{ "id": 8560241, "name": "BILLIE J. HENSLEY and wife, JOYCE HENSLEY v. CLYDE RAMSEY", "name_abbreviation": "Hensley v. Ramsey", "decision_date": "1973-08-31", "docket_number": "No. 77", "first_page": "714", "last_page": "733", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "283 N.C. 714" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "78 S.E. 2d 122", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124-125" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "238 N.C. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8608268 ], "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/238/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 S.E. 2d 766", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "770" }, { "page": "770" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558820 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 S.E. 2d 892", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "898" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8606692 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 S.E. 2d 661", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "665" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629236 ], "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 S.E. 2d 360", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "246 N.C. 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625745 ], "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/246/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 S.E. 2d 512", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "514" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 N.C. 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8596944 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/233/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 S.E. 2d 393", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566921 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0591-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 S.E. 2d 541", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "543" }, { "page": "543" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "237 N.C. 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8615403 ], "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/237/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 S.E. 142", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1889, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8650704 ], "year": 1889, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/104/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 S.E. 2d 803", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "805" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "262 N.C. 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568473 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/262/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 S.E. 2d 183", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "260 N.C. 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575226 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "454" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/260/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 S.E. 2d 395", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "247 N.C. 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627803 ], "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/247/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 S.E. 2d 400", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565799 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 S.CL 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "S.C.L.", "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 L.Ed. 177", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 U.S. 571", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 365441 ], "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/332/0571-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 U.S. 212", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 354136 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1947, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/330/0212-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1329, "char_count": 42175, "ocr_confidence": 0.581, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.435215088652209e-07, "percentile": 0.9598422533514502 }, "sha256": "4bb478aa380931836378c5ba74fd3721a8b8d4226a6d0662bf6e18304296a478", "simhash": "1:8b48b00116614010", "word_count": 7218 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:42:12.699050+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BILLIE J. HENSLEY and wife, JOYCE HENSLEY v. CLYDE RAMSEY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BOBBITT, Chief Justice.\nAt the conclusion of plaintiffs\u2019 evidence defendant moved for a directed verdict in his favor \u201cfor lack of the plaintiffs\u2019 evidence to sustain a case against the defendant.\u201d The record indicates the court then heard argument by defendant\u2019s counsel in support of this motion but is silent as to the content of such argument. Defendant\u2019s motion was denied. At the conclusion of all'the evidence the record shows simply: \u201cDefendant renews his motion for directed verdict. Motion denied.\u201d\nNothing in the record indicates that defendant, subsequent to the return of the verdict, moved for a directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or made any other motion. Nor does the record indicate that the court at that time considered on its own motion whether a directed verdict should have been entered.\nDefendant excepted to and assigns as error the denial of his motions for a directed verdict. Plaintiffs contend that defendant\u2019s failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 50, Rules of Civil Procedure, G.S. 1A-1, precludes consideration of these assignments on this appeal.\nWe note first that Rule 50(a) requires that \u201c[a] motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor.\u201d Cited decisions based on the identical provision in Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules [Title 28, U.S.C.A., Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 43 to 51, pp. 375-76] support the statement that \u201c[t]he requirement that grounds be stated on a motion for a directed verdict is mandatory.\u201d 9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, \u00a7 2533, p. 579 (1971). The better practice is to set forth the specific grounds in a written motion. 9 Wright & Miller, op. cit. \u00a7 2533, p. 581. If the movant relies upon an. oral statement for such specific grounds, a transcript thereof must be incorporated in the case on appeal.\nApart from the failure of the record to disclose the specific grounds urged by defendant in support of his motions for a directed verdict, whether a directed verdict should have been granted is not presented on this appeal.\nRule 50(b), which bears the caption, \u201cMotion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,\u201d is composed of sections (1) and (2).\nRule 50(b) (1) provides:\n\u201cWhenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the submission of the action to the jury shall be deemed to be subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment, a party who has moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such party, within 10 days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict. In either case the motion shall be granted if it appears that the motion for directed verdict could properly have been granted. A motion for a new trial may be joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the alternative. If a verdict was returned the judge may allow the judgment to stand or may set aside the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. If no verdict was returned the judge may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed or may order a new trial. Not later than ten (10) days after entry of judgment or the discharge of the jury if a verdict was not returned, the judge on his own motion may, with or without further notice and hearing, grant, deny, or redeny a motion for directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence that was denied or for any reason was not granted.\" (Our italics.)\nRule 50 (b) authorizes \u201ca \u2018reserved directed verdict\u2019 motion practice.\u201d Phillips Supplement (1970) to the Second Edition of McIntosh, N. C. Practice and Procedure, \u00a7 1488.35, p. 29, hereafter cited as Phillips. The reservation of final ruling on a motion for a directed verdict affords the basis for the post-verdict motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.\nOur Rule 50 (b) (2) provides:\n\u201cAn appellate court, on finding that a trial judge should have granted a motion for directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence, may not direct entry of judgment in accordance with the motion unless the party who made the motion for a directed verdict also inoved for judgment in accordance with Rule 50(b)(1) or the trial judge on his own motion granted, denied or redenied the motion for a directed verdict in accordance with Rule 50(b)(1).\u201d (Our italics.)\nOur Rule 50 (b) (2) has no counterpart in Federal Rule 50(b).\nIn Cone v. West Virginia Pulp and Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 91 L.Ed. 849, 67 S.Ct. 752 (1947), the Supreme Court of the United States held that, in the absence of a post-verdict motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in accordance with Federal Rule 50 (b), the Circuit Court of Appeals had no authority to enter judgment in accordance with the defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict but was limited to the award of a new trial. Accord, Globe Liquor Co. v. San Roman, 332 U.S. 571, 92 L.Ed. 177, 68 S.CL 246 (1948). The reasons underlying the decisions in Cone and in Globe Liquor Co. are set forth in the opinions of Justice Black. See also, Comment in Phillips, op. cit., p. 33, n. 14. For criticisms of these decisions, see 5A Moore\u2019s Federal Practice, \u00b6 50.12, pp. 2367-74 (2d Ed. 1971). Seemingly to free the trial judge from dependence upon the initiative of a litigant after verdict to renew his motion for a directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the General Assembly amended Rule 50(b) as originally proposed, see Chapter 954, Session Laws of 1967, by substituting therefor Rule 50(b) (1) and (b) (2) as quoted above. Chapter 895, Session Laws of 1969. See Elster, Highlights of Legislative Changes to the New Rules of Civil Procedure, 6 Wake Forest Intra. L. Rev. 267, 278-80 (1970).\nNow under the italicized portion of Rule 50(b)(1) and under the italicized portion of Rule 50(b) (2), as quoted above, the trial judge on his own motion, within the time prescribed in Rule 50(b) (1), may grant, deny, or redehy the motion for a directed verdict in accordance with Rule 50(b) (1).\nWe note that Rule 41 and Rule 50 (b) were\u2019 rewritten and enacted by Sections 10 and Tl, respectively^ of Chapter 895, Session Laws of 1969. Whether the court, after the entry of judgment and within the time prescribed by Rule 50(b)(1), upon motion or on its own motion may set aside the verdict and judgment and order' a voluntary dismissal without prejudice upon such terms and conditions as justice requires, is not presented on this appeal. See Rule 41 (a) (2); also, King v. Lee, 279 N.C. 100, 181 S.E. 2d 400 (1971).\nSince the defendant made no post-verdict motion and since the trial judge after verdict did not of his own motion consider whether a directed verdict should have been entered, this Court \u201cmay not direct entry of judgment in accordance with the motion\u201d by reason of the express terms Of Eule 50 (b) (2).\nWe consider now whether defendant\u2019s other assignments of error entitle him to a new trial.\nEvidence offered by defendant was sufficient to support findings that W. W. Chambers, from whom plaintiffs derive their title, acquired the property now owned by plaintiffs subsequent and subject to the easement which the Duncans had previously conveyed to the Buckners, as appurtenant to the property conveyed by the Duncans to the Buckners, that is, \u201ca right-of-way to a road across said Duncan\u2019s lot along said Lank-ford\u2019s line.\u201d\nA deed which conveys a portion of the grantor\u2019s property and in addition grants the right of ingress and egress over other lands of the grantor to a highway creates an easement in. favor of and appurtenant to the land conveyed and subjects the remaining land of the grantor to the burden of such easement. Andrews v. Lovejoy, 247 N.C. 554, 101 S.E. 2d 395 (1958). \u201cAn appurtenant easement is one which is attached to and passes with the dominant tenement as an appurtenance thereof. . . .\u201d Shingleton v. State, 260 N.C. 451, 454, 133 S.E. 2d 183, 185 (1963).\nEvidence offered by defendant was sufficient to support findings that plaintiffs\u2019 ownership of the 1.88 acres was based on a connected chain of title to the Duncans. In connection therewith, we note that, upon the death of W. W. Chambers, a presumption arose that he died intestate. Collins v. Coleman & Co., 262 N.C. 478, 480, 137 S.E. 2d 803, 805 (1964), and cases cited; Stansbury, North Carolina Evidence \u00a7 250 (2d Ed. 1963).\nEvidence offered by defendant was sufficient to support findings that defendant\u2019s ownership of the easement over the strip in controversy is based on a connected chain of title to the Duncans and that defendant, in respect of the easement, has a better title from the common source. Mobley v. Griffin, 104 N.C. 112, 10 S.E. 142 (1889).\nDefendant relies solely upon an easement created by express grant. \u201cNo particular words are necessary to constitute a grant, and any words which clearly show the intention to give an easement, which is by law grantable, are sufficient to effect that purpose, provided the language is certain and definite in its terms. . . . The instrument should describe with reasonable certainty the easement created and the dominant and servient tenements.\u201d 28 C.J.S., Easements \u00a7 24; Borders v. Yarbrough, 237 N.C. 540, 542, 75 S.E. 2d 541, 543 (1953); Oliver v. Ernul, 277 N.C. 591, 597, 178 S.E. 2d 393, 396 (1971).\nWe hold the easement granted by the Duncans to the Buck-ners sufficient in these respects. The easement granted is a right-of-way across the Duncan lot. The Flat Creek-Georgetown Road was the only public road accessible to the Buckners by crossing the Duncan lot. The location of the right-of-way is fixed as along the Langford (Lankford) line. Hensley testified that defendant \u201cwas claiming 10 foot.\u201d\n\u201cGrantees take title to lands subject to duly recorded easements which have been granted by their predecessors in title.\u201d Waldrop v. Brevard, 233 N.C. 26, 30, 62 S.E. 2d 512, 514 (1950); Borders v. Yarbrough, supra, at 542, 75 S.E. 2d at 543; Reed v. Elmore, 246 N.C. 221, 230, 98 S.E. 2d 360, 366 (1957).\n\u201cThe law contemplates that a purchaser of land will examine each recorded deed or other instrument in his chain of title, and charges him with notice of every fact affecting his title which such an examination would disclose.\u201d Higdon v. Jaffa, 231 N.C. 242, 248, 56 S.E. 2d 661, 665 (1949); Hege v. Sellers, 241 N.C. 240, 248, 84 S.E. 2d 892, 898 (1954). Consequently, when plaintiffs purchased the property described in the complaint they were charged with notice of the easement to which their property was subjected by the terms of the deed (D-5) from the Duncans to the Buckners.\nDefendant excepted to the submission of each of the three issues and to instructions of the court with reference thereto.\nThe first issue, \u201cWas the easement held by the defendant, terminated by adverse possession by the plaintiffs?\u201d, was answered \u201cNo.\u201d The wording of the issue implies that plaintiffs conceded that defendant had an easement but contended it had been terminated by plaintiffs\u2019 adverse possession.\nAn easement by grant as set forth in his chain of title is the only easement claimed by defendant. This involves only a strip of land of undefined width within the boundaries of the 1.88 acres described in P-1 and shown on P-2 extending from the northern boundary of the Flat Creek-Georgetown Road along and immediately west of the Wheeler (formerly Garrison) line 308 feet, more or less, to the adjoining parcel of land owned by defendant.\nSince the plaintiffs did not concede defendant owned the easement claimed by defendant, the only explanation of the wording of the first issue is that indicated by the following excerpt from the charge: \u201c[T]here\u2019s been some evidence which tends to show . . . that a road was built to the property owned by Clyde Ramsey . . . before Duncan ever deeded it out and before the easement was granted. Now, if you should find that to be the fact, members of the jury, then I instruct you that the easement that was granted to Buckner and later on down the line got into the defendant Ramsey, was to that road that existed at that time and that road only.\u201d Defendant\u2019s exception to this instruction was well taken. To what extent the route used by the Duncans prior to their deed to the Buckners crossed the remaining Duncan lands or the land of George Langford, Mrs. Duncan\u2019s uncle, is immaterial. The Duncans could not grant an easement over any land except that which they then owned.\nIn connection with the first issue, the court also stated: \u201c[T]he court instructs you . . . that the defendant did come into some easement by these deeds.\u201d The impression prevails that the thrust of the court\u2019s instructions with reference to ad-' verse possession was directed solely to such portion of the plaintiffs\u2019 land as was included within the route used by the Duncans prior to their deed to the Buckners. [Note: The injunction portion of the judgment is in accord with that view.]\nThe second issue, \u201cDid the defendant trespass upon the property of the plaintiffs?\u201d, was answered \u201cYes.\u201d In connection' therewith the court instructed the jury: \u201c[I]f you should find that the road was there before the easement was granted by the Duncans and ... that -this easement referred specifically to that road, that the holder of the easement has no right to move that road to some place else on the property without the permission of the person owning the property.\u201d This instruction involves the same error, namely, that the easement granted by the Duncans to the Buckners related to an undefined course partly through Duncan lands and partly through Langford lands to the Flat Creek-Georgetown Road rather than to the strip of land described in the Duncan-Buckner deed over which the Dun-cans had authority to grant an easement.\nNothing in the evidence suggests that the use of any route or wagon road in whole or in part on the Langford (now Wheeler) land was other than permissive.\nThe court instructed the jury it would be their duty to answer the first issue, \u201cYes,\u201d if satisfied from the evidence and by its greater weight \u201cthat the plaintiff possessed his land under known boundaries and with color of title, in actual, open, hostile, exclusive and continuous possession/that such possession was hostile to the use by the defendant of his easement for a continuous period of at least seven years. . . .\u201d (Our italics;) Thus, the court treated plaintiffs\u2019 recorded deed dated 17 March 1960 from Frank Chambers (unmarried) solely as color of title.\nAssuming, but not conceding, that plaintiffs had adverse possession of the controverted strip for seven years, such possession would be insufficient to \u201cterminate\u201d defendant\u2019s easement. There was evidence to support findings that plaintiffs owned the 1.88 acres by a connected chain of title to the Dun-cans. If this evidence was accepted, their deed from Frank Chambers constituted a link in a valid chain of title to the 1.88 acres.\n\u201cColor of title is generally defined as a written instrument which purports to convey the land described therein but fails to do so because of a want of title in the grantor or some defect in the mode of conveyance.\u201d Price v. Tomrich Cory., 275 N.C. 385, 391, 167 S.E. 2d 766, 770 (1969). \u201cColor of title is that which gives the semblance or appearance of title, but is not title in fact \u2014 that which, on its face, professes to pass title, but fails to do so because of a want of title in the person from whom it comes or the employment of an ineffective means of conveyance. It is a title in appearance only. If an instrument actually passes the title, it is clear that it is not \u2018color of title.\u2019 The term implies that a valid title has not passed.\u201d 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Adverse Possession \u00a7 105, p. 188. Accord, Justice v. Mitchell, 238 N.C. 364, 366, 78 S.E. 2d 122, 124-125 (1953), and cases cited.\nA valid deed, nothing else appearing, may serve as color of title. Price v. Tomrich, supra, at 392, 167 S.E. 2d at 770. However, when it is shown that the landowner has a good title based on a connected chain of title to a common source, such landowner will not be permitted to ignore a duly recorded easement granted by his predecessors in title by the fiction of treating his valid deed merely as color of title and thereby defeat an outstanding valid easement by adverse possession for a period of seven years.\nThe last quoted portion of the charge is erroneous and defendant\u2019s exceptive assignment of error thereto is well taken.\nOn cross-examination of defendant, plaintiffs\u2019 counsel was permitted over defendant\u2019s objection to elicit testimony from defendant tending to show that defendant had acquired land contiguous to the parcel conveyed by the Duncans to the Buckners and from this after-acquired land had access to the Flat Creek-Georgetown Road. The admission of this testimony was erroneous. When an easement is created by a deed, the existence or nonexistence of other access to the highway does not affect the easement. Andrews v. Lovejoy, supra, at 557, 101 S.E. 2d at 398.\nIt is unnecessary to discuss any of defendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error. For the errors indicated, the defendant is awarded a new trial.\nNew trial.", "type": "majority", "author": "BOBBITT, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lamar Gudger for defendant appellant.", "Roberts & Cogburn by Max 0. Cogburn for plaintiff ap-pellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BILLIE J. HENSLEY and wife, JOYCE HENSLEY v. CLYDE RAMSEY\nNo. 77\n(Filed 31 August 1973)\n1. Rules of Civil Procedure \u00a7 50 \u2014 motion for directed verdict \u2014 requirement of setting forth specific grounds\nRule 50(a) requires that \u201c[a] motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor,\u201d and the better practice is to set forth the specific grounds in a written motion; however, if a movant relies upon an oral statement for such specific grounds, a transcript thereof must be incorporated in the case on appeal.\n2. Rules of Civil Procedure \u00a7 50 \u2014 motion for directed verdict \u2014 failure to move for judgment n.o.v. \u2014 directed verdict barred in Supreme Court\nSince defendant made no post-verdict motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and since the trial judge after verdict did not of his own motion consider whether a directed verdict should have been entered, the Supreme Court could not direct entry of judgment in accordance with defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict by reason of the express terms of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(b)(2).\n3. Easements \u00a7 9\u2014 title from common source \u2014 conveyance of easement \u2014 better title in defendant\nIn an action to determine whether defendant trespassed upon plaintiffs\u2019 property in bulldozing a road thereon or whether he was within his rights in improving th\u00e9 road by virtue of an easement described in the deeds of conveyance comprising his chain of title to his property which adjoined that of plaintiffs, evidence offered by defendant was sufficient to support findings that plaintiffs and defendant obtained their lands from a common source, the source conveyed defendant\u2019s property with the easement prior to conveying plaintiffs\u2019 property, and therefore defendant, in respect of the easement,, had a better title from the common source.\n4. Easements \u00a7 2 \u2014 creation by deed \u2014 sufficiency of description of roadway\nNo particular words are necessary to grant an easement, but the granting instrument should describe with reasonable certainty the easement created and the dominant and servient tenements; hence, the language \u201cincluding a right-of-way to a road across said Duncan\u2019s lot along said Lankford\u2019s Line,\u201d in a deed from the parties\u2019 common source to a grantee in defendant\u2019s chain of title was sufficient to constitute an easement by express grant.\n5. Easements \u00a7 9\u2014 easement given by predecessor in title \u2014 land subsequently taken subject to easement\nThe law contemplates that a purchaser of land will examine each recorded deed or other instrument in his chain of title, and charges him with notice of every fact affecting his title which such an examination would disclose; consequently, when plaintiffs purchased the property described in the complaint they were charged with notice of the easement to which their property was subjected by the terms of the prior deed from the parties\u2019 common source to a grantee in defendant\u2019s chain of title.\n6. Adverse Possession \u00a7 25.1; Easements \u00a7 6 \u2014 easement for roadway \u2014 termination by adverse possession \u2014 trespass \u2014 erroneous instructions\nIn giving instructions on the issue of whether an easement for a roadway held by defendant was terminated by adverse possession by plaintiffs and on the issue of defendant\u2019s trespass on plaintiffs\u2019 land, the trial court erred in referring to the route of an undefined course used by the parties\u2019 common source of their respective properties prior to a conveyance of land and the easement in question to a grantee in defendant\u2019s chain of title; rather, the court should have instructed that the easement related to a strip of land described in the deed from the common source to the grantee in defendant\u2019s chain of title over which the common source had authority to grant an easement.\n7. Adverse Possession \u00a7\u00a7 17, 25.1 \u2014 valid deed \u2014 no color of title \u2014 no termination of easement by adverse possession\nA valid deed, nothing else appearing, may serve as color of title, but when it is shown that the landowner has a good title based on a connected chain of title to a common source, such landowner will not be permitted to ignore a duly recorded easement granted by his predecessors in title by the fiction of treating his valid deed merely as color of title and thereby defeat an outstanding valid easement by adverse possession for a period of seven years; therefore, the trial court erred in giving an instruction which treated plaintiffs\u2019 deed to the land in question solely as color of title where the deed did in fact pass title to plaintiffs.\n8. Easements \u00a7 6\u2014 easement for roadway \u2014 immaterial evidence improperly admitted\nWhen an easement is created by deed, the existence or nonexistence of other access to the highway does not affect the easement; therefore, in an action to determine the parties\u2019 rights with respect to a strip of land over which defendant claimed an easement had been expressly granted his predecessors in title, the trial court erred in allowing evidence of defendant\u2019s access to the highway through contiguous land owned by him.\nAppeal by defendant from Winner, J., 14 August 1972 Session of Buncombe County District Court, transferred for initial appellate review by the Supreme Court by order dated 26 March 1973 entered pursuant to G.S. 7A-31(b) (4).\nThis action was commenced on 21 June 1971.\nPlaintiffs alleged they were owners and in possession of a certain parcel of land in Flat Creek Township, Buncombe County, North Carolina, which had been conveyed to them by Frank Chambers (unmarried) by deed dated 17 March 1960, recorded in Book 827, Page 277, in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Buncombe County, North Carolina; and that on 8 May 1971 defendant removed plaintiffs\u2019 fence, entered upon plaintiffs\u2019 property with a bulldozer and excavated a portion of plaintiffs\u2019 yard for use as a road or driveway, thereby trespassing upon and materially impairing the value of plaintiffs\u2019 property. Plaintiffs prayed that defendant be enjoined from further trespass upon their property and that plaintiffs recover actual and punitive damages and costs.\nAnswering, defendant admitted that on 8 May 1971, plaintiffs occupied a residence on the property described in the complaint; otherwise, defendant denied plaintiffs\u2019 allegations.\nAs a further defense, defendant asserted that what he had done was \u201cby authority of and in the exercise of defendant\u2019s rights in the easement and right-of-way described in the deeds, of conveyance comprising defendant\u2019s chain of title in his property, which adjoins plaintiffs\u2019 property and derives from common source and by prior right. . . Defendant\u2019s allegations contain references to the recorded deeds constituting his chain of title.\nIn accordance with the requests of plaintiffs and of defendant, there was a jury trial, at which both plaintiffs and defendant offered evidence.\nAs evidence of ownership, plaintiffs offered as Exhibit P-1 the recorded deed dated 17 March 1960 from Frank Chambers (unmarried) to plaintiffs, which purports to convey in fee simple, free and clear of encumbrances, the parcel of land in Flat Creek Township described therein and in the complaint as follows:\n\u201cBeginning on a stake made from an old automobile axle, said stake being in Pierce Hensley\u2019s southeast corner, and being also in the north margin of the Flat Creek-Georgetown Road, and runs thence with said Hensley\u2019s line, North Io West 25(8 feet to a stake in southeasterly margin of the old Burnsville Road; thence with said margin of said road, North 38\u00b0 East 132 feet to a stake in Ramsey\u2019s line; thence leaving said \u00a1Road