{
  "id": 8564994,
  "name": "DOROTHY M. WRENN v. HERBERT G. WATERS",
  "name_abbreviation": "Wrenn v. Waters",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "DOROTHY M. WRENN v. HERBERT G. WATERS"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "HUSKINS, Justice.\nOn the contributory negligence issue the court charged the jury as follows:\n\u201cThe law requires a driver to exercise due care in entering an intersection, even though she is entering on the green light. She must exercise the care that a reasonably prudent person would exercise, under the circumstances, taking into consideration the possibility that someone might come in the intersection in violation of the rule, coming in the intersection on the red light.\u201d\nThis constitutes the entire charge on the second issue. Plaintiff contends this charge is inadequate, incomplete and prejudicial and assigns same as error.\nThe leading case in North Carolina on the duty of a motorist entering an intersection is Cox v. Freight Lines, 236 N.C. 72, 72 S.E. 2d 25 (1952). In that case the Court, speaking through Justice Ervin, overruled earlier cases which held in effect that \u201cthe right to rely on a right of way created by positive legislation and to assume that other users of the highway will obey the law and exercise ordinary care is restricted to those motorists who are themselves absolutely free from negligence.\u201d It was said that the cases supporting that principle \u201cconstitute a negation of the basic concept that since every, person necessarily acts on appearances, his conduct in a given situation must be judged in the light of all the circumstances surrounding him at the time.\u201d\nFour years later in Wright v. Pegram, 244 N.C. 45, 92 S.E. 2d 416 (1956), Justice Higgins supplied the much-cited general rule which is grounded on the principles set out in Cox:\n\u201cWe are not unmindful of the fact that a motorist facing a green light as he approaches and enters an intersection is under the continuing obligation to maintain a proper lookout, to keep his vehicle under reasonable control, and to operate it at such speed and in such manner as not to endanger or be likely to endanger others upon the highway. Ward v. Bowles, 228 N.C. 273, 45 S.E. 2d 354 [1947]. Nevertheless, in the absence of anything which gives or should give him notice to the contrary, a motorist has the right to assume and to act on the assumption that another motorist will observe the rules of the road and stop in obedience to a traffic signal. Cox v. Freight Lines, 236 N.C. 72, 72 S.E. 2d 25 [1952].\u201d\nThis language is quoted with approval in Currin v. Williams, 248 N.C. 32, 102 S.E. 2d 455 (1958), and in Galloway v. Hartman, 271 N.C. 372, 156 S.E. 2d 727 (1967). See also Troxler v. Motor Lines, 240 N.C. 420, 82 S.E. 2d 342 (1954); Hyder v. Battery Company, Inc., 242 N.C. 553, 89 S.E. 2d 124 (1955); and Jones v. Schaffer, 252 N.C. 368, 114 S.E. 2d 105 (1960), all of which support this view; and 3 Blashfield Automobile Law and Practice (3rd Ed., 1965) \u00a7 114.42, where supporting cases from other jurisdictions are collected.\nWhen the instant charge on contributory negligence is laid alongside the language of Wright v. Pegram, supra, its deficiency is quite apparent. The charge was correct as far as it went, but it failed to go far enough. The able and conscientious trial judge should have further instructed the jury that in the absence of anything which gives or should give notice to the contrary, a motorist has the right to assume and to act on the assumption that opposing drivers will observe the rules of the road and stop in obedience to a traffic signal. Failure to so charge was error; hence this assignment must be sustained. We put aside the remaining assignments without discussion.\nError in the respect indicated necessitates a new trial. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals where it will be certified to the Superior Court of Wake County for a new trial in accordance with this opinion.\nError and remanded.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HUSKINS, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Smith, Leach, Anderson and Dor sett, and Hollow ell and Ragsdale, by William L. Ragsdale, for the plaintiff appellant.",
      "Teague, Johnson, Patterson, Dilthey and Clay by Ronald C. Dilthey, for the defendant appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "DOROTHY M. WRENN v. HERBERT G. WATERS\nNo. 47\n(Filed 18 November 1970)\nAutomobiles \u00a7\u00a7 19, 90\u2014 driver entering intersection on green light \u2014 duty to use due care \u2014 assumption as to other drivers \u2014 instructions\nAn instruction that a driver entering an intersection on a green light must exercise the care that a reasonably prudent person would exercise under the circumstances, taking into consideration the possibility that someone might come into the intersection in violation of the red light, held deficient in failing to further charge that in the absence of anything which gives or should give notice to the contrary, a motorist has the right to assume and to act on the assumption that opposing drivers will observe the rules of the road and stop in obedience to a traffic signal.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Carr, J., December 1969 Civil Session, Wake Superior Court.\nPersonal injury suit arising out of a collision at 12:30 p.m. on 24 September 1968 between automobiles driven by plaintiff and defendant. The road was dry and the weather was clear.\nPlaintiff was driving west on New Bern Avenue in Raleigh, and defendant was driving north on Tarboro Road, approaching its intersection with New Bern Avenue. At this intersection there are five traffic lanes on New Bern Avenue with three lanes used for westbound traffic. The intersection is controlled by traffic control signals. There are left turn signals controlling left turning traffic. These signals operate on the impulse of an electronic eye which is aimed at the left turn lanes on New Bern Avenue. Thus westbound traffic may be flowing freely under a green signal in the westbound lanes of New Bern Avenue while the eastbound traffic on New Bern is stopped by the red light to allow westbound turning traffic to flow south into Tarboro Road.\nThe two vehicles collided in the intersection. The point of impact was in the center westbound lane of New Bern Avenue six to seven feet into the intersection, measured from the prolonged eastern curb line of Tarboro Road. Plaintiff\u2019s testimony, corroborated by a passenger in her car and by the operator of an Esso Station located in the southeast corner of New Bern and Tarboro Road, is to the effect that plaintiff was driving west on New Bern when the light facing her turned green; that two other cars preceding her by two or three car lengths passed through the intersection; that she followed them into the intersection and struck defendant\u2019s car in its right side as he attempted to pass through the intersection on Tarboro Road, going north. Plaintiff testified she did not see defendant\u2019s car before impact; that there were cars in the left turn lane immediately to her left; and that she was driving 15-20 miles per hour in the center westbound lane. Plaintiff stated on cross examination: \u201cBefore I attempted to enter the intersection I looked as I do anytime I am traveling through an intersection. On this particular day at this particular intersection, I do not remember turning and looking to my left. ... I remember there was traffic around the intersection. I remember I was at the Piggly Wiggly when the light turned green.\u201d\nDefendant, a 74-year-old man, testified that the light in his lane was green when he entered the intersection. A passenger in his vehicle also said the light facing him was green although she admitted that she was presently suing defendant for her injuries. Another defense witness testified that the light facing defendant was green as defendant moved into the intersection. No one contends that the traffic control lights at this intersection were malfunctioning. Each party simply contends that the light facing her or him was green. The sequence of the lights was checked by the police following the collision and found to be working properly.\nIssues of negligence, contributory negligence, and damages were submitted. The jury answered the negligence issue \u201cyes\u201d and the contributory negligence issue \u201cyes.\u201d The court accordingly adjudged that plaintiff recover nothing and pay the costs. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, assigning errors in the charge. That court found no error, 9 N.C. App. 39, 175 S.E. 2d 368 (1970), and we allowed certiorari, 277 N.C. 117.\nSmith, Leach, Anderson and Dor sett, and Hollow ell and Ragsdale, by William L. Ragsdale, for the plaintiff appellant.\nTeague, Johnson, Patterson, Dilthey and Clay by Ronald C. Dilthey, for the defendant appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0337-01",
  "first_page_order": 357,
  "last_page_order": 361
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