{ "id": 8572631, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TOMMIE CRUMP", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Crump", "decision_date": "1972-02-09", "docket_number": "No. 84", "first_page": "491", "last_page": "494", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "280 N.C. 491" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "184 S.E. 2d 845", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569578 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 S.E. 2d 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559611 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 S.E. 2d 364", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "260 N.C. 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573304 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/260/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 S.E. 2d 423", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 58", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565626 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 S.E. 2d 487", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 598", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563091 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0598-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 492, "char_count": 8204, "ocr_confidence": 0.545, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8919180214436267e-07, "percentile": 0.7290955959208433 }, "sha256": "d828459b6120d4754eaf2c08e58a5c775e76d063014cdf214ac776fafd02caed", "simhash": "1:c672c06076416e3e", "word_count": 1383 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:17:02.302234+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TOMMIE CRUMP" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUSKINS, Justice.\nMrs. Andrews was allowed to testify over objection: \u201cI had never seen the boys before, but anyway in the conversation, they asked Michael, one of them, I don\u2019t know which, \u2014 if he had any jumping cables and would help them start their car. I told Michael it was too near time to close and he had too much work to do to leave.\u201d At another point in her testimony, she said over objection: \u201cI don\u2019t know which one said it . . . but one said, \u2018Michael, can you take your car?\u2019 \u201d Defendant\u2019s first assignment of error is predicated on the admission of this evidence. He contends it was incompetent \u201cabsent a finding of conspiracy.\u201d\nThe evidence shows that this defendant and Edward Scott were jointly engaged on an illegal mission. They were acting in unison in furtherance of a common design. The evidence gives rise to the permissible inference that they had conspired together to rob Mrs. Andrews and the kidnapping of Michael Penland was necessary to accomplish that objective \u2014 they needed transportation. Therefore, statements made in furtherance of the common design, whether by the defendant or his partner in crime, are competent. State v. Sanders, 276 N.C. 598, 174 S.E. 2d 487 (1970). Moreover, the evidence objected to was relevant on the question of identity since it placed the kidnappers and their victim together at the time and place in question. \u201cAny evidence which is relevant to the trial of a criminal action is admissible.\u201d State v. Winford, 279 N.C. 58, 181 S.E. 2d 423 (1971). Furthermore, Michael Penland testified substantially to the same effect without objection, and the admission of this evidence from Mrs. Andrews was largely cumulative and could not have changed the result of the trial. An appellant must show that evidence alleged to be erroneous was prejudicial and that a different result but for the error would have likely ensued. State v. Woolard, 260 N.C. 133, 132 S.E. 2d 364 (1963); State v. Sanders, supra. We hold the evidence was competent. Had it been incompetent, its admission would have been entirely harmless. Stansbury, North Carolina Evidence (2d Ed.) \u00a7 9.\nIncluded as part of defendant\u2019s first assignment of error is the following question propounded to Michael Penland on direct examination and his answer thereto over objection:\n\u201cQ. Did you tell DeBois Edmundson whether or not you could recognize the two men who had been in your car during the course of that night?\n\u201cA. Yes, sir.\u201d\nDefendant contends such testimony violates the hearsay rule and the best evidence rule. Michael Penland\u2019s testimony as to what he told Officer Edmundson is the best evidence, and the officer\u2019s testimony would have been competent only to corroborate what the victim told him. Furthermore, the testimony is not hearsay. Its probative force does not depend upon the competency and credibility of any person other than the witness himself. Hence it cannot be classified as hearsay. Stansbury, North Carolina Evidence (2d Ed.), Hearsay, \u00a7 138. We find no merit in any of the three exceptions upon which the first assignment of error is based.\nDefendant\u2019s remaining assignments are formal and require no discussion. The uncontradicted evidence proves kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt, State v. Ingland, 278 N.C. 42, 178 S.E. 2d 577 (1971); State v. Murphy, 280 N.C. 1, 184 S.E. 2d 845 (1971), and supports the verdict and judgment. The only error appearing in this record was committed by the defendant and his partner in crime when they embarked upon their unlawful mission which culminated in the kidnapping of Michael Penland.\nIn the trial below we find\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUSKINS, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Redden, Redden & Redden, by Monroe M. Redden, Attorneys for defendant appellant.", "Robert Morgan, Attorney General, and Donald A. Davis, Staff Attorney, for the State of North Carolina." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TOMMIE CRUMP\nNo. 84\n(Filed 9 February 1972)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 68, 79; Kidnapping \u00a7 1 \u2014 statements in furtherance of common design \u2014 competency against all defendants \u2014 testimony placing kidnappers and victim together\nIn this kidnapping prosecution, testimony that one of the defendants asked the victim \u201cif he had any jumping cables and would help start their car,\u201d and also asked the victim if he could take his car, held competent against both defendants, notwithstanding the witness testified that she did not know which defendant made the statements, since defendants were jointly engaged in an illegal mission and the statements were made in furtherance of a common design, and since the testimony was relevant on the question of identity in that it placed the kidnappers and their victim together at the time and place in question.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 73, 81 \u2014 hearsay evidence \u2014 best evidence rule\nTestimony by a kidnap victim that he had told a police officer that he could recognize the kidnappers was not hearsay and did not violate the best evidence rule.\n3. Kidnapping \u00a7 1 \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe State\u2019s evidence supports the jury\u2019s verdict finding the defendant guilty of kidnapping and judgment pronounced thereon.\nDefendant appeals from Thornburg, J3 May 1971 Session, Henderson Superior Court. This case was docketed as No. 152 and argued at the Fall Term 1971.\nDefendant was tried on a hill of indictment, proper in form, charging him with kidnapping Michael Penland on 19 April 1971.\nThe State\u2019s evidence \u2014 defendant offered none \u2014 tends to show that Michael Penland was employed in a grocery store in Hendersonville, owned and operated by Mrs. Helen Andrews. On 19 April 1971 at 10:40 p.m., Tommie Crump and Edward Scott went to the grocery store and inquired about a jumper cable to start their car. Michael Penland agreed to assist them and, when the store closed at 11 p.m., they got in his1 car and the three left together. Tommie Crump stuck a pistol in Michael\u2019s ribs and told him to follow Mrs. Andrews, the owner of the store who had just driven away. They asked Michael \u201cif she had the money.\u201d Michael told them it wouldn\u2019t do any good because Mrs. Andrews had locked the money in the safe. The defendant and Edward Scott then abandoned the idea of following her and told Michael to take them down the road to their car. Michael followed orders and eventually discovered they had no car and that their story about a dead battery was false. Defendant continued to hold the pistol on Michael, and he drove up and down various streets as directed, eventually arriving at a dirt road where Crump told him to stop the car and open the trunk. When he did so, defendant told him to get in the trunk and fired the pistol into the weeds to demonstrate the gun was real. When Michael pleaded with him, defendant changed his mind, put Michael in the front seat on the passenger side, and Edward Scott drove Michael\u2019s car from that point. Eventually, under orders of defendant, Michael resumed the driving duties. Defendant and Edward Scott told him they were going to rob a service station, and Michael drove them to a Shell station on the Chimney Rock Highway. Discovering people about the station, they did not stop but drove back toward Henderson-ville, and defendant ordered Michael to drive him to Asheville. He still had the gun in his hand. They drove to Fletcher and defendant then ordered Penland to take him back to the Skyline Drive-In at Hendersonville. They .sat in the car at the drive-in about three minutes and then drove to a wooded area near Boyd\u2019s Pontiac place where defendant and Edward Scott got out of the car. Michael went directly to Mrs. Andrews\u2019 house and told her what had occurred.\nPenland testified that he drove his car to all the places enumerated because defendant was holding a gun on him and he was afraid.\nThis case was consolidated by consent with the case against Edward Scott who was also charged with kidnapping. The jury convicted both defendants. Edward Scott did not appeal, and the judgment as to him is not in the record. Defendant Crump was sentenced to State Prison for a period of fifteen years and appealed to the Court of Appeals at State expense and with appointed counsel. The case was transferred to the Supreme Court for initial appellate review under our general referral order dated 31 July 1970.\nRedden, Redden & Redden, by Monroe M. Redden, Attorneys for defendant appellant.\nRobert Morgan, Attorney General, and Donald A. Davis, Staff Attorney, for the State of North Carolina." }, "file_name": "0491-01", "first_page_order": 511, "last_page_order": 514 }