201canswers for the record\u201d were competent, and the testimony could be properly elicited.\nReversed and remanded.\nMoore, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "SHARP, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "John H. Vernon and W. B. Dalton, Jr., for plaintiff appellant.", "Jordan, Wright, Nichols, Caffrey & Hill by Luke Wright and Edward L. Murrelle for defendant appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MRS. RUBY W. PETTY, Widow, EDGAR PETTY, Deceased, Employee v. ASSOCIATED TRANSPORT, INC., Self-Insurer\nNo. 20\n(Filed 15 April 1970)\n1. Master and Servant \u00a7\u00a7 47, 58\u2014 interpretation of G.S. 97-12 \u2014 suicide by employee \u2014 objective of Compensation Act\nAn interpretation of G.S. 97-12 as prohibiting compensation to the dependents of an employee who intentionally killed'himself is not compatible with the objective of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, which is to provide for the injured workman, or his dependents in the event of his death, at the cost of the industry which he was serving.\n2. Master and Servant \u00a7 47\u2014 construction of Compensation Act\nBenefits under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act should not be denied by a technical, narrow and strict construction.\nS.Master and Servant \u00a7 58\u2014 workmen\u2019s compensation \u2014 suicide resulting from compensable accident \u2014 intervening act\nWhen suicide is the end result of an injury sustained in a compensable accident, it is an intervening act but not an intervening cause.\n4. Master and Servant \u00a7 58\u2014 workmen's compensation \u2014 suicide resulting from compensable accident\nAn employee who becomes mentally deranged and deprived of normal judgment as the result of a compensable accident and commits suicide in consequence thereof does not act wilfully within the meaning of G.S. 97-12, and his death is compensable under the Compensation Act.\n5. Master and Servant \u00a7 97\u2014 workmen\u2019s compensation \u2014 hearing by Commission under misapprehension of the law \u2014 remand for necessary finding of fact\nWhere a claim for compensation for the death of an employee who committed suicide while totally disabled from a compensable accident was heard and reviewed in the Industrial Commission under the misapprehension that G.S. 97-12 prohibited compensation for the death of an employee who intentionally took his own life, even though his death was directly attributable to the injuries he received in the accident, the cause must be returned to the Industrial Commission for a specific finding whether the employee\u2019s suicide was attributable to an abnormal mental condition resulting from the compensable accident, no finding with respect thereto having been made.\n6. Master and Servant \u00a7 85\u2014 workmen\u2019s compensation \u2014 rehearing by Industrial Commission\nThe Industrial Commission, in a proper case, may grant a rehearing and hear additional evidence.\n7. Master and Servant \u00a7 93\u2014 workmen\u2019s compensation \u2014 rulings upon objections to evidence \u2014 answers \u201cfor the record\u201d ,\n\u2022 Ordinarily, when objection is made to a question propounded to a wit-, ness in a workmen\u2019s compensation hearing, the proper procedure is for the commissioner to require counsel to state the grounds of objection and then to make his ruling; when a ruling is deferred and the witness is allowed to answer \u201cfor the record,\u201d the ruling should be entered in the transcript before the hearing commissioner makes his award.\n8. Master and Servant \u00a7 93\u2014 workmen\u2019s compensation \u2014 suicide \u2014 causal relation to accident \u2014 hypothetical questions \u2014 expert testimony\nIn this proceeding upon a claim for compensation for the death of an employee who committed suicide while totally disabled from a compensable accident, doctor\u2019s answers \u201cfor the record\u201d to hypothetical questions seeking to establish a direct causal relation between the employee\u2019s accident and suicide were competent.\nMoore, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\nON certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals reported in 4 N.C. App. 361, 167 S.E. 2d 38, docketed and argued in the Supreme Court as Case No. 20 at the Fall Term 1969.\nPlaintiff, the widow and sole dependent of Edgar Petty (Petty), instituted this proceeding before the North Carolina Industrial Commission to recover death benefits under G.S. 97-38. On 13 February 1966 Petty (57) was working for defendant, a self-insurer, as an over-the-road truck driver. On that day he was injured on the highway in Maryland in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. On 8 July 1966 he committed suicide. Plaintiff contends that the suicidal act was causally related to the accident and that she is therefore entitled to compensation.\nThe first hearing in this case was held by Commissioner William F. Marshall, Jr., on 3 April 1967. The second was conducted on 1 April 1968 by Deputy Commissioner Robert F. Thomas. The only evidence adduced by defendant was the medical reports of the surgeon who treated Petty in Maryland. The testimony of plaintiff\u2019s witnesses tended to show the following facts:\nPlaintiff\u2019s co-driver, J. W. Walker, was driving the truck when a two-pound hunk of concrete hurtled from an overhead bridge into the bunk where Petty was resting. Walker stopped the truck and observed that Petty was bloody and unconscious, \u201cthe rock laying up beside his head.\u201d He \u201cwaived down traffic to get some help,\u201d and in about 30 minutes an ambulance took Petty to Prince George General Hospital at Cheverly, Maryland, where he was treated by Dr. Dunn Kavanaugh.\nThe rock had fractured Petty\u2019s right cheek and shattered his jawbone. There were three complete fractures of the mandible and \u201ca fracture of the remaining portion of the alveolus on the right maxilla, which contained two molar teeth.\u201d Dr. Kavanaugh attempted to reduce the fracture by drilling holes in the bones and wiring them together. He also placed wires around the teeth and applied arch bars to the upper and lower arches with wire around each of the solid teeth.\nOn 22 February 1966, after nine days in the Maryland hospital, Petty was permitted to return to North Carolina for follow-up care. His personal physician, Dr. Matthews of Burlington, saw him on 24 February 1966 and immediately referred him to Dr. Erie E. Peacock, Jr., of North Carolina Memorial Hospital at Chapel Hill. Dr. Peacock examined Petty on 1 March 1966 and found \u201can unstable nonunion of a fracture of the symphysis of the mandible.\u201d Dr. Peacock attempted to stabilize the jaw without surgery by driving Kir-schner wires across the fragments. However, this procedure was unsuccessful. On 11 April 1966, he operated and found the cause of the instability to be \u201ca large butterfly fragment\u201d and two lateral fragments which were barely touching each other. He drilled opposing holes on each side of the loose fragments and in the lateral processes, and wired them together tightly. Arch bars were placed on both dental arches by fastening them to the teeth with steel wires. The wires were removed on 17 April 1966, and Petty was discharged from North Carolina Memorial Hospital.\nAs long as Petty\u2019s jaws were wired he could not talk normally, and he could take nourishment only through a quill. Between the date of the accident and his death he lost forty pounds. All the while his jawbone was wired (32 days) he suffered pain from muscular spasms in his face, neck, and jaw. One of his multiple discomforts was that he could not complete a yawn. After the wires were removed, he complained of \u201ca novocain numbness\u201d of the lower lip and jaw. This, the doctor told him, \u201cmight last for several years or it could go away.\u201d Dr. Peacock\u2019s operation corrected the nonunion of the bone fragments and the instability of the jaw. However, Petty\u2019s appearance was not the same as it had been before the accident. His teeth did not meet right; his jaw jutted; and his eyes were \u201cnot right.\u201d He continued to have trouble talking, and he could not open his mouth normally. His teeth were still braced, and within 2-3 days after his return from Chapel Hill the braces set up muscular spasms which seemed to him to be pulling his teeth apart where they were wired. He became apprehensive that damage was being done to the bone. Five or six of his teeth were loose. He had no bite, and he could not chew even soft food. During the last two weeks of his life, Petty had no appetite and could not sleep.\nPrior to 13 February 1966, according to Petty\u2019s neighbors, associates, and family, he was a happy, healthy, well-adjusted man, who enjoyed fishing, fish frys, cook-outs, and keeping his yard. He was friendly, poised, and assured, a devoted husband and father, and a loving grandparent. His minister characterized him as \u201ca wonderful person.\u201d Petty\u2019s home in Elon College was paid for; \u201che had money in the bank\u201d and no debts. On 28 February 1966 he became eligible for retirement at $250.00 a month for life. Before the accident Petty had manifested no symptoms of mental illness. After the accident, however, his personality changed; \u201che was never himself thereafter.\u201d\n. Early in March, after Dr. Peacock started treating him, Petty became upset because he felt that Dr. Peacock was too busy to take a personal -interest in his case. However,' he \u201ccalmed down\u201d when Dr. Matthews told him that Dr. Peacock was \u201cthe best qualified man in the whole area\u201d to treat his injury. Later Petty said he was glad he had not changed doctors. Dr. Peacock told Petty that he was unduly concerned about himself, and his wife and daughter felt that this was \u201cthe kind of talk\u201d he needed to hear. After the first of March, Petty was definitely anxious, nervous, and showed signs of depression. His family noted that his thinking and comprehension \u201cwas slowed.\u201d He did not always understand what was said to him, and'he was forgetful. He was concerned only with his physical feelings, and he did not want his grandchildren around for fear they would hurt him. His eyes did not seem to focus, and at times he would stare vacantly. It was Dr. Matthews\u2019 opinion that Petty\u2019s accident would have had an emotional effect on anybody.\nPetty dreaded the operation on April 11th, his second, and there was a marked change in his condition thereafter. His depression and nervousness worsened. He would pace the floor of his room and the hospital corridor or stare out of his window and cry. He continued to do this after he came home from the hospital on April 17th.\nSometime in May, Petty apparently realized that he was mentally ill. He told his minister, Mr. Ben Cox, that he knew something was wrong with him; that he had feelings of hostility toward total strangers; that while sitting on a bench in the city park, he had wanted to throw something at a child who rode by on a bicycle. Mr. Cox had advised him to go to the mental-health clinic.\nThe last of May, Petty went to the office of his sister-in-law, Mrs. Webster, a nurse with the Alamance County Health Department, and told her that he constantly had \u201cfeelings of confusion in his head,\u201d a \u201cfeeling of pressure and blurred vision,\u201d and \u201ca feeling of something closing in on him.\u201d He told her he was thinking of killing his wife and her mother. When she asked him if he had told his wife about these feelings he wept and said she was \u201cdearest of all to him,\u201d and he could hot discuss the situation with her lest she become afraid of him. As he talked, his eyes did not focus. He told Mrs. Webster he wanted help; that he had talked to Mr. Cox; and that he was willing to'consult a psychiatrist. At his request she went to the Petty home that night to help him tell his wife of these \u201cstrange feelings\u201d and of his fear that he might harm her, her mother, and the colored maid. Mrs. Petty assured him that she had no fear he would ever harm her and that they would seek help immediately.\nThe next morning Petty and his wife went to see Dr. Matthews. Petty was reluctant to disclose the details of his feelings to the doctor but managed to tell him that he had the urge to harm the occupants of his house and that this frightened him. It was obvious to Dr. Matthews that Petty\u2019s reasoning power was disturbed, and he arranged for Petty to see Dr. Fox at the mental clinic that afternoon.\n. Dr. Fox saw Petty on June 2nd and 9th. Dr. W. D. Clarkson, the director of the mental-health clinic, saw him on June 22nd. Dr. Clarkson thought Petty was \u201crepressing,\u201d for he could get very little out of him. The doctor was concerned for him and troubled by \u201cwhat he didn\u2019t say.\u201d He told Petty to return on June 29th with his wife.\nPetty did not tell his wife Dr. Clarkson wanted to see her. On June 29th Petty cancelled his appointment and went to Durham to see his mother-in-law. After learning of Petty\u2019s urge to do harm, his wife had sent her there to stay with another daughter. When he arrived about 10:30 a.m. his face was red and his eyes wild. He told his mother-in-law that he had started to Butner but decided to come by and tell her he was going to kill his wife and himself, that he was in a fog and could not get out. She talked with him until 2:30 when he appeared to be quiet and said he wanted to go back home. She immediately telephoned her daughter and informed her of Petty\u2019s agitated state.\nDespite the urge to harm his wife, Petty was always kind to her. At no time after his accident did he ever speak crossly to her or manifest irritability toward her. Nor did he ever complain about the liquid diet which she prepared for him.\nOn 8 July 1966 Dr. Cadell, a dentist, was scheduled to begin procedures calculated to correct Petty\u2019s dental problems. Petty had told his wife that he did not believe he would ever have the nerve \u201cto go through with that dental work.\u201d On the afternoon of July 7th, the day before his first scheduled appointment with the dentist, Petty went to the home of a policeman, a friend to whom he had loaned his pistol, and repossessed the weapon. On the following morning, after his wife went to work, a neighbor saw him take a bag from his car into the house. When Mrs. Petty came in from work that afternoon she found his body on the floor of his bedroom. He had shot himself with the pistol he had procured the day before.\nAs a result of the accident on 3 February 1966, Petty was completely and totally disabled until his death on 8 July 1966. However, Dr. Matthews thought he would have sufficiently recovered from his injury to have returned to work within 30 days had the dental work proceeded according to plan.\nIn Dr. Clarkson\u2019s opinion, the injury which Petty received in Maryland on 13 February 1966 could have contributed to the mental condition he observed on 22 June 1966. At that time Petty was anxious, severely depressed, and paced the floor. Dr. Clarkson described his condition as an \u201cagitated depression\u201d or \u201cinvolutional psychotic depression.\u201d Such depression in a man of Petty\u2019s age, he said, indicated a \u201chigh likelihood of suicide,\u201d and \u201che would assume that his death on July 8 was related to his depression.\u201d It was also Dr. Clarkson\u2019s opinion that if Petty suffered great pain it could have contributed to an emotional condition such as depression, particularly if the pain was chronic, and he saw no end or solution to it. Dr. Clarkson also said that if Petty was unconscious after the accident\u2014 as Walker testified \u2014 the assumption is that he had suffered a concussion of the brain, and the presence of some brain injury could not be ruled out. However, he found in the hospital records \u201cno gross evidence\u201d of brain damage.\nOn 15 May 1968, Commissioner Marshall filed his opinion and award. Inter alia he found:\n\u201c(6) . . . All evdientiary medical records and all medical evidence points to the fact that plaintiff (sic) did not suffer any brain injury in the accident; that the deceased employee knew the nature and extent of his surroundings and that the depression experienced was the normal reaction to the nature and length of time of recovery for the accident and subsequent operation, ... (7) that there is no causal relationship between the self-inflicted injuries resulting in death on July 7, 1966 (sic), and the industrial injury sustained on February 13, 1966.\u201d His conclusion of law was that \u201c[t]here is no causal relationship shown connecting the admitted industrial accident of February 13, 1966, and the self-inflicted injuries resulting in death on July 7, 1966.\u201d He denied plaintiff\u2019s claim for death benefits, and she appealed to the full Commission.\nUpon appeal the full Commission concluded that Commissioner Marshall had reached the correct result but for the wrong reason; that the decision should rest on \u201cG. S. 97-12 concerning the willful intention of the employee to kill himself, rather than upon the basis of causal relationship.\u201d It struck out Finding of Fact No. 7 and substituted therefor the following: \u201c7. The deceased employee shot himself to death with his own pistol . . . deceased having obtained such pistol (on the preceding day) from a policeman to whom he had loaned it. . . . The death of deceased employee was occasioned by his willful and premeditated intention to kill himself.\u201d Upon this finding it substituted for Marshall\u2019s conclusion of law the following: \u201cThe death of the deceased employee was occasioned by the willful and premeditated intention of the employee to kill himself. The plaintiff is therefore not entitled to compensation. G. S. 97-12; cf. Painter v. Mead, 258 N.C. 741.\u201d\nFrom the award of the full Commission, plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which found \u201cNo error.\u201d We allowed certiorari.\nJohn H. Vernon and W. B. Dalton, Jr., for plaintiff appellant.\nJordan, Wright, Nichols, Caffrey & Hill by Luke Wright and Edward L. Murrelle for defendant appellee." }, "file_name": "0417-01", "first_page_order": 443, "last_page_order": 456 }