{ "id": 8559274, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HAROLD LEGUSTA WATKINS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Watkins", "decision_date": "1973-06-01", "docket_number": "No. 53", "first_page": "504", "last_page": "512", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "283 N.C. 504" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "174 S.E. 2d 526", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563327 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 S.E. 2d 345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 N.C. 718", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12167716 ], "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/229/0718-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 S.E. 2d 623", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1945, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 N.C. 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8601304 ], "year": 1945, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/225/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 S.E. 2d 132", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1947, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "228 N.C. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625474 ], "year": 1947, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/228/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 S.E. 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1929, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 N.C. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627574 ], "year": 1929, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/196/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 S.E. 2d 519", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1944, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 N.C. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8617272 ], "year": 1944, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/223/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 S.E. 2d 83", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 N.C. 637", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8620349 ], "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/249/0637-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 S.E. 2d 154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 N.C. 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574189 ], "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/264/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 S.E. 409", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1919, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "177 N.C. 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8655091 ], "year": 1919, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/177/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 S.E. 2d 238", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1940, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 N.C. 660", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8623349 ], "year": 1940, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/218/0660-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 S.E. 2d 452", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 N.C. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8607855 ], "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/245/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 S.E. 2d 429", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560086 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 N.C. 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8693779 ], "year": 1879, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/80/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 S.E. 2d 198", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 N.C. 622", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569811 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/270/0622-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 S.E. 2d 461", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 662", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559824 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0662-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 S.E. 151", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1926, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 N.C. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630195 ], "year": 1926, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/191/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "22 S.E. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 N.C. 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629144 ], "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/222/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 652", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570781 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 S.E. 2d 19", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566644 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 S.E. 2d 846", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559259 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0584-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 888, "char_count": 19836, "ocr_confidence": 0.511, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.477955829983626e-07, "percentile": 0.9603405449506902 }, "sha256": "0fa982ef42212018fc17395e170244ee700a2b545fe0f13de4bb44fdddc0be66", "simhash": "1:9b6178ba17a7df1d", "word_count": 3458 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:42:12.699050+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HAROLD LEGUSTA WATKINS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUSKINS, Justice.\nThe failure of the trial judge to inform the jury that a conviction of murder in the first degree would result in a mandatory sentence of death constitutes defendant\u2019s first assignment of error.\nThe jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree with recommendation of mercy. Defendant contends that had the jury known a sentence of death would be pronounced notwithstanding the mercy recommendation it would not have convicted him of murder in the first degree.\nFor reasons hereinafter stated, the death sentence pronounced in this case must be vacated and a life sentence pronounced in lieu thereof. In light of that fact, this assignment is overruled without discussion.\nThe propriety of informing the jury of the amount of punishment which a verdict of guilty will empower or require the judge to impose was explored in depth by Justice Sharp, writing for the Court, in State v. Rhodes, 275 N.C. 584, 169 S.E. 2d 846 (1969). The rule is stated in the following quotation from that case:\n\u201cIn this jurisdiction, except in one class of cases, the presiding judge fixes the punishment for a convicted defendant within the limits provided by the applicable statute. The exception is capital cases in which the jury may r\u00e9duce the penalty from death to life imprisonment. G.S. 14-17 (murder in the first degree); G.S. 14-21 (rape); G.S. 14-52 (burglary in the first degree); G.S. 14-58 (arson). In all other instances, the jury has performed its function and discharged its duty when it returns its verdict of guilty or not guilty. [Citations omitted.]\n\u201cThe amount of punishment which a verdict of guilty will empower the judge to impose is totally irrelevant to the issue of a defendant\u2019s guilt. It is, therefore, no concern of the jurors.\u201d\nSince 18 January 1973, the law enunciated in Rhodes has become, and is now, applicable in all cases without exception, including capital cases, because juries in this State no longer have the discretionary power to reduce the penalty in capital cases from death to life imprisonment. State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 194 S.E. 2d 19 (decided 18 January 1973).\nDefendant contends the court erred in allowing the solicitor to propound leading questions. His second assignment is based on exceptions to the following questions:\n1. \u201cDid you see the defendant, Harold Legusta Watkins, about that time?\u201d\n2. \u201cWas Ingram doing anything at all to Watkins at this time?\u201d\n3. \u201cAt the time he shot Lee Edward Ingram, was Lee Edward Ingram doing anything at all to Watkins?\u201d\n4. \u201cDid you see him load it again?\u201d\nThese questions do not necessarily suggest the answer desired although all of them could be answered yes or no. Be that as it may, \u201c[t]he allowance of leading questions is a matter entirely within the discretion of the trial judge, and his rulings will not be reviewed on appeal, at least in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion.\u201d Stansbury, N. C. Evidence \u00a7 31 (2d ed. 1963); State v. Frazier, 280 N.C. 181, 185 S.E. 2d 652 (1972); State v. Harris, 222 N.C. 157, 22 S.E. 2d 229 (1942); State v. Buck, 191 N.C. 528, 132 S.E. 151 (1926). No abuse of discretion is shown and no prejudice to defendant is discernible. Defendant\u2019s second assignment is therefore overruled.\nDefendant\u2019s third assignment of error is grounded on the failure of the court to instruct the jury on the right of self-defense.\nWhere the evidence is insufficient to invoke the doctrine of self-defense, the trial judge is not required to instruct the jury thereon. State v. Freeman, 275 N.C. 662, 170 S.E. 2d 461 (1969); State v. McLawhorn, 270 N.C. 622, 155 S.E. 2d 198 (1967); State v. Chavis, 80 N.C. 353 (1879). Indeed, it would be error to do so. State v. Johnson, 278 N.C. 252, 179 S.E. 2d 429 (1971).\nOn the other hand, where defendant\u2019s evidence is sufficient to warrant a charge on self-defense, the instruction must be given even though the State\u2019s evidence is contradictory. State v. Hipp, 245 N.C. 205, 95 S.E. 2d 452 (1956); State v. Greer, 218 N.C. 660, 12 S.E. 2d 238 (1940). In resolving this question the facts are to be interpreted in the light most favorable to defendant. State v. Finch, 177 N.C. 599, 99 S.E. 409 (1919). No special prayer for the instruction need be given. State v. Todd, 264 N.C. 524, 142 S.E. 2d 154 (1965); State v. Wagoner, 249 N.C. 637, 107 S.E. 2d 83 (1959).\nApplying the foregoing principles, we hold that the evidence when considered in the light most favorable to defendant did not warrant an instruction on self-defense. In essence, defendant testified that he went after the shotgun so he could discuss the apparent enmity of deceased toward him on an equal basis and without fearing for his own safety. \u201cI figured if I had a gun, I would have a better chance to talk with him and tell him to leave me alone, than without it.\u201d He alighted from the truck with gun in hand and crossed the street to the sidewalk on the other side with the gun pointed toward the ground. He saw deceased, walked toward him, stopped five or six feet from him, and called his name. Deceased turned and faced defendant. Defendant said, \u201cMule, why do you and Herman want to fight me, man?\u201d Deceased then started walking toward defendant with his hands in his back pockets. He threw up his arms and said, \u201cMan I don\u2019t mean no harm \u2014 we don\u2019t mean no harm.\u201d Immediately after making that statement he lunged at defendant with arms outstretched. At that moment the shotgun was still pointed toward the ground, but after the lunge, \u201cI throwed the gun up . . . and it shot. I don\u2019t know for sure if I pulled the trigger, I didn\u2019t mean to pull the trigger, I meant to scare him to keep him back off of me.\u201d Defendant saw no weapon in possession of the deceased and none was found upon his body.\nAt most, defendant\u2019s testimony makes out a non-felonious assault upon defendant by deceased. Assuming the truth of such evidence, it afforded defendant no legal basis for the intentional use of deadly force under the guise of self-defense. The law does not sanction the use of deadly force to repel simple assaults. State v. Ellerbe, 223 N.C. 770, 28 S.E. 2d 519 (1944); State v. Dills, 196 N.C. 457, 146 S.E. 1 (1929).\nNor does the State\u2019s evidence show self-defense. The State\u2019s witness Staton testified that defendant walked up to the deceased, said \u201cSay what you said before,\u201d then raised the gun and shot him before Ingram said anything else. The State\u2019s witness Mrs. McDonald testified that \u201cthe defendant came up. Ingram was getting ready to turn around when the defendant says, \u2018Say it now what you said before,\u2019 and Ingram got out of the car, and he was turning around; and he put his hand up and said, \u2018Hold it, man, hold it,\u2019 and the defendant shot him.\u201d\nThus, the State\u2019s evidence shows defendant shot deceased in cold blood, without provocation, under circumstances in which no reasonable man would have felt any apprehension of great bodily harm. Such evidence affords no basis whatsoever for an instruction on self-defense. See State v. Johnson, supra (278 N.C. 252, 179 S.E. 2d 429).\nOne who is an aggressor, or one who enters a fight voluntarily without lawful excuse, may not plead self-defense when he slays his adversary. State v. Randolph, 228 N.C. 228, 45 S.E. 2d 132 (1947). \u201cThe right of self-defense is available only to a person who is without fault, and if a person voluntarily, that is, aggressively and willingly, without legal provocation or excuse, enters into a fight, he cannot invoke the doctrine of self-defense unless he first abandons the fight and withdraws from it and gives notice to his adversary that he has done so.\u201d State v. Davis, 225 N.C. 117, 33 S.E. 2d 623 (1945). Accord, State v. Johnson, supra (278 N.C. 252, 179 S.E. 2d 429); State v. Church, 229 N.C. 718, 51 S.E. 2d 345 (1949). Thus the trial court correctly refrained from charging on self-defense. The evidence was sufficient to invoke the theory of accident, and the court properly presented that phase of the matter to the jury. Defendant\u2019s third assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant\u2019s fourth and fifth assignments of error relating to the failure of the court to charge on voluntary manslaughter and relating to acceptance of an allegedly improper verdict are overruled without discussion. See State v. Freeman, 275 N.C. 662, 170 S.E. 2d 461 (1969); State v. Baldwin, 276 N.C. 690, 174 S.E. 2d 526 (1970).\nFinally, defendant assigns as error the death sentence pronounced in this case. For the reasons which follow, this assignment is good.\nThe decision of this Court in State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 194 S.E. 2d 19 (decided 18 January 1973), judicially severed the unconstitutional discretionary proviso from G.S. 14-17 (and other statutes relating to capital crimes) and left standing the remainder of each statute as the only valid expression of the legislative intent, with death as the mandatory punishment for murder in the first degree, rape, burglary in the first degree and arson. The effect of that severance was to change the penalty for first degree murder, and the other capital crimes, from death or life imprisonment in the discretion of the jury to mandatory death. We regarded the change as an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of the penalty for the four capital crimes in this State and held that the enlarged penalty, i.e., mandatory death, could not be constitutionally applied ex post facto. For that reason, Waddell specifically holds that the mandatory death penalty for murder in the first degree, rape, burglary in the first degree and arson may not be constitutionally applied to any offense committed prior to 18 January 1973, the date Waddell was handed down. Therefore, since the murder of Lee Edward Ingram, for which defendant was convicted, occurred on 24 February 1972, the mandatory death penalty cannot be applied.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court of Richmond County insofar as it imposed the death penalty upon this defendant is reversed. The case is remanded to the Superior Court of Richmond County with directions to proceed as follows:\n1. The presiding judge of the Superior Court of Richmond County will cause to be served on the defendant, Harold Legusta Watkins, and on his counsel of record, notice to appear during a session of said Superior Court at a designated time, not less than ten days from the date of the notice, at which time, in open court, the defendant, Harold Legusta Watkins, being present in person and being represented by his counsel, the presiding judge, based on the verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree with recommendation of mercy returned by the jury at the trial of this case at the November 13, 1972 Session, will pronounce judgment that the defendant, Harold Legusta Watkins, be imprisoned for life in the State\u2019s prison.\n2. The presiding judge of the Superior Court of Richmond County will issue a writ of habeas corpus to the official having custody of the defendant, Harold Legusta Watkins, to produce him in open court at the time and for the purpose of being present when the judgment imposing life imprisonment is pronounced.\nRemanded for judgment.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUSKINS, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Joseph G. Davis, Jr., Attorney for defendant appellant.", "Robert Morgan, Attorney General, and Howard P. Satisky, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of North Carolina." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HAROLD LEGUSTA WATKINS\nNo. 53\n(Filed 1 June 1973)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 120, 135, 138 \u2014 imposition of punishment \u2014 role of judge and jury\nThe rule that the presiding judge fixes the punishment for a convicted defendant within the limits provided by the applicable statute and therefore the amount of punishment which a verdict of guilty will empower the judge to impose is totally irrelevant to the issue of a defendant\u2019s guilt and of no concern to the jurors is now applicable in all cases without exception, including capital cases because juries in this State no longer have the discretionary power to reduce the penalty in capital cases from death to life imprisonment.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 87 \u2014 leading questions allowed \u2014 no error\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the solicitor to ask leading questions where the four questions involved did not necessarily suggest the answer desired although all of them could have been answered yes or no.\n3. Homicide \u00a7 28 \u2014 failure to instruct on self-defense \u2014 no error\nDefendant was not entitled to an instruction on self-defense where his evidence tended to show that he approached the unarmed deceased with a shotgun, deceased lunged at him and defendant \u201cthrowed the gun up . . . and it shot\u201d; nor did the State\u2019s evidence require such an instruction where it tended to show that defendant walked up to the deceased, said \u201cSay what you said before,\u201d then raised the gun and shot him before deceased could say anything else.\n4. Constitutional Law \u00a7 35; Criminal Law \u00a7 135\u2014 first degree murder \u2014 mandatory death penalty not applicable\nThe mandatory death penalty for murder in the first degree, rape, burglary in the first degree and arson may not be constitutionally applied to any offense committed prior to 18 January 1973, the date State v. Waddell was handed down; therefore, since the murder for which defendant was convicted occurred on 24 February 1972, the mandatory death penalty cannot be applied and the case is remanded for imposition of sentence of life imprisonment.\nDefendant appeals from judgment of Martin, /., 18 November 1972 Session, Richmond Superior Court.\nDefendant was tried upon a bill of indictment, proper in form, charging him with the murder of Lee Edward Ingram on 24 February 1972.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tends to show that defendant worked in Aberdeen on 24 February 1972 and returned to Rockingham about 5:30 p.m. Around 9 p.m. he left Potts\u2019 Pool Room on East Washington Street in Rockingham in company with James Malloy and Alfred Steele. They drove to the Philadelphia section which is about five miles from East Washington Street. There defendant redeemed a 12-gauge single-barreled shotgun which he and his uncle had previously pawned to Mrs. Maude Dennis. Defendant and his companions then returned to East Washington Street. Defendant alighted and his companions drove on about fifty feet to park the car. \u201cAbout a minute after we let the defendant out of the car, I heard a shot. At that time we were getting out of the truck. . . . When I got out of the truck, I saw somebody laying in the street, but I did not know who it was. He was about 50 or 60 feet away.\u201d\nCassie Belle Staton testified that she was in the vicinity of East Washington Street around 10 p.m. and had seen Lee Edward Ingram, the deceased, come out of the pool room about 9:30 p.m. and get in a car occupied by Mrs. Imogene McDonald. He stayed in the car awhile and was getting out of it when defendant approached with a shotgun in his hand and said, \u201cI got you now.\u201d With gun in hand, defendant kept repeating, \u201cSay what you said before; say it now.\u201d Ingram replied, \u201cMan, what are you talking about?\u201d Defendant said, \u201cCome on now; why don\u2019t you say it now?\u201d Before Ingram said anything else defendant threw up the gun and shot him in the face. Ingram died on the spot. Defendant went into Potts\u2019 Pool Room, reloading the gun as he went.\nPoliceman Jasper Christmas arrived on the scene within five minutes and found Ingram lying on the street five or six feet from Potts\u2019 Pool Hall. He examined the body, found part of the head blown off, and determined that Lee Edward Ingram was dead.\nDefendant testified as a witness in his own behalf. He said he was twenty-one years of age, married but not living with his wife. He was casually acquainted with Lee Edward Ingram and knew he went by the name of \u201cMule\u201d Ingram. He first heard about Ingram in September 1971. At that time Ingram was with defendant\u2019s wife, and as she left to go with defendant Mule Ingram \u201ctold me I had better not hit her.\u201d He saw Ingram again in December 1971 in company with one Herman Baldwin when Baldwin fired a gun toward defendant\u2019s house. Defendant testified he had been informed by his brother that Mule Ingram, Herman Baldwin and Bo Didley were looking for him; that Mule was \u201ccursing and going on\u201d and had a gun; \u201cthat Mule was the one that wanted to fight, and that Mule was pushing [putting] Herman up to fight me.\u201d\nDefendant testified that he weighs 133 pounds and is 5 feet 9 inches tall, and that Mule Ingram weighed about twenty pounds more and was about two inches taller. On 24 February 1972 defendant worked in Aberdeen, returned to Rockingham after getting off work, and went to Quick\u2019s Grill where he drank some beer and wine. He then went to the pool room where he saw several people including Mule Ingram. He heard Mule Ingram say, \u201cDamn \u2014 that damn ass is here now.\u201d After hearing this, defendant left the pool room and got James Malloy to take him to get the shotgun, intending to talk to Ingram. \u201cI figured that was the only way I could talk to him to keep him away from me, to leave me alone.\u201d Defendant further testified that he had given Ingram no reason to call him a damn ass. He went to Maudie\u2019s Place and got a shotgun his uncle had pawned there and returned, figuring that \u201cif they seen me with the gun ... I would have a better chance to talk with him and tell him to leave me alone.\u201d When he got back to the East Washington Street area defendant got out of the truck and crossed the street to the sidewalk with the gun in his right hand, the barrel pointed downward. He saw Ingram standing facing the McDonald car, walked toward him, stopped five or six feet from him, and called his name. When Ingram turned to face him, defendant said, \u201cMule, why do you and Herman want to fight me, man?\u201d Ingram threw his arms up and said, \u201cMan, I don\u2019t mean no harm \u2014 we don\u2019t mean no harm,\u201d but was coming toward defendant while making that statement; \u201cand right after he said that he just made a jump, a lunge at me.\u201d When Ingram made the lunge he was about an arm\u2019s length away, and defendant \u201cthrowed the gun up and it shot.\u201d\nDefendant said he did not recall pulling the trigger and meant only to scare Ingram to keep him off. He testified that he entered the pool room and a man named Rush told him he had better run, whereupon he threw the gun down and ran. He said he never ejected the spent shell from the chamber and never reloaded the gun. He stated that he believed Ingram had a knife at the time but that he did not intend to kill Ingram. He denied saying to Ingram: \u201cSay again what you said before, say it now, man.\u201d\nNumerous witnesses testified that they had known defendant all of his life and that his general reputation was good.\nAlbert McDonald, a rebuttal witness for the State, testified that he was in Potts\u2019 Pool Room about ten o\u2019clock when he heard the shot; that defendant came in and asked for Herman Baldwin \u201cand said he was going to kill that son-of-a-bitch too\u201d; that somebody' said \u201cHere comes the police,\u201d and defendant ran toward the back door, threw the shotgun in the bathroom, and ran out.\nMrs. Imogene McDonald testified that she talked with Lee Edward Ingram, the deceased, while her husband was in the pool room; that Ingram was sitting in her car, and when he opened the door to get out the defendant approached and said, \u201cSay it now what you said before\u201d; that Ingram then got out of the car and was turning around as he put his hand up and said, \u201cHold it, man, hold it,\u201d and defendant shot him; that they were three to six feet apart; that defendant then went into the pool room; that Mule Ingram was her first cousin.\nDefendant\u2019s motion for judgment of nonsuit at the close of all the evidence was denied. The jury convicted defendant of murder in the first degree and recommended mercy. Defendant appeals from a sentence of death by asphyxiation, assigning errors discussed in the opinion.\nJoseph G. Davis, Jr., Attorney for defendant appellant.\nRobert Morgan, Attorney General, and Howard P. Satisky, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of North Carolina." }, "file_name": "0504-01", "first_page_order": 532, "last_page_order": 540 }