{
  "id": 8569610,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIE EDWARD MOORE",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Moore",
  "decision_date": "1971-10-13",
  "docket_number": "No. 71",
  "first_page": "455",
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    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:36:58.436463+00:00",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIE EDWARD MOORE"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "BOBBITT, Chief Justice.\nDefendant assigns as error the denial of his motion under G.S. 15-173 for judgment as of nonsuit.\nLowery\u2019s testimony includes a statement that he \u201cwas not scared or in fear of (his) life.\u201d Defendant contends Lowery\u2019s asserted absence of fear of his life negates the guilt of defendant in respect of the crime charged in the indictment. We hold this contention is without merit.\nRobbery at common law is the felonious taking of money or goods of any value from the person of another, or in his presence, against his will, by violence or putting him in fear. State v. Lawrence, 262 N.C. 162, 163, 136 S.E. 2d 595, 596-597 (1964), and cases cited. It is not necessary to prove both violence and putting in fear \u2014 proof of either is sufficient. State v. Sawyer, 224 N.C. 61, 65, 29 S.E. 2d 34, 37 (1944), and cases cited.\nLowery testified the money was taken by defendant from his person without his consent and against his will; that defendant reached into Lowery\u2019s pocket with his left hand and took his money; and that defendant was holding an opened knife in his right hand. Since this testimony indicates that the money was taken forcibly from Lowery\u2019s person, it would have supported a conviction of guilty of common-law robbery entirely without reference to whether Lowery perceived danger to himself.\nWe note (1) that the word \u201cfear\u201d as used in the phrase, \u201cputting him in fear,\u201d in the definition of common-law robbery is not confined to fear of death; and (2) that the use or threatened use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon is not an essential of common-law robbery.\nThe indictment is based on G.S. 14-87, which provides:\n\u201cAny person or persons who, having in possession or with the use or threatened use of any firearms or other dangerous weapon, implement or means, whereby the life of a person is endangered or threatened, unlawfully takes or attempts to take personal property from another or from any place of business, residence or banking institution or any other place where there is a person or persons in attendance, at any time, either day or night, or who aids or abets any such person or persons in the commission of such crime, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than five nor more than thirty years.\u201d\nG.S. 14-87 bears the caption \u201cRobbery with firearms or other dangerous weapons\u201d and defines explicitly the essentials of the crime created thereby. With reference to the evidence in this case, the essentials consisted of the unlawful taking or attempt to take personal property from Lowery; the possession, use or threatened use of \u201cfirearms or other dangerous weapon, implement or means\u201d; and danger or threat to the life of Lowery. State v. Covington, 273 N.C. 690, 699-700, 161 S.E. 2d 140, 147 (1968).\nWith reference to nonsuit, the determinative question is whether there was evidence sufficient to support a jury finding that Lowery\u2019s life was in fact endangered or threatened by defendant\u2019s possession, use or threatened use of the opened knife, not whether Lowery was \u201cscared or in fear of (his) life.\u201d The jury might infer that one who engages in the perpetration of a robbery by means of an opened knife intends to use the knife to inflict injury to the extent necessary or apparently necessary to accomplish his purpose. The verbal threat and the assault (from which Lowery was .protected by the glass door) are indicative of defendant\u2019s resolution to use the knife to inflict injury. It may be inferred that the threat of use and actual use of the knife constituted a danger to Lowery\u2019s life which was averted by his agility, the protecting glass door and his escape.\nThe record contains no description of the knife exhibited and used by defendant. In State v. Norris, 264 N.C. 470, 473, 141 S.E. 2d 869, 872 (1965), it was held that evidence of the defendant\u2019s pointing of a pocketknife with opened blade at his victim was sufficient under the circumstances of that case to support a finding that the pocketknife was a dangerous weapon within the meaning of G.S. 14-87.\nOn motion for judgment as of nonsuit, the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference therefrom. State v. Vincent, 278 N.C. 63, 64-65, 178 S.E. 2d 608, 609 (1971), and cases cited. When tested by this well-established rule, the evidence was ample to require submission to the jury and to support a verdict of guilty as charged.\nThe evidence tends to show that both the verbal threat made by defendant and his actual use of the knife in an attempt to stab Lowery occurred immediately after defendant had obtained the money from Lowery\u2019s pocket and while defendant was engaged in an attempt to rob him of his billfold. Seemingly, defendant contends this evidence is irrelevant since the bill of indictment contains no reference to the billfold. It is unnecessary to consider whether defendant could be found guilty under this bill of indictment of attempted robbery of Lowery\u2019s billfold. The events referred to in the evidence occurred quickly as parts of a single transaction and all facets of the evidence were for consideration in determining whether defendant was guilty of the specific charge for which he was indicted, namely, robbing Lowery of $1.39.\nDefendant\u2019s only other assignment of error relates to the denial of his motion to set aside the verdict as being against the weight of the evidence and for a new trial. This motion was addressed to the trial court\u2019s discretion and was without merit.\nIt is noted that the court\u2019s charge was not brought forward in the record. Therefore, it is presumed that the jury was charged correctly as to the law arising upon the evidence as required by G.S. 1-180. State v. Cooper, 273 N.C. 51, 58, 159 S.E. 2d 305, 310 (1968); 3 Strong, N. C. Index 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7 158 (1967). Moreover, the record contains a stipulation \u201cthat the court\u2019s instructions to the jury are free of error.\u201d\nNo error.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "BOBBITT, Chief Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Morgan, Assistant Attorney General Eagles and Staff Attorney Walker for the State.",
      "Richard H. Robertson for defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIE EDWARD MOORE\nNo. 71\n(Filed 13 October 1971)\n1. Robbery \u00a7 1\u2014 elements of common law robbery\nRobbery at common law is the felonious taking of money or goods of any value from the person of another, or in his presence, against his will, by violence or putting him in fear; it is not necessary to prove both violence and putting in fear, proof of either being sufficient.\n2. Robbery \u00a7 4\u2014 armed robbery \u2014 sufficiency of evidence \u2014 victim\u2019s life endangered or threatened\nThe State\u2019s evidence was sufficient to be submitted to the jury in this prosecution for armed robbery where it tended to show that defendant demanded the victim\u2019s money and removed $1.39 from the victim\u2019s pocket with his left hand while holding an opened knife in his right hand, that defendant threatened to cut off the victim\u2019s head if he didn\u2019t surrender his billfold, that defendant struck at the victim with his knife but hit the window of the victim\u2019s truck, and that the victim then escaped from defendant, notwithstanding the victim testified that he \u201cwas not scared or in fear of (his) life,\u201d since the evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding that the victim\u2019s life was in fact endangered or threatened by defendant\u2019s possession, use or threatened use of the opened knife.\n3. Robbery \u00a7 3\u2014 armed robbery \u2014 threats and attempted stabbing after money was taken \u2014. competency\nIn this trial upon an indictment charging defendant with an armed robbery of $1.39, evidence that after defendant had taken the $1.39 he threatened to cut off the victim\u2019s head unless the victim surrendered his billfold and that he attempted to stab the victim was competent, since the events referred to in the evidence occurred as part of a single transaction.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 132\u2014 motion to set aside verdict\nMotion to set aside the verdict as being against the weight of the evidence was addressed to the trial court\u2019s discretion.\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 158\u2014 failure to include charge in record \u2014 presumption\nWhere the court\u2019s charge was not brought forward in the record, it is presumed that the jury was charged correctly as to the law arising upon the evidence as required by G.S. 1-180.\nAppeal by defendant from McLean, J., at February 1, 1971 Schedule \u201cA\u201d Criminal Session of Mecklenburg Superior Court, transferred for initial appellate review by the Supreme Court under general order of July 31, 1970, entered pursuant to G.S. 7A-31 (b) (4).\nDefendant was indicted for the armed robbery of Grover C. Lowery with a deadly weapon, namely, a knife, in violation of G.S. 14-87, the amount taken being $1.39.\nThe only evidence was that offered by the State. It tends to show the facts, summarized except where quoted, narrated below.\nOn July 14, 1970, between 7:15 and 7:25 a.m., Grover Coleman Lowery (Lowery), a driver of a Waldensian Bakery truck, was parked across Caldwell Street in Charlotte, North Carolina, from a grocery store, waiting for the store to open so he could make a delivery. He had been waiting a very few minutes' when defendant crossed Caldwell Street, walked up to the side of the truck, and said, \u201cMan, I want your money.\u201d Defendant reached into Lowery\u2019s pocket and removed what Lowery \u201clater learned (to be) $1.39.\u201d As he was reaching into Lowery\u2019s pocket with his left hand, defendant had an opened knife in his right hand. Defendant said, \u201cMan, I want your billfold.\u201d When Lowery stated that he did not have a billfold, defendant said, \u201cI\u2019ll cut your God damn head off if you don\u2019t give it to me.\u201d Lowery had \u201cone foot on the bottom step of the van and the other one up.\u201d As Lowery began \u201cto pull the door to a little bit,\u201d defendant \u201cdrew that knife back and struck but he hit the glass with the knife,\u201d the glass being right beside Lowery. Lowery managed to knock the truck out of gear. It rolled down the incline (street). Then, after driving a few blocks, Lowery located W. T. Thompson (Thompson), a Charlotte Police Officer, and reported the robbery. Thompson followed Lowery back to the scene. They observed a group of four or five persons on the sidewalk on Seventh Street, approximately 50 feet west of Caldwell Street and approximately 250 feet from the grocery store. Lowery identified defendant as the man who had robbed him. Thompson found two $1.00 bills balled up in defendant\u2019s fist, which defendant had drawn behind him on Thompson\u2019s approach. A frisk of defendant disclosed that \u201che had a knife in his right front pocket with the blade open.\u201d Later, at the police station, Thompson found two nickels and four pennies in defendant\u2019s possession.\nThe jury found defendant guilty of armed robbery as charged in the indictment. Thereupon, the court pronounced judgment that defendant be confined in the State\u2019s prison for the term of 25 years. It was ordered that this sentence commence at the expiration of a sentence imposed by Judge Bailey at the May 8, 1967 Regular \u201cB\u201d Session of Mecklenburg Superior Court in Case No. 49-288.\nDefendant excepted and appealed.\nAttorney General Morgan, Assistant Attorney General Eagles and Staff Attorney Walker for the State.\nRichard H. Robertson for defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0455-01",
  "first_page_order": 483,
  "last_page_order": 488
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