{ "id": 8573751, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DONNIE L. FORD, Alias RONALD FORD", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Ford", "decision_date": "1972-04-12", "docket_number": "No. 50", "first_page": "62", "last_page": "70", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "281 N.C. 62" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 328", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "13 N.C. App. 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549944 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/13/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 S.E. 2d 923", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "926" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560062 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 A.L.R. 2d 549", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 L.Ed. 2d 1025", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 S.E. 2d 669", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569883 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 S.E. 2d 647", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570082 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 U.S. 459", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6174781 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/394/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 N.C.L. Rev. 352", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "N.C. L. Rev.", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "380 U.S. 400", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1525264 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/380/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 U.S. 145", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1767723 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/391/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6164855 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/378/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 S.Ct. 200", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 L.Ed. 2d 93", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "393 U.S. 820", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11324384, 11324425, 11324530, 11324310, 11324214, 11324472 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/393/0820-03", "/us/393/0820-04", "/us/393/0820-06", "/us/393/0820-02", "/us/393/0820-01", "/us/393/0820-05" ] }, { "cite": "207 So. 2d 412", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2593457 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ala/281/0659-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 S.E. 2d 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "12 N.C. App. 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548243 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/12/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 S.E. 2d 638", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "12 N.C. App. 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548222 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/12/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 S.E. 2d 29", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 N.C. App. 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554907 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/10/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 U.S. 238", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1771759 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243-44" }, { "page": "279-80" }, { "page": "1712" }, { "page": "244" }, { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/395/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 S.E. 2d 108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 N.C. 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565348 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/271/0544-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 793, "char_count": 20215, "ocr_confidence": 0.519, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.1749263170986457e-07, "percentile": 0.9123410283765578 }, "sha256": "61163bbee6bf0e089d6566161247fc8a593e8f6fa0e2527a90608ceb92463481", "simhash": "1:2d0bacce74a36633", "word_count": 3373 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:53:41.611741+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DONNIE L. FORD, Alias RONALD FORD" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BOBBITT, Chief Justice.\nThe question is whether the plea of nolo contendere and the judgment entered thereon should be vacated and the cause remanded to the superior court to permit defendant to replead to the bill of indictment. If not, the decision of the majority of the panel of the Court of Appeals must be affirmed.\nIn State v. Woody, 271 N.C. 544, 157 S.E. 2d 108 (1967), this Court affirmed judgments based on pleas of guilty entered in behalf of defendant by his counsel. On appeal, defendant assigned as error the acceptance of the pleas \u201cwithout ascertaining whether or not the defendant personally wished to enter\u201d them. An excerpt from the opinion of Chief Justice Parker is quoted below:\n\u201c[D]ue to the ever-increasing burden placed upon this Court to rule upon the countless petitions for review of the constitutionality of criminal convictions, it would be well, though not mandatory, for every trial judge in this State to interrogate, as most of our trial judges do, every defendant who enters a plea of guilty in order to be sure that he has freely, voluntarily and intelligently consented to and authorized the entry of such plea. However, we wish to make it clear that any failure on the part of the trial judge to follow this recommended procedure in cases of this nature would not be fatal to the conviction.\u201d\nG.S. 7A-457 (b), as amended by Chapter 1243, Session Laws of 1971, provides: \u201cIf an indigent person waives counsel as provided in subsection (a), and pleads guilty to any offense, the court shall inform him of the nature of the offense and the possible consequences of his plea, and as a condition of accepting the plea of guilty the court shall examine the person and shall ascertain that the plea was freely, understandably [sic] and voluntarily made, without undue influence, compulsion or duress, and without promise of leniency.\u201d (Our italics.) In the present case, defendant was represented by counsel who tendered the plea in open court in defendant\u2019s presence and in his behalf.\nWhen a defendant who is represented by counsel tenders a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere, the law as declared in State v. Woody, supra, has not been modified by any subsequent decision of this Court or by any North Carolina statute. However, our law has been affected by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 23 L.Ed. 2d 274, 89 S.Ct. 1709 (1969).\nSince Boykin was decided, and based thereon, panels of the North Carolina Court of Appeals have held consistently that, notwithstanding a defendant who is represented by counsel enters a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere, it must appear affirmatively in the record that he did so voluntarily and understanding. State v. Harris, 10 N.C. App. 553, 180 S.E. 2d 29 (1971); State v. Treadway, 12 N.C. App. 167, 182 S.E. 2d 638 (1971); State v. Atkins, 12 N.C. App. 169, 182 S.E. 2d 595 (1971). In each of these cases the defendant\u2019s plea and the judgment entered thereon were vacated and the case was remanded to the superior court to permit the defendant to replead to the bill of indictment. In Harris, Judge Brock said: \u201cThe failure of the record in this case to affirmatively show that defendant was aware of the consequences of his pleas of guilty and to affirmatively show that his pleas were voluntarily and understandingly entered entitles the defendant to have his pleas of guilty vacated and entitles him to replead to the charges.\u201d Supra at 561, 180 S.E. 2d at 34.\nIn Boykin v. State, 207 So. 2d 412 (Ala. 1968), the defendant, represented by court-appointed counsel, entered a plea of guilty to each of five indictments for common-law robbery. It was provided by statute that \u201c[a]ny person who is convicted of robbery shall be punished, at the discretion of the jury, by death, or by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than ten years.\u201d Alabama Code, Title 14, \u00a7 415 (1959). It was also provided by statute: \u201cIf he pleads guilty, . . . the court must cause the punishment to be determined by a jury. . . .\u201d Alabama Code, Title 15, \u00a7 277 (1959). In Case No. 15520, the jury returned the following verdict: \u201cWe, the Jury, find the defendant guilty of Robbery, as charged in the indictment, on his plea of guilty, and further find that he shall suffer death by electrocution.\u201d On appeal, the judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Alabama. (Note: Although, the appeal relates specifically to No. 15520 and to the jury\u2019s verdict therein, the dissenting opinion states that \u201c[b]y agreement, all five cases were presented to the same jury.\u201d) Three of the seven Justices of the Supreme Court of Alabama dissented on the ground that \u201cthe record does not disclose that the defendant voluntarily and understandingly entered his pleas of guilty.\u201d The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari. 393 U.S. 820, 21 L.Ed. 2d 93, 89 S.Ct. 200 (1968).\nThe Supreme Court of the United States reversed. This excerpt from the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas indicates the basis of decision: \u201cSeveral federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial. First, is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1. Second, is the right to trial by jury. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145. Third, is the right to confront one\u2019s accusers. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400. We cannot presume a waiver of these three important federal rights from a silent record. What is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence.\u201d Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44, 23 L.Ed. 2d 274, 279-80, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712. Decision was based on the ground that \u201c \u2018the record does not disclose that the defendant voluntarily and understandingly entered his pleas of guilty.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 244, 23 L.Ed. 2d at 280, 89 S.Ct. at 1713 (quoting the dissent in Boykin v. State, supra).\nA dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan, with whom Mr. Justice Black joined, stated that \u201c[t]he Court thus in effect fastens upon the States, as a matter of federal constitutional law, the rigid prophylactic requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.\u201d Although Rule 11 is not mentioned in Mr. Justice Douglas\u2019s opinion for the Court, there is substantial justification for Mr. Justice Harlan\u2019s statement. See, \u201cCriminal Procedure \u2014 Requirements for Acceptance of Guilty Pleas,\u201d 48 N.C.L. Rev. 352 (1970).\nRule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. Appendix (1971), provides: \u201cA defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the court, nolo con-tendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such plea or a plea of nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. If a defendant refuses to plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea of guilty or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.\u201d\nIn Boykin, Mr. Justice Douglas quotes with approval from McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 22 L.Ed. 2d 418, 89 S.Ct. 1166 (1969), a decision based solely on the Court\u2019s interpretation of Rule 11. In McCarthy, the Court held that, in a criminal prosecution in the United States District Court, the trial judge could not accept a plea of guilty unless, in addition to all other requirements, he determined that there was a factual basis for the plea.\nBoykin involved death sentences. Nothing in the opinions of the Supreme Court of Alabama and of the Supreme Court of the United States indicates that the trial judge made any inquiry of the defendant or of his counsel with reference to whether the pleas of guilty were voluntarily and understanding entered. Nothing in the opinions of the Court of Appeals in Harris, Treadway and Atkins indicates that the trial judge made any inquiry of the defendant or of his counsel with reference to whether the pleas of guilty were voluntarily and understandingly entered. The question before us is whether the present record discloses sufficiently that defendant\u2019s plea of nolo contendere was entered voluntarily and understandingly.\nAlthough the record contains no exception or assignment of error, defendant\u2019s appeal presents the question whether error appears on the face of the record proper. State v. Roberts, 279 N.C. 500, 183 S.E. 2d 647 (1971). \u201cOrdinarily, in criminal cases the record proper consists of (1) the organization of the court, (2) the charge (information, warrant or indictment), (3) the arraignment and plea, (4) the verdict, and (5) the judgment.\u201d State v. Tinsley, 279 N.C. 482, 183 S.E. 2d 669 (1971). Boykin requires us to hold that a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere may not be considered valid unless it appears affirmatively that it was entered voluntarily and understandingly. Hence, a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere, unaccompanied by evidence that the plea was entered voluntarily and understandingly, and a judgment entered thereon, must be vacated as in Harris, Treadway and Atkins. If the plea is sustained, it must appear affirmatively that it was entered voluntarily and understandingly. Thus, whether technically a part of the record proper, evidence as to what occurred when defendant was arraigned and entered his plea must be considered if a judgment based upon the plea is to be sustained. This evidence appears in the agreed statement of case on appeal.\nIt must be conceded that the inquiries addressed by the court to defendant\u2019s counsel and those addressed directly to defendant fall short of approved practice with reference to the acceptance of pleas of guilty or of nolo contendere. True, defendant\u2019s counsel stated that he had explained to defendant the effect of the plea of nolo contendere; and defendant stated that he understood the plea of nolo contendere and that it was entered freely, voluntarily and understandingly. Even so, the nature and consequences of the plea should have been explained to defendant in open court. Evidence to the effect that the plea was entered voluntarily and understandingly should have been developed fully and a finding to that effect made in order to safeguard a defendant\u2019s rights, to protect his counsel from charges of unauthorized action, and generally to protect the plea and judgment from collateral attack in State post-conviction and' federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Annotation, \u201cValidity of Guilty Pleas,\u201d 25 L.Ed. 2d 1025 (1971) ; also, \u201cStandards Relating to Pleas of Guilty,\u201d American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice (Approved Draft, 1968) ; also, Annotation, \u201cCourts duty to advise or admonish accused as to consequences of plea of guilty, or determine that he is advised thereof.\u201d 97 A.L.R. 2d 549 (1964).\n\u201cA plea of nolo contendere ... is tantamount to a plea of guilty for purposes of the particular criminal action in which it is tendered and accepted. The presiding judge acquires full power to pronounce judgment against the defendant for the crime charged in the indictment.\u201d State v. Norman, 276 N.C. 75, 79, 170 S.E. 2d 923, 926 (1969). The nature and consequences of the plea of nolo contendere are generally understood by those who have acquired experience as defendants in criminal actions and as prisoners in our penal system. Defendant\u2019s counsel stated that he had explained to defendant the effect of a plea of nolo contendere and defendant stated that he understood \u201cwhat a plea of nolo contendere is.\u201d\nIn our view, the deficiency in the court\u2019s inquiries and in defendant\u2019s responses is cured by defendant\u2019s testimony on the occasion of his arraignment and plea. This testimony of defendant discloses affirmatively that he has no defense to the crime for which he was indicted.\nThe indictment is based on G.S. 148-45 (a) which in part provides: \u201cAny prisoner convicted of escaping or attempting to escape from the State prison system who at any time subsequent to such conviction escapes or attempts to escape therefrom shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than three years.\u201d Thus, upon a valid plea of nolo contendere to an indictment properly charging a second offense of escape, the statute provides that punishment shall be \u201cby imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than three years.\u201d\nThe testimony of Officer Crews tends to show that defendant had been convicted for breaking and entering and that he had escaped once before. Defendant testified he had been convicted on January 12, 1968, for breaking and entering and sentenced to a prison term of \u201cfour to seven years.\u201d According to the testimony of Officer Crews and of defendant, defendant was an escapee from January 9, 1971, until officers \u201cpicked him up\u201d in July, 1971.\nDefendant testified that on January 9, 1971, he and four other prisoners were permitted to attend a movie and \u201cto mingle\u201d with other patrons; that he took a seat downstairs; that at 5:30, the time they were supposed to leave, he went back upstairs where \u201cthe volunteer\u201d was supposed to be, but could not find either the volunteer or any of the prisoners; that he discovered that the car in which they had come to the movie was gone; that he \u201cthought about calling in,\u201d but didn\u2019t do so \u201cbecause one of the officers of the other units had already said if anybody messed up he was going to see that he would get whatever he could for him\u201d; and that \u201c[f]rom January 9th until the time they picked [him] up in July, [he] knew [he] had escaped but not in every sense of the word.\u201d\nG.S. 148-45 (b) provides in express terms that the conduct of the defendant, as related by him, constitutes an escape within the meaning of G.S. 148-45 (a).\nNeither defendant nor his counsel has ever contended that defendant did not understand the full significance of his plea of nolo contendere or that the plea was entered otherwise than voluntarily and understandingly. The present contention, namely, the asserted inadequacy of the record to show that the plea was entered voluntarily and understandingly, was made for the first time upon defendant\u2019s appeal to this Court from the Court of Appeals. The brief filed by defendant in the Court of Appeals referred to defendant\u2019s conduct as \u201cin the nature of a breach of trust\u201d rather than an escape, and made the contention that the alleged escape by defendant \u201cwas surrounded by many extenuating circumstances and that the sentence was more severe than the evidence warranted.\u201d It may be that defendant was under the erroneous impression that the two-year sentence he received was the maximum.\nWhen the entire record is considered, we think it appears that defendant\u2019s plea of nolo contendere was entered voluntarily and understandingly. Hence, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "BOBBITT, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Morgan and Deputy Attorney General Vanore for the State.", "Curtiss Todd for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DONNIE L. FORD, Alias RONALD FORD\nNo. 50\n(Filed 12 April 1972)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 161\u2014 absence of assignments of error \u2014 review of record proper\nAlthough the record contains no exception or assignment of error, defendant\u2019s appeal presents the question whether error appears on the face of the record proper.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 157\u2014 record proper\nOrdinarily, in criminal cases the record proper consists of (1) the organization of the court, (2) the information, warrant or indictment, (3) the arraignment and plea, (4) the verdict, and (5) the judgment.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 23, 25\u2014 plea of guilty \u2014 plea of nolo contendere \u2014 voluntariness \u2014 showing in record\nA plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere may not be considered valid unless it appears affirmatively that it was entered voluntarily and understandingly.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 25\u2014 plea of nolo contendere \u2014 voluntariness \u2014 consideration of evidence presented\nWhether technically a part of the record proper, evidence as to what occurred when defendant was arraigned and entered a plea of nolo contendere will be considered by the appellate court in determining if the plea was entered voluntarily and understandingly.\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 25\u2014 plea of nolo contendere \u2014 insufficiency of court\u2019s inquiries\nAlthough defendant\u2019s counsel stated that he had explained to defendant the effect of a plea of nolo contendere, and defendant stated that he understood the plea of nolo contendere and that it was entered freely, voluntarily and understandingly, defendant\u2019s plea of nolo contendere to a charge of felonious escape should not have been accepted until the nature and consequences of the plea had been explained to defendant in open court and evidence to the effect that the plea was entered voluntarily and understandingly had been developed fully and a finding to that effect made by the court.\n6. Criminal Law \u00a7 25\u2014 plea of nolo contendere \u2014 deficiencies in court\u2019s inquiries \u2014 defendant\u2019s testimony\nAlthough inquiries addressed by the court to defendant and to his counsel fell short of approved practice with reference to the acceptance of pleas of guilty or of nolo contendere, deficiencies in the court\u2019s inquiries and in defendant\u2019s responses were cured by defendant\u2019s testimony on the occasion of his arraignment and plea which discloses affirmatively that he has no defense to the crime of felonious escape for which he was indicted, and when the entire record is considered, it appears that defendant\u2019s plea of nolo contendere was entered voluntarily and understandingly.\nAppeal by defendant from the decision of the Court of Appeals reported in 13 N.C. App. 34, 185 S.E. 2d 328, which found \u201cNo error\u201d in the \u201ctrial\u201d before Falls, J., at the August 9, 1971 Session of Foesyth Superior Court.\nDefendant was arraigned on a bill of indictment which charged that on January 9, 1971, while he was lawfully confined in the North Carolina Department of Correction in the custody of Captain T. D. Hill at Stokes Subsidiary #5546, under sentences imposed for breaking and entering and escape at the January 12, 1968 and February 7, 1969 Sessions of the Superior Court of Forsyth County, defendant did unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously escape while assigned to work at Forsyth Memorial Laundry Room, Winston-Salem, N. C.\nDefendant, an indigent, through his court-appointed counsel, Curtiss Todd, Esq., tendered a plea of nolo contendere. In response to the court\u2019s inquiry, Mr. Todd stated that he had explained to defendant \u201cthe effect of a plea of nolo contendere.\u201d In response to inquiries which the court addressed directly to him, defendant stated in substance that he understood the meaning of a plea of nolo contendere; that nobody had promised him anything in exchange for this plea; and that he entered the plea freely, voluntarily and understandingly. Thereupon, the court heard the testimony of Correctional Officer Zeb Crews and the testimony of defendant.\nThe judgment signed by Judge Falls recites that defendant had \u201centered a plea of nolo contendere to the offense of Felonious Escape, being the second offense, and of the grade of felony. . . .\u201d Upon this plea, the judgment imposed a prison sentence of two years, to commence upon expiration of the sentences defendant was then serving. Defendant appealed.\nThe record on appeal contains no exceptions or assignments of error. In the Court of Appeals, an opinion was written by each of the three members of the hearing panel. Reference is made to the opinion of Judge Hedrick, to the concurring opinion of Judge Graham, and to the dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Mallard.\nDefendant appeals to the Supreme Court of right under G.S. 7A-30 (2).\nAttorney General Morgan and Deputy Attorney General Vanore for the State.\nCurtiss Todd for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0062-01", "first_page_order": 90, "last_page_order": 98 }