{ "id": 8559413, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PRESTON GLENN HUMPHREY", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Humphrey", "decision_date": "1973-06-01", "docket_number": "No. 59", "first_page": "570", "last_page": "574", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "283 N.C. 570" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "61 N.C. 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2090081 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/61/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 S.E. 324", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 N.C. 740", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8616534 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/208/0740-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 S.Ct. 4", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 L.Ed. 659", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 U.S. 848", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11318696, 11318601, 11318468, 11318765 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/344/0848-03", "/us/344/0848-02", "/us/344/0848-01", "/us/344/0848-04" ] }, { "cite": "96 L.Ed. 1302", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 U.S. 790", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11341724 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/343/0790-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 A.L.R. 659", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 A.L.R. 2d 1447", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 A.L.R. 3d 1228", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 A.L.R. 391", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 N.C. 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1961126 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/53/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 S.E. 657", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8650978 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/100/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 S.E. 2d 348", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 N.C. 662", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12167610 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/229/0662-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 649", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6175415 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0649-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 S.E. 2d 802", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 N.C. 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562331 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/271/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 S.E. 2d 328", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557876 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 677", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571097 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 S.E. 2d 145", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575301 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 S.E. 2d 241", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558608 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E. 2d 735", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573795 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 S.E. 2d 364", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8596105 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E. 2d 47", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573124 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0633-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 643, "char_count": 10318, "ocr_confidence": 0.535, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.754901533651809e-07, "percentile": 0.9301198641310748 }, "sha256": "364cb42989df9fd2099e5674564f3984d0263d8169e22ce75d50ef5b981f2602", "simhash": "1:121a106704022cc7", "word_count": 1721 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:42:12.699050+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PRESTON GLENN HUMPHREY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRANCH, Justice.\nDefendant first assigns as error the admission of evidence concerning the commission of an offense involving .indecent exposure which allegedly occurred a short time after the commission of the charged crime.\nThe general rule in North Carolina is that the State may not offer proof of another crime independent of and distinct from the crime for which defendant is being prosecuted even though the separate offense is of the same nature as the charged crime. State v. Long, 280 N.C. 633, 187 S.E. 2d 47; State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 81 S.E. 2d 364; 1 Stansbury North Carolina Evidence \u00a7 91 (Brandis rev. 1973). However, such evidence is competent to show \u201cthe quo animo, intent, design, guilty knowledge, or scienter, or to make out the res gestae, or to exhibit a chain of circumstances in respect of the matter on trial, when such crimes are so connected with the offense charged as to throw light upon one or more of these questions.\u201d State v. Jenerett, 281 N.C. 81, 187 S.E. 2d 735; State v. Atkinson, 275 N.C. 288, 167 S.E. 2d 241.\nThe evidence here challenged was competent to show defendant\u2019s quo animo, or state of mind.\nFurther, in light of the overwhelming evidence, including defendant\u2019s confession, we do not believe there is a reasonable probability that the admission of this evidence might have contributed to defendant\u2019s conviction. State v. Thacker, 281 N.C. 447, 189 S.E. 2d 145; State v. Taylor, 280 N.C. 273, 185 S.E. 2d 677.\nThis assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error relate to the rulings of the trial judge sustaining the State\u2019s objections to psychiatric testimony concerning ' defendant\u2019s mental' state as .affecting his criminal responsibility and intent, and the refusal of the trial judge to give special instructions which would mandate'an acquittal if the jury found that-defendant\u2019s actions resulted from an irresistible, uncontrollable impulse.\nDefendant sought to elicit from Dr. Robert N. Harper an opinion as to whether \u201cdefendant possessed sufficient power to prevent himself from committing the act.\u201d The trial judge sustained the State\u2019s objection to this line of questioning.\nFor more than 100 years this Court has recognized the test of criminal responsibility to be the ability of the accused at the time he committed the act to realize and appreciate the nature and quality thereof \u2014 his ability to distinguish between right and wrong. State v. Mereer, 275 N.C. 108, 165 S.E. 2d 328; State v. Spence, 271 N.C. 23, 155 S.E. 2d 802, rev\u2019d on other grounds 392 U.S. 649, 20 L.Ed. 2d 1350, 88 S.Ct. 2290; State v. Creech, 229 N.C. 662, 51 S.E. 2d 348; State v. Potts, 100 N.C. 457, 6 S.E. 657; State v. Brandon, 53 N.C. 463. North Carolina, as well as many other jurisdictions, has steadfastly refused to recognize the \u201cirresistible impulse doctrine\u201d as a test of criminal responsibility. State v. Spence, supra; State v. Creech, supra; State v. Brandon, supra; Annot., 173 A.L.R. 391. See generally, Annot., 22 A.L.R. 3d 1228; Annot., 45 A.L.R. 2d 1447; Annot., 70 A.L.R. 659.\nIn State v. Spence, supra, former Chief Justice Parker, quoting respectively from State v. Creech, supra, and Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 96 L.Ed. 1302, 72 S.Ct. 1002, reh. den. 344 U.S. 848, 97 L.Ed. 659, 73 S.Ct. 4 stated:\n\u201c \u2018The test of responsibility is the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong at the time and in respect of the matter under investigation. S. v. Potts, 100 N.C. 457, 6 S.E. 657; S. v. Brandon, 53 N.C. 463. He who knows the right and still the wrong pursues is amenable to the criminal law. S. v. Jenkins, 208 N.C. 740, 182 S.E. 324. On the other hand, if \u201cthe accused should be in such a state of mental disease as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing wrong,\u201d the law does not hold him accountable for his acts, for guilt arises from volition, and not from a diseased mind. S. v. Haywood, 61 N.C. 376.\n\u2018We are aware of the criticism of this standard by some psychiatrists and others. Still, the critics have offered nothing better. It has the merit of being well established, practical and so plain \u201cthat he may run that readeth it.\u201d Hab. 2:2. Moreover, it should be remembered that the criminal law applies equally to all sorts and conditions of people. It ought to be sufficiently clear to be understood by the ordinary citizen.\u2019\n\u2018 . . . Knowledge of right and wrong is the exclusive test of criminal responsibility in a majority of American jurisdictions. The science of psychiatry has made tremendous strides since that test was laid down in M\u2019Nagkten\u2019s Case, but the progress of science has not reached a point where its learning would compel us to require the states to eliminate the right and wrong test from their criminal law_\nDefendant\u2019s counsel ably presented arguments for adoption of the \u201cirresistible impulse doctrine.\u201d However, neither defendant\u2019s arguments nor our research disclose reasons sufficiently persuasive to warrant modification or abrogation of the long-recognized \u201cright and wrong\u201d test of criminal responsibility.\nThe trial judge\u2019s rulings on the psychiatric testimony offered by defendant was without error, and he correctly refused to give the special instructions tendered by defendant.\nWe have carefully examined the entire record of this case and find no prejudicial error.\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRANCH, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Morgan; Assistant Attorney General Millard R. Rich, Jr. and Assistant Attorney General, Richard B. Conely for the State.", "Carlos W. Murray, Jr. for appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PRESTON GLENN HUMPHREY\nNo. 59\n(Filed 1 June 1973)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 34; Rape \u00a7 4\u2014 evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt of a subsequent offense \u2014 admissibility to show quo animo\nTrial court in a rape prosecution did not err in admitting evidence concerning the commission of an offense involving indecent exposure which allegedly occurred a short time after'the commission of the charged crime where that evidence was competent to show defendant\u2019s quo animo, or state of mind; moreover, in the light of the overwhelming evidence, including defendant\u2019s confession, there was no reasonable probability that the admission of the evidence in question might have contributed to defendant\u2019s conviction.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 5, 63\u2014 criminal responsibility \u2014 right and wrong test \u2014 irresistible impulse doctrine\nThe test of criminal responsibility is not the \"irresistible impulse doctrine,\u201d rather, it is the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong at the time and in respect of the matter under-investigation; therefore, the trial judge in a rape case properly refused to allow psychiatric testimony with respect to an \u201cuncontrollable urge\u201d under which defendant allegedly committed the offense, and he correctly refused to give the special instructions tendered by defendant.\nAppeal by defendant from Godwin, S. J., 6 November 1972 Special Criminal Session of WAKE Superior Court.\nDefendant was tried on a bill of indictment charging the crime of rape. Upon his arraignment he entered a plea of not guilty.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show that on the night of 15 July 1972 Miss Donna Jo Connally, who was director of religious life for Youth Camps, Inc., was in Faircloth Dormitory at Meredith College checking rooms to see if they were ready to accommodate girls who were arriving on the following day. As she walked along the first floor hall, she observed a man approaching and asked if she could help him. He continued to walk toward her, saying that he was looking, for .a girl named Diane. As he came closer Miss Connally observed that his private parts were exposed, and she thereupon tried to lock herself in a room. He caught her, and in the ensuing struggle she fell to the floor. He began ripping off her clothes and then took her into a room, where he finished taking off her clothes. He took off his own clothes and despite her pleas, screams and struggles had intercourse with her against her will. He left the dormitory, and Miss Connally sought help and was thereafter carried to Rex Hospital.\nThe State offered medical testimony which disclosed that the doctors observed bruises and lacerations on the body of Miss Connally. The examination further disclosed a laceration of the hymen. Dr. Davis, a pathologist, testified that intercourse had definitely taken place.\nDefendant was picked up by police officers at a parking lot at approximately 2:15 a.m. He voluntarily accompanied the officers to the police station where he later prepared and signed a statement. The statement admitted the raping of Donna Jo Connally and also related that in the early morning hours of 16 July he followed a woman home and while completely naked walked up into the next yard. He left when she turned on the lights and started the motor of her automobile.\nAt trial defendant testified and admitted that he had raped Miss Connally. He stated: \u201cI didn\u2019t want to do it to her. I just had to. I mean it just \u2014 I couldn\u2019t control it. I couldn\u2019t stop it.\u201d\nDefendant also offered as a witness Dr. Robert N. Harper, a medical expert in psychiatry.\nThe trial judge conducted a voir dire hearing on the State\u2019s objection to Dr. Harper\u2019s testimony concerning defendant\u2019s mental condition. At the close of the voir dire hearing, the judge indicated that he would sustain the State\u2019s objection to any testimony by the witness to the effect \u201cthat the defendant was caught up in an uncontrollable urge to have sexual intercourse with Miss Connally which he could not control, and that the act of rape charged in the bill of indictment probably would not have occurred but for said uncontrollable urge.\u201d Thereafter Dr. Harper testified before the jury that in his opinion defendant understood and appreciated the nature and quality of his act and that defendant was aware of its wrongful nature. The trial judge refused to allow the witness to express an opinion as to whether defendant possessed sufficient power to prevent himself from committing the act or from stating his opinion that the act would not have occurred but for mental disease or defect afflicting defendant at the time it was committed.\nThe jury returned a verdict of guilty, and defendant appealed from judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment.\nAttorney General Morgan; Assistant Attorney General Millard R. Rich, Jr. and Assistant Attorney General, Richard B. Conely for the State.\nCarlos W. Murray, Jr. for appellant." }, "file_name": "0570-01", "first_page_order": 598, "last_page_order": 602 }