{ "id": 8574647, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES BRYAN WATSON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Watson", "decision_date": "1972-05-10", "docket_number": "No. 35", "first_page": "221", "last_page": "233", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "281 N.C. 221" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "13 N.C. App. 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550072 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/13/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 U.S. 427", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11722669 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/405/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 U.S.L.W. 4299", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "U.S.L.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "395 U.S. 250", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1771609 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/395/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 S.Ct. 1283", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "386 U.S. 987", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6319834, 6319426, 6320070, 6319598 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/386/0987-03", "/us/386/0987-01", "/us/386/0987-04", "/us/386/0987-02" ] }, { "cite": "386 U.S. 18", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168882 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/386/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "21 A.L.R. 3d 418", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 P. 1011", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Cal. App. 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App.", "case_ids": [ 2075375 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app/52/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 Cal. Rptr. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "230 Cal. App. 2d 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2142506 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-2d/230/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 N.W. 303", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 Iowa 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Iowa", "case_ids": [ 2286679 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/iowa/198/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 Okla. Crim. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Okla. 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"N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559842 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0670-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 S.E. 2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 681", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563286 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0681-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 227", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 643", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571921 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 S.E. 2d 671", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569338 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 U.S. 510", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1767501 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/391/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ga. 682", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 24328 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga/63/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 S.E. 616", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ga. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 412771, 413046 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga/115/0259-01", "/ga/115/0259-02" ] }, { "cite": "64 Mo. 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo.", "case_ids": [ 968414 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo/64/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 S.E. 2d 4", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 Va. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Va.", "case_ids": [ 2061380 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/va/197/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 A.L.R. 875", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 S.E. 2d 833", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559222 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 S.E. 2d 523", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 N.C. 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8608166 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/224/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 S.E. 2d 670", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 N.C. 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627993 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/239/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 U.S. 77", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1499425 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"opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 714", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567599 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0714-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E. 2d 779", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573959 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0121-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1171, "char_count": 27540, "ocr_confidence": 0.527, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.894866042563582e-07, "percentile": 0.93362103350427 }, "sha256": "1b8063c1fbade5df17c4a1fc9d2521e0db3347db260933ac527163989536b0fd", "simhash": "1:0179dcec1f2f6472", "word_count": 4696 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:53:41.611741+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES BRYAN WATSON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRANCH, Justice.\nDefendant assigns as error the failure of the trial court to dismiss the prosecution on the ground that he had not been afforded a speedy trial.\nThe record in this case shows that the alleged crime was committed on 19 July 1969, and a warrant was issued on that day charging defendant with murder. On 30 July 1969 defendant was given a preliminary hearing and was bound over (without privilege of bond) to the Superior Court of Cumberland County for action by the grand jury. On 21 July 1969 defendant was found to be an indigent, and Mr. Edward J. David of the Cumberland County Bar was appointed as counsel for defendant. On 12 August 1969, upon motion of his counsel, defendant was committed to the State Hospital at Raleigh for a period of sixty days for observation and examination towards determining whether defendant had mental capacity to know right from wrong and to understanding^ enter a plea. On 22 September 1969 the grand jury of Cumberland County returned a true bill of indictment, charging defendant with murder. On 2 October defendant was transferred to Central Prison in Raleigh because of inadequate jail facilities in Cumberland County. Defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus on 1 November 1969, in which he alleged that he had been denied his right to a speedy trial, and alleged many other violations of his constitutional rights. On 18 November 1969 Judge Hamilton Hob-good signed a writ of habeas corpus ad 'prosequendum directing the Department of Correction to deliver defendant to the Sheriff of Cumberland County on 25 November 1969 to the end that he might be tried on 1 December 1969. On 12 December 1969 defendant was released on bond, and remained free on bond until the date of his trial except for one day in January 1970 and for approximately eleven days in August 1970, when he was in custody because his bondsman \"went off his bond.\u201d On 15 December 1969 (after defendant had been released on bond) Judge Bickett denied defendant\u2019s petition for writ of habeas corpus. Defendant made no motion for a speedy trial after he was released on bond. Defendant\u2019s counsel moved for, and was granted, two continuances before the case was called for trial. Defendant\u2019s counsel again moved for a continuance after the trial court denied his motion for dismissal on the ground that he had been denied a speedy trial.\nIn the recent case of State v. Spencer, 281 N.C. 121, 187 S.E. 2d 779, this Court considered the question of speedy trial, and there stated:\n\u201cThe constitutional right to a speedy trial protects an accused from extended imprisonment before trial, from public suspicion generated by an untried accusation, and from loss of witnesses and other means of proving his innocence resulting from passage of time. Whether defendant has been denied the right of a speedy trial is a matter to be determined by the trial judge in light of the circumstances of each case. The accused has the burden of showing that the delay was due to the State\u2019s wilfullness or neglect. Unavoidable delays- and delays caused or requested by defendant do not violate his right to a speedy trial. Further, a defendant may waive his right to- a speedy trial by failing to demand or to make some effort to obtain a speedier trial. State v. Ball, 277 N.C. 714, 178 S.E. 2d 377; State v. Hollars, 266 N.C. 45, 145 S.E. 2d 309; State v. Lowry and State v. Mallory, 263 N.C. 536, 139 S.E. 2d 870. The constitutional right to a speedy trial prohibits arbitrary and oppressive delays by the prosecution. State v. Johnson, 275 N.C. 264, 167 S.E. 2d 274. But this right is necessarily relative and is consistent with delays under certain circumstances. Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 49 L.ed. 950, 25 S.Ct. 573.\u201d\nIn instant case defendant\u2019s motion for a mental examination, in effect, was a motion for a continuance. Thereafter he was granted two continuances. During the period from 12 December 1969, when he was released on bond, to the date of his trial, defendant made no effort to obtain a speedier trial. He has failed to show that the delay in his trial resulted in prolonged imprisonment, created public suspicion against him, or deprived him of any means of proving his innocence. Nor does the record disclose that the State wilfully or by its neglect caused arbitrary or oppressive delay.\nThis assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant contends that the trial judge erred in not allowing his challenge for cause directed to the district solicitor\u2019s father-in-law as a juror.\nThe question of the competency of jurors is a matter within the trial judge\u2019s discretion, and his rulings thereon are not subject to review on appeal unless accompanied by some imputed error of law. G.S. 9-14; State v. Spencer, 239 N.C. 604, 80 S.E. 2d 670; State v. DeGraffenreid, 224 N.C. 517, 31 S.E. 2d 523.\nThis Court discussed possible disqualifications of a juror because of his relationship with a State\u2019s witness in the case of State v. Allred, 275 N.C. 554, 169 S.E. 2d 833, and there stated:\n\u201cIn this jurisdiction, a juror, who is related to the defendant by blood or marriage within the ninth degree of kinship, is properly rejected when challenged by the State for cause on that ground. . . .\n$ $ $\n\u201cWe do not hold that a relationship within the ninth degree between a juror and a State\u2019s witness, standing alone, is legal ground for challenge for cause. This is in accord with the weight of authority in other jurisdictions. Annotation, \u2018Relationship to prosecutor or witness for prosecution as disqualifying juror in criminal case.\u2019 18 A.L.R. 875; 31 Am. Jur., Jury \u00a7 192; 50 C.J.S., Juries \u00a7 218(b) (1). Even so, where such relationship exists and is known and recognized by the juror, a defendant\u2019s challenge for cause should be rejected only if it should appear clearly that, under the circumstances' of the particular case, the challenged juror would have no reason or disposition to favor his kinsman by giving added weight to his testimony or otherwise. ...\u201d\nWe are unable to find a North Carolina case which considers whether a juror is disqualified because he is related within the prohibited degree to counsel in the case. However, the majority rule in other jurisdictions is that a juror is not disqualified by the fact that he is related to counsel involved in the case. Petcosky v. Bowman, 197 Va. 240, 89 S.E. 2d 4; State of Missouri v. Jones, 64 Mo. 391; Roberts v. Roberts, 115 Ga. 259, 41 S.E. 616. The Georgia cases note an exception to this general rule and hold that the juror is disqualified where the prohibited relationship exists and counsel\u2019s fee is contingent upon success in the case. Melson v. Dickson, 63 Ga. 682, and Roberts v. Roberts, supra.\nWe note that in instant case the trial judge carefully examined the juror and denied the challenge only after the juror stated that he would not convict on his relationship to the solicitor and after it was ascertained that the solicitor (juror\u2019s son-in-law) was not prosecuting in this case. These circumstances do not show imputed error of law or abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in making his ruling.\nThis assignment of error is not sustained.\nDefendant assigns as error the action of the trial judge in allowing the State\u2019s challenge for cause of certain jurors because of their beliefs as to capital punishment.\nEach of the jurors successfully challenged stated, in effect, that under no circumstances could he vote for a verdict which would result in the imposition of the death penalty.\nA trial judge should allow challenge for cause when a venireman is not willing to consider all possible penalties provided by state law and when the venireman is unalterably committed to vote against the death penalty, regardless of the evidence which might be presented at trial. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 20 L.ed. 2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770; State v. Doss, 279 N.C. 413, 183 S.E. 2d 671; State v. Chance, 279 N.C. 643, 185 S.E. 2d 227; State v. Miller, 276 N.C. 681, 174 S.E. 2d 481.\nThe Court correctly sustained the State\u2019s challenges for cause.\nDefendant\u2019s most serious assignment of error relates to admission into evidence, over objection, a portion of a certified copy of the victim\u2019s death certificate. He contends that admission of this evidence violated his constitutional right of confrontation and cross-examination.\nWe note that the record does not contain a copy of the death certificate; however, the record does show that the Judge read portions of the death certificate to the jury, and in order to consider this assignment of error we must assume that the portions read to the jury are correctly indicated in that part of the charge which states:\n\u201cThe State further offered evidence in the form of an authenticated copy of a record of the Office of Vital Statistics of the State of North Carolina, State Board of Health, which in substance tends to show that Billy Gene Horner died in Cumberland County on July 19, 1969, and that the immediate cause of death was hemorrhage and asphyxia due to or as a consequence of stab wound of the left neck.\u201d\nAt the time of defendant\u2019s trial, Article I, \u00a7 11 of the North Carolina Constitution (now Article I, \u00a7 23) provided:\n\u201cIn all criminal prosecutions, every person charged with crime has the right to be informed of the accusation and to confront the accusers and witnesses with other testimony, and to have counsel for defense, and not be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence, or to pay costs, jail fees, or necessary witness fees of the defense, unless found guilty.\u201d\nThe right of confrontation confirms the common-law rule that, in criminal trials, the witnesses must be present and subject to cross-examination. State v. Bumper, 275 N.C. 670, 170 S.E. 2d 457; State v. Perry, 210 N.C. 796, 188 S.E. 639; State v. Hightower, 187 N.C. 300, 121 S.E. 616; State v. Thomas, 64 N.C. 74. This same protection is granted by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198, 166 S.E. 2d 652; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 13 L.ed. 2d 923, 85 S.Ct. 1065. The right of confrontation is an absolute right rather than a privilege, and it must be afforded an accused not only in form but in substance. State v. Bumper, supra; State v. Hightower, supra; State v. Hackney, 240 N.C. 230, 81 S.E. 2d 778.\nThis Court considered the admissibility of a death certificate in a civil action to recover damages for wrongful death in the case of Branch v. Dempsey, 265 N.C. 733, 145 S.E. 2d 395. There the appellant assigned as error the exclusion from evidence of a certified copy of the death certificate. This Court held that the death certificate was properly excluded because it contained hearsay statements concerning the manner in which the collision, which allegedly caused the fatal injuries, occurred. In so doing, the Court, in part, stated:\n\u201cThe purpose of the statute appears to be to permit the death certificate to be introduced as evidence of the fact of death, the time and place where it occurred, the identity of the deceased, the bodily injury or disease which was the cause of death, the disposition of the body and possibly other matters relating to the death. We think it was not the purpose of the Legislature to make the certificate competent evidence of whatever might be stated thereon. ...\u201d\nWe note that Branch v. Dempsey, supra, considered G.S. 130-73, which was superseded by the present G.S. 130-66. A notable difference in the statutes is that G.S. 130-73 stated \u201cthat any copy of the record of a birth or death certificate properly certified . . . shall be prima facie evidence in all courts and places of the facts therein stated.\u201d (Emphasis ours.) The comparable portion of the present G.S. 130-66 (applicable in this case) states:\n\u201c(b) The State Registrar is authorized to prepare typewritten, photographic, or other reproductions of original records and files in his office. Such reproductions, when certified by him, shall be considered for all purposes the same as the original and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.\u201d\nOur research fails to disclose a decision of this Court which considers whether the death certificate of a homicide victim is admissible into evidence to prove some element of the crime pursuant to a statute making it prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. We note a split of authority in other jurisdictions on this question.\nThe Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma, in the case of Osborn v. State, 86 Okla. Crim. 259, 194 P. 2d 176, without discussion approved the admission of a death certificate in the trial of a murder case pursuant to a statute which provided that a certified copy of a death certificate \u201cshall be prima facie evidence in all courts and places of the facts therein stated.\u201d\nIn the case of State v. Flory, 198 Iowa 75, 199 N.W. 303, defendant was charged with the murder of his wife by administering poison. There the Supreme Court of Iowa held that the trial judge committed prejudicial error in excluding a certified copy of the death certificate of the victim when it was offered into evidence by defendant. In that state a statute provided that a properly certified death certificate was prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated in all courts and places.\nThe California Courts of Appeals have taken diverse views on this question. The California cases decided by these courts are reviewed and the better rule stated in the case of People v. Holder, 230 Cal. App. 2d 50, 40 Cal. Rptr. 655, where the Court stated:\n\u201cThe authorities are in disagreement as to which elements of the death certificate are statements of \u2018fact\u2019 and which are not. The line between fact and opinion is often thin and indistinct. (Citations omitted.) Occurrence of death is doubtless a fact which is proved prima facie by the certificate. (Citations omitted.) The cause of death, however, may amount only to an opinion or conclusion, sometimes resulting from inferences drawn by a medical expert. . . . Other decisions assume without discussion that cause of death (no matter how dependent on medical con-elusions) is a fact which may be established prima facie by certificate. (Citations omitted.) ....\n\u201cThe point of the matter is not that conclusionary entries on death certificates are necessarily unreliable; rather, that Health and Safety Code section 10577 would permit their admission as hearsay. The coupling of hearsay and conclusionary elements in a single piece of evidence arouses the more fundamental problem of fairness to the defendant in a criminal case. The cause of death entry may emanate from a complex value judgment drawn by a medical expert. (See, for example, Longuy v. La Societe Francaise, 52 Cal. App. 370, 198 P. 1011.) When it rides into the fray mounted on a saddle of a public document, it is unaccompanied by the expert. The latter appears in court only in the form of the document. He himself is not available for cross-examination by the defense.\u201d\nSee also 30 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, \u00a7 1009, p. 143, and Annotation: Evidence \u2014 Official Death Certificate, 21 A.L.R. 3d 418.\nThe clear mandate of Article I, \u00a7 11 (now Article I, \u00a7 23) of the North Carolina Constitution, and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guaranteeing the right of confrontation and cross-examination, and the fundamental fairness guaranteed to an accused in a criminal action by due process of law require that we hold that the trial judge erroneously admitted the hearsay and conclusory statement contained in the death certificate, \u201cthat the immediate cause of death was hemorrhage and asphyxia due to or as a consequence of stab wound of the left neck.\u201d\nHowever, we mus't determine if the admission of this evidence as to cause of death was such prejudicial error as to require a new trial.\nThe fact that the improper admission of this evidence violated a right guaranteed by the United States Constitution does not, per se, render the error prejudicial. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L.ed. 2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824; reh. den. 386 U.S. 987, 18 L.ed. 2d 241, 87 S.Ct. 1283; Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 23 L.ed. 2d 284, 89 S.Ct. 1726. Unless there is a reasonable possibility that the improperly admitted evidence contributed to defendant\u2019s conviction, there is no prejudicial error. Chapman v. California, supra.\nWe deem it appropriate to here note the recent United States Supreme Court decision in the case of Schneble v. Florida (March 21, 1972; 40 U.S.L.W. 4299), 405 U.S. 427, 31 L.ed. 2d 340, 92 S.Ct. 1056. There the confession of a codefendant was admitted against the defendant and the confessor was not present for the purposes of confrontation and cross-examination by the defendant. This evidence corroborated other independent, objective evidence strongly pointing to defendant\u2019s guilt. The United States Supreme Court held that the admission into evidence of the confession of the codefendant was error, but that in view of the other overwhelming evidence of the defendant\u2019s guilt, such error was not reversible error.\nThe challenged evidence admitted in instant case relates to the same constitutional right, but is less persuasive than that complained of in Schneble v. Florida, supra.\nWe conclude that the evidence in this case clearly and overwhelmingly supports a reasonable inference that defendant intentionally used a deadly weapon and thereby inflicted a would which proximately caused Horner\u2019s death, and that the minds of an average jury would not have found the evidence less persuasive had the conclusory evidence contained in the certified copy of the death certificate been excluded. The admission of the evidence contained in the certified copy of the death certificate was at most harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. Schneble v. Florida, supra; Chapman v. California, supra.\nFinally, defendant argues that the trial judge erred in overruling his motions for judgment as of nonsuit.\nIn light of the preceding ruling, we do not deem it necessary to discuss this assignment of error at length. It is sufficient to say that upon application of the often-repeated and well-recognized rules as to the sufficiency of evidence to overrule a motion for nonsuit, we conclude that there was plenary evidence to repel defendant\u2019s motion. See 2 Strong\u2019s N. C. Index 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7 106, p. 654, and cases there cited.\nWe have carefully reviewed this entire record and find no prejudicial error.\nThe decision of the Court of Appeals is\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRANCH, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Morgan and Assistant Attorney General Magner for the State.", "Downing, David & Vallery, by Edward J. David, for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES BRYAN WATSON\nNo. 35\n(Filed 10 May 1972)\n1. Constitutional Law \u00a7 30\u2014 speedy trial \u2014 delay between warrant and trial\nDefendant was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial by the delay between the issuance of a warrant charging him with homicide on 19 July 1969 and his trial at the 19 April 1971 session of court, where defendant was committed to the State Hospital for 60 days upon motion of his counsel, defendant was granted continuances on two occasions, defendant was out on bail for most of the time between 12 December 1969 and the date of his trial but made no effort to obtain a speedier trial, and defendant has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the delay or that the State wilfully or by its neglect caused arbitrary or oppressive delay.\n2. Jury \u00a7 5\u2014 competency of juror \u2014 discretion of court\nThe question of the competency of jurors is a matter within the trial judge\u2019s discretion, and his rulings thereon are not subject to review on appeal unless accompanied by some imputed error of law. G.S. 9-14.\n3. Jury \u00a7 5\u2014 father-in-law of solicitor \u2014 competency as juror\nThe trial court did not err in the denial of defendant\u2019s challenge for cause directed to the district solicitor\u2019s father-in-law as a juror, where the challenge was allowed only after the juror stated, upon being questioned by the court, that he would not convict on his relationship to the solicitor, and after it was ascertained that the district solicitor was not prosecuting defendant\u2019s case.\n4. Constitutional Law \u00a7 29; Criminal Law \u00a7 135; Jury \u00a7 7\u2014 jurors opposed to death penalty \u2014 challenge for cause\nThe trial court properly allowed the State\u2019s challenges for cause to prospective jurors who stated, in effect, that under no circumstances could they vote for a verdict which would result in the imposition of the death penalty.\n5. Constitutional Law \u00a7 31; Criminal Law \u00a7 88\u2014 right of cross-examination\nThe witnesses in criminal trials must be present and subject to cross-examination. Sixth and Fourteenth Am\u00e9ndments to the U. S. Constitution; Article I, \u00a7 23 of the N. C. Constitution.\n6. Constitutional Law \u00a7 31\u2014 right of confrontation\nThe right of confrontation is an absolute right rather than a privilege and must be afforded an accused not only in form but in substance.\n7. Constitutional Law \u00a7 31; Criminal Law \u00a7 80; Death \u00a7 1; Homicide \u00a7 15\u2014 cause of death \u2014 competency of death certificate \u2014 right of confrontation \u2014 due process \u2014 harmless error\nIn a homicide prosecution, defendant\u2019s right to confrontation and his right to fundamental fairness in a criminal trial guaranteed by due process were violated by the admission in evidence of the hearsay and conclusory statement in the victim\u2019s death certificate that \u201cthe immediate cause of death was hemorrhage and asphyxia due to or as a consequence of stab wounds of left neck\u201d; however, the admission of such evidence was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt in view of the other overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt. Sixth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution; Article I, \u00a7 11 (Now Article I, \u00a7 23) of the N. C. Constitution; G.S. 130-66.\n8. Criminal Law \u00a7 169\u2014 erroneous admission of evidence \u2014 violation of constitutional right\nThe improper admission of evidence which violates a right guaranteed by the U. S. Constitution does not constitute prejudicial error unless there is a reasonable possibility that such evidence contributed to defendant\u2019s conviction.\nOn certiorari to the North Carolina Court of Appeals to review its decision (13 N.C. App. 54) finding no error in the trial before Cooper, J., at the 19 April 1971 Session of Cumberland Superior Court.\nThe State\u2019s evidence, in substance, was as follows:\nShelton David Tew testified that on 19 July 1969 he and Billy Gene Horner were standing at the bar in Gib\u2019s Lounge in Fayetteville, North Carolina, drinking beer, when defendant, as he passed by, bumped into Horner. Tew, Jesse Robert Pittman and Horner passed defendant as they walked to a booth where they intended to play checkers. As they passed defendant, Horner said to him, \u201cI will see you later.\u201d The trio sat in the booth where Horner and Pittman began to play checkers. After a few minutes, defendant approached the booth and said to Horner, \u201cSo you will see me later, will you?\u201d Horner did not reply. Defendant slapped Horner twice, and Horner raised both hands and backed up. Defendant momentarily held a knife at Horner\u2019s throat and then thrust the knife into his neck just below the left ear. The knife was \u201cmaybe\u201d four inches long and two inches wide. Defendant then walked to the end of the bar. Horner, beginning to bleed profusely from the neck, nose and mouth, stepped out of the booth, over to a pool table, and picked up a cue stick. He was so weak that he could only lean against the table. Tew took Horner out of the lounge and down the street for a distance of approximately 75 feet, where Horner collapsed on the sidewalk. He was at that time bleeding from the gash in his neck and from his nose and mouth. He was carried away by an ambulance a few minutes later.\nJesse Robert Pittman testified that on 19 July 1969, while he was playing checkers with Horner in Gib\u2019s Lounge, he saw defendant approaching with a knife in his hand. Pittman left the booth and walked over to the bar after defendant and Horner began to scuffle. When he next observed Horner, Horner was stepping out from the booth with blood gushing from his neck and mouth. He observed Horner stagger over to the pool table and fall. He next saw Horner lying across the hood of a car. He believed Horner was dead when he was carried away in an ambulance a few minutes later.\nDouglas Davidson testified that he was a member of the Fayetteville police force on 19 July 1969, and that he and Officer Albert Tanzilo observed a person, later identified as Horner, lying on the street. He observed a trail of blood beginning at Gib\u2019s Lounge and leading to the place where Horner was lying. Horner was bleeding from his mouth, and when he tried to talk he could only make a gurgling sound. After calling an ambulance, Davidson went into Gib\u2019s Lounge in an attempt to locate witnesses. When he returned to the street he observed attendants putting Horner into an ambulance. Horner appeared to be dead at that time.\nOfficer Tanzilo testified to substantially the same facts as did Officer Davidson. He further testified that after the ambulance departed he and Officer Davidson proceeded about a block and a half to 204 Campbell Avenue, which was the home of defendant\u2019s parents. They there arrested defendant, who at that time had blood on his shirt, trousers and arms.\nDetective Sergeant A. A. Banks testified, without objection, to certain statements made to him by defendant, including a volunteered statement by defendant that \u201cIf he (Horner) is dead, I killed him. He was a no good SOB, and he ought to be dead.\u201d\nWilliam Joyner, Director of the City-County ABC Bureau of Identification, testified, in part:\n\u201c .. . I recognize the photograph marked S-6 and shown to me. It is a photograph taken by me at Cape Fear Valley Hospital morgue, of Mr. Horner. That picture was taken approximately a quarter to six or six o\u2019clock. The picture shows the body of the deceased, and puncture wound on the left side of his face. . . .\n\u201c . . . S-6 is a photograph of the deceased, showing a puncture wound on the left side of his neck.\u201d\nDefendant, testifying in his own behalf, stated that on 19 July 1969 he had been drinking whiskey and beer. He had for some time had trouble with Billy Gene Horner, and Horner had threatened to kill him in June 1969. He stated that on 19 July 1969 he walked up to the booth in which Horner was sitting and asked, \u201cWhy is it you want to kill me or jump on me every time you see me?\u201d Thereupon Horner mumbled something, and \u201ccome up with a motion as if to hit me, which he did, and I throwed up my hand to keep him from hitting me. . . . his left hand had a sharp object in it which cut me on the leg.\u201d He did not realize Horner had been cut until he saw him bleeding at the pool table. He did not intend to kill or hurt Horner in any way.\nDefendant offered a number of witnesses who gave testimony as to the occurrence in Gib\u2019s Lounge on 19 July 1969. He also offered witnesses who testified that Horner had a reputation for being a violent person. Some of the witnesses testified on cross-examination that defendant had a reputation for being a man of violent character.\nThe jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree. The trial judge imposed a sentence of imprisonment of not less than 25 nor more than 30 years. Defendant appealed, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals found no error in the trial. We allowed defendant\u2019s petition for certiorari on 14 January 1972.\nAttorney General Morgan and Assistant Attorney General Magner for the State.\nDowning, David & Vallery, by Edward J. David, for defendant." }, "file_name": "0221-01", "first_page_order": 249, "last_page_order": 261 }