{ "id": 8574896, "name": "ANNIE NEAL STEVENSON, Sister, CURTIS DANIELS, Brother, ALFRED DANIELS, Brother, O'NEAL DANIELS, Deceased Employee v. CITY OF DURHAM, Employer, Self-Insurer", "name_abbreviation": "Stevenson v. City of Durham", "decision_date": "1972-05-10", "docket_number": "No. 3", "first_page": "300", "last_page": "304", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "281 N.C. 300" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "12 N.C. 632", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "187 S.E. 2d 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 S.E. 37", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "185 N.C. 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8655958 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/185/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 S.E. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 629", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575910 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0629-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 S.E. 2d 342", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "259 N.C. 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559758 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/259/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 S.E. 2d 604", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 N.C. 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559875 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/267/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 S.E. 2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575029 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 S.E. 2d 282", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575554 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 S.E. 2d 765", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 535", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562463 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 S.E. 2d 427", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560510 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 S.E. 2d 296", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 583", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571265 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 S.E. 2d 128", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "8 N.C. App. 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551130 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/8/0302-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 440, "char_count": 9781, "ocr_confidence": 0.541, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2551625893108581e-06, "percentile": 0.9886698027568402 }, "sha256": "367e02a6f102795d1bad73a2a210a3bf0ae588d4242e9de5812528a7fa2cc920", "simhash": "1:fa09c47afca26e4f", "word_count": 1645 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:53:41.611741+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ANNIE NEAL STEVENSON, Sister, CURTIS DANIELS, Brother, ALFRED DANIELS, Brother, O\u2019NEAL DANIELS, Deceased Employee v. CITY OF DURHAM, Employer, Self-Insurer" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRANCH, Justice.\nThe question presented by this appeal is whether \u201cbrothers\u201d and \u201csisters\u201d who are eighteen years of age, or older, and married are \u201cnext of kin\u201d as defined in G.S. 97-40.\nAt the time of O\u2019Neal Daniels\u2019 injury and death, G.S. 97-40, in part, provided:\nSubject to the provisions of G.S. 97-38, if the deceased employee leaves neither whole nor partial dependents, then the compensation which would be payable under G.S. 97-38 to whole dependents shall be commuted to its present value and paid in a lump sum to the next of kin as herein defined. For purposes of this section and G.S. 97-38, \u201cnext of kin\u201d shall include only child, father, mother, brother or sister of the deceased employee. For all such next of kin who are neither wholly or partially dependent upon the deceased employee and who take under this section, the order of priority among them shall be governed by the general law applicable to the distribution of the personal estate of persons dying intestate. . . .\nIf the deceased employee leaves1 neither whole dependents, partial dependents, nor next of kin as hereinabove defined, then no compensation shall be due or payable on account of the death of the deceased employee, except that the employer shall pay or cause to be paid the burial expenses of the deceased employee not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500.00) to the person or persons entitled thereto. (Emphasis ours.)\nG.S. 97-38 classifies those persons eligible to receive, and determines the amount of, death benefits payable under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act to persons wholly or partially dependent upon the earnings of a deceased employee. If the deceased employee leaves neither whole nor partial dependents, as here, then G.S. 97-40 provides for the commutation and payment of compensation to the \u201cnext of kin\u201d as therein defined.\nThe Court of Appeals, relying on the case of Jones v. Sutton, 8 N.C. App. 302, 174 S.E. 2d 128, affirmed the opinion and award of the Industrial Commission. The rationale of the majority decision of the Court of Appeals is that G.S. 97-40 and G.S. 97-2(12) are in pari materia and therefore should be construed with reference to each other. G.S. 97-2(12) provides:\nChild, Grandchild, Brother, Sister. \u2014 The term \u201cchild\u201d shall include a posthumous child, a child legally adopted prior to the injury of the employee, and a stepchild or acknowledged illegitimate child dependent upon the deceased, but does not include married children unless wholly dependent upon him. \u201cGrandchild\u201d means a child as above defined of a child as above defined. \u201cBrother\u201d and \u201csister\u201d include stepbrothers and stepsisters, half brothers and half sisters, and brothers and sisters by adoption, but does not include married brothers nor married sisters unless wholly dependent on the employee. \u201cChild,\u201d \u201cgrandchild,\u201d \u201cbrother\u201d and \u201csister\u201d include only persons who at the tim\u00e9 of the death of the deceased employee are under eighteen years of age.\nAfter the Court of Appeals filed its decision in this case, this Court, in the case of Smith v. Exterminators, 279 N.C. 583, 184 S.E. 2d 296, in construing G.S. 97-38 and G.S. 97-40, stated:\n\u201c . .. Thus, G.S. 97-40 determines the person or persons entitled to receive the death benefits provided in the Act, but the amount payable to the person or persons entitled thereto is determined by G.S. 97-38, commuted to its present, lump sum value. When, as here, the deceased employee left no dependent, whole or partial, the amount payable is not reduced from the amount which would have been payable had the deceased employee left a person wholly dependent upon him unless there is no person surviving who falls within the term \u2018next of kin\u2019, as defined in G.S. 97-k0. ...\u201d (Emphasis ours.)\nG.S. 97-40 as rewritten by the 1965 General Assembly added \u201cnext of kin\u201d as a category of persons entitled to death benefits under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act. The rewritten statute defined the term \u201cnext of kin\u201d and specified the order of priority among \u201cnext of kin\u201d who are neither wholly nor partially dependent upon the deceased employee and who take under the section.\nThe primary rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature controls the interpretation of a statute. In seeking to discover this intent, the courts should consider the language of the statute, the spirit of the act, and what the act seeks to accomplish. Galligan v. Chapel Hill, 276 N.C. 172, 171 S.E. 2d 427; State v. Spencer, 276 N.C. 535, 173 S.E. 2d 765; Freeland v. Orange County, 273 N.C. 452, 160 S.E. 2d 282. Equally well recognized is the rule that the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act should be liberally construed so that the benefits under the Act will not be denied by narrow, technical or strict interpretation. Hollman v. City of Raleigh, 273 N.C. 240, 159 S.E. 2d 874; Cates v. Construction Co., 267 N.C. 560, 148 S.E. 2d 604; Keller v. Wiring Co., 259 N.C. 222, 130 S.E. 2d 342. \u201cIn seeking to discover and give effect to the legislative intent, an act must be considered as a whole, and none of its provisions shall be deemed useless or redundant if they can reasonably be considered as adding something to the act which is in harmony with its purpose. In re Watson, 273 N.C. 629, 161 S.E. 2d 1; Jones v. Board of Education, 185 N.C. 303, 117 S.E. 37.\u201d State v. Harvey, ante 1, 187 S.E. 2d 706.\nImposition of the restrictions contained in G.S. 97-2(12) upon the definition of \u201cnext of kin\u201d as defined in G.S. 97-40 would require that we ignore the unambiguous language contained in G.S. 97-40 that \u201cnext of kin\u201d be as \u201cherein defined.\u201d Further, a child, brother or sister who is partially or wholly dependent and under eighteen years of age would take death benefits under the provisions of G.S. 97-38. Thus, the imposition of the restrictions of dependency and age contained in G.S. 97-2(12) would result in a narrow and technical interpretation of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act.\nWe conclude that the 1965 re-write of G.S. 97-40 shows a clear intent by the General Assembly to remove the requirements of dependency, age and marital status from the definition of \u201cnext of kin\u201d who are entitled to death benefits under Section 40 of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act. This conclusion draws strength from the fact that the 1972 General Assembly (after the decision in Jones v. Sutton, supra) further amended G.S. 97-40 so as to include adult children or adult brothers and adult sisters in the definition of \u201cnext of kin\u201d contained in that section. By this amendment the General Assembly again evidenced its intent that the definition of \u201cnext of kin\u201d as contained in G.S. 97-40 should not be narrowly and strictly limited by the provisions of G.S. 97-2(12). Cates v. Construction Co., supra.\nWe note with approval the reasoning and conclusions in the dissenting opinion filed in the Court of Appeals by Mallard, Chief Judge.\nThe doctrine of pari materia does not apply and the provisions of G.S. 97-40 should not be construed with the provisions of G.S. 97-2(12).\nWe hold that brothers and sisters who are eighteen years of age or older, and who are married, are \u201cnext of kin\u201d as defined in G.S. 97-40.\nThe decision of the Court of Appeals is\nReversed.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRANCH, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Mason H. Anderson for 'plaintiff appellants.", "C. V. Jones, S. F. Gcmtt by S. F. Gantt, for defendant appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ANNIE NEAL STEVENSON, Sister, CURTIS DANIELS, Brother, ALFRED DANIELS, Brother, O\u2019NEAL DANIELS, Deceased Employee v. CITY OF DURHAM, Employer, Self-Insurer\nNo. 3\n(Filed 10 May 1972)\n1. Statutes \u00a7 5\u2014 statutory construction \u2014 legislative intent\nThe intent of the legislature controls the interpretation of a statute; in seeking to discover this intent, the courts should consider the language of the statute, the spirit of the act, and what the act' seeks to accomplish.\n2. Master and Servant \u00a7 47\u2014 Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act \u2014 construction\nThe Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act should be liberally construed so that the benefits under the Act will not be denied by narrow, technical or strict construction.\n3. Master and Servant \u00a7 79\u2014 workmen\u2019s compensation \u2014 death benefits \u2014 next of kin\nBrothers and sisters of a deceased employee who are eighteen years of age or older and married are \u201cnext of kin\u201d as defined in G.S. 97-40 and are entitled to receive compensation for the death of an employee who left no wife, child, parents or dependents surviving him, the dependency, age and marital status restrictions contained in G.S. 97-2(12) not being applicable to the definition of \u201cnext of kin\u201d contained in G.S. 97-40.\nAppeal from decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals (12 N.C. 632) affirming opinion and award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission.\nThe facts stipulated by the parties to this action disclose that O\u2019Neal Daniels was killed on 18 September 1969 as a result of an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment with defendant City of Durham. Defendant was a self-insurer. Deceased left no wife, child, parents, or dependents of any kind surviving him. He was survived by two brothers and one sister, all of whom were married and over eighteen years of age at the time of his death.\nThe surviving sister and brothers filed a claim with the North Carolina Industrial Commission alleging that they were next of kin pursuant to G.S. 97-40 and were therefore entitled to compensation as his next of kin.\nThe North Carolina Industrial Commission held that claimants were not next of kin and therefore no compensation was due or payable as a result of the employee\u2019s death, except the sum of $500 already paid to his administratrix to be applied on burial expenses.\nClaimants appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, with Chief Judge Mallard dissenting.\nThe case is before this Court on appeal pursuant to G.S. 7A-30 (2).\nMason H. Anderson for 'plaintiff appellants.\nC. V. Jones, S. F. Gcmtt by S. F. Gantt, for defendant appellee." }, "file_name": "0300-01", "first_page_order": 328, "last_page_order": 332 }