{ "id": 8558344, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LEVON BRYANT", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Bryant", "decision_date": "1973-04-11", "docket_number": "No. 47", "first_page": "227", "last_page": "234", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "283 N.C. 227" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "181 S.E. 2d 405", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565770 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 U.S. 250", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1771609 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/395/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 U.S. 18", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168882 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/386/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 U.S. 609", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1524757 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/380/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 A.L.R. 3d 1335", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 S.E. 2d 733", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 N.C. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12166109 ], "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/229/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 S.E. 470", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1936, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 N.C. 725", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2221417 ], "year": 1936, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/209/0725-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 S.E. 2d 740", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 572", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567109 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0572-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 S.E. 2d 115", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560629 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 S.E. 2d 156", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1939, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 N.C. 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8601719 ], "year": 1939, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/216/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 S.E. 2d 533", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1940, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 N.C. 627", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8611265 ], "year": 1940, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/216/0627-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 S.E. 2d 39", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "236 N.C. 738", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627698 ], "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/236/0738-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 S.E. 2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565220 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 S.E. 2d 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562785 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 S.E. 2d 858", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559179 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 S.E. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568083 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 S.E. 145", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1917, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 N.C. 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11270313 ], "year": 1917, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/173/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 S.E. 955", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1905, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. 491", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8656905 ], "year": 1905, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/137/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 U.S. 323", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6170963 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/398/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 S.E. 2d 71", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565099 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 S.E. 2d 778", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8596772 ], "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 S.E. 2d 589", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "255 N.C. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569896 ], "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/255/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 S.E. 2d 44", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 N.C. 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564264 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/269/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 S.E. 2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563969 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 S.E. 2d 296", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574551 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0198-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 839, "char_count": 17291, "ocr_confidence": 0.513, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2711802582710392e-07, "percentile": 0.783768474532685 }, "sha256": "1b59858809776f5d6439155c4a4e9c995f8d7953ab9e7187c290108fb8e61d83", "simhash": "1:d7675d36c2663876", "word_count": 2950 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:42:12.699050+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LEVON BRYANT" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUSKINS, Justice.\nFor his first assignment of error defendant says the court erred in denying his motion to quash the first degree murder charge. He argues that the action of the committing magistrate, who found \u201cprobable cause\u201d of second degree murder only, amounted to a dismissal of the first degree murder charge and limited the State to second degree murder as the maximum charge for which defendant could be tried.\nA district judge sitting as a committing magistrate in a preliminary hearing has no authority to dismiss a first degree murder charge. G.S. 7A-272(b) confers jurisdiction on the judges of the district court \u201cto conduct preliminary examinations and to bind the accused over for trial . . . upon a finding of probable cause, making appropriate orders as to bail or commitment.\u201d When performing these duties in felony cases, the district judge sits only as an examining magistrate. The trial and dismissal of felonies is beyond the jurisdiction of the district court.\n\u201cIn North Carolina, a preliminary hearing is simply an inquiry into whether the accused should be discharged or whether, on the other hand, there is probable cause to submit the State\u2019s evidence to the grand jury and seek a bill of indictment to the end that the accused may be placed upon trial. . . . [A]nd a discharge of the accused is not an acquittal and does not bar a later indictment.\u201d State v. Cradle, 281 N.C. 198, 188 S.E. 2d 296 (1972).\nChief Justice Bobbitt in State v. Foster, 282 N.C. 189, 192 S.E. 2d 320 (1972), said: \u201cNeither the North Carolina nor the United States Constitution requires a preliminary hearing. A preliminary hearing is not a necessary step in the prosecution of a person accused of crime, and an accused person is not entitled to a preliminary hearing as a matter of substantive right.\u201d It has been repeatedly held that a preliminary hearing is not an essential prerequisite to the finding of a bill of indictment and that it is proper to try the accused upon a bill of indictment without a preliminary hearing. State v. Overman, 269 N.C. 453, 153 S.E. 2d 44 (1967); State v. Hargett, 255 N.C. 412, 121 S.E. 2d 589 (1961); State v. Hackney, 240 N.C. 230, 81 S.E. 2d 778 (1954); 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law \u00a7 442 (1965).\nIt necessarily follows that an accused may be tried upon a bill of indictment which charges a felony different from the crime for which he was bound over. \u201cManifestly, when a prosecuting officer is satisfied that a higher grade of offense than that returned by the committing magistrate has been committed, he may draw the bill accordingly.\u201d State v. Mack, 282 N.C. 334, 193 S.E. 2d 71 (1972). To hold otherwise would constitute a committing magistrate the most powerful judicial officer in the State, endowed with infallibility and immune to appellate review. Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 26 L.Ed. 2d 300, 90 S.Ct. 1757 (1970), cited and relied on by defendant, is not in point. This assignment has no merit and is overruled.\nA State\u2019s witness, Willie James Gardner, testified that he visited defendant in jail, asked him why he killed the deceased, and defendant \u201cjust shook his head.\u201d Then, over objection, the witness was permitted to testify that he told defendant: \u201cWell, I heard a rumor that Charles [the deceased] was going with your wife. Is that true?\u201d The witness continued: \u201cAnd he said no; that it won\u2019t that. He said it was about some money and some other things. ...\u201d Defendant contends that the quoted testimony \u201camounted to nothing more than hearsay and should have been stricken.\u201d This constitutes defendant\u2019s second assignment of error.\nThe hearsay rule has often been stated as follows: \u201cEvidence, oral or written, is called hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part upon the competency and credibility of some person other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it.\u201d King v. Bynum, 137 N.C. 491, 49 S.E. 955 (1905); Chandler v. Jones, 173 N.C. 427, 92 S.E. 145 (1917). \u201cExpressed differently, whenever the assertion of any person, other than that of the witness himself in his present testimony, is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, the evidence so offered is hearsay. If offered for any other purpose, it is not hearsay.\u201d Stansbury, N. C. Evidence \u00a7 138 (Brandis Rev. 1973).\nHere, the testimony of Willie James Gardner concerning his conversation with defendant was not offered to prove the truth of rumors that the deceased was going with the defendant\u2019s wife. Its probative force did not depend on the competency and credibility of some person other than Willie James Gardner. Accordingly, the evidence was not hearsay and the hearsay rule is inapplicable. State v. Miller, 282 N.C. 633, 194 S.E. 2d 353 (1973). The evidence was relevant to defendant\u2019s state of mind and tended to show motive, and was properly admitted. State v. Robbins, 275 N.C. 537, 169 S.E. 2d 858 (1969). This assignment is overruled.\nDefendant next contends that the trial judge improperly defined \u201creasonable doubt\u201d as \u201ca possibility of innocence.\u201d The portion of the charge assigned as error is almost verbatim the charge quoted and discussed in State v. Bryant, 282 N.C. 92, 191 S.E. 2d 745 (1972), where this Court, while not approving the innovative portion of the charge, said: \u201cWe are of the opinion that the portion of the charge to which defendants here except places a greater burden on the State than the approved usage of such terms' as \u2018fully satisfied,\u2019 \u2018entirely convinced,\u2019 or \u2018satisfied to a moral certainty.\u2019 This portion of the charge is more favorable to defendants than that to-which they are entitled. They therefore fail to show error prejudicial to them.\u201d Accord, State v. Wright, 282 N.C. 364, 192 S.E. 2d 818 (1972). Prejudicial error is not shown here; hence, there is no merit in this assignment.\nFinally, defendant assigns as error-the following portion of the charge:\n\u201cNow ladies and gentlemen, I do want to charge you that in this case the defendant did not testify. Now, one of the most precious rights that we have under' the United States Constitution and under the common law of North Carolina, 'without regard to the U. S. Constitution is that no person is required to testify against himself in a criminal case, and the only way that this right can be fully protected is that when a person accused of a crime does not testify, that the jury must not consider his failure to testify one way or the other in reaching a decision in the case; so don\u2019t consider in your deliberations the fact that the defendant did not testify in this case.\u201d\nWe must decide whether the court committed prejudicial error by charging the jury in this fashion, no request for such charge having been made by defendant.\nG.S. 8-54 in relevant part reads as follows:\n\u201cIn the trial of all indictments, complaints, or other proceedings against persons charged with the commission of crimes, offenses or misdemeanors, the person so charged is, at his own request, but not otherwise, a competent witness, and his failure to make such request shall not create any presumption against him.\u201d (Emphasis ours.)\nUnder the foregoing statute the judge, is not required to instruct the jury that a defendant\u2019s failure to testify creates no presumption against him unless defendant so requests. State v. Rainey, 236 N.C. 738, 74 S.E. 2d 39 (1953); State v. Kelly, 216 N.C. 627, 6 S.E. 2d 533 (1940); State v. Jordan, 216 N.C. 356, 5 S.E. 2d 156 (1939); 3 Strong N. C. Index 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7 116. Chief Justice Bobbitt, speaking for the Court in State v. Barbour, 278 N.C. 449, 180 S.E. 2d 115 (1971), said: \u201cDefendant assigns as error the court\u2019s instructions to the effect that defendant\u2019s failure to testify was not to be considered against him. Although the instruction is meager and is not commended, we are constrained to hold that it meets minimum requirements. Ordinarily, it would seem better to give no instruction concerning a defendant\u2019s failure to testify unless such an instruction is requested by defendant.\u201d It is noted that the defendant Barbour made no request for such an instruction.\nIn State v. Rankin, 282 N.C. 572, 193 S.E. 2d 740 (1973), a case in which defendant did not request an instruction concerning his failure to testify but insisted the court erred in failing to give same, we said: \u201cSince defendant did not request the instruction he now insists the court should have given, the trial court properly omitted any mention of it.\u201d\nIn State v. Horne, 209 N.C. 725, 184 S.E. 470 (1936), the trial judge, without any request, instructed the jury with respect to defendant\u2019s failure to testify, saying defendant had a right to sit mute and say nothing and it should not be considered against him. The Court said: \u201cWe find no error in this instruction of which the defendant can complain.\u201d\nIn State v. McNeill, 229 N.C. 377, 49 S.E. 2d 733 (1948), the trial judge, without request, called the jury\u2019s attention to the fact that the defendant offered no evidence and did not testify in his own behalf and instructed the jury that defendant had the right to elect whether he would testify or not and his failure to do so \u201cshall not be considered against him prej-udicially by the jury.\u201d Since a new trial was awarded on. other grounds, the Court commented on this part of the charge as follows: \u201c . . . [W] e wish to call attention to the fact that the failure of a defendant to go upon the witness stand and testify in his own behalf' should not be made the subject of comment, except to inform the jury that a defendant may or may not testify in his own behalf as he may see fit, and his failure to testify \u2018shall not create any presumption against him.\u2019 G.S. 8-54.\u201d\nSome jurisdictions hold that unless the defendant so requests, such an instruction tends to accentuate the significance of his silence and thus impinges upon defendant\u2019s unfettered right to testify or not to testify at his option. See Annot., 18 A.L.R. 3d 1335.\nIn Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 14 L.Ed. 2d 106, 85 S.Ct. 1229 (1965), the failure of the accused to testify was commented upon by the prosecuting attorney and, in its instructions, by the court. Both the prosecutor and the court acted under Article I, section 13, of the California Constitution which provides that \u201c ... in any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him may be commented upon by the court and by counsel, and may be considered by the court or the jury.\u201d The Supreme Court of the United States held that the California comment rule violates the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court said: \u201cWhat the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing. What it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence .of the accused into evidence against him is quite another.\u201d It should be noted that in Griffin the trial judge instructed the jury, in effect, that defendant\u2019s silence is evidence of guilt, a permissible instruction under the California comment rule.\nHere, under our law, the trial judge specifically instructed the jury to the contrary. While we do not approve the language chosen, and reemphasize that it is better to give no instruction concerning failure of defendant to testify unless he requests, it, State v. Barbour, supra, we hold that the instruction given was not prejudicial. Even if it bp conceded arguendo that th\u00e9 charge was technically erroneous, in our opinion it was' harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L.Ed. 2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824 (1967); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 23 L.Ed. 2d 284, 89 S.Ct. 1726 (1969); State v. Fletcher and Arnold, 279 N.C. 85, 181 S.E. 2d 405. (1971). A different result would not have ensued had the portion of the charge complained of been omitted. Therefore, the charge was not prejudicial, and this assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant having failed to show prejudicial error the verdict and judgment must be upheld.\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUSKINS, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "G&rrans & Spence by C. E. Gerrcms for defendant appellant.", "Robert Morgan, Attorney General; William W. Melvin and William B. Ray, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of North Carolina." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LEVON BRYANT\nNo. 47\n(Filed 11 April 1973)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 21\u2014 preliminary hearing \u2014 probable cause of second degree murder \u2014 trial thereafter for first degree murder\nA finding of probable cause of second degree murder only by a district judge sitting as a committing magistrate did not amount to a dismissal of the first degree murder charge contained in the warrant or limit the State to second degree murder as the maximum charge for which defendant could be tried, and defendant was properly tried for first degree murder upon an indictment thereafter returned by the grand jury.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 73, 77 \u2014 conversation with defendant \u2014 hearsay rule \u2014 competency to show motive\nIn this first degree murder case, testimony by a witness that he asked defendant about a rumor that deceased had been going with defendant\u2019s wife and that defendant replied that it wasn\u2019t that but that \u201cit was about some money and other things\u201d was not hearsay and was properly admitted to show defendant\u2019s state of mind and his motive.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 112 \u2014 instructions on reasonable doubt \u2014 possibility of innocence\nIn a first degree murder prosecution, the trial judge\u2019s definition of reasonable doubt as a \u201cpossibility of innocence\u201d was more favorable to defendant than was required and therefore did not constitute prejudicial error.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 116 \u2014 charge on defendant\u2019s failure to testify \u2014 no prejudice\nAlthough it is the better practice to give no instruction concerning the failure of defendant to testify unless he requests it, the trial court\u2019s instruction in this first degree murder case to the effect that defendant\u2019s failure to testify should not be considered by the jury was not prejudicial to defendant.\nDefendant appeals from judgment of Webb, J23 October 1972 Criminal Session, Lenoir Superior Court.\nDefendant was charged in a warrant with the first degree murder of Charles Graham on 30 September 1972. A preliminary hearing was conducted before a district judge on 12 October 1972. The district judge, sitting as a committing magistrate, found probable cause of murder in the second degree and bound defendant over to the next term of superior court for trial with appearance bond fixed at $10,000.\nAt the 23 October 1972 Session the Grand Jury of Lenoir County returned a true bill of indictment charging defendant with murder in the first degree. Before pleading to the bill of indictment, defendant moved that the State be limited to murder in the second degree as the maximum charge against him. The motion was denied, defendant entered a plea of not guilty and was placed on trial for first degree murder.\nThe State\u2019s evidence \u2014 defendant offered none \u2014 tends to show that on and prior to 30 September 1972 the defendant, the deceased Charles Graham, and Freddie Marshall were operating a poker game in the back room of Charles Graham\u2019s shoeshine parlor in the 400 block of East Bright Street in Kinston. The cut from the poker game was to be split among the three, share and share alike.\nAbout 8:30 p.m. on 30 September 1972 while Freddie Marshall was talking to Charles Graham in the front area of the shoeshine parlor, defendant called Marshall outside and .told him to get out of the place. He asserted that Charles Graham owed him eleven dollars and had told him he would pay him Monday, but that he wanted the money now. The eleven dollars represented defendant\u2019s cut from the poker game the preceding night. Freddie Marshall offered to pay the debt but defendant declined the money saying he wanted to get it from Charles Graham. Defendant then went toward his car and returned with a .22 rifle in his hand. Charles Graham was sitting in the shoeshine stand on the inside of the building. Defendant ran up to the front of the building, fired through the window, then moved toward the door and fired two more shots toward the shoeshine stand. The deceased was found lying facedown in front of the shoeshine stand with blood under his head. Three spent .22 shells were found in front of the shoeshine parlor, and there was a bullet hole in the middle windowpane. \u201cThere is approximately eight inches to a foot from the windowpane to the chair. The bullet hole is approximately two inches above the chair arms.\u201d The deceased had three wounds \u2014 two on the head, one nicking the lower portion of the ear and entering the left mastoid process and the other above the right eye. The third wound was in the left front flank along the belt line area. Death resulted from the gunshot wounds in the head.\nPrior to the shooting defendant expressed ill will toward the deceased for not paying defendant his cut from the poker game; and the morning after the shooting defendant stated the reason he shot Charles Graham was \u201cmoney and some other things.\u201d\nThe jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree, and defendant was sentenced to prison for the remainder of his natural life. From the judgment imposed defendant appealed to the Supreme Court assigning errors discussed in the opinion.\nG&rrans & Spence by C. E. Gerrcms for defendant appellant.\nRobert Morgan, Attorney General; William W. Melvin and William B. Ray, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of North Carolina." }, "file_name": "0227-01", "first_page_order": 255, "last_page_order": 262 }