{ "id": 8565057, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. FRANKLIN VANCE", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Vance", "decision_date": "1970-11-18", "docket_number": "No. 52", "first_page": "345", "last_page": "348", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "277 N.C. 345" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "96 S.E. 2d 842", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 N.C. 610", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8616120 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/245/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 S.E. 2d 789", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "243 N.C. 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621521 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/243/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 S.E. 2d 921", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "230 N.C. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629354 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/230/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 S.E. 2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 N.C. 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8613571 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/233/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 S.E. 105", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 N.C. 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630522 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/206/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 S.E. 2d 465", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "256 N.C. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572156 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/256/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 S.E. 2d 844", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 N.C. 716", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625810 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/234/0716-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 S.E. 2d 175", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "256 N.C. 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573532 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/256/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 S.E. 17", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "187 N.C. 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8654132 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/187/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 S.E. 848", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "190 N.C. 810", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8615200 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/190/0810-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 S.E. 2d 769", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 N.C. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624570 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/254/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 S.E. 2d 708", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 N.C. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570227 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/263/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 S.E. 894", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 N.C. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8653842 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/186/0446-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 437, "char_count": 8316, "ocr_confidence": 0.55, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3893882951758159e-07, "percentile": 0.6424322421886373 }, "sha256": "caa39776dbe31ad94a689e2baea20731e624aa6c13ac4458a7f27773df829106", "simhash": "1:c749913736487493", "word_count": 1443 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:02:40.568981+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. FRANKLIN VANCE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRANCH, Justice.\nDefendant assigns as error the instructions of the trial judge concerning the defendant\u2019s wife\u2019s testimony as an interested witness. In this connection, the trial judge charged:\n\u201cThis defendant\u2019s wife testified in the case. The court charges you that she is an interested witness; that she is interested in the outcome of your verdict. And so the court charges you that you should scrutinize and look carefully into her testimony. But that if after you have looked carefully into and scrutinized her testimony, you believe she is telling the truth about the matter, then you would give the same weight and the same belief to her testimony that you would to that of any disinterested witness who may have testified.\u201d\nThis assignment of error is without merit. Similar charges have been approved in State v. Barnhill, 186 N.C. 446, 119 S.E. 894; State v. Morgan, 263 N.C. 400, 139 S.E. 2d 708; State v. Faust, 254 N.C. 101, 118 S.E. 2d 769. Neither was there prejudicial error in the trial court\u2019s failure to give a similar instruction as to possibly interested State\u2019s witnesses since defendant did not request such instruction on this subordinate feature of the trial. State v. Sauls, 190 N.C. 810, 130 S.E. 848.\nDefendant assigns as error the failure of the trial judge to correctly instruct the jury on his defense of alibi.\nDefendant\u2019s evidence of alibi relates to a substantive feature of the case, so without tendering a special prayer he was entitled to an instruction as to the legal effect of his evidence, if it should be accepted by the jury. State v. Melton, 187 N.C. 481, 122 S.E. 17; State v. Spencer, 256 N.C. 487, 124 S.E. 2d 175.\nThe sole reference to defendant\u2019s chief defense of alibi in the trial judge\u2019s instructions to the jury was the following:\n\u201cNow the defendant, on the other hand, says and contends that he wasn\u2019t there at all; that there has been a mistake about this thing; that he was somewhere else. He pleads what is sometimes called in law an alibi, which has sometimes been interpreted to mean being somewhere else at the time so that it would have been impossible for him to have been the person or to have committed the crime that was charged. He says and contends that he has accounted to you here in the evidence for his whereabouts at the time that he is accused of having been in this house. He says that his activities were accounted for from about 11 o\u2019clock that night and for the remainder of the night by different persons that saw him at different places and by his wife. So he says and contends, members of the jury, that you ought to return a verdict of not guilty.\u201d\nIn State v. Spencer, supra, the court\u2019s charge as to defendants\u2019 defense of alibi consisted of a statement to the effect that defendants contended they were not present when the crime was committed. This Court, holding the charge to be erroneous, stated:\n\u201cDefendants were entitled to a charge on alibi substantially as follows: \u2018An accused, who relies on an alibi, does not have the burden of proving it. It is incumbent upon the State to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt on the whole evidence that such accused is guilty. If the evidence of alibi, in connection with all the other testimony in the case, leaves the jury with a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, the State fails to carry the burden of proof imposed upon it by law, and the accused is entitled to an acquittal.\u2019 S. v. Minton, 234 N.C. 716, 68 S.E. 2d 844. See S. v. Allison, 256 N.C. 240, 123 S.E. 2d 465, as to charge on alibi.\u201d (Emphasis supplied.)\nThe State contends that the charge on the defense of alibi is adequate when the entire charge is contextually interpreted. True, in other portions of the charge the court, without relating the charge to the defense of alibi, placed the burden of proof upon the State to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt.\nIn no place in the charge was the jury told that defendant did not have the burden of proving the defense of alibi.\nThe doctrine of contextual interpretation of a charge has been applied in proving inexact charges on alibi (State v. Sheffield, 206 N.C. 374, 174 S.E. 105, State v. Bridgers, 233 N.C. 577, 64 S.E. 2d 867), but only in cases where the court \u201cexpressly or substantially states that the burden of proving an alibi does not rest on the defendant.\u201d State v. Allison, 256 N.C. 240, 123 S.E. 2d 465. Here, the trial judge, in effect, only stated defendant\u2019s contention that he was not present at the time the crime was committed, without applying the law to the defendant\u2019s contention in any manner.\nFailure to adequately charge on defendant\u2019s defense of alibi resulted in prejudicial error. State v. Spencer, supra; State v. Melton, supra; State v. Sutton, 230 N.C. 244, 52 S.E. 2d 921.\nAlthough defendant did not raise the point, we think it proper to observe that the trial judge in this capital case failed to instruct the jury as to the legal effect of a verdict of guilty of rape with recommendation of life imprisonment, which requires the court to pronounce a judgment of life imprisonment. Failure to so instruct is error. G.S. 14-17; State v. Carter, 243 N.C. 106, 89 S.E. 2d 789; State v. Cook, 245 N.C. 610, 96 S.E. 2d 842.\nBecause of prejudicial error in the charge there must be a new trial.\nNew trial.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRANCH, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Morgan and Staff Attorney Jacobs for the State.", "Phin Horton, Jr., and Harold R. Wilson for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. FRANKLIN VANCE\nNo. 52\n(Filed 18 November 1970)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 117\u2014 wife as interested witness \u2014 instructions\nInstructions as to how the jury should consider the testimony of defendant\u2019s wife as an interested witness held without error.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 117\u2014 instructions on testimony of interested witnesses\nFailure of the trial court to instruct the jury as to how they should consider the testimony of possibly interested State\u2019s witnesses was not prejudicial where defendant did not request such instruction on this subordinate feature of the trial.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 113\u2014 evidence of alibi \u2014 instructions\nDefendant\u2019s evidence of alibi relates to a substantive feature of the case, and he is entitled to an instruction as to the legal effect of his evidence without the necessity of tendering a special prayer therefor.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 113\u2014 instructions on alibi \u2014 prejudicial error\nA charge that referred to defendant\u2019s defense of alibi only in the statement of defendant\u2019s contentions and that failed to apply the law to the evidence of alibi, held reversible error.\n5. Rape \u00a7 6; Criminal Law \u00a7 120\u2014 instruction on guilty verdict with recommendation of mercy\nFailure of the trial court in a rape prosecution to instruct the jury that a guilty verdict with recommendation of life imprisonment requires the court to pronounce a judgment of life imprisonment held erroneous. G.S. 14-17.\nAppeal by defendant from Crissman, J., 11 May 1970 Criminal Session Forsyth Superior Court.\nDefendant was tried upon a bill of indictment charging him with the capital crime of rape of Janice L. Jones.\nThe State offered evidence of the prosecuting witness, Janice L. Jones, which tended to show that she was thirteen years old and lived in an apartment in Winston-Salem with her mother, two brothers, aged four years and fourteen months, respectively, and a cousin aged four years. On the morning of 4 April 1970, at about 2:10 to 2:15 o\u2019clock a.m., her mother left to pick up a friend at Reynolds Tobacco Company. Immediately thereafter, defendant came to the apartment and by force and against her will had sexual intercourse with her. He left the apartment at about 3:15 a.m. The State offered other witnesses to corroborate prosecuting witness.\nDefendant offered testimony of several witnesses, including his wife, which tended to show that on the night of 3 April 1970 and the morning of 4 April 1970, defendant attended a party at the home of one Saluda Rennick. He remained there until approximately 1:45 a.m., and arrived at his home at approximately 2:15 a.m. His wife testified that he awakened her at about 2:15 and that he was still in bed when she left for work at 5:00 o\u2019clock a.m.\nThe jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged in the bill of indictment. Defendant appealed from the sentence of death pronounced on the verdict.\nAttorney General Morgan and Staff Attorney Jacobs for the State.\nPhin Horton, Jr., and Harold R. Wilson for defendant." }, "file_name": "0345-01", "first_page_order": 365, "last_page_order": 368 }