{ "id": 8563997, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN LEE EDWARDS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Edwards", "decision_date": "1972-11-15", "docket_number": "No. 2", "first_page": "201", "last_page": "207", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "282 N.C. 201" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "139 S.E. 2d 620", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 N.C. 406", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570263 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/263/0406-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 S.E. 2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "255 N.C. 583", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571608 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/255/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 S.E. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560152 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 U.S. 433", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1785566 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/367/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 U.S. 532", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6158265 ], "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/331/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 U.S. 707", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6181228 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "710" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/386/0707-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 S.E. 421", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "210 N.C. 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628566 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/210/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 S.E. 2d 561", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565516 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 123", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569736 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E. 2d 761", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573668 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0038-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 764, "char_count": 15766, "ocr_confidence": 0.554, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3052344300341564e-07, "percentile": 0.623078025012269 }, "sha256": "1d46ae272e8d4a78160e6b480a500f307c7bf3b1820d1e7038a20cfdaf30b2e0", "simhash": "1:347bf7ae77b4c2eb", "word_count": 2594 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:08:27.476898+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN LEE EDWARDS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HIGGINS, Justice.\nBy Exceptions Nos. 28 through 68, the defendant challenged the court\u2019s findings and order culminating in the admission of his confession in evidence before the jury. The evidence before the court with reference to the circumstances under which the confession was obtained was free from conflict. Its interpretation, therefore, became a question of law.\nHere is a summary of the essential facts as disclosed by the testimony of the officers: Eighteen days after the dead body of Mrs. Lloyd was discovered, the officers questioned the defendant, an 18-year-old retarded colored male with 60 IQ. Officer Horton, describing the defendant, testified: \u201cBoth his parents are deceasesd. And he more or less grew up like . . . a weed on the street fighting for his survival.\u201d\nAt first he denied any knowledge of Mrs. Lloyd\u2019s death and he stated that he was out the night of September 4-5 with named friends. When questioned, they failed to corroborate his story. Thereafter, on September 23-24, the officers conducted a further interrogation, pointing out the contradictions in his stories. While that interrogation was underway, a bondsman for the defendant in another criminal case \u201cturned him in.\u201d Thereafter, he was in custody. The interrogation continued in the Chapel Hill solicitor\u2019s office until 1:30 a.m. At that time he began to cry and admitted to the officers he had broken into Mrs. Lloyd\u2019s house for the purpose of stealing. She awakened, began screaming, and he choked her. He then disconnected the telephone and left. The officers reduced the confession to writing, using as much of defendant\u2019s words as fitted the story. They obtained a promise from him that he would repeat the confession and sign it in the presence of an attorney when the court appointed one to represent him.\nAlthough it was after midnight and the interrogation had been underway for several hours, the investigating officers left Chapel Hill with the defendant in custody, having called the district judge who appointed Mr. Noell attorney for the prisoner. Mr. Noell reported at once to the Hillsborough jail and conferred briefly with the defendant. The officers then, in the presence of Mr. Noell, presented the confession written in Chapel Hill and requested the defendant to sign it as he had promised to do before he saw Mr. Noell. Notwithstanding the advice of his attorney not to sign the confession or make any admissions, one of the officers reminded the defendant of his promise and admitted he said to John: \u201c . . . (I)f this is the statement you gave me, I would like your signature here. And this is the time that John signed it.\u201d The confession was offered and admitted in evidence over the defendant\u2019s objection.\nThe record discloses the Miranda warnings were given before any of the interrogations, but the defendant was without the presence or the advice of counsel until just before placing his signature on the writing prepared by the officers. The incidents here involved occurred prior to October 30, 1971, when G.S. 7A-457 was amended. State v. Wright, 281 N.C. 38, 187 S.E. 2d 761; State v. Blackmon, 280 N.C. 42, 185 S.E. 2d 123; State v. Lynch, 279 N.C. 1, 181 S.E. 2d 561.\nIt is obvious that the defendant\u2019s promise that he would repeat the confession in the presence of his attorney in Hills-borough outweighed the advice of the attorney. The confession obtained after a long questioning in the absence of counsel was inadmissible. When it was repeated pursuant to the promise, the taint was not removed. The prisoner was required to make a decision between the advice of his attorney not to sign and the promise he had made to the officers when he was not represented by counsel that he would sign in the presence of the attorney. He chose to disregard the advice of counsel and to keep his promise to the officers. Such was the uncontradicted evidence of the State\u2019s witnesses.\nThere was actually no break in the interrogation procedure beginning early in the evening at Chapel Hill and culminating in the signing of the confession at 3 o\u2019clock in the morning in Hillsborough. At the end of a long interrogation without counsel, the defendant, in tears, had made the confession. The inference is inescapable that the officers, thereafter, were in a hurry to have the defendant repeat the confession in the presence of a lawyer. As soon as the confession was obtained, although after midnight, the officers called the district judge who appointed Attorney Noell. Mr. Noell appeared promptly at the jail in Hillsborough where he advised the defendant not to make any admissions and not to sign any papers. The defendant signed after the officers told him that he need not follow the advice of his counsel. He signed on the line as requested by the officers.\nThe confession in Chapel Hill was inadmissible as having been induced at a time when the defendant was without counsel. The promise to repeat it was also made without counsel. It is not altogether surprising that this retarded boy paid more attention to his recent promise to the officers than he did to the advice of an attorney whom he did not know. The officers were his custodians. The attorney was a stranger. In this setting, the confession cannot qualify as voluntary.\nThe test by which admissibility is measured, was stated by Chief Justice Stacy in State v. Moore, 210 N.C. 686, 188 S.E. 421:\n\u201cVoluntary confessions are admissible in evidence against the party making them; involuntary confessions are not. A confession is voluntary in law when \u2014 and only when \u2014 it was in fact voluntarily made ....\n**:!:* ****\n\u201cIt is true that where a confession has been obtained under circumstances rendering it involuntary, a presumption arises which imputes the same prior influence to any subsequent confession, and this presumption must be overcome before the subsequent confession can be received in evidence.\u201d (Citing authorities.)\nThe Supreme Court of the United States in Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 710, stated the rule:\n\u201cOn this record, we cannot hold that petitioner\u2019s third statement was voluntary. It plainly cannot, on these facts, be separated from the circumstances surrounding the two earlier \u2018confessions.\u2019 There is here no break in the stream of events from the time Sunday morning when petitioner was taken to the police station to the time Tuesday morning some nine days later that he signed the statement in issue, sufficient to insulate the statement from the effect of all that went before. Compare United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947) with Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 444 (1961).\u201d\nIn State v. Gray, 268 N.C. 69, 150 S.E. 2d 1, this Court stated the rule:\n\u201c . . . \u2018Any circumstance indicating coercion or lack of voluntariness renders the admission incompetent.\u2019 State v. Guffey, supra. The fact that the defendant was in custody when he made the statement is a circumstance to be considered. State v. Guffey, supra. The mental capacity of the defendant is also a circumstance to be considered. State v. Whittemore, 255 N.C. 583, 122 S.E. 2d 396. There may, of course, be coercion of the mind without physical torture or threat thereof. State v. Chamberlain, 263 N.C. 406, 139 S.E. 2d 620.\u201d\nOn the record before us we are forced to conclude the evidence before the able trial judge was insufficient to support his finding the defendant\u2019s written confession was voluntary. The court committed prejudicial error in permitting the State to offer it in evidence.\nOther Assignments of Error do not require discussion.\nFor the court\u2019s error in admitting the defendant\u2019s confession, the verdicts are set aside, the judgments are vacated, and it is ordered that on each charge there be a\nNew trial.", "type": "majority", "author": "HIGGINS, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert Morgan, Attorney General, by Burley B. Mitchell, Jr., Assistant Attorney General for the State.", "Chambers, Stein, Ferguson & Banning by Adam Stein, Kenneth S. Broun for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN LEE EDWARDS\nNo. 2\n(Filed 15 November 1972)\nCriminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 75, 76\u2014 confession \u2014 finding of voluntariness unsupported by evidence \u2014 admission as prejudicial error\nEvidence presented on voir dire was insufficient to support the judge\u2019s finding that defendant\u2019s confession was voluntarily made where such evidence tended to show that defendant, an 18-year-old retarded male, was interrogated long into the night, that defendant finally confessed to the commission of the alleged offenses, that officers reduced the confession to writing and obtained a promise from defendant that he would repeat the confession and sign it in the presence of a court appointed attorney, and that defendant did in fact adhere to his promise despite advice from his attorney not to sign the confession or to make any admission; therefore, the court committed prejudicial error in a first degree murder and first degree burglary case by allowing the State to offer defendant\u2019s confession into evidence.\nAppeal by defendant from McKinnon, J., January 10, 1972 Session, Orange Superior Court.\nThe defendant, John Lee Edwards, was charged by grand jury indictments with the capital felonies of first degree burglary and first degree murder. The offenses are alleged to have been committed on the night of September 4-5,1971. The charges involved the forcible entry into the home of Mrs. Dora Lloyd for the purpose of committing the felony of rape and the first degree murder of Mrs. Lloyd.\nOn the morning of September 5, 1971, the dead body of Mrs. Lloyd was discovered in the house where she lived alone in Orange County. The autopsy disclosed she had died as a result of strangulation, perhaps by human hands. At the time of her death Mrs. Lloyd was 83 years of age.\nOn September 23 or 24 the officers questioned the defendant, a colored male eighteen years of age, concerning his possible connection with the charges of burglary and murder. At the time of the interrogation he was a suspect, but not under arrest. After being advised of his constitutional rights, he said he had nothing whatever to do with the murder of Mrs. Lloyd or the entry into her home. He gave an account of his actions on the night of September 4-5 and named the persons who were with him.\nDuring a further interrogation on September 24, the defendant\u2019s bondsman on another charge surrendered him to the interrogating officers who told him their information indicated he was not telling the truth. After questioning for several hours, he finally broke down, cried, and confessed that he forcibly entered the home of Mrs. Lloyd for the purpose of committing larceny. When she discovered his presence and screamed, he choked her until she ceased to resist. These admissions were obtained after midnight. The officers reduced the admissions to writing, using as nearly as possible the defendant\u2019s words. The officers requested and obtained a promise that he would repeat the admissions in the presence of an attorney when one was appointed for him.\nImmediately after obtaining the confession and the promise to repeat it, the officers called the district judge and requested the appointment of counsel. Although the hour was after midnight, the judge immediately appointed Attorney F. Lloyd Noell who met the officers and the prisoner soon after they arrived at the jail in Hillsborough. Following a short interview with the defendant, Mr. Noell advised him not to make any statements and not to sign any papers.\nOfficer Horton on cross-examination made this admission: \u201cI think the biggest part of the conversation between Chapel Hill and Hillsborough was the fact that John would make this statement in the presence of his attorney. ... He was asked if he would make the statement in the presence of an attorney. . . . He was asked if you will give us the same statement in the presence of your attorney, the answer was, yes.\u201d\nWhile the officers, the defendant, and Mr. Noell were together, the officers advised the defendant that he was not bound to accept the advice of his attorney, but that he had the right to decide for himself whether to sign the confession. At this time they presented the memorandum which had been written in Chapel Hill a short time before. The officers stated they would like for him to sign it and pointed out on the paper a place for his name. Declining the advice of his attorney, accepting the advice of the officers, he signed the confession. The hour was about 3 o\u2019clock in the morning following a night of interrogation.\nShortly after the signing of the memorandum, defendant\u2019s counsel petitioned the court to order a psychological examination of the defendant. Pursuant to the petition, the court ordered the defendant committed to Cherry Hospital for observation. The following is the conclusion of the hospital staff:\n. . Psychological report reveals a mild degree of retardation at the level of IQ 60. He was tense, hostile and suspicious during the psychological testing. He admitted that just before going to sleep he hears a voice talking to him saying, \u2018Why come I don\u2019t get to my normal self\u2019 and also that he sees something like \u2018humans fighting.\u2019 The patient did actually reaffirm the presence of these hallucinatory experiences in the interview of 11-23-71.\n\u201cIn evaluating this case, it is the feeling of the staff that the accident referred to in the past history that occurred early in 1968 when his bicycle was struck by a car, is not likely to be a contributory factor to the abnormalities seen on the electroencephalogram (brain wave test). The abnormality described as 14 & 6 positive spike phenomenon is seen in adolescents who show abnormal particularly aggressive behavior but it is not quite conclusive for any behavior abnormality. There is definite evidence of mental retardation and environmental problems have led to sullen and resentful attitude in this individual. The brief hallucinatory experiences described are not sufficiently severe to cause this disturbed behavior and to justify the diagnosis of psychotic disorder. The only positively established diagnoses are Mental Retardation, Mild, IQ 60 and Adjustment Reaction of Adolescence, and Without Psychosis. In the opinion of the staff, John Lee Edwards is competent to stand trial.\u201d\nThe trial began on January 10, 1972. Without objection, the indictments were consolidated and the cases tried together. After the jury was selected the State offered evidence tending to show that Mrs. Lloyd\u2019s home had been forcibly entered and she had been killed by strangulation.\nWhen the State offered the written confession by the defendant, his counsel objected. During the voir dire, one of the officers who conducted the interrogation testified, describing the prisoner: \u201cI would say that he hasn\u2019t had the opportunity that those of us . . . fortunate enough to have parents. To the best of my knowledge, he more or less grew up making his own rules and fighting for his survival.\u201d\nThe judge, in the absence of the jury, heard the evidence heretofore recited with respect to the circumstances under which the confession was obtained and concluded it was voluntarily made by the defendant in the presence of counsel. The confession was admitted in evidence over defendant\u2019s objection. The defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss both charges were denied.\nThe jury returned verdicts finding the defendant guilty of burglary in the first degree and murder in the first degree as charged in the indictments. The jury, however, having failed to make any recommendation with respect to punishment, the court imposed the death sentence in each case. The defendant appealed. After the judgments were entered the defendant petitioned that his trial counsel be relieved and that the present attorneys of record be appointed to prosecute his appeal. The court made the requested orders.\nRobert Morgan, Attorney General, by Burley B. Mitchell, Jr., Assistant Attorney General for the State.\nChambers, Stein, Ferguson & Banning by Adam Stein, Kenneth S. Broun for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0201-01", "first_page_order": 221, "last_page_order": 227 }