{ "id": 8562175, "name": "THOMAS G. LANE, JR., Administrator d.b.n. of the Estate of Tommy Curtis Colee, Deceased v. BETTY COLEE SCARBOROUGH, THOMAS W. COLEE and LYNN WOOD COLEE", "name_abbreviation": "Lane v. Scarborough", "decision_date": "1973-12-12", "docket_number": "No. 64", "first_page": "407", "last_page": "412", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "284 N.C. 407" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "198 S.E. 2d 45", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "19 N.C. App. 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549758 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/19/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 S.E. 2d 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "747" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 N.C. 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624567 ], "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/234/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 S.E. 2d 826", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "836" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "253 N.C. 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626659 ], "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "635" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/253/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 S.E. 2d 666", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1945, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 N.C. 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8601436 ], "year": 1945, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/225/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 S.E. 2d 788", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "236 N.C. 734", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627662 ], "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/236/0734-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 S.E. 2d 167", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8609502 ], "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 S.E. 2d 841", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 N.C. 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626814 ], "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/251/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 S.E. 2d 295", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 N.C. 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12166702 ], "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/229/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 S.E. 2d 413", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "237 N.C. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8614010 ], "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/237/0462-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 561, "char_count": 11504, "ocr_confidence": 0.577, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8247746016510807e-06, "percentile": 0.9941463768737097 }, "sha256": "3dbbef3cbe5b179f9779a2b7e1e2d33ad568235a819827cf821bd59517f40253", "simhash": "1:330fcdd305b9b942", "word_count": 1931 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:23:00.028129+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THOMAS G. LANE, JR., Administrator d.b.n. of the Estate of Tommy Curtis Colee, Deceased v. BETTY COLEE SCARBOROUGH, THOMAS W. COLEE and LYNN WOOD COLEE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": ". SHARP, Justice.\nAs the parties have stipulated, the sole question presented by this appeal is whether Lynn, by executing the separation agreement, releasesd her distributive share as surviving spouse in the estate of Colee. G.S. 29-13 and G.S. 29-14.\nQuestions relating to the construction and effect of separation agreements between a husband and wife are ordinarily determined by the same rules which govern the interpretation of contracts generally. Whenever a court is called upon to interpret a contract its primary purpose is to ascertain the intention of the parties at the moment of its execution. Bowles v. Bowles, 237 N.C. 462, 75 S.E. 2d 413 (1953); 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation \u00a7 904 (1966); 27B C.J.S. Divorce- \u00a7 301(3) (1959).\n\u201cThe heart of a contract is the intention of the parties, which is to be ascertained from the expressions used, the subject matter, the end in view, the purpose sought, and the situation of the parties at the time.\u201d Electric Co. v. Insurance Co., 229 N.C. 518, 520, 50 S.E. 2d 295, 297 (1948). When a contract is in writing and free from any ambiguity which would require resort to extrinsic evidence, or the consideration of disputed fact, the intention of the parties is a question of law. The court determines the effect of their agreement by declaring its legal meaning. Briggs v. Mills, Inc., 251 N.C. 642, 111 S.E. 2d 841 (1960); Howland v. Stitzer, 240 N.C. 689, 84 S.E. 2d 167 (1954); Strigas v. Insurance Co., 236 N.C. 734, 73 S.E. 2d 788 (1953); Atkinson v. Atkinson, 225 N.C. 120, 33 S.E. 2d 666 (1945); 4 Williston, Contracts \u00a7 616 (3d ed. 1961) ; Calamari & Perillo Contracts \u00a7 49 (1970).\nA contract, however, encompasses not only its express provisions but also all such implied provisions as are. necessary to effect the intention of the parties unless express terms prevent such inclusion. 4 Williston, Contracts \u00a7 601B (3d ed. 1961). \u201cThe court will be prepared to imply a term if . there -arises from the language of the contract itself, and the circumstances under which it is entered into, an inference that the parties must have intended the stipulation in question.\u201d 1 Chitty, Contracts \u00a7 693 (23d ed. A. G. Guest 1968). The doctrine of implication of unexpressed terms has been succinctly stated as follows :\n\u201cIntention or meaning in a contract may be manifested or conveyed either expressly or impliedly, and it is fundamental that that which is plainly or necessarily implied in the language of a contract is as much a part of it as that which is expressed. If it can be plainly seen from all the provisions of the instrument taken together that the obligation in question was within the contemplation of the parties when making their contract or is necessary to carry their intention into effect, the law will imply the obligation and enforce it. The policy of the law is to supply in contracts what is presumed to have been in\u00e1dvertently omitted or to have been deemed perfectly obvious by the parties, the parties being supposed to have made those stipulations which as honest, fair, and just men they ought to have made.\u201d 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts \u00a7 255 at 649 (1964). However, \u201c[n]o meaning, terms, or conditions can be implied which are inconsistent with the expressed provisions.\u201d 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts, supra at 652.\nWe come now to apply the foregoing principles to the construction of the separation agreement which Colee and Lynn executed in June 1970. In express terms they declared that they could no longer live together without endangering their health and well-being. They agreed that henceforth they would live wholly separate and apart from each other as though they had never been married and that neither would molest the other or interfere in his affairs. She agreed to make no demands upon him. for support and to impose no obligation or responsibility upon him. Each agreed that the other would thereafter hold, acquire, and dispose of \u201call classes and kinds of property, both real and personal as though free and unmarried, without the consent or joinder of the other party\u201d and each released \u201cthe right to administer upon the estate of the other.\u201d (Emphasis added;) Further, they agreed to divide their household furnishings between them. (Apparently, they owned no real estate jointly.)\nIn our view, the specific terms of the contract are totally inconsistent with an intention that the parties would each retain the right to share in the estate of the other under G.S. 29-13 and G.S. 29-14, if he or she were to become the surviving spouse. The provisions that each would thereafter acquire, hold, and dispose of property as though unmarried and that each renounced the right to administer upon the estate of the other refute the contention that Lynn intended to retain any rights in her husband\u2019s estate.\n\u201cAgreements must receive a reasonable interpretation, according to the intention of the parties at the time of executing them, gathered from the language employed by them. . . . \u201d Stanley v. Cox 253 N.C. 620, 635, 117 S.E. 2d 826, 836 (1960). We also point out that the \u201cterm \u2018separation and property settlement agreement\u2019 in the absence of clear language or impelling implications connotes not only complete and permanent cessation of marital relations, but a full and final settlement of all' property rights of every kind and character.\u201d Bost v. Bost, 234 N.C. 554, 557, 67 S.E. 2d 745, 747 (1951).\n. In this case the intention of each party to release his or her share in the estate of the other is implicit in the express provisions of their separation agreement, their situation and purpose at the time the instrument was executed. The law will, therefore, imply the release and specifically enforce it. We hold that Lynn Wood Colee, the surviving spouse of Tommy Curtis Colee, deceased, released her right to share in his estate by the execution of the separation agreement of 19 June 1970.\nThe decision of the Court of Appeals is\nReversed.", "type": "majority", "author": ". SHARP, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Allen A. Bailey by Douglas A. Brackett for defendant ap-pellee.", "' Sanders, Walker & London by Robert G. Sanders and Robert C. Stephens for Betty Colee Scarborough and Thomas W. Cole\u00e9." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THOMAS G. LANE, JR., Administrator d.b.n. of the Estate of Tommy Curtis Colee, Deceased v. BETTY COLEE SCARBOROUGH, THOMAS W. COLEE and LYNN WOOD COLEE\nNo. 64\n(Filed 12 December 1973)\n1. Husband and Wife \u00a7 11\u2014 separation agreement \u2014 construction\nQuestions relating to the construction and effect of. separation agreements between a husband and wife are ordinarily determined by the same rules which govern the interpretation of contracts generally.\n2. Contracts \u00a7 12\u2014 construction \u2014 intent of parties\nThe heart of a contract is the intention of the parties which is to' be ascertained from, the expressions used, the subject matter, the end in view, the purpose sought, and the situation of the parties at the time.\n3. Contracts \u00a7 12\u2014 construction \u2014 implied provisions given effect\nA contract encompasses not only its express provisions but also all such implied provisions as are necessary to effect the intention of the parties unless express terms prevent such inclusion.\n4. Husband and Wife \u00a7 11; Descent and Distribution \u00a7 13\u2014 separation agreement \u2014 release of - right to share in spouse\u2019s estate\nWhere plaintiff and her deceased spouse entered into a separation agreement in which they declared that they could no longer live together without endangering their health and well-being, they agreed to live wholly separate and apart from each other as though they had never been married, plaintiff agreed to make no demands upon deceased for support, each agreed that the other would thereafter hold, acquir\u00e9 and dispose of all kinds of property as though free and unmarried, without the consent or joinder of the other party, and each released the right to administer upon the estate of the other, the specific terms of the contract were totally inconsistent with an intention that the parties would each retain the right to share in the estate of the other under G.S. '29-13 . and G.S. 29-14, if he or 'she were to become the surviving spouse. '\nAppeal by defendants Betty Colee Scarborough and Thomas W. Colee under G.S. 7A-30(2) from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of Snepp, J., 1- January 1973 Schedule \u201cC\u201d Session of Mecklenburg.\nThis action for a declaratory judgment was instituted by the administrator d.b.n. of Tommy Curtis Colee (Colee)-, who died intestate on 15 July 1971, to determine whether defendant Lynn Wood Colee (Lynn), Colee\u2019s surviving spouse, is entitled to. share in his estate. Judge Snepp heard the controversy upon a waiver of-, jury trial and stipulated facts, which ar\u00e9 summarized below.\nColee and Lynn were married on 12 October 1968. No children were born of their marriage. In June 1970 they executed the separation agreement, a copy of which is attached to the complaint as Exhibit A. At the time of Colee\u2019s death they were living separate and apart but were not divorced. Defendants Betty Colee Scarborough and Thomas W. Colee are the parents of Colee, and they claim his entire estate. Lynn also claims the estate, which is less than $10,000.00.\nIn the preamble to the separation agreement the parties recited their marriage, their separation on 14 June 1970, and their conviction that they could no longer live togeth\u00e9r as husband and wife. In the first three numbered paragraphs thereafter they agreed (1) that henceforth they would \u201clive wholly separate and apart from each other in the same manner and to the same extent as though they had never been married\u201d; (2) that no children were born of their marriage; and (3) that they would divide their household furnishings. The remaining paragraphs of the agreement are quoted verbatim:\n\u201c4. That from -and after the date of this Agreement the said party of the second part [Lynn] does hereby agree that she will make no demands upon the said party of the first part [Colee] for support and further will incur no obligations, debts or otherwise which will be or become the responsibility of the said party of-the first part.\n\u201c5. It is agreed that each of the parties may from this date, and at all times hereafter purchase, acquire, own, hold, possess, dispose of, and convey any and all classes and kinds of property, both real and personal, as though free and unmarried, without the consent or joinder of the other party, and each party does hereby release the right to administer upon the estate of the other.\n\u201c6. Both parties hereunto agree that henceforth neither of them, in any manner will molest or interfere with the personal rights, liberties, privileges or affairs of the other, and each shall henceforth live his and her own personal life as though unmarried, and unrestricted in any manner by the marriage that has heretofore existed.\u201d\nJudge Snepp ruled that by their separation agreement Colee and Lynn did not \u201cmutually release their right, of intestate\u2019s succession\u201d as provided by G.S. 29-13 and G.S. 29-14; that Lynn is an heir of Colee and \u201chas the right to inherit from his estate as a surviving spouse.\u201d He ordered plaintiff administrator to distribute to Lynn the assets of Colee\u2019s estate to which she, as surviving spouse, would be entitled under G.S. 29-13 and G.S. 29-14. From this judgment defendant-parents appealed. In a 2-to-l decision the Court of Appeals affirmed. Lane v. Scarborough, 19 N.C. App. 32, 198 S.E. 2d 45 (1973). By reason of the dissent defendant-parents appeal to this Court as a matter of right.\nAllen A. Bailey by Douglas A. Brackett for defendant ap-pellee.\n' Sanders, Walker & London by Robert G. Sanders and Robert C. Stephens for Betty Colee Scarborough and Thomas W. Cole\u00e9." }, "file_name": "0407-01", "first_page_order": 427, "last_page_order": 432 }