{ "id": 8570109, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT WILLIAMS, JR.", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Williams", "decision_date": "1971-12-15", "docket_number": "No. 134", "first_page": "132", "last_page": "137", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "280 N.C. 132" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "181 S.E. 2d 423", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 58", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565626 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "35 S.E. 2d 621", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 N.C. 549", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8613110 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/225/0549-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 S.E. 2d 174", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "256 N.C. 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573589 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/256/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 S.E. 2d 484", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 N.C. 20", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12164507 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/229/0020-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 S.E. 2d 352", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 N.C. 722", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8613378 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/224/0722-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 S.E. 2d 305", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574394 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 S.E. 2d 127", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129-130" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 N.C. 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565233 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/271/0521-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 S.E. 2d 337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 N.C. 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574153 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "515" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/264/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 S.E. 2d 171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "253 N.C. 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8622143 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/253/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 S.E. 2d 83", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 N.C. 637", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8620349 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/249/0637-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 S.E. 2d 918", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8614001 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 S.E. 2d 322", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8610424 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 S.E. 2d 560", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 N.C. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559380 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/274/0062-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 585, "char_count": 11081, "ocr_confidence": 0.562, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.883548288533603e-07, "percentile": 0.9333513266603575 }, "sha256": "6a80c923b29145069d99dc384666444ad912d1fd80f35e1679349e5921186e12", "simhash": "1:970f9972f75b789e", "word_count": 1868 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:17:02.302234+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT WILLIAMS, JR." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRANCH, Justice.\nAll of defendant\u2019s assignments of error are directed to the charge.\nDefendant contends that the court erred in instructing the jury as to second degree murder and manslaughter. In this connection, the trial judge instructed the jury:\nThere is no evidence of malice in this case other than the presumption if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant intentionally inflicted the wound upon the deceased, Mr. Stroud, as he has been referred to here in the Bill of Indictment. Then, if you so find, that it proximally resulted, there is from no other cause, the death of Mr. Stroud, that the wound was intentionally inflicted by the Defendant, that raises the presumption that he is guilty of murder in the second degree.\nThe correct rule concerning the presumptions which arise in a homicide case are found in State v. Propst, 274 N.C. 62, 161 S.E. 2d 560. There the Court stated:\nIf and when the State satisfied the jury from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally shot Taylor with a .38 pistol and thereby proximately caused Taylor\u2019s death, two presumptions arose: (1) that the killing was unlawful, and (2) that it was done with malice. Nothing else appearing, the defendant would be guilty of murder in the second degree. State v. Gordon, 241 N.C. 356, 85 S.E. 2d 322; State v. Adams, 241 N.C. 559, 85 S.E. 2d 918; State v. Wagoner, 249 N.C. 637, 107 S.E. 2d 83; State v. Revis, 253 N.C. 50, 116 S.E. 2d 171; State v. Phillips, 264 N.C. 508, 515, 142 S.E. 2d 337, 340; State v. Price, 271 N.C. 521, 525, 157 S.E. 2d 127, 129-130; State v. Cooper, 273 N.C. 51, 57, 159 S.E. 2d 305, 309.\nHere the charge does not mention the intentional use of a deadly weapon. Nor are the presumptions which arise from the intentional use of a deadly weapon correctly stated. Further, nothing appears in this part of the charge which indicates that the presumption of malice might be rebutted. Thus, even a cursory examination of this portion of the charge reveals that it does not comply with the rule as correctly stated in State v. Propst, supra.\nThe court thereafter charged:\nNow, manslaughter, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, as I have told you before, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Mr. Williams, intentionally inflicted the wound in the chest of the deceased, Jerry Stroud, and that it proximally resulted in death of Mr. Stroud, then he would be presumed to be guilty of murder in the second degree; . . .\nThe court set out to charge on manslaughter, but proceeded to give a definition of murder in the second degree.\nAgain, in discussing distinctions in homicides, the record shows:\n[The presence in one case of premeditation and deliberation and the absence of the other, or one or both of these elements is the distinction different between murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree.]\nTo the above portion of the charge as set out in brackets, the Defendant excepts. Defendant\u2019s Exception No. 4.\n[The presence of the one and the absence of the other element of malice is the distinction between murder in the second degree and manslaughter.]\nThe chief purpose of a charge is to give a clear instruction which applies the law to the evidence in such manner as to assist the jury in understanding the case and in reaching a correct verdict. State v. Biggs, 224 N.C. 722, 32 S.E. 2d 352; Lewis v. Watson, 229 N.C. 20, 47 S.E. 2d 484.\nDefendant further contends that the trial judge expressed opinions to the jury. In support of this contention defendant cites portions of the record which show the following:\nCriminal negligence is more than carelessness1. The Defendant\u2019s act of criminal negligence, if it was done, was with recklessness or carelessness and showed a thoughtless disregard for consequences or heedless indifference for the safety and rights of others. That would be what is known in law as culpable negligence or criminal negligence .... and the State of course will further prove to you in both murder in the second degree and manslaughter that Jerry Stroud\u2019s death was a natural and probable result of the Defendant\u2019s act.\nDefendant correctly contends that this portion of the charge amounted to a statement of opinion that, if the stabbing was done, an act of criminal negligence had been committed by defendant.\nIn that connection, you are instructed, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the State of North Carolina has satisfied you beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant, Mr. Robert Williams, Jr., unlawfully, willfully and feloniously, in a criminal and negligent way and the act was criminally negligent, reckless, and careless and showed total disregard for consequences or heedless indifference to the safety and rights of others and such act was done with a deadly weapon, as that term has been described to you, and you are further satisfied from the evidence that the deceased, Mr. Stroud\u2019s death was a natural and probable result of the Defendant\u2019s act, it would be your duty to return a verdict of involuntary manslaughter.\nThis part of the court\u2019s instructions omitted the single word \u201cif.\u201d Undoubtedly this was an inadvertent omission. It resulted, however, in an expression of opinion by the court that the State had already shown that defendant\u2019s act was criminally negligent.\nIn the case of State v. Kea, 256 N.C. 492, 124 S.E. 2d 174, the trial judge charged \u201cManslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice . . . .\u201d It was apparent that the trial judge intended to charge that \u201cManslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice.\u201d There the trial court in other places correctly charged as to this element of manslaughter ; nevertheless, this Court held that such charge resulted in prejudicial error.\nIt is clear that some of the errors in this charge resulted from lapsus linguae on the part of the trial judge; however, in all fairness to this experienced trial judge, we feel compelled to observe that it is also apparant that many of the errors of omission and commission resulted from the taking and transcription of the record.\nThis Court, however, is bound by the record as certified and can judicially know only what appears of record. State v. Morgan, 225 N.C. 549, 35 S.E. 2d 621; State v. Winford, 279 N.C. 58, 181 S.E. 2d 423.\nWe seriously doubt that any part of the charge as challenged by any one assignment of error would constitute prejudicial error; however, without attempting to discuss all assignments of error, we conclude that the total charge failed to clarify the material issues so as to aid the jury in reaching a verdict.\nFor reasons stated, there must be a\nNew trial.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRANCH, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Morgan and Assistant Attorney General Banks for the State.", "Winston, Coleman and Bernholz, by Barry T. Winston, for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT WILLIAMS, JR.\nNo. 134\n(Filed 15 December 1971)\n1. Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 23, 24\u2014 instructions on presumptions arising in a homicide case \u2014 expression of opinion\nThe instructions in a homicide prosecution, when considered in their totality, warranted a new trial for the following errors: (1) the trial court, in purporting to charge on the presumptions arising from the intentional use of a deadly weapon, failed to mention the intentional use of a deadly weapon; (2) the charge failed to indicate that the presumption of malice might be rebutted; (3) the trial court set out to charge on manslaughter but ended up by defining murder in the second degree; (4) the court, by inadvertently omitting the word \u201cif,\u201d stated as a proven fact that the State had established the defendant\u2019s criminal negligence in stabbing the homicide victim.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 111\u2014 purpose of the charge\nThe chief purpose of a charge is to give a clear instruction which applies the law to the evidence in such manner as to assist the jury in understanding the case and in reaching a correct verdict.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 158\u2014 conclusiveness of certified record\nThe Supreme Court is bound by the record as certified and can judicially know only what appears of record.\nAppeal by defendant from Bickett, J., 26 April 1971 Session of Orange Superior Court.\nDefendant was charged by bill of indictment with murder. The State elected to seek a verdict of guilty of second degree murder or manslaughter.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tends to show the following:\nWilliam Aaron Crutchfield testified that he, Jerry Stroud (also known as Jerry Thompson), Rachel Davis, Alonzo Jennings, and defendant were in the parking lot in front of Mason\u2019s Grill and Grocery Store in Chapel Hill just before noon on 23 January 1971. While they were engaged in a conversation about purchasing some wine, defendant and Stroud began to talk in a loud manner. Officer Farrow of the Chapel Hill Police Department stopped and cautioned them about the excessive noise. Shortly after Officer Farrow drove off, defendant and Stroud began wrestling. After wrestling for a short time, defendant pulled out a knife. Stroud told defendant to quit playing with the knife. Then Stroud threw defendant to the ground. Defendant, still holding the knife, got up and moved towards Stroud, who raised both his hands above his head. Defendant walked up and \u201cgigged\u201d Stroud one time in the chest. Stroud said, \u201cYou cut me,\u201d and pulled out his knife. Stroud did not have a weapon of any sort in his hands before this. Stroud opened his knife and stepped towards defendant. Stroud stopped and closed his knife. By this time he was bleeding profusely from the wound in his chest.\nCrutchfield, an employee of North Carolina Memorial Hospital, walked around defendant to Stroud and offered to take him to the hospital. Stroud collapsed on the way to Crutchfield\u2019s car. Crutchfield\u2019s efforts to revive Stroud were futile. While Crutchfield was assisting Stroud, defendant walked behind them, saying, \u201cI didn\u2019t stab you.\u201d Defendant was the only one who could have inflicted the fatal wound.\nDr. David K. Wiecking testified that deceased died from a single stab wound which pierced his heart and caused a severe hemorrhage.\nThe State offered other witnesses whose testimony tended to corroborate the witness Aaron Crutchfield.\nDefendant testified that he and Stroud were playing around and wrestling; and that both he and Stroud pulled out knives. Defendant slipped to the ground after grabbing Stroud. As defendant got up an old lady walked by and said, \u201cFellows, quit playing before one of you gets hurt.\u201d They quit playing and both closed their knives. As defendant was walking off, the old lady said, \u201cThe boy has been stabbed.\u201d Defendant turned around and replied, \u201cJerry, I wouldn\u2019t stab you for nothing in the world.\u201d Defendant ran home. He voluntarily surrendered to the police after talking with his father.\nThe jury returned a verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Defendant appealed from judgment imposing prison sentence of seven to ten years.\nThis case is transferred for initial appellate review by the Supreme Court under an order made pursuant to G.S. 7A-31(b)(4).\nAttorney General Morgan and Assistant Attorney General Banks for the State.\nWinston, Coleman and Bernholz, by Barry T. Winston, for defendant." }, "file_name": "0132-01", "first_page_order": 152, "last_page_order": 157 }